Pullup ticket #6422 - requested by bouyer

sysutils/xenkernel413: security fix

Revisions pulled up:
- sysutils/xenkernel413/Makefile                                1.12
- sysutils/xenkernel413/distinfo                                1.9
- sysutils/xenkernel413/patches/patch-XSA355                    1.1
- sysutils/xenkernel413/patches/patch-XSA360                    1.1

---
   Module Name:	pkgsrc
   Committed By:	bouyer
   Date:		Wed Feb  3 22:27:16 UTC 2021

   Modified Files:
   	pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel413: Makefile distinfo
   Added Files:
   	pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel413/patches: patch-XSA355 patch-XSA360

   Log Message:
   Add upstream patches for Xen security advisory 355 and 360.
   Bump PKGREVSION

4 files changed, 129 insertions, 3 deletions

diff --git a/sysutils/xenkernel413/Makefile b/sysutils/xenkernel413/Makefile
index cb1e3aa80a0..40355585048 100644
--- a/sysutils/xenkernel413/Makefile
+++ b/sysutils/xenkernel413/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.11 2020/12/16 17:15:22 bouyer Exp $
+# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.11.2.1 2021/02/16 07:57:46 bsiegert Exp $
 
 VERSION=	4.13.2
-PKGREVISION=	4
+PKGREVISION=	5
 DISTNAME=	xen-${VERSION}
 PKGNAME=	xenkernel413-${VERSION}
 CATEGORIES=	sysutils
diff --git a/sysutils/xenkernel413/distinfo b/sysutils/xenkernel413/distinfo
index a914c15978a..fbd90bcc9d8 100644
--- a/sysutils/xenkernel413/distinfo
+++ b/sysutils/xenkernel413/distinfo
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.8 2020/12/16 17:15:22 bouyer Exp $
+$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.8.2.1 2021/02/16 07:57:46 bsiegert Exp $
 
