Pullup ticket #5070 - requested by bouyer

sysutils/xenkernel45: security patch

Revisions pulled up:
- sysutils/xenkernel45/Makefile                                 1.19
- sysutils/xenkernel45/distinfo                                 1.15
- sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-XSA-182                    1.1
- sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-XSA-183                    1.1

-------------------------------------------------------------------
   Module Name:	pkgsrc
   Committed By:	bouyer
   Date:		Tue Jul 26 14:31:57 UTC 2016

   Modified Files:
   	pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel45: Makefile distinfo
   Added Files:
   	pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches: patch-XSA-182 patch-XSA-183

   Log Message:
   Apply security patch from XSA-182 and XSA-183. Bump PKGREVISION


   To generate a diff of this commit:
   cvs rdiff -u -r1.18 -r1.19 pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel45/Makefile
   cvs rdiff -u -r1.14 -r1.15 pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel45/distinfo
   cvs rdiff -u -r0 -r1.1 pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-XSA-182 \
       pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-XSA-183

4 files changed, 186 insertions, 3 deletions

diff --git a/sysutils/xenkernel45/Makefile b/sysutils/xenkernel45/Makefile
index b1cd83882ec..4531012c41a 100644
--- a/sysutils/xenkernel45/Makefile
+++ b/sysutils/xenkernel45/Makefile
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.17 2016/06/16 09:58:19 prlw1 Exp $
+# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.17.2.1 2016/07/28 13:35:31 spz Exp $
 
 VERSION=	4.5.3
 DISTNAME=	xen-${VERSION}
 PKGNAME=	xenkernel45-${VERSION}
-#PKGREVISION=	0
+PKGREVISION=	1
 CATEGORIES=	sysutils
 MASTER_SITES=	http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/${VERSION}/
 
diff --git a/sysutils/xenkernel45/distinfo b/sysutils/xenkernel45/distinfo
index ae01c4fd679..c7fd4ad1c12 100644
--- a/sysutils/xenkernel45/distinfo
+++ b/sysutils/xenkernel45/distinfo
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.14 2016/05/12 15:42:58 bouyer Exp $
+$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.14.2.1 2016/07/28 13:35:31 spz Exp $
 
