6476279 multiple vulnerabilities in OpenSSL (CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-2940)

6476772 update OpenSSL version string with information about security patches included

14 files changed, 148 insertions, 12 deletions

diff --git a/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c b/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
index 2b9c25611e..75399edfa8 100644
--- a/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
+++ b/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
@@ -826,6 +826,7 @@ static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
 		}
 	else if (ret == -1)
 		return -1;
+	ret = 0;
 	/* SEQUENCE, SET and "OTHER" are left in encoded form */
 	if ((utype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
 		|| (utype == V_ASN1_SET) || (utype == V_ASN1_OTHER))
diff --git a/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/dh/dh.h b/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/dh/dh.h
index 7871882e35..43afc2b854 100644
--- a/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/dh/dh.h
+++ b/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/dh/dh.h
@@ -72,6 +72,10 @@
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
+# define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS   10000
+#endif
 	
 #define DH_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P     0x01
 #define DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME 0x02 /* new with 0.9.7h; the built-in DH
@@ -222,6 +226,7 @@ void ERR_load_DH_strings(void);
 #define DH_R_BAD_GENERATOR				 101
 #define DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE				 100
 #define DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY				 102
+#define DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE				 103
 
 #ifdef  __cplusplus
 }
diff --git a/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_err.c b/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
index ea67fb71a0..502e9d1c27 100644
--- a/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
+++ b/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA DH_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(DH_R_BAD_GENERATOR)          ,"bad generator"},
 {ERR_REASON(DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE)       ,"no private value"},
 {ERR_REASON(DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY)         ,"invalid public key"},
+{ERR_REASON(DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE)      ,"modulus too large"},
 {0,NULL}
 	};
 
diff --git a/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
index cc17c8851b..994546e044 100644
--- a/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+++ b/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
@@ -179,6 +179,12 @@ static int compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
 	int ret= -1;
         int check_result;
 
+	if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
+		{
+		DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY,DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
 	ctx = BN_CTX_new();
 	if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
 	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
diff --git a/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa.h b/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa.h
index b12db98b13..ab72922c2f 100644
--- a/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa.h
+++ b/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa.h
@@ -84,6 +84,10 @@
 #endif
 #endif
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
+# define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS  10000
+#endif
+
 #define DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P	0x01
 #define DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME       0x02 /* new with 0.9.7h; the built-in DSA
                                               * implementation now uses constant time
@@ -272,6 +276,8 @@ void ERR_load_DSA_strings(void);
 /* Reason codes. */
 #define DSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE		 100
 #define DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS			 101
+#define DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE				 102
+#define DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE				 103
 
 #ifdef  __cplusplus
 }
diff --git a/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c b/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c
index fd42053572..44d75d65f0 100644
--- a/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c
+++ b/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c
@@ -89,8 +89,10 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA DSA_str_functs[]=
 
 static ERR_STRING_DATA DSA_str_reasons[]=
 	{
+{ERR_REASON(DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE)		 ,"bad q value"},
 {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE),"data too large for key size"},
 {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS)    ,"missing parameters"},
+{ERR_REASON(DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE)	 ,"modulus too large"},
 {0,NULL}
 	};
 
diff --git a/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
index 3fd8a35613..d6addc2ac1 100644
--- a/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+++ b/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
@@ -304,6 +304,18 @@ static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig,
 		return -1;
 		}
 
+       if (BN_num_bits(dsa->q) != 160)
+		{
+		DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY,DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
+	if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
+		{
+		DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY,DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
 	BN_init(&u1);
 	BN_init(&u2);
 	BN_init(&t1);
diff --git a/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/ec/ec.h b/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/ec/ec.h
index a19a075b0d..db62abc917 100644
--- a/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/ec/ec.h
+++ b/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/ec/ec.h
@@ -92,6 +92,10 @@ extern "C" {
 # endif
 #endif
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS
+# define OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS 661
+#endif
+
 