 SHA1 (xen413/xen-4.13.2.tar.gz) = d514f1de9582c58676420bb2c9fb1c765b44fbff
 RMD160 (xen413/xen-4.13.2.tar.gz) = 96727c20bd84338f8c67c7c584c01ef877bbcb18
@@ -7,8 +7,10 @@ Size (xen413/xen-4.13.2.tar.gz) = 39037826 bytes
 SHA1 (patch-Config.mk) = 9372a09efd05c9fbdbc06f8121e411fcb7c7ba65
 SHA1 (patch-XSA348) = 70de325f88e004228d2b69b7ae3b4106175be1e0
 SHA1 (patch-XSA351) = edb0975ab0aa53d7a0ae7816fe170a081eea695e
+SHA1 (patch-XSA355) = 73ca5dff042a4a54b06af36e6ace7d09673c05f0
 SHA1 (patch-XSA358) = 71d5b2e3d19223b986b8572adfbe7355a3a03db6
 SHA1 (patch-XSA359) = 4b778a86fffbe0e2a364e1589d573bbc7c27ff99
+SHA1 (patch-XSA360) = c1aa4bdade4d3318bc2dffa83e359f66997b11df
 SHA1 (patch-fixpvh) = fd71e150e0b3a461875c02c4419dbfb30548d8f6
 SHA1 (patch-xen_Makefile) = 465388d80de414ca3bb84faefa0f52d817e423a6
 SHA1 (patch-xen_Rules.mk) = c743dc63f51fc280d529a7d9e08650292c171dac
diff --git a/sysutils/xenkernel413/patches/patch-XSA355 b/sysutils/xenkernel413/patches/patch-XSA355
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..47840e00601
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sysutils/xenkernel413/patches/patch-XSA355
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-XSA355,v 1.1.2.2 2021/02/16 07:57:46 bsiegert Exp $
+
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Subject: memory: fix off-by-one in XSA-346 change
+
+The comparison against ARRAY_SIZE() needs to be >= in order to avoid
+overrunning the pages[] array.
+
+This is XSA-355.
+
+Fixes: 5777a3742d88 ("IOMMU: hold page ref until after deferred TLB flush")
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
+
+--- xen/common/memory.c.orig
++++ xen/common/memory.c
+@@ -854,7 +854,7 @@ int xenmem_add_to_physmap(struct domain
+             ++extra.ppage;
+ 
+         /* Check for continuation if it's not the last iteration. */
+-        if ( (++done > ARRAY_SIZE(pages) && extra.ppage) ||
++        if ( (++done >= ARRAY_SIZE(pages) && extra.ppage) ||
+              (xatp->size > done && hypercall_preempt_check()) )
+         {
+             rc = start + done;
diff --git a/sysutils/xenkernel413/patches/patch-XSA360 b/sysutils/xenkernel413/patches/patch-XSA360
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..197097c4596
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sysutils/xenkernel413/patches/patch-XSA360
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-XSA360,v 1.1.2.2 2021/02/16 07:57:46 bsiegert Exp $
+
+From: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+Subject: x86/dpci: do not remove pirqs from domain tree on unbind
+
+A fix for a previous issue removed the pirqs from the domain tree when
+they are unbound in order to prevent shared pirqs from triggering a
+BUG_ON in __pirq_guest_unbind if they are unbound multiple times. That
+caused free_domain_pirqs to no longer unmap the pirqs because they
+are gone from the domain pirq tree, thus leaving stale unbound pirqs
+after domain destruction if the domain had mapped dpci pirqs after
+shutdown.
+
+Take a different approach to fix the original issue, instead of
+removing the pirq from d->pirq_tree clear the flags of the dpci pirq
+struct to signal that the pirq is now unbound. This prevents calling
+pirq_guest_unbind multiple times for the same pirq without having to
+remove it from the domain pirq tree.
+
+This is XSA-360.
+
+Fixes: 5b58dad089 ('x86/pass-through: avoid double IRQ unbind during domain cleanup')
+Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+
+--- xen/arch/x86/irq.c.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/irq.c
+@@ -1331,7 +1331,7 @@ void (pirq_cleanup_check)(struct pirq *p
+     }
+ 
+     if ( radix_tree_delete(&d->pirq_tree, pirq->pirq) != pirq )
+-        BUG_ON(!d->is_dying);
++        BUG();
+ }
+ 
+ /* Flush all ready EOIs from the top of this CPU's pending-EOI stack. */
+--- xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c.orig
++++ xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
+@@ -862,6 +862,10 @@ static int pci_clean_dpci_irq(struct dom
+ {
+     struct dev_intx_gsi_link *digl, *tmp;
+ 
++    if ( !pirq_dpci->flags )
++        /* Already processed. */
++        return 0;
++
+     pirq_guest_unbind(d, dpci_pirq(pirq_dpci));
+ 
+     if ( pt_irq_need_timer(pirq_dpci->flags) )
+@@ -872,15 +876,10 @@ static int pci_clean_dpci_irq(struct dom
+         list_del(&digl->list);
+         xfree(digl);
+     }
++    /* Note the pirq is now unbound. */
++    pirq_dpci->flags = 0;
+ 
+-    radix_tree_delete(&d->pirq_tree, dpci_pirq(pirq_dpci)->pirq);
+-
+-    if ( !pt_pirq_softirq_active(pirq_dpci) )
+-        return 0;
+-
+-    domain_get_irq_dpci(d)->pending_pirq_dpci = pirq_dpci;
+-
+-    return -ERESTART;
++    return pt_pirq_softirq_active(pirq_dpci) ? -ERESTART : 0;
+ }
+ 
+ static int pci_clean_dpci_irqs(struct domain *d)
+@@ -897,18 +896,8 @@ static int pci_clean_dpci_irqs(struct do
+     hvm_irq_dpci = domain_get_irq_dpci(d);
+     if ( hvm_irq_dpci != NULL )
+     {
+-        int ret = 0;
+-
+-        if ( hvm_irq_dpci->pending_pirq_dpci )
+-        {
+-            if ( pt_pirq_softirq_active(hvm_irq_dpci->pending_pirq_dpci) )
+-                 ret = -ERESTART;
+-            else
+-                 hvm_irq_dpci->pending_pirq_dpci = NULL;
+-        }
++        int ret = pt_pirq_iterate(d, pci_clean_dpci_irq, NULL);
+ 
+-        if ( !ret )
+-            ret = pt_pirq_iterate(d, pci_clean_dpci_irq, NULL);
+         if ( ret )
+         {
+             spin_unlock(&d->event_lock);
+--- xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/irq.h.orig
++++ xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/irq.h
+@@ -160,8 +160,6 @@ struct hvm_irq_dpci {
+     DECLARE_BITMAP(isairq_map, NR_ISAIRQS);
+     /* Record of mapped Links */
+     uint8_t link_cnt[NR_LINK];
+-    /* Clean up: Entry with a softirq invocation pending / in progress. */
+-    struct hvm_pirq_dpci *pending_pirq_dpci;
+ };
+ 
+ /* Machine IRQ to guest device/intx mapping. */