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author | taca <taca@pkgsrc.org> | 2016-09-18 17:30:10 +0000 |
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committer | taca <taca@pkgsrc.org> | 2016-09-18 17:30:10 +0000 |
commit | f5e7167f10b27081d03506f7eb695981546bee24 (patch) | |
tree | 12ed62d4147c654c50be4294763e930acc58a5bd /security/openssh/patches/patch-auth-passwd.c | |
parent | 2a7e70b6d055688a7fcac5058fc2f574225de727 (diff) | |
download | pkgsrc-f5e7167f10b27081d03506f7eb695981546bee24.tar.gz |
Update openssh to 7.3.1 (OpenSSH 7.3p1).
OpenSSH 7.3p1 is primarily a bugfix release and here is summary.
Changes since OpenSSH 7.2
=========================
Security
--------
* sshd(8): Mitigate a potential denial-of-service attack against
the system's crypt(3) function via sshd(8). An attacker could
send very long passwords that would cause excessive CPU use in
crypt(3). sshd(8) now refuses to accept password authentication
requests of length greater than 1024 characters. Independently
reported by Tomas Kuthan (Oracle), Andres Rojas and Javier Nieto.
* sshd(8): Mitigate timing differences in password authentication
that could be used to discern valid from invalid account names
when long passwords were sent and particular password hashing
algorithms are in use on the server. CVE-2016-6210, reported by
EddieEzra.Harari at verint.com
* ssh(1), sshd(8): Fix observable timing weakness in the CBC padding
oracle countermeasures. Reported by Jean Paul Degabriele, Kenny
Paterson, Torben Hansen and Martin Albrecht. Note that CBC ciphers
are disabled by default and only included for legacy compatibility.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): Improve operation ordering of MAC verification for
Encrypt-then-MAC (EtM) mode transport MAC algorithms to verify the
MAC before decrypting any ciphertext. This removes the possibility
of timing differences leaking facts about the plaintext, though no
such leakage has been observed. Reported by Jean Paul Degabriele,
Kenny Paterson, Torben Hansen and Martin Albrecht.
* sshd(8): (portable only) Ignore PAM environment vars when
UseLogin=yes. If PAM is configured to read user-specified
environment variables and UseLogin=yes in sshd_config, then a
hostile local user may attack /bin/login via LD_PRELOAD or
similar environment variables set via PAM. CVE-2015-8325,
found by Shayan Sadigh.
New Features
------------
* ssh(1): Add a ProxyJump option and corresponding -J command-line
flag to allow simplified indirection through a one or more SSH
bastions or "jump hosts".
* ssh(1): Add an IdentityAgent option to allow specifying specific
agent sockets instead of accepting one from the environment.
* ssh(1): Allow ExitOnForwardFailure and ClearAllForwardings to be
optionally overridden when using ssh -W. bz#2577
* ssh(1), sshd(8): Implement support for the IUTF8 terminal mode as
per draft-sgtatham-secsh-iutf8-00.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): Add support for additional fixed Diffie-Hellman
2K, 4K and 8K groups from draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-03.
* ssh-keygen(1), ssh(1), sshd(8): support SHA256 and SHA512 RSA
signatures in certificates;
* ssh(1): Add an Include directive for ssh_config(5) files.
* ssh(1): Permit UTF-8 characters in pre-authentication banners sent
from the server. bz#2058
Bugfixes
--------
* ssh(1), sshd(8): Reduce the syslog level of some relatively common
protocol events from LOG_CRIT. bz#2585
* sshd(8): Refuse AuthenticationMethods="" in configurations and
accept AuthenticationMethods=any for the default behaviour of not
requiring multiple authentication. bz#2398
* sshd(8): Remove obsolete and misleading "POSSIBLE BREAK-IN
ATTEMPT!" message when forward and reverse DNS don't match. bz#2585
* ssh(1): Close ControlPersist background process stderr except
in debug mode or when logging to syslog. bz#1988
* misc: Make PROTOCOL description for direct-streamlocal@openssh.com
channel open messages match deployed code. bz#2529
* ssh(1): Deduplicate LocalForward and RemoteForward entries to fix
failures when both ExitOnForwardFailure and hostname
canonicalisation are enabled. bz#2562
* sshd(8): Remove fallback from moduli to obsolete "primes" file
that was deprecated in 2001. bz#2559.
* sshd_config(5): Correct description of UseDNS: it affects ssh
hostname processing for authorized_keys, not known_hosts; bz#2554
* ssh(1): Fix authentication using lone certificate keys in an agent
without corresponding private keys on the filesystem. bz#2550
* sshd(8): Send ClientAliveInterval pings when a time-based
RekeyLimit is set; previously keepalive packets were not being
sent. bz#2252
Diffstat (limited to 'security/openssh/patches/patch-auth-passwd.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/openssh/patches/patch-auth-passwd.c | 10 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/security/openssh/patches/patch-auth-passwd.c b/security/openssh/patches/patch-auth-passwd.c index 4cc6a057996..dbdbce7302d 100644 --- a/security/openssh/patches/patch-auth-passwd.c +++ b/security/openssh/patches/patch-auth-passwd.c @@ -1,11 +1,11 @@ -$NetBSD: patch-auth-passwd.c,v 1.3 2016/01/18 12:53:26 jperkin Exp $ +$NetBSD: patch-auth-passwd.c,v 1.4 2016/09/18 17:30:11 taca Exp $ Replace uid 0 with ROOTUID macro ---- auth-passwd.c.orig 2015-08-21 04:49:03.000000000 +0000 +--- auth-passwd.c.orig 2016-07-27 22:54:27.000000000 +0000 +++ auth-passwd.c -@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const - #endif +@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const + return 0; #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN - if (pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES) @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Replace uid 0 with ROOTUID macro ok = 0; #endif if (*password == '\0' && options.permit_empty_passwd == 0) -@@ -123,7 +123,12 @@ auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const +@@ -128,7 +128,12 @@ auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const authctxt->force_pwchange = 1; } #endif |