Update xenkernel45 and xentools45 to 4.5.2.

Changes since 4.5.1 includes security fixes (most of which were already in
our local patches) and bug fixes. The complete list of changes
is there:
http://www.xenproject.org/downloads/xen-archives/xen-45-series/xen-452.html

6 files changed, 8 insertions, 296 deletions

diff --git a/sysutils/xenkernel45/Makefile b/sysutils/xenkernel45/Makefile
index 1270b76c98c..6e06c9e907b 100644
--- a/sysutils/xenkernel45/Makefile
+++ b/sysutils/xenkernel45/Makefile
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.12 2016/01/07 17:48:33 bouyer Exp $
+# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.13 2016/01/08 13:24:29 bouyer Exp $
 
-VERSION=	4.5.1
+VERSION=	4.5.2
 DISTNAME=	xen-${VERSION}
 PKGNAME=	xenkernel45-${VERSION}
-PKGREVISION=	2
+#PKGREVISION=	0
 CATEGORIES=	sysutils
 MASTER_SITES=	http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/${VERSION}/
 
diff --git a/sysutils/xenkernel45/distinfo b/sysutils/xenkernel45/distinfo
index c80c96e02bc..3bdd3a8c080 100644
--- a/sysutils/xenkernel45/distinfo
+++ b/sysutils/xenkernel45/distinfo
@@ -1,14 +1,10 @@
-$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.12 2016/01/07 17:48:33 bouyer Exp $
+$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.13 2016/01/08 13:24:29 bouyer Exp $
 
-SHA1 (xen-4.5.1.tar.gz) = f10328ce63625a5a7bfa3af5899c4432a467c051
-RMD160 (xen-4.5.1.tar.gz) = 4c449d799e041a52a94c00ee43a8c28fd4af1b96
-SHA512 (xen-4.5.1.tar.gz) = 9436243e26bc64bc836a179abdc3a6b1b6fa9d3f2170453092c18be71fa62e18cd4465a9154c0f28a7ac8d69d08361ba1defef240a51197f058c012c3855ba04
-Size (xen-4.5.1.tar.gz) = 18410400 bytes
+SHA1 (xen-4.5.2.tar.gz) = c764589afc817aee4a5df5fa5dc2c7b8ab79508b
+RMD160 (xen-4.5.2.tar.gz) = 953f81cd175b3cb9f591ce21d3c838ecb8e6a780
+SHA512 (xen-4.5.2.tar.gz) = e0ce01a5356c254bfde48fae0b0e005c42c1615a7ccf4c1ba7dcf90784777b53995e9a9ae4575e3f19ef341014b34cb8c06e39d68be359f7fd69830501a144dd
+Size (xen-4.5.2.tar.gz) = 18416220 bytes
 SHA1 (patch-CVE-2015-5307) = f140ec14cbb9d5194e926d8f34777ebddf3d6836
-SHA1 (patch-CVE-2015-7835) = b62858a3c615e564e56e52d84e4c7961fb63122d
-SHA1 (patch-CVE-2015-7969) = 4e3d5a6eeaaaa6b7ce656b24bf9ce40c174897f1
-SHA1 (patch-CVE-2015-7970) = 3e757e1f17b9c5861517c2a9ad88ec0f32b311e8
-SHA1 (patch-CVE-2015-7971) = 3bba0f79548ae55558a9d0aeadc9aac6d9c56252
 SHA1 (patch-CVE-2015-8339) = 080bc4c04ee5ad832756b11a65b1598f12eae97e
 SHA1 (patch-CVE-2015-8555) = 493a9229c2d5f8bd3bedc79166939d4883466645
 SHA1 (patch-Config.mk) = a2a104d023cea4e551a3ad40927d4884d6c610bf
diff --git a/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-CVE-2015-7835 b/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-CVE-2015-7835
deleted file mode 100644
index 38dac501b30..00000000000
--- a/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-CVE-2015-7835
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-$NetBSD: patch-CVE-2015-7835,v 1.1 2015/10/29 20:40:53 bouyer Exp $
- 
-Patch for CVE-2015-7835 aka XSA-148, from
-http://xenbits.xenproject.org/xsa/xsa148-4.5.patch
- 
-
---- xen/arch/x86/mm.c.orig
-+++ xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -162,7 +162,10 @@ static void put_superpage(unsigned long 
- static uint32_t base_disallow_mask;
- /* Global bit is allowed to be set on L1 PTEs. Intended for user mappings. */
- #define L1_DISALLOW_MASK ((base_disallow_mask | _PAGE_GNTTAB) & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL)
--#define L2_DISALLOW_MASK (base_disallow_mask & ~_PAGE_PSE)
-+
-+#define L2_DISALLOW_MASK (unlikely(opt_allow_superpage) \
