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authortaca <taca@pkgsrc.org>2016-09-18 17:30:10 +0000
committertaca <taca@pkgsrc.org>2016-09-18 17:30:10 +0000
commitf5e7167f10b27081d03506f7eb695981546bee24 (patch)
tree12ed62d4147c654c50be4294763e930acc58a5bd /security/openssh/patches/patch-auth-passwd.c
parent2a7e70b6d055688a7fcac5058fc2f574225de727 (diff)
downloadpkgsrc-f5e7167f10b27081d03506f7eb695981546bee24.tar.gz
Update openssh to 7.3.1 (OpenSSH 7.3p1).
OpenSSH 7.3p1 is primarily a bugfix release and here is summary. Changes since OpenSSH 7.2 ========================= Security -------- * sshd(8): Mitigate a potential denial-of-service attack against the system's crypt(3) function via sshd(8). An attacker could send very long passwords that would cause excessive CPU use in crypt(3). sshd(8) now refuses to accept password authentication requests of length greater than 1024 characters. Independently reported by Tomas Kuthan (Oracle), Andres Rojas and Javier Nieto. * sshd(8): Mitigate timing differences in password authentication that could be used to discern valid from invalid account names when long passwords were sent and particular password hashing algorithms are in use on the server. CVE-2016-6210, reported by EddieEzra.Harari at verint.com * ssh(1), sshd(8): Fix observable timing weakness in the CBC padding oracle countermeasures. Reported by Jean Paul Degabriele, Kenny Paterson, Torben Hansen and Martin Albrecht. Note that CBC ciphers are disabled by default and only included for legacy compatibility. * ssh(1), sshd(8): Improve operation ordering of MAC verification for Encrypt-then-MAC (EtM) mode transport MAC algorithms to verify the MAC before decrypting any ciphertext. This removes the possibility of timing differences leaking facts about the plaintext, though no such leakage has been observed. Reported by Jean Paul Degabriele, Kenny Paterson, Torben Hansen and Martin Albrecht. * sshd(8): (portable only) Ignore PAM environment vars when UseLogin=yes. If PAM is configured to read user-specified environment variables and UseLogin=yes in sshd_config, then a hostile local user may attack /bin/login via LD_PRELOAD or similar environment variables set via PAM. CVE-2015-8325, found by Shayan Sadigh. New Features ------------ * ssh(1): Add a ProxyJump option and corresponding -J command-line flag to allow simplified indirection through a one or more SSH bastions or "jump hosts". * ssh(1): Add an IdentityAgent option to allow specifying specific agent sockets instead of accepting one from the environment. * ssh(1): Allow ExitOnForwardFailure and ClearAllForwardings to be optionally overridden when using ssh -W. bz#2577 * ssh(1), sshd(8): Implement support for the IUTF8 terminal mode as per draft-sgtatham-secsh-iutf8-00. * ssh(1), sshd(8): Add support for additional fixed Diffie-Hellman 2K, 4K and 8K groups from draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-03. * ssh-keygen(1), ssh(1), sshd(8): support SHA256 and SHA512 RSA signatures in certificates; * ssh(1): Add an Include directive for ssh_config(5) files. * ssh(1): Permit UTF-8 characters in pre-authentication banners sent from the server. bz#2058 Bugfixes -------- * ssh(1), sshd(8): Reduce the syslog level of some relatively common protocol events from LOG_CRIT. bz#2585 * sshd(8): Refuse AuthenticationMethods="" in configurations and accept AuthenticationMethods=any for the default behaviour of not requiring multiple authentication. bz#2398 * sshd(8): Remove obsolete and misleading "POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!" message when forward and reverse DNS don't match. bz#2585 * ssh(1): Close ControlPersist background process stderr except in debug mode or when logging to syslog. bz#1988 * misc: Make PROTOCOL description for direct-streamlocal@openssh.com channel open messages match deployed code. bz#2529 * ssh(1): Deduplicate LocalForward and RemoteForward entries to fix failures when both ExitOnForwardFailure and hostname canonicalisation are enabled. bz#2562 * sshd(8): Remove fallback from moduli to obsolete "primes" file that was deprecated in 2001. bz#2559. * sshd_config(5): Correct description of UseDNS: it affects ssh hostname processing for authorized_keys, not known_hosts; bz#2554 * ssh(1): Fix authentication using lone certificate keys in an agent without corresponding private keys on the filesystem. bz#2550 * sshd(8): Send ClientAliveInterval pings when a time-based RekeyLimit is set; previously keepalive packets were not being sent. bz#2252
Diffstat (limited to 'security/openssh/patches/patch-auth-passwd.c')
-rw-r--r--security/openssh/patches/patch-auth-passwd.c10
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/security/openssh/patches/patch-auth-passwd.c b/security/openssh/patches/patch-auth-passwd.c
index 4cc6a057996..dbdbce7302d 100644
--- a/security/openssh/patches/patch-auth-passwd.c
+++ b/security/openssh/patches/patch-auth-passwd.c
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-$NetBSD: patch-auth-passwd.c,v 1.3 2016/01/18 12:53:26 jperkin Exp $
+$NetBSD: patch-auth-passwd.c,v 1.4 2016/09/18 17:30:11 taca Exp $
Replace uid 0 with ROOTUID macro
---- auth-passwd.c.orig 2015-08-21 04:49:03.000000000 +0000
+--- auth-passwd.c.orig 2016-07-27 22:54:27.000000000 +0000
+++ auth-passwd.c
-@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const
- #endif
+@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const
+ return 0;
#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
- if (pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES)
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Replace uid 0 with ROOTUID macro
ok = 0;
#endif
if (*password == '\0' && options.permit_empty_passwd == 0)
-@@ -123,7 +123,12 @@ auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const
+@@ -128,7 +128,12 @@ auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const
authctxt->force_pwchange = 1;
}
#endif