diff options
author | bouyer <bouyer@pkgsrc.org> | 2016-11-22 20:53:40 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | bouyer <bouyer@pkgsrc.org> | 2016-11-22 20:53:40 +0000 |
commit | 1e0ccae904dac03c07d0364e1767a051a5ec9c61 (patch) | |
tree | 2bf81be77dc659692b186236cab97bfe64dd1ce7 /sysutils/xenkernel42 | |
parent | e634e7721b6857b0ff3e899b56111a9add0ff6c8 (diff) | |
download | pkgsrc-1e0ccae904dac03c07d0364e1767a051a5ec9c61.tar.gz |
Backport upstream patches, fixing today's XSA 191, 192, 195, 197, 198.
Bump PKGREVISIONs
Diffstat (limited to 'sysutils/xenkernel42')
-rw-r--r-- | sysutils/xenkernel42/Makefile | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | sysutils/xenkernel42/distinfo | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | sysutils/xenkernel42/patches/patch-XSA-191 | 142 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | sysutils/xenkernel42/patches/patch-XSA-192 | 65 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | sysutils/xenkernel42/patches/patch-XSA-195 | 49 |
5 files changed, 262 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/sysutils/xenkernel42/Makefile b/sysutils/xenkernel42/Makefile index 2cd1087dbe1..db0257f8d8e 100644 --- a/sysutils/xenkernel42/Makefile +++ b/sysutils/xenkernel42/Makefile @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@ -# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.23 2016/09/08 15:41:01 bouyer Exp $ +# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.24 2016/11/22 20:55:29 bouyer Exp $ VERSION= 4.2.5 DISTNAME= xen-${VERSION} PKGNAME= xenkernel42-${VERSION} -PKGREVISION= 12 +PKGREVISION= 13 CATEGORIES= sysutils MASTER_SITES= http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/${VERSION}/ diff --git a/sysutils/xenkernel42/distinfo b/sysutils/xenkernel42/distinfo index aae88fe3d5a..b88165351f0 100644 --- a/sysutils/xenkernel42/distinfo +++ b/sysutils/xenkernel42/distinfo @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.22 2016/09/12 13:22:39 maya Exp $ +$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.23 2016/11/22 20:55:29 bouyer Exp $ SHA1 (xen-4.2.5.tar.gz) = f42741e4ec174495ace70c4b17a6b9b0e60e798a RMD160 (xen-4.2.5.tar.gz) = 7d4f7f1b32ee541d341a756b1f8da02816438d19 @@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ SHA1 (patch-XSA-182) = f0325a6f7c7cc20c3f11367384628dbe25c90b2d SHA1 (patch-XSA-185) = a2313922aa4dad734b96c80f64fe54eca3c14019 SHA1 (patch-XSA-187-1) = 55ea0c2d9c7d8d9476a5ab97342ff552be4faf56 SHA1 (patch-XSA-187-2) = ed2d384b4cf429443560afbf71b42fb4123a279b +SHA1 (patch-XSA-191) = 7a5e2e78c457c5922e2ccd711f2a39afba238e40 +SHA1 (patch-XSA-192) = f95757227ece59a2f320308edefcf01f1a96212c +SHA1 (patch-XSA-195) = bb20234c4db0dc098ea47564732e87710bfcb9d8 SHA1 (patch-xen_Makefile) = e0d1b74518b9675ddc64295d1523ded9a8757c0a SHA1 (patch-xen_arch_x86_Rules.mk) = 6b9b4bfa28924f7d3f6c793a389f1a7ac9d228e2 SHA1 (patch-xen_arch_x86_hvm_hvm.c) = b6bac1d466ba5bc276bc3aea9d4c9df37f2b9b0f diff --git a/sysutils/xenkernel42/patches/patch-XSA-191 b/sysutils/xenkernel42/patches/patch-XSA-191 new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..1f6ba53629f --- /dev/null +++ b/sysutils/xenkernel42/patches/patch-XSA-191 @@ -0,0 +1,142 @@ +$NetBSD: patch-XSA-191,v 1.1 2016/11/22 20:55:29 bouyer Exp $ + +backported from: + +From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Subject: x86/hvm: Fix the handling of non-present segments + +In 32bit, the data segments may be NULL to indicate that the segment is +ineligible for use. In both 32bit and 64bit, the LDT selector may be NULL to +indicate that the entire LDT is ineligible for use. However, nothing in Xen +actually checks for this condition when performing other segmentation +checks. (Note however that limit and writeability checks are correctly +performed). + +Neither Intel nor AMD specify the exact behaviour of loading a NULL segment. +Experimentally, AMD zeroes all attributes but leaves the base and limit +unmodified. Intel zeroes the base, sets the limit to 0xfffffff and resets the +attributes to just .G and .D/B. + +The use of the segment information in the VMCB/VMCS is equivalent to a native +pipeline interacting with the segment cache. The present bit can therefore +have a subtly different meaning, and it is now cooked to uniformly indicate +whether the segment is usable or not. + +GDTR and IDTR don't have