 SHA1 (xen-4.5.3.tar.gz) = 95d56c42642adcffe55dcf82a021d49115373108
 RMD160 (xen-4.5.3.tar.gz) = 7ba586b20404e95308007663e87868c0ccc0e6f4
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ Size (xen-4.5.3.tar.gz) = 18416997 bytes
 SHA1 (patch-Config.mk) = a2a104d023cea4e551a3ad40927d4884d6c610bf
 SHA1 (patch-XSA-172) = ff4560534381d4d4c553170fbeb674f9361d9740
 SHA1 (patch-XSA-173) = 0f6a2c4d9467713f3d969020f8fba62aa2f5297b
+SHA1 (patch-XSA-182) = 77dfd369df89a51355318e26e38837482f09996e
+SHA1 (patch-XSA-183) = f2a6027ff71c32c16abeb1b17e3226b714a5f1f4
 SHA1 (patch-xen_Makefile) = 750d0c8d4fea14d3ef3f872de5242a1f5104cbbe
 SHA1 (patch-xen_arch_x86_Rules.mk) = 7b0894ba7311edb02118a021671f304cf3872154
 SHA1 (patch-xen_common_page__alloc.c) = c4d606de1cada8cf89b5abd16efada3d58c68a03
diff --git a/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-XSA-182 b/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-XSA-182
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..76902a07740
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-XSA-182
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-XSA-182,v 1.1.2.2 2016/07/28 13:35:31 spz Exp $
+
+From 798c1498f764bfaa7b0b955bab40b01b0610d372 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2016 14:32:03 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/pv: Remove unsafe bits from the mod_l?_entry() fastpath
+
+All changes in writeability and cacheability must go through full
+re-validation.
+
+Rework the logic as a whitelist, to make it clearer to follow.
+
+This is XSA-182
+
+Reported-by: Jérémie Boutoille <jboutoille@ext.quarkslab.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
+---
+ xen/arch/x86/mm.c          | 28 ++++++++++++++++------------
+ xen/include/asm-x86/page.h |  1 +
+ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+index b4c4fa4..a68a1ab 100644
+--- xen/arch/x86/mm.c.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+@@ -1695,6 +1695,14 @@ static inline int update_intpte(intpte_t *p,
+                   _t ## e_get_intpte(_o), _t ## e_get_intpte(_n),   \
+                   (_m), (_v), (_ad))
+ 
++/*
++ * PTE flags that a guest may change without re-validating the PTE.
++ * All other bits affect translation, caching, or Xen's safety.
++ */
++#define FASTPATH_FLAG_WHITELIST                                     \
++    (_PAGE_NX_BIT | _PAGE_AVAIL_HIGH | _PAGE_AVAIL | _PAGE_GLOBAL | \
++     _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_USER)
++
+ /* Update the L1 entry at pl1e to new value nl1e. */
+ static int mod_l1_entry(l1_pgentry_t *pl1e, l1_pgentry_t nl1e,
+                         unsigned long gl1mfn, int preserve_ad,
+@@ -1735,9 +1743,8 @@ static int mod_l1_entry(l1_pgentry_t *pl1e, l1_pgentry_t nl1e,
+             return -EINVAL;
+         }
+ 
+-        /* Fast path for identical mapping, r/w, presence, and cachability. */
+-        if ( !l1e_has_changed(ol1e, nl1e,
+-                              PAGE_CACHE_ATTRS | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_PRESENT) )
++        /* Fast path for sufficiently-similar mappings. */
++        if ( !l1e_has_changed(ol1e, nl1e, ~FASTPATH_FLAG_WHITELIST) )
+         {
+             adjust_guest_l1e(nl1e, pt_dom);
+             if ( UPDATE_ENTRY(l1, pl1e, ol1e, nl1e, gl1mfn, pt_vcpu,
+@@ -1819,11 +1826,8 @@ static int mod_l2_entry(l2_pgentry_t *pl2e,
+             return -EINVAL;
+         }
+ 
+-        /* Fast path for identical mapping and presence. */
+-        if ( !l2e_has_changed(ol2e, nl2e,
+-                              unlikely(opt_allow_superpage)
+-                              ? _PAGE_PSE | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_PRESENT
+-                              : _PAGE_PRESENT) )
++        /* Fast path for sufficiently-similar mappings. */
++        if ( !l2e_has_changed(ol2e, nl2e, ~FASTPATH_FLAG_WHITELIST) )
+         {
+             adjust_guest_l2e(nl2e, d);
+             if ( UPDATE_ENTRY(l2, pl2e, ol2e, nl2e, pfn, vcpu, preserve_ad) )
+@@ -1888,8 +1892,8 @@ static int mod_l3_entry(l3_pgentry_t *pl3e,
+             return -EINVAL;
+         }
+ 
+-        /* Fast path for identical mapping and presence. */
+-        if ( !l3e_has_changed(ol3e, nl3e, _PAGE_PRESENT) )
++        /* Fast path for sufficiently-similar mappings. */
