Apply patches which fixes recent security problem of OpenSSL.

	http://secunia.com/advisories/22130/

Bump PKGREVISION.

14 files changed, 337 insertions, 3 deletions

diff --git a/security/openssl/Makefile b/security/openssl/Makefile
index fbb42d36165..1adcc964e59 100644
--- a/security/openssl/Makefile
+++ b/security/openssl/Makefile
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.116 2006/09/07 09:44:31 adrianp Exp $
+# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.117 2006/09/30 04:20:24 taca Exp $
 
 OPENSSL_SNAPSHOT?=	# empty
 OPENSSL_STABLE?=	# empty
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ MASTER_SITES=	ftp://ftp.openssl.org/snapshot/
 .  endif
 .endif
 
-PKGREVISION=	2
+PKGREVISION=	3
 SVR4_PKGNAME=	ossl
 CATEGORIES=	security
 MAINTAINER=	pkgsrc-users@NetBSD.org
diff --git a/security/openssl/distinfo b/security/openssl/distinfo
index 08a8264f7bd..2d855d99722 100644
--- a/security/openssl/distinfo
+++ b/security/openssl/distinfo
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.52 2006/09/07 09:44:31 adrianp Exp $
+$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.53 2006/09/30 04:20:24 taca Exp $
 
 SHA1 (openssl-0.9.7i.tar.gz) = 4c23925744d43272fa19615454da44e01465eb06
 RMD160 (openssl-0.9.7i.tar.gz) = 0dce52c5793a0c37f17b620f7d26bbf9e4fcf755
@@ -8,6 +8,18 @@ SHA1 (patch-ac) = ee8229a330cb5fcdd31cceaa14f3cadcba4858bf
 SHA1 (patch-ad) = 2581d06c21ed6d1c9a554289591031a6eb66a686
 SHA1 (patch-ae) = cb3ce622ef9efc4098d57b10059e5424272520c8
 SHA1 (patch-af) = e8a9d803d362658e0db3f044b35794b2084b7667
+SHA1 (patch-ah) = 5245d7ca407af952cfa028e46cf7a54dc0f50f6f
+SHA1 (patch-ai) = f960775a57551a70806517b439606099000ea97e
 SHA1 (patch-ak) = 7f9960a97cbe83c381c2a4565ca3a6e4e661bf54
 SHA1 (patch-al) = 64fd0be6adf30821b4c4bba3c9088c6dcbff3ba7
 SHA1 (patch-am) = 209aad896f976e5acc9bf66f5e3fdf6193d2ff3d
+SHA1 (patch-an) = c38cf54341ae5b770f984859c1a3bf6df41e0532
+SHA1 (patch-ao) = 834860d35eaa1211db664346a362822114bd16ef
+SHA1 (patch-ap) = 9473b8e69b71864baab3d38ee3de90e7027b1b0b
+SHA1 (patch-aq) = 68704a8048f7eea3744ae5e04dda09c676762923
+SHA1 (patch-ar) = 575be597244eb04576651d7b0276604d51fa7464
+SHA1 (patch-as) = d7984ceadfa51356e6d7a9cc398c1adf7e755930
+SHA1 (patch-at) = d232c98b680c8b279181b08efc84c569128d9ebb
+SHA1 (patch-au) = 6924cb666df8ed1eadd28a8ba75462560e72ac43
+SHA1 (patch-av) = dc8d31971b9535965339681b7a0c32d0b72d50bd
+SHA1 (patch-aw) = 9139c779ac221595423c38dd97a0ec91f103083e
diff --git a/security/openssl/patches/patch-ah b/security/openssl/patches/patch-ah
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..5ddd76b5a9d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/openssl/patches/patch-ah
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-ah,v 1.6 2006/09/30 04:20:24 taca Exp $
+
+# http://secunia.com/advisories/22130/
+
+--- ssl/s3_srvr.c.orig	2005-04-10 08:52:53.000000000 +0900
++++ ssl/s3_srvr.c
+@@ -1727,7 +1727,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(
+ 
+                 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
+                         {
+-                        int len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
++                        size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
+                         if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH ) 
+                                 {
+                                 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
diff --git a/security/openssl/patches/patch-ai b/security/openssl/patches/patch-ai
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..fcfcb175d74
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/openssl/patches/patch-ai
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-ai,v 1.6 2006/09/30 04:20:24 taca Exp $
+
+# http://secunia.com/advisories/22130/
+
+--- crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c.orig	2005-05-29 05:15:47.000000000 +0900
++++ crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
+@@ -157,6 +157,28 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int fl
+ 	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
+ 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
+ 
++ 	if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
++ 		{
++ 		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
++ 		return -1;
++ 		}
++ 
++ 	if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
++ 		{
++ 		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
++ 		return -1;
++ 		}
++ 
++ 	/* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
++ 	if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
++ 		{
++ 		if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
++ 			{
++ 			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
++ 			return -1;
++ 			}
++ 		}
++ 	
+ 	BN_init(&f);
+ 	BN_init(&ret);
+ 	if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
+@@ -576,6 +598,28 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int fl
+ 	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
+ 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
+ 
++	if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
++		{
++		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
++		return -1;
++		}
++
++	if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
++		{
++		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
++		return -1;
++		}
++
++	/* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
++	if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
++		{
++		if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
++			{
++			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
++			return -1;
++			}
++		}
++
+ 	BN_init(&f);
+ 	BN_init(&ret);
+ 	ctx=BN_CTX_new();
diff --git a/security/openssl/patches/patch-an b/security/openssl/patches/patch-an
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..f8eacf9fb82
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/openssl/patches/patch-an
