Update to 1.0.4, including a patch by Tonnerre, provided

in PR 30378.

version 1.0.4                May  4 2005

 * Fix switch and hub modes.

 * Optionally start scripts when a Subnet becomes (un)reachable.

version 1.0.3                Nov 11 2004

* Show error message when failing to write a PID file.

* Ignore spaces at end of lines in config files.

* Fix handling of late packets.

* Unify BSD tun/tap device handling. This allows IPv6 on tun devices and
  anything on tap devices as long as the underlying OS supports it.

* Handle IPv6 on Solaris tun devices.

* Allow tinc to work properly under Windows XP SP2.

* Allow VLAN tagged Ethernet frames in switch and hub mode.

* Experimental PMTUDiscovery, TunnelServer and BlockingTCP options.

version 1.0.2                Nov  8 2003

* Fix address and hostname resolving under Windows.

* Remove warnings about non-existing scripts and unsupported address families.

* Use the event logger under Windows.

* Fix quoting of filenames and command line arguments under Windows.

* Strict checks for length incoming network packets and return values of
  cryptographic functions,

* Fix a bug in metadata handling that made the tinc daemon abort.

3 files changed, 203 insertions, 7 deletions

diff --git a/net/tinc/Makefile b/net/tinc/Makefile
index cbab497c42f..132983bbf57 100644
--- a/net/tinc/Makefile
+++ b/net/tinc/Makefile
@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
-# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.4 2005/04/11 21:47:00 tv Exp $
+# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.5 2005/05/30 16:58:03 wiz Exp $
 #
 
-DISTNAME=	tinc-1.0.1
-PKGREVISION=	1
+DISTNAME=	tinc-1.0.4
 CATEGORIES=	net
 MASTER_SITES=	http://tinc.nl.linux.org/packages/
 
diff --git a/net/tinc/distinfo b/net/tinc/distinfo
index 088bc172a43..a1df13bd749 100644
--- a/net/tinc/distinfo
+++ b/net/tinc/distinfo
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
-$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.2 2005/02/24 12:14:05 agc Exp $
+$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.3 2005/05/30 16:58:03 wiz Exp $
 