-+                          ? base_disallow_mask & ~_PAGE_PSE \
-+                          : base_disallow_mask)
- 
- #define l3_disallow_mask(d) (!is_pv_32on64_domain(d) ?  \
-                              base_disallow_mask :       \
-@@ -1770,7 +1773,10 @@ static int mod_l2_entry(l2_pgentry_t *pl
-         }
- 
-         /* Fast path for identical mapping and presence. */
--        if ( !l2e_has_changed(ol2e, nl2e, _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-+        if ( !l2e_has_changed(ol2e, nl2e,
-+                              unlikely(opt_allow_superpage)
-+                              ? _PAGE_PSE | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_PRESENT
-+                              : _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-         {
-             adjust_guest_l2e(nl2e, d);
-             if ( UPDATE_ENTRY(l2, pl2e, ol2e, nl2e, pfn, vcpu, preserve_ad) )
diff --git a/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-CVE-2015-7969 b/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-CVE-2015-7969
deleted file mode 100644
index dfe82e224d3..00000000000
--- a/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-CVE-2015-7969
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-$NetBSD: patch-CVE-2015-7969,v 1.1 2015/10/29 20:40:53 bouyer Exp $
- 
-Patch for CVE-2015-7869 aka XSA-149 + XSA-151, from
-http://xenbits.xenproject.org/xsa/xsa149.patch
-http://xenbits.xenproject.org/xsa/xsa151.patch
- 
---- xen/common/domain.c.orig
-+++ xen/common/domain.c
-@@ -841,6 +841,7 @@ static void complete_domain_destroy(stru
- 
-     xsm_free_security_domain(d);
-     free_cpumask_var(d->domain_dirty_cpumask);
-+    xfree(d->vcpu);
-     free_domain_struct(d);
- 
-     send_global_virq(VIRQ_DOM_EXC);
-
---- xen/common/xenoprof.c.orig
-+++ xen/common/xenoprof.c
-@@ -239,6 +239,7 @@ static int alloc_xenoprof_struct(
-     d->xenoprof->rawbuf = alloc_xenheap_pages(get_order_from_pages(npages), 0);
-     if ( d->xenoprof->rawbuf == NULL )
-     {
-+        xfree(d->xenoprof->vcpu);
-         xfree(d->xenoprof);
-         d->xenoprof = NULL;
-         return -ENOMEM;
-@@ -286,6 +287,7 @@ void free_xenoprof_pages(struct domain *
-         free_xenheap_pages(x->rawbuf, order);
-     }
- 
-+    xfree(x->vcpu);
-     xfree(x);
-     d->xenoprof = NULL;
- }
diff --git a/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-CVE-2015-7970 b/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-CVE-2015-7970
deleted file mode 100644
index 79a37b0d58c..00000000000
--- a/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-CVE-2015-7970
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,182 +0,0 @@
-$NetBSD: patch-CVE-2015-7970,v 1.1 2015/10/29 20:40:53 bouyer Exp $
- 
-Patch for CVE-2015-7970 aka XSA-150, from
-http://xenbits.xenproject.org/xsa/xsa150.patch
-
---- xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c.orig
-+++ xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c
-@@ -920,28 +920,6 @@ p2m_pod_zero_check(struct p2m_domain *p2
- }
- 
- #define POD_SWEEP_LIMIT 1024
--
--/* When populating a new superpage, look at recently populated superpages
-- * hoping that they've been zeroed.  This will snap up zeroed pages as soon as 
-- * the guest OS is done with them. */
--static void
--p2m_pod_check_last_super(struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long gfn_aligned)
--{
--    unsigned long check_gfn;
--
--    ASSERT(p2m->pod.last_populated_index < POD_HISTORY_MAX);
--
--    check_gfn = p2m->pod.last_populated[p2m->pod.last_populated_index];