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-an,v 1.1 2006/09/30 04:20:24 taca Exp $
+
+# http://secunia.com/advisories/22130/
+
+--- crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c.orig	2005-05-01 03:16:40.000000000 +0900
++++ crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
+@@ -628,6 +628,9 @@ static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VA
+ 	if(!ret) {
+ 		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
+ 		return 0;
++
++        ret = 0;
++
+ 	} else if(ret == -1) return -1;
+ 	/* SEQUENCE, SET and "OTHER" are left in encoded form */
+ 	if((utype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || (utype == V_ASN1_SET) || (utype == V_ASN1_OTHER)) {
+@@ -662,7 +665,11 @@ static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VA
+ 		 * internally irrespective of the type. So instead just check
+ 		 * for UNIVERSAL class and ignore the tag.
+ 		 */
+-		if(!asn1_collect(&buf, &p, plen, inf, -1, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)) goto err;
++		if(!asn1_collect(&buf, &p, plen, inf, -1, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL))
++			{
++			free_cont = 1;
++			goto err;
++			}
+ 		len = buf.length;
+ 		/* Append a final null to string */
+ 		if(!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(&buf, len + 1)) {
+@@ -903,7 +910,7 @@ static int asn1_collect(BUF_MEM *buf, un
+ 			return 0;
+ #endif
+ 		} else {
+-			if(!collect_data(buf, &p, plen)) return 0;
++			if(plen && !collect_data(buf, &p, plen)) return 0;
+ 		}
+ 		len -= p - q;
+ 	}
diff --git a/security/openssl/patches/patch-ao b/security/openssl/patches/patch-ao
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..0b53ba7001a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/openssl/patches/patch-ao
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-ao,v 1.1 2006/09/30 04:20:24 taca Exp $
+
+# http://secunia.com/advisories/22130/
+
+--- ssl/ssl_lib.c.orig	2005-06-11 05:00:39.000000000 +0900
++++ ssl/ssl_lib.c
+@@ -1187,7 +1187,7 @@ char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *
+ 		c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
+ 		for (cp=c->name; *cp; )
+ 			{
+-			if (len-- == 0)
++			if (len-- <= 0)
+ 				{
+ 				*p='\0';
+ 				return(buf);
diff --git a/security/openssl/patches/patch-ap b/security/openssl/patches/patch-ap
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..f29eb463c49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/openssl/patches/patch-ap
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-ap,v 1.1 2006/09/30 04:20:24 taca Exp $
+
+# http://secunia.com/advisories/22130/
+
+--- crypto/dh/dh.h.orig	2005-05-16 10:26:03.000000000 +0900
++++ crypto/dh/dh.h
+@@ -70,6 +70,10 @@
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #include <openssl/ossl_typ.h>
+ 	
++#ifndef OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
++# define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS	10000
++#endif
++
+ #define DH_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P     0x01
+ #define DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME 0x02 /* new with 0.9.7h; the built-in DH
+                                        * implementation now uses constant time
+@@ -203,6 +207,7 @@ void ERR_load_DH_strings(void);
+ #define DH_F_DH_GENERATE_KEY				 103
+ #define DH_F_DH_GENERATE_PARAMETERS			 104
+ #define DH_F_DH_NEW_METHOD				 105
++#define DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE                           103
+ 
+ /* Reason codes. */
+ #define DH_R_BAD_GENERATOR				 101
diff --git a/security/openssl/patches/patch-aq b/security/openssl/patches/patch-aq
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..85f55a29427
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/openssl/patches/patch-aq
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-aq,v 1.1 2006/09/30 04:20:24 taca Exp $
+
+# http://secunia.com/advisories/22130/
+
+--- crypto/dh/dh_key.c.orig	2005-05-28 00:39:11.000000000 +0900
++++ crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+@@ -180,6 +180,12 @@ static int compute_key(unsigned char *ke
+ 	BIGNUM *tmp;
+ 	int ret= -1;
+ 
++	if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
++		{
++		DHerr(DH_F_DH_COMPUTE_KEY,DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
+ 	ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ 	if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
+ 	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+@@ -213,8 +219,11 @@ static int compute_key(unsigned char *ke
+ 
+ 	ret=BN_bn2bin(tmp,key);
+ err:
+-	BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+-	BN_CTX_free(ctx);
++	if (ctx != NULL)
++		{
++		BN_CTX_end(ctx);
++		BN_CTX_free(ctx);
++		}
+ 	return(ret);
+ 	}
+ 
diff --git a/security/openssl/patches/patch-ar b/security/openssl/patches/patch-ar
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..9c25622a73a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/openssl/patches/patch-ar
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-ar,v 1.1 2006/09/30 04:20:24 taca Exp $
+
+# http://secunia.com/advisories/22130/
+
+--- crypto/dsa/dsa.h.orig	2005-05-16 10:26:04.000000000 +0900
++++ crypto/dsa/dsa.h
+@@ -79,6 +79,10 @@
+ # include <openssl/dh.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifndef OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
++# define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS	10000
++#endif
++
+ #define DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P	0x01
+ #define DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME       0x02 /* new with 0.9.7h; the built-in DSA
+                                               * implementation now uses constant time
+@@ -252,8 +256,10 @@ void ERR_load_DSA_strings(void);
+ #define DSA_F_SIG_CB					 114
+ 
+ /* Reason codes. */
++#define DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE				 102
+ #define DSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE		 100
+ #define DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS			 101