-SHA1 (tinc-1.0.1.tar.gz) = dfd064d1e7eba298e4f9a103543fd656700e243b
-RMD160 (tinc-1.0.1.tar.gz) = f12faf6e46e6662a70517462223744ee8fa513a7
-Size (tinc-1.0.1.tar.gz) = 464507 bytes
+SHA1 (tinc-1.0.4.tar.gz) = b70c87a147e5a01edcb70593ea29155eed075785
+RMD160 (tinc-1.0.4.tar.gz) = f4ec33a10f5039c625ec124376216cc03aa5f318
+Size (tinc-1.0.4.tar.gz) = 480305 bytes
+SHA1 (patch-aa) = f1cd0121d10181ab8ce44295605ecd46ea225ba5
diff --git a/net/tinc/patches/patch-aa b/net/tinc/patches/patch-aa
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..079ce0940a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/tinc/patches/patch-aa
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+diff -Nur src/protocol_auth.c src/protocol_auth.c
+--- src/protocol_auth.c	Fri May 27 14:28:54 2005
++++ src/protocol_auth.c	Fri May 27 14:28:30 2005
+@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@
+ 
+ bool send_metakey(connection_t *c)
+ {
+-	char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
++	char *buffer;
+ 	int len;
+ 	bool x;
+ 
+@@ -129,10 +129,11 @@
+ 	/* Allocate buffers for the meta key */
+ 
+ 	if(!c->outkey)
+-		c->outkey = xmalloc(len);
++		c->outkey = xmalloc_and_zero(len);
+ 
+ 	if(!c->outctx)
+ 		c->outctx = xmalloc_and_zero(sizeof(*c->outctx));
++	buffer = xmalloc_and_zero(2 * len + 1);
+ 	cp();
+ 	/* Copy random data to the buffer */
+ 
+@@ -167,6 +168,7 @@
+ 	if(RSA_public_encrypt(len, c->outkey, buffer, c->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) {
+ 		logger(LOG_ERR, _("Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)"),
+ 			   c->name, c->hostname);
++		free(buffer);
+ 		return false;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -191,35 +193,45 @@
+ 					c->outcipher->iv_len)) {
+ 			logger(LOG_ERR, _("Error during initialisation of cipher for %s (%s): %s"),
+ 					c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
++			free(buffer);
+ 			return false;
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		c->status.encryptout = true;
+ 	}
+ 
++	free(buffer);
+ 	return x;
+ }
+ 
+ bool metakey_h(connection_t *c)
+ {
+-	char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
++	char *buffer, fmt[513];
+ 	int cipher, digest, maclength, compression;
+ 	int len;
+ 
+ 	cp();
+ 
+-	if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d %d %d %d %d " MAX_STRING, &cipher, &digest, &maclength, &compression, buffer) != 5) {
++	len = RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key);
++	buffer = xmalloc(2 * len + 1);
++	memset(buffer, 0, 2 * len + 1);
++
++	memset(fmt, 0, 513);
++	snprintf(fmt, 512, "%%*d %%d %%d %%d %%d %%%ds", 2 * len);
++
++	if(sscanf(c->buffer, fmt, &cipher, &digest, &maclength, &compression, buffer) != 5) {
+ 		logger(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "METAKEY", c->name,
+ 			   c->hostname);
++		free(buffer);
+ 		return false;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	len = RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key);
+ 
+ 	/* Check if the length of the meta key is all right */
+ 
+ 	if(strlen(buffer) != len * 2) {
+ 		logger(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name, c->hostname, "wrong keylength");
++		free(buffer);
+ 		return false;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -240,6 +252,7 @@
+ 	if(RSA_private_decrypt(len, buffer, c->inkey, myself->connection->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) {	/* See challenge() */
+ 		logger(LOG_ERR, _("Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)"),
+ 			   c->name, c->hostname);
++		free(buffer);
+ 		return false;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -258,6 +271,7 @@
+ 		
+ 		if(!c->incipher) {
+ 			logger(LOG_ERR, _("%s (%s) uses unknown cipher!"), c->name, c->hostname);
++			free(buffer);
+ 			return false;
+ 		}
+ 
+@@ -267,6 +281,7 @@
+ 					c->incipher->iv_len)) {
+ 			logger(LOG_ERR, _("Error during initialisation of cipher from %s (%s): %s"),
+ 					c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
++			free(buffer);
+ 			return false;
+ 		}
+ 
+@@ -282,11 +297,13 @@
+ 
+ 		if(!c->indigest) {
+ 			logger(LOG_ERR, _("Node %s (%s) uses unknown digest!"), c->name, c->hostname);
++			free(buffer);
+ 			return false;
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		if(c->inmaclength > c->indigest->md_size || c->inmaclength < 0) {
+ 			logger(LOG_ERR, _("%s (%s) uses bogus MAC length!"), c->name, c->hostname);
++			free(buffer);
+ 			return false;
+ 		}
+ 	} else {
+@@ -297,19 +314,22 @@
+ 
+ 	c->allow_request = CHALLENGE;
+ 
++	free(buffer);
+ 	return send_challenge(c);
+ }
+ 
+ bool send_challenge(connection_t *c)
+ {
+-	char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
++	char *buffer;
+ 	int len;
++	bool ret;
+ 
+ 	cp();
+ 
+ 	/* CHECKME: what is most reasonable value for len? */
+ 
+ 	len = RSA_size(c->rsa_key);
++	buffer = xmalloc_and_zero(2 * len + 1);
+ 
+ 	/* Allocate buffers for the challenge */
+ 
+@@ -327,29 +347,37 @@
+ 
+ 	/* Send the challenge */
+ 
+-	return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHALLENGE, buffer);
++	ret = send_request(c, "%d %s", CHALLENGE, buffer);
++
++	free(buffer);
++
++	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+ bool challenge_h(connection_t *c)
+ {
+-	char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
+-	int len;
++	char *buffer, fmt[513];
++	int len = RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key);
+ 
+ 	cp();
+ 
+-	if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING, buffer) != 1) {
++	buffer = xmalloc(2 * len + 1);
++	memset(fmt, 0, 513);
++	snprintf(fmt, 512, "%%*d %%%ds", 2*len);
++
++	if(sscanf(c->buffer, fmt, buffer) != 1) {
+ 		logger(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "CHALLENGE", c->name,
+ 			   c->hostname);
++		free(buffer);
+ 		return false;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	len = RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key);
+-
+ 	/* Check if the length of the challenge is all right */
+ 
+ 	if(strlen(buffer) != len * 2) {
+ 		logger(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name,
+ 			   c->hostname, "wrong challenge length");
++		free(buffer);
+ 		return false;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -366,6 +394,7 @@
+ 
+ 	/* Rest is done by send_chal_reply() */
+ 
++	free(buffer);
+ 	return send_chal_reply(c);
+ }
+