Improve previous security fix for cyrpt_blowfish().

There was incompatible result by previous fix and it should be gone away.

Beside ths security fix, ${PREFIX}/bin/phar.phar has correct shbang line.

Bump PKGREVISION.

2 files changed, 157 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/lang/php53/patches/patch-af b/lang/php53/patches/patch-af
index 8ca11c4eaca..c06b90d9d76 100644
--- a/lang/php53/patches/patch-af
+++ b/lang/php53/patches/patch-af
@@ -1,7 +1,16 @@
-$NetBSD: patch-af,v 1.2 2011/03/19 07:01:19 taca Exp $
+$NetBSD: patch-af,v 1.3 2011/06/22 09:54:35 taca Exp $
 
 --- ext/phar/Makefile.frag.orig	2011-02-25 09:32:17.000000000 +0000
 +++ ext/phar/Makefile.frag
+@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ PHP_PHARCMD_EXECUTABLE = ` \
+ 	else \
+ 		$(top_srcdir)/build/shtool echo -n -- "$(PHP_EXECUTABLE)"; \
+ 	fi;`
+-PHP_PHARCMD_BANG = `$(top_srcdir)/build/shtool echo -n -- "$(INSTALL_ROOT)$(bindir)/$(program_prefix)php$(program_suffix)$(EXEEXT)";`
++PHP_PHARCMD_BANG = `$(top_srcdir)/build/shtool echo -n -- "$(bindir)/$(program_prefix)php$(program_suffix)$(EXEEXT)";`
+ 
+ $(builddir)/phar/phar.inc: $(srcdir)/phar/phar.inc
+ 	-@test -d $(builddir)/phar || mkdir $(builddir)/phar
 @@ -39,4 +39,4 @@ install-pharcmd: pharcmd
  	-@$(mkinstalldirs) $(INSTALL_ROOT)$(bindir)
  	$(INSTALL) $(builddir)/phar.phar $(INSTALL_ROOT)$(bindir)
diff --git a/lang/php53/patches/patch-ext_standard_crypt__blowfish.c b/lang/php53/patches/patch-ext_standard_crypt__blowfish.c
index 0e6d346facc..f8ea74092ea 100644
--- a/lang/php53/patches/patch-ext_standard_crypt__blowfish.c
+++ b/lang/php53/patches/patch-ext_standard_crypt__blowfish.c
@@ -1,16 +1,160 @@
-$NetBSD: patch-ext_standard_crypt__blowfish.c,v 1.1 2011/06/20 13:38:19 taca Exp $
+$NetBSD: patch-ext_standard_crypt__blowfish.c,v 1.2 2011/06/22 09:54:35 taca Exp $
 
 - Fix potential security problem by char signedness processing:
   http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/06/20/2
 
+  Dereived from revision 1.11 change of http://cvsweb.openwall.com/cgi/cvsweb.cgi/Owl/packages/glibc/crypt_blowfish/crypt_blowfish.c.
+
 --- ext/standard/crypt_blowfish.c.orig	2010-02-21 23:47:14.000000000 +0000
 +++ ext/standard/crypt_blowfish.c
-@@ -565,7 +565,7 @@ static void BF_set_key(__CONST char *key
+@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
+  * cracking removed.
+  *
+  * Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 1998-2002 and
++ * placed in the public domain.  Quick self-test added in 2011 and also
+  * placed in the public domain.
+  *
+  * There's absolutely no warranty.
+@@ -51,6 +52,13 @@
+ #define __CONST __const
+ #endif
+ 
++/*
++ * Please keep this enabled.  We really don't want incompatible hashes to be
++ * produced.  The performance cost of this quick self-test is around 0.6% at
++ * the "$2a$08" setting.
++ */
++#define BF_SELF_TEST
++
+ #ifdef __i386__
+ #define BF_ASM				0
+ #define BF_SCALE			1
+@@ -63,6 +71,7 @@
+ #endif
+ 
+ typedef unsigned int BF_word;
++typedef signed int BF_word_signed;
+ 
+ /* Number of Blowfish rounds, this is also hardcoded into a few places */
+ #define BF_N				16
+@@ -555,7 +564,8 @@ static void BF_swap(BF_word *x, int coun
+ 	} while (ptr < &data.ctx.S[3][0xFF]);
+ #endif
+ 
+-static void BF_set_key(__CONST char *key, BF_key expanded, BF_key initial)
++static void BF_set_key(__CONST char *key, BF_key expanded, BF_key initial,
++    int sign_extension_bug)
+ {
+ 	__CONST char *ptr = key;
+ 	int i, j;
+@@ -565,7 +575,10 @@ static void BF_set_key(__CONST char *key
  		tmp = 0;
  		for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
  			tmp <<= 8;
 -			tmp |= *ptr;
-+			tmp |= (unsigned char)*ptr;
++			if (sign_extension_bug)
++				tmp |= (BF_word_signed)(signed char)*ptr;
++			else
++				tmp |= (unsigned char)*ptr;
  