 typedef enum {
 	/* values as defined in X9.62 (ECDSA) and elsewhere */
@@ -482,6 +486,7 @@ void ERR_load_EC_strings(void);
 #define EC_R_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE			 117
 #define EC_R_DISCRIMINANT_IS_ZERO			 118
 #define EC_R_EC_GROUP_NEW_BY_NAME_FAILURE		 119
+#define EC_R_FIELD_TOO_LARGE				 138
 #define EC_R_GROUP2PKPARAMETERS_FAILURE			 120
 #define EC_R_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE			 121
 #define EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS			 101
@@ -492,7 +497,9 @@ void ERR_load_EC_strings(void);
 #define EC_R_INVALID_FIELD				 103
 #define EC_R_INVALID_FORM				 104
 #define EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER			 122
+#define EC_R_INVALID_PENTANOMIAL_BASIS			 132
 #define EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY			 123
+#define EC_R_INVALID_TRINOMIAL_BASIS			 137
 #define EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS				 124
 #define EC_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY			 125
 #define EC_R_NOT_A_NIST_PRIME				 135
diff --git a/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c b/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
index 5693201a26..3b0392a7a2 100644
--- a/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
+++ b/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
@@ -741,6 +741,7 @@ static EC_GROUP *ec_asn1_parameters2group(const ECPARAMETERS *params)
 	EC_GROUP		*ret = NULL;
 	BIGNUM			*p = NULL, *a = NULL, *b = NULL;
 	EC_POINT		*point=NULL;
+	long			field_bits;
 
 	if (!params->fieldID || !params->fieldID->fieldType || 
 	    !params->fieldID->p.ptr)
@@ -779,6 +780,13 @@ static EC_GROUP *ec_asn1_parameters2group(const ECPARAMETERS *params)
 
 		char_two = params->fieldID->p.char_two;
 
+		field_bits = char_two->m;
+		if (field_bits > OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS)
+			{
+			ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_FIELD_TOO_LARGE);
+			goto err;
+		}
+
 		if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
 			{
 			ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@@ -799,6 +807,13 @@ static EC_GROUP *ec_asn1_parameters2group(const ECPARAMETERS *params)
 				}
 
 			tmp_long = ASN1_INTEGER_get(char_two->p.tpBasis);
+
+			if (!(char_two->m > tmp_long && tmp_long > 0))
+				{
+				ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_INVALID_TRINOMIAL_BASIS);
+				goto err;
+			}
+
 			/* create the polynomial */
 			if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)char_two->m))
 				goto err;
@@ -817,6 +832,13 @@ static EC_GROUP *ec_asn1_parameters2group(const ECPARAMETERS *params)
 				ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR);
 				goto err;
 				}
+
+			if (!(char_two->m > penta->k3 && penta->k3 > penta->k2 && penta->k2 > penta->k1 && penta->k1 > 0))
+				{
+				ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_INVALID_PENTANOMIAL_BASIS);
+				goto err;
+			}
+
 			/* create the polynomial */
 			if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)char_two->m)) goto err;
 			if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)penta->k1)) goto err;
@@ -858,6 +880,20 @@ static EC_GROUP *ec_asn1_parameters2group(const ECPARAMETERS *params)
 			ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
 			goto err;
 			}
+
+		if (BN_is_negative(p) || BN_is_zero(p))
+			{
+			ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_INVALID_FIELD);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		field_bits = BN_num_bits(p);
+		if (field_bits > OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS)
+			{
+			ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_FIELD_TOO_LARGE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
 		/* create the EC_GROUP structure */
 		ret = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(p, a, b, NULL);
 		if (ret == NULL)
@@ -909,6 +945,17 @@ static EC_GROUP *ec_asn1_parameters2group(const ECPARAMETERS *params)
 		ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
 		goto err;
 		}
+
+	if (BN_is_negative(a) || BN_is_zero(a))
+		{
+		ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (BN_num_bits(a) > (int)field_bits + 1) /* Hasse bound */
+		{
+		ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_PARAMETERS2GROUP, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
+		goto err;
+	}
 	