access rights like the other segments, but for +consistency, they are treated as being present so no special casing is needed +elsewhere in the segmentation logic. + +AMD hardware does not consider the present bit for %cs and %tr, and will +function as if they were present. They are therefore unconditionally set to +present when reading information from the VMCB, to maintain the new meaning of +usability. + +Intel hardware has a separate unusable bit in the VMCS segment attributes. +This bit is inverted and stored in the present field, so the hvm code can work +with architecturally-common state. + +This is XSA-191. + +Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> + +--- xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c.orig 2016-11-22 15:03:34.000000000 +0100 ++++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c 2016-11-22 15:15:51.000000000 +0100 +@@ -1921,6 +1921,10 @@ + * COMPATIBILITY MODE: Apply segment checks and add base. + */ + ++ /* Segment not valid for use (cooked meaning of .p)? */ ++ if ( !reg->attr.fields.p ) ++ return 0; ++ + switch ( access_type ) + { + case hvm_access_read: +@@ -2105,6 +2109,10 @@ + hvm_get_segment_register( + v, (sel & 4) ? x86_seg_ldtr : x86_seg_gdtr, &desctab); + ++ /* Segment not valid for use (cooked meaning of .p)? */ ++ if ( !desctab.attr.fields.p ) ++ goto fail; ++ + /* Check against descriptor table limit. */ + if ( ((sel & 0xfff8) + 7) > desctab.limit ) + goto fail; +--- xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c.orig 2016-11-22 15:03:33.000000000 +0100 ++++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c 2016-11-22 15:15:51.000000000 +0100 +@@ -517,6 +517,7 @@ + { + case x86_seg_cs: + memcpy(reg, &vmcb->cs, sizeof(*reg)); ++ reg->attr.fields.p = 1; + reg->attr.fields.g = reg->limit > 0xFFFFF; + break; + case x86_seg_ds: +@@ -550,13 +551,16 @@ + case x86_seg_tr: + svm_sync_vmcb(v); + memcpy(reg, &vmcb->tr, sizeof(*reg)); ++ reg->attr.fields.p = 1; + reg->attr.fields.type |= 0x2; + break; + case x86_seg_gdtr: + memcpy(reg, &vmcb->gdtr, sizeof(*reg)); ++ reg->attr.bytes = 0x80; + break; + case x86_seg_idtr: + memcpy(reg, &vmcb->idtr, sizeof(*reg)); ++ reg->attr.bytes = 0x80; + break; + case x86_seg_ldtr: + svm_sync_vmcb(v); +--- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c.orig 2016-11-22 15:03:33.000000000 +0100 ++++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c 2016-11-22 15:15:51.000000000 +0100 +@@ -809,10 +809,12 @@ + + vmx_vmcs_exit(v); + +- reg->attr.bytes = (attr & 0xff) | ((attr >> 4) & 0xf00); +- /* Unusable flag is folded into Present flag. */ +- if ( attr & (1u<<16) ) +- reg->attr.fields.p = 0; ++ /* ++ * Fold VT-x representation into Xen's representation. The Present bit is ++ * unconditionally set to the inverse of unusable. ++ */ ++ reg->attr.bytes = ++ (!(attr & (1u << 16)) << 7) | (attr & 0x7f) | ((attr >> 4) & 0xf00); + + /* Adjust for virtual 8086 mode */ + if ( v->arch.hvm_vmx.vmx_realmode && seg <= x86_seg_tr +@@ -892,11 +894,11 @@ + } + } + +- attr = ((attr & 0xf00) << 4) | (attr & 0xff); +- +- /* Not-present must mean unusable. */ +- if ( !reg->attr.fields.p ) +- attr |= (1u << 16); ++ /* ++ * Unfold Xen representation into VT-x representation. The unusable bit ++ * is unconditionally set to the inverse of present. ++ */ ++ attr = (!(attr & (1u << 7)) << 16) | ((attr & 0xf00) << 4) | (attr & 0xff); + + /* VMX has strict consistency requirement for flag G. */ + attr |= !!(limit >> 20) << 15; +--- xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c.orig 2016-11-22 15:03:34.000000000 +0100 ++++ xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c 2016-11-22 15:15:51.000000000 +0100 +@@ -1136,6 +1136,10 @@ + &desctab, ctxt)) ) + return rc; + ++ /* Segment not valid for use (cooked meaning of .p)? */ ++ if ( !desctab.attr.fields.p ) ++ goto raise_exn; ++ + /* Check against descriptor table limit. */ + if ( ((sel & 0xfff8) + 7) > desctab.limit ) + goto raise_exn; diff --git a/sysutils/xenkernel42/patches/patch-XSA-192 b/sysutils/xenkernel42/patches/patch-XSA-192 new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..304acf2b76e --- /dev/null +++ b/sysutils/xenkernel42/patches/patch-XSA-192 @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +$NetBSD: patch-XSA-192,v 1.1 2016/11/22 20:55:29 bouyer Exp $ + +From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> +Subject: x86/HVM: don't load LDTR with VM86 mode attrs during task switch + +Just like TR, LDTR is purely a protected mode facility and hence needs +to be loaded accordingly. Also move its loading to where it +architecurally belongs. + +This is XSA-192. + +Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> +Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> + +--- xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c.orig 2016-11-22 15:15:51.000000000 +0100 ++++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c 2016-11-22 15:29:02.000000000 +0100 +@@ -2072,16 +2072,15 @@ + } + + static int hvm_load_segment_selector( +- enum x86_segment seg, uint16_t sel) ++ enum x86_segment seg, uint16_t sel, unsigned int eflags) + { + struct segment_register desctab, cs, segr; + struct desc_struct *pdesc, desc; + u8 dpl, rpl, cpl; + int fault_type = TRAP_invalid_tss; +- struct cpu_user_regs *regs = guest_cpu_user_regs(); + struct vcpu *v = current; + +- if ( regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM ) ++ if ( eflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM ) + { + segr.sel = sel; + segr.base = (uint32_t)sel << 4; +@@ -2332,6 +2331,8 @@ + if ( rc != HVMCOPY_okay ) + goto out; + ++ if ( hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_ldtr, tss.ldt, 0) ) ++ goto out; + + if ( hvm_set_cr3(tss.cr3) ) + goto out; +@@ -2354,13 +2355,12 @@ + } + + exn_raised = 0; +- if ( hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_ldtr, tss.ldt) || +- hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_es, tss.es) || +- hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_cs, tss.cs) || +- hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_ss, tss.ss) || +- hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_ds, tss.ds) || +- hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_fs, tss.fs) || +- hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_gs, tss.gs) ) ++ if ( hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_es, tss.es, tss.eflags) || ++ hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_cs, tss.cs, tss.eflags) || ++ hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_ss, tss.ss, tss.eflags) || ++ hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_ds, tss.ds, tss.eflags) || ++ hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_fs, tss.fs, tss.eflags) || ++ hvm_load_segment_selector(x86_seg_gs, tss.gs, tss.eflags) ) + exn_raised = 1; + + rc = hvm_copy_to_guest_virt( diff --git a/sysutils/xenkernel42/patches/patch-XSA-195 b/sysutils/xenkernel42/patches/patch-XSA-195 new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..cd557389449 --- /dev/null +++ b/sysutils/xenkernel42/patches/patch-XSA-195 @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +$NetBSD: patch-XSA-195,v 1.1 2016/11/22 20:55:29 bouyer Exp $ + +backported from: + +From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> +Subject: x86emul: fix huge bit offset handling + +We must never chop off the high 32 bits. + +This is XSA-195. + +Reported-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com> +Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> +Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> + +--- xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c.orig 2016-11-22 15:15:51.000000000 +0100 ++++ xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c 2016-11-22 16:02:09.000000000 +0100 +@@ -1756,6 +1756,12 @@ + else + { + /* ++ * Instructions such as bt can reference an arbitrary offset from ++ * their memory operand, but the instruction doing the actual ++ * emulation needs the appropriate op_bytes read from memory. ++ * Adjust both the source register and memory operand to make an ++ * equivalent instruction. ++ * + * EA += BitOffset DIV op_bytes*8 + * BitOffset = BitOffset MOD op_bytes*8 + * DIV truncates towards negative infinity. +@@ -1767,14 +1773,15 @@ + src.val = (int32_t)src.val; + if ( (long)src.val < 0 ) + { +- unsigned long byte_offset; +- byte_offset = op_bytes + (((-src.val-1) >> 3) & ~(op_bytes-1)); ++ unsigned long byte_offset = ++ op_bytes + (((-src.val - 1) >> 3) & ~(op_bytes - 1L)); ++ + ea.mem.off -= byte_offset; + src.val = (byte_offset << 3) + src.val; + } + else + { +- ea.mem.off += (src.val >> 3) & ~(op_bytes - 1); ++ ea.mem.off += (src.val >> 3) & ~(op_bytes - 1L); + src.val &= (op_bytes << 3) - 1; + } + } |