  			if (!*ptr) ptr = key; else ptr++;
  		}
+@@ -575,8 +588,9 @@ static void BF_set_key(__CONST char *key
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+-char *php_crypt_blowfish_rn(__CONST char *key, __CONST char *setting,
+-	char *output, int size)
++static char *BF_crypt(__CONST char *key, __CONST char *setting,
++	char *output, int size,
++	BF_word min)
+ {
+ #if BF_ASM
+ 	extern void _BF_body_r(BF_ctx *ctx);
+@@ -602,7 +616,7 @@ char *php_crypt_blowfish_rn(__CONST char
+ 
+ 	if (setting[0] != '$' ||
+ 	    setting[1] != '2' ||
+-	    setting[2] != 'a' ||
++	    (setting[2] != 'a' && setting[2] != 'x') ||
+ 	    setting[3] != '$' ||
+ 	    setting[4] < '0' || setting[4] > '3' ||
+ 	    setting[5] < '0' || setting[5] > '9' ||
+@@ -613,7 +627,7 @@ char *php_crypt_blowfish_rn(__CONST char
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	count = (BF_word)1 << ((setting[4] - '0') * 10 + (setting[5] - '0'));
+-	if (count < 16 || BF_decode(data.binary.salt, &setting[7], 16)) {
++	if (count < min || BF_decode(data.binary.salt, &setting[7], 16)) {
+ 		clean(data.binary.salt, sizeof(data.binary.salt));
+ 		__set_errno(EINVAL);
+ 		return NULL;
+@@ -621,7 +635,7 @@ char *php_crypt_blowfish_rn(__CONST char
+ 
+ 	BF_swap(data.binary.salt, 4);
+ 
+-	BF_set_key(key, data.expanded_key, data.ctx.P);
++	BF_set_key(key, data.expanded_key, data.ctx.P, setting[2] == 'x');
+ 
+ 	memcpy(data.ctx.S, BF_init_state.S, sizeof(data.ctx.S));
+ 
+@@ -721,14 +735,59 @@ char *php_crypt_blowfish_rn(__CONST char
+ 	BF_encode(&output[7 + 22], data.binary.output, 23);
+ 	output[7 + 22 + 31] = '\0';
+ 
++#ifndef BF_SELF_TEST
+ /* Overwrite the most obvious sensitive data we have on the stack. Note
+  * that this does not guarantee there's no sensitive data left on the
+  * stack and/or in registers; I'm not aware of portable code that does. */
+ 	clean(&data, sizeof(data));
++#endif
+ 
+ 	return output;
+ }
+ 
++char *php_crypt_blowfish_rn(__CONST char *key, __CONST char *setting,
++	char *output, int size)
++{
++#ifdef BF_SELF_TEST
++	__CONST char *test_key = "8b \xd0\xc1\xd2\xcf\xcc\xd8";
++	__CONST char *test_2a =
++	    "$2a$00$abcdefghijklmnopqrstuui1D709vfamulimlGcq0qq3UvuUasvEa"
++	    "\0"
++	    "canary";
++	__CONST char *test_2x =
++	    "$2x$00$abcdefghijklmnopqrstuuVUrPmXD6q/nVSSp7pNDhCR9071IfIRe"
++	    "\0"
++	    "canary";
++	__CONST char *test_hash, *p;
++	int ok;
++	char buf[7 + 22 + 31 + 1 + 6 + 1];
++
++	output = BF_crypt(key, setting, output, size, 16);
++
++/* Do a quick self-test.  This also happens to overwrite BF_crypt()'s data. */
++	test_hash = (setting[2] == 'x') ? test_2x : test_2a;
++	memcpy(buf, test_hash, sizeof(buf));
++	memset(buf, -1, sizeof(buf) - (6 + 1)); /* keep "canary" only */
++	p = BF_crypt(test_key, test_hash, buf, sizeof(buf) - 6, 1);
++
++	ok = (p == buf && !memcmp(p, test_hash, sizeof(buf)));
++
++/* This could reveal what hash type we were using last.  Unfortunately, we
++ * can't reliably clean the test_hash pointer. */
++	clean(&buf, sizeof(buf));
++
++	if (ok)
++		return output;
++
++/* Should not happen */
++	__set_errno(EINVAL); /* pretend we don't support this hash type */
++	return NULL;
++#else
++#warning Self-test is disabled, please enable
++	return BF_crypt(key, setting, output, size, 16);
++#endif
++}
++
+ char *php_crypt_gensalt_blowfish_rn(unsigned long count,
+ 	__CONST char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size)
+ {