 	/* extract the cofactor (optional) */
 	if (params->cofactor == NULL)
diff --git a/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_err.c b/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_err.c
index 73c0055f01..49e59d3841 100644
--- a/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_err.c
+++ b/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_err.c
@@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EC_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(EC_R_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE),"d2i ecpkparameters failure"},
 {ERR_REASON(EC_R_DISCRIMINANT_IS_ZERO)   ,"discriminant is zero"},
 {ERR_REASON(EC_R_EC_GROUP_NEW_BY_NAME_FAILURE),"ec group new by name failure"},
+{ERR_REASON(EC_R_FIELD_TOO_LARGE)	 ,"field too large"},
 {ERR_REASON(EC_R_GROUP2PKPARAMETERS_FAILURE),"group2pkparameters failure"},
 {ERR_REASON(EC_R_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE),"i2d ecpkparameters failure"},
 {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS)   ,"incompatible objects"},
@@ -198,7 +199,9 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EC_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_FIELD)          ,"invalid field"},
 {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_FORM)           ,"invalid form"},
 {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER)    ,"invalid group order"},
+{ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_PENTANOMIAL_BASIS),"invalid pentanomial basis"},
 {ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY)    ,"invalid private key"},
+{ERR_REASON(EC_R_INVALID_TRINOMIAL_BASIS),"invalid trinomial basis"},
 {ERR_REASON(EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS)     ,"missing parameters"},
 {ERR_REASON(EC_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY)    ,"missing private key"},
 {ERR_REASON(EC_R_NOT_A_NIST_PRIME)       ,"not a NIST prime"},
diff --git a/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h b/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
index e056bffc72..63b2ca8a97 100644
--- a/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
+++ b/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/opensslv.h
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
 #define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 0.9.8a-fips 11 Oct 2005"
 #else
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 0.9.8a 11 Oct 2005"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 0.9.8a 11 Oct 2005 (+ security patches to 2006-09-29)"
 #endif
 #define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT	" part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
 
diff --git a/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa.h b/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
index baf8bc51e3..b1c42d71ab 100644
--- a/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
+++ b/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
@@ -159,6 +159,17 @@ struct rsa_st
 	BN_BLINDING *mt_blinding;
 	};
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
+# define OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS  16384
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS
+# define OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS        3072
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS
+# define OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS   64 /* exponent limit enforced for "large" modulus only */
+#endif
+
 #define RSA_3	0x3L
 #define RSA_F4	0x10001L
 
@@ -407,13 +418,13 @@ void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void);
 #define RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q			 126
 #define RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL			 120
 #define RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID			 134
+#define RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE				 105
 #define RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT			 140
 #define RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING			 113
 #define RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q			 127
 #define RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR			 121
 #define RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED			 135
 #define RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED			 114
-#define RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT			 105
 #define RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME				 128
 #define RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME				 129
 #define RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED		 130
diff --git a/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
index 306a1fea21..6a95ec953f 100644
--- a/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
+++ b/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
@@ -168,6 +168,28 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
 
+	if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
+		{
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+		return -1;
+		}
+ 
+	if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
+		{
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+		return -1;
+		}
+ 
+	/* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
+	if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
+		{
+		if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
+			{
+			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+			return -1;
+			}
+		}
+	
 	if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
 	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
 	f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
@@ -574,6 +596,28 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
 
+	if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
+		{
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+		return -1;
+		}
+ 
+	if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
+		{
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+		return -1;
+		}
+ 
+	/* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
+	if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
+		{
+		if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
+			{
+			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+			return -1;
+			}
+		}
+	
 	if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
 	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
 	f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
@@ -617,15 +661,6 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 		{
 	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
 		r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
-		/* Generally signatures should be at least 2/3 padding, though
-		   this isn't possible for really short keys and some standard
-		   signature schemes, so don't check if the unpadded data is
-		   small. */
-		if(r > 42 && 3*8*r >= BN_num_bits(rsa->n))
-			{
-			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT);
-			goto err;
-			}
 		break;
 	case RSA_X931_PADDING:
 		r=RSA_padding_check_X931(to,num,buf,i,num);
diff --git a/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c b/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
index dfb0816c8a..2afc9cf73f 100644
--- a/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
+++ b/usr/src/common/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
@@ -137,13 +137,13 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q) ,"iqmp not inverse of q"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL)    ,"key size too small"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID)    ,"last octet invalid"},
+{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE)	 ,"modulus too large"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT)    ,"no public exponent"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING),"null before block missing"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q)  ,"n does not equal p q"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR)   ,"oaep decoding error"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED)  ,"salt length recovery failed"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED)  ,"padding check failed"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT),"pkcs1 padding too short"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME)           ,"p not prime"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME)           ,"q not prime"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED),"rsa operations not supported"},