Pullup ticket 2144 - requested by lkundrak

security fix for libarchive

- pkgsrc/archivers/libarchive/Makefile			1.17
- pkgsrc/archivers/libarchive/distinfo			1.14
- pkgsrc/archivers/libarchive/patches/patch-ad		1.1

   Module Name:	pkgsrc
   Committed By:	lkundrak
   Date:		Fri Jul 13 09:26:32 UTC 2007

   Modified Files:
	   pkgsrc/archivers/libarchive: Makefile distinfo
   Added Files:
	   pkgsrc/archivers/libarchive/patches: patch-ad

   Log Message:
   Fix for FreeBSD-SA-07:05.libarchive CVE-2007-3641, CVE-2007-3644 and
   CVE-2007-3645.  PKGREVISION bump.

3 files changed, 234 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/archivers/libarchive/Makefile b/archivers/libarchive/Makefile
index 3aaf343a49b..99a297a3169 100644
--- a/archivers/libarchive/Makefile
+++ b/archivers/libarchive/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
-# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.16 2006/11/14 13:50:13 joerg Exp $
+# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.16.6.1 2007/07/27 22:39:34 ghen Exp $
 #
 
 DISTNAME=	libarchive-1.3.1
+PKGREVISION=	1
 CATEGORIES=	archivers
 MASTER_SITES=	http://people.freebsd.org/~kientzle/libarchive/src/
 
diff --git a/archivers/libarchive/distinfo b/archivers/libarchive/distinfo
index d785aed7de3..edc0abac724 100644
--- a/archivers/libarchive/distinfo
+++ b/archivers/libarchive/distinfo
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
-$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.13 2006/11/10 00:29:44 adrianp Exp $
+$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.13.6.1 2007/07/27 22:39:34 ghen Exp $
 