--
--    p2m->pod.last_populated[p2m->pod.last_populated_index] = gfn_aligned;
--
--    p2m->pod.last_populated_index =
--        ( p2m->pod.last_populated_index + 1 ) % POD_HISTORY_MAX;
--
--    p2m_pod_zero_check_superpage(p2m, check_gfn);
--}
--
--
- #define POD_SWEEP_STRIDE  16
- static void
- p2m_pod_emergency_sweep(struct p2m_domain *p2m)
-@@ -982,7 +960,7 @@ p2m_pod_emergency_sweep(struct p2m_domai
-          * NB that this is a zero-sum game; we're increasing our cache size
-          * by re-increasing our 'debt'.  Since we hold the pod lock,
-          * (entry_count - count) must remain the same. */
--        if ( p2m->pod.count > 0 && i < limit )
-+        if ( i < limit && (p2m->pod.count > 0 || hypercall_preempt_check()) )
-             break;
-     }
- 
-@@ -994,6 +972,58 @@ p2m_pod_emergency_sweep(struct p2m_domai
- 
- }
- 
-+static void pod_eager_reclaim(struct p2m_domain *p2m)
-+{
-+    struct pod_mrp_list *mrp = &p2m->pod.mrp;
-+    unsigned int i = 0;
-+
-+    /*
-+     * Always check one page for reclaimation.
-+     *
-+     * If the PoD pool is empty, keep checking some space is found, or all
-+     * entries have been exhaused.
-+     */
-+    do
-+    {
-+        unsigned int idx = (mrp->idx + i++) % ARRAY_SIZE(mrp->list);
-+        unsigned long gfn = mrp->list[idx];
-+
-+        if ( gfn != INVALID_GFN )
-+        {
-+            if ( gfn & POD_LAST_SUPERPAGE )
-+            {
-+                gfn &= ~POD_LAST_SUPERPAGE;
-+
-+                if ( p2m_pod_zero_check_superpage(p2m, gfn) == 0 )
-+                {
-+                    unsigned int x;
-+
-+                    for ( x = 0; x < SUPERPAGE_PAGES; ++x, ++gfn )
-+                        p2m_pod_zero_check(p2m, &gfn, 1);
-+                }
-+            }
-+            else
-+                p2m_pod_zero_check(p2m, &gfn, 1);
-+
-+            mrp->list[idx] = INVALID_GFN;
-+        }
-+
-+    } while ( (p2m->pod.count == 0) && (i < ARRAY_SIZE(mrp->list)) );
-+}
-+
-+static void pod_eager_record(struct p2m_domain *p2m,
-+                             unsigned long gfn, unsigned int order)
-+{
-+    struct pod_mrp_list *mrp = &p2m->pod.mrp;
-+
-+    ASSERT(mrp->list[mrp->idx] == INVALID_GFN);
-+    ASSERT(gfn != INVALID_GFN);
-+
-+    mrp->list[mrp->idx++] =
-+        gfn | (order == PAGE_ORDER_2M ? POD_LAST_SUPERPAGE : 0);
-+    mrp->idx %= ARRAY_SIZE(mrp->list);
-+}
-+
- int
- p2m_pod_demand_populate(struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long gfn,
-                         unsigned int order,
-@@ -1034,6 +1064,8 @@ p2m_pod_demand_populate(struct p2m_domai
-         return 0;
-     }
- 
-+    pod_eager_reclaim(p2m);
-+
-     /* Only sweep if we're actually out of memory.  Doing anything else
-      * causes unnecessary time and fragmentation of superpages in the p2m. */
-     if ( p2m->pod.count == 0 )
-@@ -1070,6 +1102,8 @@ p2m_pod_demand_populate(struct p2m_domai
-     p2m->pod.entry_count -= (1 << order);
-     BUG_ON(p2m->pod.entry_count < 0);
- 
-+    pod_eager_record(p2m, gfn_aligned, order);
-+
-     if ( tb_init_done )
-     {
-         struct {
-@@ -1085,12 +1119,6 @@ p2m_pod_demand_populate(struct p2m_domai
-         __trace_var(TRC_MEM_POD_POPULATE, 0, sizeof(t), &t);
-     }
- 
--    /* Check the last guest demand-populate */
--    if ( p2m->pod.entry_count > p2m->pod.count 
--         && (order == PAGE_ORDER_2M)
--         && (q & P2M_ALLOC) )
--        p2m_pod_check_last_super(p2m, gfn_aligned);
--
-     pod_unlock(p2m);
-     return 0;