++#define DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE				 103
+ 
+ #ifdef  __cplusplus
+ }
diff --git a/security/openssl/patches/patch-as b/security/openssl/patches/patch-as
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..311e0c43fb3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/openssl/patches/patch-as
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-as,v 1.1 2006/09/30 04:20:24 taca Exp $
+
+# http://secunia.com/advisories/22130/
+
+--- crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c.orig	2005-04-12 22:47:50.000000000 +0900
++++ crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c
+@@ -89,8 +89,10 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA DSA_str_functs[]=
+ 
+ static ERR_STRING_DATA DSA_str_reasons[]=
+ 	{
++{ERR_REASON(DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE)           ,"bad q value"},
+ {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE),"data too large for key size"},
+ {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS)    ,"missing parameters"},
++{ERR_REASON(DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE)     ,"modulus too large"},
+ {0,NULL}
+ 	};
+ 
diff --git a/security/openssl/patches/patch-at b/security/openssl/patches/patch-at
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..1ce1f479f5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/openssl/patches/patch-at
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-at,v 1.1 2006/09/30 04:20:24 taca Exp $
+
+# http://secunia.com/advisories/22130/
+
+--- crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c.orig	2005-05-26 13:40:42.000000000 +0900
++++ crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+@@ -274,6 +274,18 @@ static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned 
+ 		return -1;
+ 		}
+ 
++	if (BN_num_bits(dsa->q) != 160)
++		{
++		DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY,DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE);
++		return -1;
++		}
++
++	if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
++		{
++		DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY,DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
++		return -1;
++		}
++
+ 	BN_init(&u1);
+ 	BN_init(&u2);
+ 	BN_init(&t1);
diff --git a/security/openssl/patches/patch-au b/security/openssl/patches/patch-au
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..902f26a3f7d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/openssl/patches/patch-au
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-au,v 1.1 2006/09/30 04:20:24 taca Exp $
+
+# http://secunia.com/advisories/22130/
+
+--- crypto/rsa/rsa.h.orig	2005-06-03 03:07:16.000000000 +0900
++++ crypto/rsa/rsa.h
+@@ -154,6 +154,17 @@ struct rsa_st
+ 	BN_BLINDING *blinding;
+ 	};
+ 
++#ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
++# define OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS	16384
++#endif
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS
++# define OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS	3072
++#endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS
++# define OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS	64 /* exponent limit enforced for "large" modulus only */
++#endif
++
+ #define RSA_3	0x3L
+ #define RSA_F4	0x10001L
+ 
+@@ -386,6 +397,7 @@ void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void);
+ #define RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q			 126
+ #define RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL			 120
+ #define RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID			 134
++#define RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE				 105
+ #define RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING			 113
+ #define RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q			 127
+ #define RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR			 121
diff --git a/security/openssl/patches/patch-av b/security/openssl/patches/patch-av
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..f033b150692
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/openssl/patches/patch-av
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-av,v 1.1 2006/09/30 04:20:24 taca Exp $
+
+# http://secunia.com/advisories/22130/
+
+--- crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c.orig	2005-06-03 03:07:16.000000000 +0900
++++ crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
+@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[]
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q) ,"iqmp not inverse of q"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL)    ,"key size too small"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID)    ,"last octet invalid"},
++{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE)     ,"modulus too large"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING),"null before block missing"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q)  ,"n does not equal p q"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR)   ,"oaep decoding error"},
diff --git a/security/openssl/patches/patch-aw b/security/openssl/patches/patch-aw
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..d340b5b41b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/openssl/patches/patch-aw
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-aw,v 1.1 2006/09/30 04:20:24 taca Exp $
+
+# http://secunia.com/advisories/22130/
+
+--- ssl/s2_clnt.c.orig	2005-05-12 03:26:07.000000000 +0900
++++ ssl/s2_clnt.c
+@@ -538,7 +538,8 @@ static int get_server_hello(SSL *s)
+ 		CRYPTO_add(&s->session->peer->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ 		}
+ 
+-	if (s->session->peer != s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->x509)
++	if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL 
++      || s->session->peer != s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->x509)
+ 		/* can't happen */
+ 		{
+ 		ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);