 SHA1 (libarchive-1.3.1.tar.gz) = aed6eda15b012adbb88af0f0d76887920ffe7bbf
 RMD160 (libarchive-1.3.1.tar.gz) = e518f802d9a50afcfede6dd7cbb4f42b2cbe12a1
 Size (libarchive-1.3.1.tar.gz) = 901173 bytes
 SHA1 (patch-ab) = 5e92405b0898123d8240f332475d13abe85f8ad3
 SHA1 (patch-ac) = 5775e26d19ace2b94c870c0e8de8e6efbe4b5c63
+SHA1 (patch-ad) = ea7a7ae72ca85589830aefae6e6e4f9f4ba45c7a
diff --git a/archivers/libarchive/patches/patch-ad b/archivers/libarchive/patches/patch-ad
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..d9d010e928c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/archivers/libarchive/patches/patch-ad
@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-ad,v 1.1.2.2 2007/07/27 22:39:34 ghen Exp $
+
+Fix for CVE-2007-3641, CVE-2007-3644 and CVE-2007-3645 from FreeBSD-SA-07:05.libarchive
+
+--- libarchive/archive_read_support_format_tar.c.orig	2006-09-05 08:00:48.000000000 +0200
++++ libarchive/archive_read_support_format_tar.c	2007-07-13 11:35:48.000000000 +0200
+@@ -670,7 +670,13 @@ tar_read_header(struct archive *a, struc
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	--tar->header_recursion_depth;
+-	return (err);
++	/* We return warnings or success as-is.  Anything else is fatal. */
++	if (err == ARCHIVE_WARN || err == ARCHIVE_OK)
++		return (err);
++	if (err == ARCHIVE_EOF)
++		/* EOF when recursively reading a header is bad. */
++		archive_set_error(a, EINVAL, "Damaged tar archive");
++	return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -741,32 +747,55 @@ static int
+ header_Solaris_ACL(struct archive *a, struct tar *tar,
+     struct archive_entry *entry, struct stat *st, const void *h)
+ {
+-	int err, err2;
+-	char *p;
++	const struct archive_entry_header_ustar *header;
++	size_t size;
++	int err;
++	char *acl, *p;
+ 	wchar_t *wp;
+ 
++	/*
++	 * read_body_to_string adds a NUL terminator, but we need a little
++	 * more to make sure that we don't overrun acl_text later.
++	 */
++	header = (const struct archive_entry_header_ustar *)h;
++	size = tar_atol(header->size, sizeof(header->size));
+ 	err = read_body_to_string(a, tar, &(tar->acl_text), h);
+-	err2 = tar_read_header(a, tar, entry, st);
+-	err = err_combine(err, err2);
+-
+-	/* XXX Ensure p doesn't overrun acl_text */
++	if (err != ARCHIVE_OK)
++		return (err);
++	err = tar_read_header(a, tar, entry, st);
++	if ((err != ARCHIVE_OK) && (err != ARCHIVE_WARN))
++		return (err);
+ 
+ 	/* Skip leading octal number. */
+ 	/* XXX TODO: Parse the octal number and sanity-check it. */
+-	p = tar->acl_text.s;
+-	while (*p != '\0')
++	p = acl = tar->acl_text.s;
++	while (*p != '\0' && p < acl + size)
+ 		p++;
+ 	p++;
+ 
+-	wp = malloc((strlen(p) + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t));
+-	if (wp != NULL) {
+-		utf8_decode(wp, p, strlen(p));
+-		err2 = __archive_entry_acl_parse_w(entry, wp,
+-		    ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);
+-		err = err_combine(err, err2);
+-		free(wp);
++	if (p >= acl + size) {
++		archive_set_error(a, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
++		    "Malformed Solaris ACL attribute");
++		return(ARCHIVE_WARN);
+ 	}
+ 
++	/* Skip leading octal number. */
++	size -= (p - acl);
++	acl = p;
++
++	while (*p != '\0' && p < acl + size)
++		p++;
++
++	wp = malloc((p - acl + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t));
++	if (wp == NULL) {
++		archive_set_error(a, ENOMEM,
++		    "Can't allocate work buffer for ACL parsing");
++		return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
++	}
++	utf8_decode(wp, acl, p - acl);
++	err = __archive_entry_acl_parse_w(entry, wp,
++	    ARCHIVE_ENTRY_ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);
++	free(wp);
+ 	return (err);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -777,15 +806,17 @@ static int
+ header_longlink(struct archive *a, struct tar *tar,
+     struct archive_entry *entry, struct stat *st, const void *h)
+ {
+-	int err, err2;
++	int err;
+ 
+ 	err = read_body_to_string(a, tar, &(tar->longlink), h);
+-	err2 = tar_read_header(a, tar, entry, st);
+-	if (err == ARCHIVE_OK && err2 == ARCHIVE_OK) {
+-		/* Set symlink if symlink already set, else hardlink. */
+-		archive_entry_set_link(entry, tar->longlink.s);
+-	}
+-	return (err_combine(err, err2));
++	if (err != ARCHIVE_OK)
++		return (err);
++	err = tar_read_header(a, tar, entry, st);
++	if ((err != ARCHIVE_OK) && (err != ARCHIVE_WARN))
++		return (err);
++	/* Set symlink if symlink already set, else hardlink. */
++	archive_entry_set_link(entry, tar->longlink.s);
++	return (ARCHIVE_OK);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -795,14 +826,17 @@ static int
+ header_longname(struct archive *a, struct tar *tar,
+     struct archive_entry *entry, struct stat *st, const void *h)
+ {
+-	int err, err2;
++	int err;
+ 
+ 	err = read_body_to_string(a, tar, &(tar->longname), h);
++	if (err != ARCHIVE_OK)
++		return (err);
+ 	/* Read and parse "real" header, then override name. */
+-	err2 = tar_read_header(a, tar, entry, st);
+-	if (err == ARCHIVE_OK && err2 == ARCHIVE_OK)
+-		archive_entry_set_pathname(entry, tar->longname.s);
+-	return (err_combine(err, err2));
++	err = tar_read_header(a, tar, entry, st);
++	if ((err != ARCHIVE_OK) && (err != ARCHIVE_WARN))
++		return (err);
++	archive_entry_set_pathname(entry, tar->longname.s);
++	return (ARCHIVE_OK);
+ }
+ 
+ 
+@@ -836,12 +870,20 @@ read_body_to_string(struct archive *a, s
+ 	header = h;
+ 	size  = tar_atol(header->size, sizeof(header->size));
+ 
++	/* Sanity check. */
++	if ((size > 1048576) || (size < 0)) {
++		archive_set_error(a, EINVAL, "Special header too large");
++		return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
++	}
++
+ 	/* Read the body into the string. */
+ 	archive_string_ensure(as, size+1);
+ 	padded_size = (size + 511) & ~ 511;
+ 	dest = as->s;
+ 	while (padded_size > 0) {
+ 		bytes_read = (a->compression_read_ahead)(a, &src, padded_size);
++		if (bytes_read == 0)
++			return (ARCHIVE_EOF);
+ 		if (bytes_read < 0)
+ 			return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
+ 		if (bytes_read > padded_size)
+@@ -1027,11 +1069,13 @@ static int
+ header_pax_global(struct archive *a, struct tar *tar,
+     struct archive_entry *entry, struct stat *st, const void *h)
+ {
+-	int err, err2;
++	int err;
+ 
+ 	err = read_body_to_string(a, tar, &(tar->pax_global), h);
+-	err2 = tar_read_header(a, tar, entry, st);
+-	return (err_combine(err, err2));
++	if (err != ARCHIVE_OK)
++		return (err);
++	err = tar_read_header(a, tar, entry, st);
++	return (err);
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+@@ -1040,10 +1084,14 @@ header_pax_extensions(struct archive *a,
+ {
+ 	int err, err2;
+ 
+-	read_body_to_string(a, tar, &(tar->pax_header), h);
++	err = read_body_to_string(a, tar, &(tar->pax_header), h);
++	if (err != ARCHIVE_OK)
++		return (err);
+ 
+ 	/* Parse the next header. */
+ 	err = tar_read_header(a, tar, entry, st);
++	if ((err != ARCHIVE_OK) && (err != ARCHIVE_WARN))
++		return (err);
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * TODO: Parse global/default options into 'entry' struct here
+@@ -1141,8 +1189,11 @@ pax_header(struct archive *a, struct tar
+ 				l--;
+ 				break;
+ 			}
+-			if (*p < '0' || *p > '9')
+-				return (-1);
++			if (*p < '0' || *p > '9') {
++				archive_set_error(a, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
++				    "Ignoring malformed pax extended attributes");
++				return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
++			}
+ 			line_length *= 10;
+ 			line_length += *p - '0';
+ 			if (line_length > 999999) {
+@@ -1154,8 +1205,19 @@ pax_header(struct archive *a, struct tar
+ 			l--;
+ 		}
+ 
+-		if (line_length > attr_length)
+-			return (0);
++		/*
++		 * Parsed length must be no bigger than available data,
++		 * at least 1, and the last character of the line must
++		 * be '\n'.
++		 */
++		if (line_length > attr_length
++		    || line_length < 1
++		    || attr[line_length - 1] != '\n')
++		{
++			archive_set_error(a, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
++			    "Ignoring malformed pax extended attribute");
++			return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
++		}
+ 
+ 		/* Ensure pax_entry buffer is big enough. */
+ 		if (tar->pax_entry_length <= line_length) {