- out_of_memory:
---- xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c.orig
-+++ xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
-@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ boolean_param("hap_2mb", opt_hap_2mb);
- /* Init the datastructures for later use by the p2m code */
- static int p2m_initialise(struct domain *d, struct p2m_domain *p2m)
- {
-+    unsigned int i;
-     int ret = 0;
- 
-     mm_rwlock_init(&p2m->lock);
-@@ -73,6 +74,9 @@ static int p2m_initialise(struct domain 
- 
-     p2m->np2m_base = P2M_BASE_EADDR;
- 
-+    for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(p2m->pod.mrp.list); ++i )
-+        p2m->pod.mrp.list[i] = INVALID_GFN;
-+
-     if ( hap_enabled(d) && cpu_has_vmx )
-         ret = ept_p2m_init(p2m);
-     else
---- xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h.orig
-+++ xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
-@@ -292,10 +292,20 @@ struct p2m_domain {
-                          entry_count;  /* # of pages in p2m marked pod      */
-         unsigned long    reclaim_single; /* Last gpfn of a scan */
-         unsigned long    max_guest;    /* gpfn of max guest demand-populate */
--#define POD_HISTORY_MAX 128
--        /* gpfn of last guest superpage demand-populated */
--        unsigned long    last_populated[POD_HISTORY_MAX]; 
--        unsigned int     last_populated_index;
-+
-+        /*
-+         * Tracking of the most recently populated PoD pages, for eager
-+         * reclamation.
-+         */
-+        struct pod_mrp_list {
-+#define NR_POD_MRP_ENTRIES 32
-+
-+/* Encode ORDER_2M superpage in top bit of GFN */
-+#define POD_LAST_SUPERPAGE (INVALID_GFN & ~(INVALID_GFN >> 1))
-+
-+            unsigned long list[NR_POD_MRP_ENTRIES];
-+            unsigned int idx;
-+        } mrp;
-         mm_lock_t        lock;         /* Locking of private pod structs,   *
-                                         * not relying on the p2m lock.      */
-     } pod;
diff --git a/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-CVE-2015-7971 b/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-CVE-2015-7971
deleted file mode 100644
index 7724c92a3b3..00000000000
--- a/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-CVE-2015-7971
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-$NetBSD: patch-CVE-2015-7971,v 1.1 2015/10/29 20:40:53 bouyer Exp $
- 
-Patch for CVE-2015-7971 aka XSA-152, based on 
-http://xenbits.xenproject.org/xsa/xsa152.patch
-
---- xen/common/xenoprof.c.orig
-+++ xen/common/xenoprof.c
-@@ -676,15 +676,13 @@ ret_t do_xenoprof_op(int op, XEN_GUEST_H
-     
-     if ( (op < 0) || (op > XENOPROF_last_op) )
-     {
--        printk("xenoprof: invalid operation %d for domain %d\n",
--               op, current->domain->domain_id);
-+        gdprintk(XENLOG_DEBUG, "invalid operation %d\n", op);
-         return -EINVAL;
-     }
- 
-     if ( !NONPRIV_OP(op) && (current->domain != xenoprof_primary_profiler) )
-     {
--        printk("xenoprof: dom %d denied privileged operation %d\n",
--               current->domain->domain_id, op);
-+        gdprintk(XENLOG_DEBUG, "denied privileged operation %d\n", op);
-         return -EPERM;
-     }
- 
-@@ -907,8 +905,7 @@ ret_t do_xenoprof_op(int op, XEN_GUEST_H
-     spin_unlock(&xenoprof_lock);
- 
-     if ( ret < 0 )
--        printk("xenoprof: operation %d failed for dom %d (status : %d)\n",
--               op, current->domain->domain_id, ret);
-+        gdprintk(XENLOG_DEBUG, "operation %d failed: %d\n", op, ret);
- 
-     return ret;
- }