Pull up security fix to the pkgsrc-2004Q1 branch.

Requested by taca in ticket pkgsrc-16 (and 12, I think).

"Add three patches to resolve security issue:
SECURITY [CAN-2003-0020]: escape arbitrary data before writing into the errorlog

The three patches are from Apache cvs.
http://cvs.apache.org/viewcvs.cgi/apache-1.3/src/

Also bump PKGREVISION too."

5 files changed, 125 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/www/apache/Makefile b/www/apache/Makefile
index 2166ae17f89..2c60134e384 100644
--- a/www/apache/Makefile
+++ b/www/apache/Makefile
@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
-# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.139 2004/02/28 22:18:35 snj Exp $
+# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.139.2.1 2004/04/27 08:14:40 agc Exp $
 #
 # This pkg does not compile in mod_ssl, only the `mod_ssl EAPI' (a set of
 # code hooks that allow mod_ssl to be compiled separately later, if desired).
 
 DISTNAME=		apache_${APACHE_VERSION}
 PKGNAME=		apache-${APACHE_VERSION}
+PKGREVISION=		1
 APACHE_VERSION=		1.3.29
 CATEGORIES=		www
 MASTER_SITES=		${MASTER_SITE_APACHE:=httpd/} \
diff --git a/www/apache/distinfo b/www/apache/distinfo
index 18c22e87a5f..f4035c80718 100644
--- a/www/apache/distinfo
+++ b/www/apache/distinfo
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.30 2004/02/28 22:15:30 snj Exp $
+$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.30.2.1 2004/04/27 08:14:40 agc Exp $
 
 SHA1 (apache_1.3.29.tar.gz) = 0fb055dfd8c86457996edb36f19fb66f09dccd6a
 Size (apache_1.3.29.tar.gz) = 2435809 bytes
@@ -20,3 +20,6 @@ SHA1 (patch-ak) = 8f790a692ed9b2dd6943be43fa1cf7629c673955
 SHA1 (patch-al) = a27b9676998621229dc3a1d920ea44b8e622feb2
 SHA1 (patch-am) = d05f7c30b73c0e90daf17d9d1c4838be7fd73b02
 SHA1 (patch-ao) = 5930f9ea0f5080b260a6e0c66a37c6d1ad0df4d4
+SHA1 (patch-ap) = 3dfa2396d481aca2b746d02cb2b161bd956825f8
+SHA1 (patch-aq) = 80032eadbbb546df8eac7fe08800a784c06a06f0
+SHA1 (patch-ar) = b422847735a9a4821cfa8ba8e2e7639ce1605b39
diff --git a/www/apache/patches/patch-ap b/www/apache/patches/patch-ap
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..7bfc0cc4616
--- /dev/null
+++ b/www/apache/patches/patch-ap
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-ap,v 1.2.4.1 2004/04/27 08:14:40 agc Exp $
+SECURITY [CAN-2003-0020]: escape arbitrary data before writing into the errorlog
+
+--- src/main/http_log.c.orig	2003-02-03 09:13:21.000000000 -0800
++++ src/main/http_log.c
+@@ -314,6 +314,9 @@ static void log_error_core(const char *f
+ 			   const char *fmt, va_list args)
+ {
+     char errstr[MAX_STRING_LEN];
++#ifndef AP_UNSAFE_ERROR_LOG_UNESCAPED
++    char scratch[MAX_STRING_LEN];
++#endif
+     size_t len;
+     int save_errno = errno;
+     FILE *logf;
+@@ -445,7 +448,14 @@ static void log_error_core(const char *f
+     }
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifndef AP_UNSAFE_ERROR_LOG_UNESCAPED
++   if (ap_vsnprintf(scratch, sizeof(scratch) - len, fmt, args)) {
++       len += ap_escape_errorlog_item(errstr + len, scratch,
++                                      sizeof(errstr) - len);
++   }
++#else
+     len += ap_vsnprintf(errstr + len, sizeof(errstr) - len, fmt, args);
++#endif
+ 
+     /* NULL if we are logging to syslog */
+     if (logf) {
diff --git a/www/apache/patches/patch-aq b/www/apache/patches/patch-aq
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..3c4c78d4221
--- /dev/null
+++ b/www/apache/patches/patch-aq
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-aq,v 1.2.4.1 2004/04/27 08:14:40 agc Exp $
+SECURITY [CAN-2003-0020]: escape arbitrary data before writing into the errorlog
+
+--- src/include/httpd.h.orig	2004-04-07 12:24:10.967724616 -0700
++++ src/include/httpd.h
+@@ -1072,6 +1072,8 @@ API_EXPORT(char *) ap_escape_html(pool *
+ API_EXPORT(char *) ap_construct_server(pool *p, const char *hostname,
+ 				    unsigned port, const request_rec *r);
+ API_EXPORT(char *) ap_escape_logitem(pool *p, const char *str);
++API_EXPORT(size_t) ap_escape_errorlog_item(char *dest, const char *source,
++                                           size_t buflen);
+ API_EXPORT(char *) ap_escape_shell_cmd(pool *p, const char *s);
+ 
+ API_EXPORT(int) ap_count_dirs(const char *path);
diff --git a/www/apache/patches/patch-ar b/www/apache/patches/patch-ar
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..ee788e50d44
--- /dev/null
+++ b/www/apache/patches/patch-ar
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-ar,v 1.2.4.1 2004/04/27 08:14:40 agc Exp $
+SECURITY [CAN-2003-0020]: escape arbitrary data before writing into the errorlog
+
+--- src/main/util.c.orig	2003-02-03 09:13:23.000000000 -0800
++++ src/main/util.c
+@@ -1520,6 +1520,69 @@ API_EXPORT(char *) ap_escape_logitem(poo
+     return ret;
+ }
+ 
++API_EXPORT(size_t) ap_escape_errorlog_item(char *dest, const char *source,
++                                           size_t buflen)
++{
++    unsigned char *d, *ep;
++    const unsigned char *s;
++
++    if (!source || !buflen) { /* be safe */
++        return 0;
++    }
++
++    d = (unsigned char *)dest;
++    s = (const unsigned char *)source;
++    ep = d + buflen - 1;
++
++    for (; d < ep && *s; ++s) {
++
++        if (TEST_CHAR(*s, T_ESCAPE_LOGITEM)) {
++            *d++ = '\\';
++            if (d >= ep) {
++                --d;
++                break;
++            }
++
++            switch(*s) {
++            case '\b':
++                *d++ = 'b';
++                break;
++            case '\n':
++                *d++ = 'n';
++                break;
++            case '\r':
++                *d++ = 'r';
++                break;
++            case '\t':
++                *d++ = 't';
++                break;
++            case '\v':
++                *d++ = 'v';
++                break;
++            case '\\':
++                *d++ = *s;
++                break;
++            case '"': /* no need for this in error log */
++                d[-1] = *s;
++                break;
++            default:
++                if (d >= ep - 2) {
++                    ep = --d; /* break the for loop as well */
++                    break;
++                }
++                c2x(*s, d);
++                *d = 'x';
++                d += 3;
++            }
++        }
++        else {
++            *d++ = *s;
++        }
++    }
++    *d = '\0';
++
++    return (d - (unsigned char *)dest);
++}
+ 
+ API_EXPORT(char *) ap_escape_shell_cmd(pool *p, const char *str)
+ {