++        if ( !l3e_has_changed(ol3e, nl3e, ~FASTPATH_FLAG_WHITELIST) )
+         {
+             adjust_guest_l3e(nl3e, d);
+             rc = UPDATE_ENTRY(l3, pl3e, ol3e, nl3e, pfn, vcpu, preserve_ad);
+@@ -1952,8 +1956,8 @@ static int mod_l4_entry(l4_pgentry_t *pl4e,
+             return -EINVAL;
+         }
+ 
+-        /* Fast path for identical mapping and presence. */
+-        if ( !l4e_has_changed(ol4e, nl4e, _PAGE_PRESENT) )
++        /* Fast path for sufficiently-similar mappings. */
++        if ( !l4e_has_changed(ol4e, nl4e, ~FASTPATH_FLAG_WHITELIST) )
+         {
+             adjust_guest_l4e(nl4e, d);
+             rc = UPDATE_ENTRY(l4, pl4e, ol4e, nl4e, pfn, vcpu, preserve_ad);
+diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/page.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/page.h
+index 6dc9646..03c024c 100644
+--- xen/include/asm-x86/page.h.orig
++++ xen/include/asm-x86/page.h
+@@ -308,6 +308,7 @@ void efi_update_l4_pgtable(unsigned int l4idx, l4_pgentry_t);
+ #define _PAGE_AVAIL2   _AC(0x800,U)
+ #define _PAGE_AVAIL    _AC(0xE00,U)
+ #define _PAGE_PSE_PAT _AC(0x1000,U)
++#define _PAGE_AVAIL_HIGH (_AC(0x7ff, U) << 12)
+ /* non-architectural flags */
+ #define _PAGE_PAGED   0x2000U
+ #define _PAGE_SHARED  0x4000U
+-- 
+2.1.4
+
diff --git a/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-XSA-183 b/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-XSA-183
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..b9ecb904737
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-XSA-183
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-XSA-183,v 1.1.2.2 2016/07/28 13:35:31 spz Exp $
+
+From 777ebe30e81ab284f9b78392875fe884a593df35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Date: Wed, 15 Jun 2016 18:32:14 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/entry: Avoid SMAP violation in
+ compat_create_bounce_frame()
+
+A 32bit guest kernel might be running on user mappings.
+compat_create_bounce_frame() must whitelist its guest accesses to avoid
+risking a SMAP violation.
+
+For both variants of create_bounce_frame(), re-blacklist user accesses if
+execution exits via an exception table redirection.
+
+This is XSA-183 / CVE-2016-6259
+
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+---
+v2:
+ * Include CLAC on the exit paths from compat_create_bounce_frame which occur
+   from faults attempting to load %fs
+ * Reposition ASM_STAC to avoid breaking the macro-op fusion of test/jz
+---
+ xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S | 3 +++
+ xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S        | 2 ++
+ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
+index 0e3db7c..1eaf4bb 100644
+--- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
+@@ -350,6 +350,7 @@ ENTRY(compat_int80_direct_trap)
+ compat_create_bounce_frame:
+         ASSERT_INTERRUPTS_ENABLED
+         mov   %fs,%edi
++        ASM_STAC
+         testb $2,UREGS_cs+8(%rsp)
+         jz    1f
+         /* Push new frame at registered guest-OS stack base. */
+@@ -403,6 +404,7 @@ UNLIKELY_START(nz, compat_bounce_failsafe)
+         movl  %ds,%eax
+ .Lft12: movl  %eax,%fs:0*4(%rsi)        # DS
+ UNLIKELY_END(compat_bounce_failsafe)
++        ASM_CLAC
+         /* Rewrite our stack frame and return to guest-OS mode. */
+         /* IA32 Ref. Vol. 3: TF, VM, RF and NT flags are cleared on trap. */
+         andl  $~(X86_EFLAGS_VM|X86_EFLAGS_RF|\
+@@ -448,6 +450,7 @@ compat_crash_page_fault_4:
+         addl  $4,%esi
+ compat_crash_page_fault:
+ .Lft14: mov   %edi,%fs
++        ASM_CLAC
+         movl  %esi,%edi
+         call  show_page_walk
+         jmp   dom_crash_sync_extable
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
+index 6e27508..0c2e63a 100644
+--- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
+@@ -462,9 +462,11 @@ domain_crash_page_fault_16:
+ domain_crash_page_fault_8:
+         addq  $8,%rsi
+ domain_crash_page_fault:
++        ASM_CLAC
+         movq  %rsi,%rdi
+         call  show_page_walk
+ ENTRY(dom_crash_sync_extable)
++        ASM_CLAC
+         # Get out of the guest-save area of the stack.
+         GET_STACK_BASE(%rax)
+         leaq  STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(guest_cpu_user_regs)(%rax),%rsp
+-- 
+2.1.4
+