Add patches from Xen security advisory, fixing:

CVE-2015-7835 aka XSA-148
CVE-2015-7869 aka XSA-149 + XSA-151
CVE-2015-7970 aka XSA-150
CVE-2015-7971 aka XSA-152
Bump PKGREVISION

5 files changed, 286 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/sysutils/xenkernel45/Makefile b/sysutils/xenkernel45/Makefile
index 4c0c9c15dda..0e84ebfe4ce 100644
--- a/sysutils/xenkernel45/Makefile
+++ b/sysutils/xenkernel45/Makefile
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
-# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.9 2015/06/23 17:45:33 bouyer Exp $
+# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.10 2015/10/29 20:40:53 bouyer Exp $
 
 VERSION=	4.5.1
 DISTNAME=	xen-${VERSION}
 PKGNAME=	xenkernel45-${VERSION}
+PKGREVISION=	1
 CATEGORIES=	sysutils
 MASTER_SITES=	http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/${VERSION}/
 
diff --git a/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-CVE-2015-7835 b/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-CVE-2015-7835
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..38dac501b30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-CVE-2015-7835
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-CVE-2015-7835,v 1.1 2015/10/29 20:40:53 bouyer Exp $
+ 
+Patch for CVE-2015-7835 aka XSA-148, from
+http://xenbits.xenproject.org/xsa/xsa148-4.5.patch
+ 
+
+--- xen/arch/x86/mm.c.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+@@ -162,7 +162,10 @@ static void put_superpage(unsigned long 
+ static uint32_t base_disallow_mask;
+ /* Global bit is allowed to be set on L1 PTEs. Intended for user mappings. */
+ #define L1_DISALLOW_MASK ((base_disallow_mask | _PAGE_GNTTAB) & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL)
+-#define L2_DISALLOW_MASK (base_disallow_mask & ~_PAGE_PSE)
++
++#define L2_DISALLOW_MASK (unlikely(opt_allow_superpage) \
++                          ? base_disallow_mask & ~_PAGE_PSE \
++                          : base_disallow_mask)
+ 
+ #define l3_disallow_mask(d) (!is_pv_32on64_domain(d) ?  \
+                              base_disallow_mask :       \
+@@ -1770,7 +1773,10 @@ static int mod_l2_entry(l2_pgentry_t *pl
+         }
+ 
+         /* Fast path for identical mapping and presence. */
+-        if ( !l2e_has_changed(ol2e, nl2e, _PAGE_PRESENT) )
++        if ( !l2e_has_changed(ol2e, nl2e,
++                              unlikely(opt_allow_superpage)
++                              ? _PAGE_PSE | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_PRESENT
++                              : _PAGE_PRESENT) )
+         {
+             adjust_guest_l2e(nl2e, d);
+             if ( UPDATE_ENTRY(l2, pl2e, ol2e, nl2e, pfn, vcpu, preserve_ad) )
diff --git a/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-CVE-2015-7969 b/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-CVE-2015-7969
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..dfe82e224d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-CVE-2015-7969
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-CVE-2015-7969,v 1.1 2015/10/29 20:40:53 bouyer Exp $
+ 
+Patch for CVE-2015-7869 aka XSA-149 + XSA-151, from
+http://xenbits.xenproject.org/xsa/xsa149.patch
+http://xenbits.xenproject.org/xsa/xsa151.patch
+ 
+--- xen/common/domain.c.orig
++++ xen/common/domain.c
+@@ -841,6 +841,7 @@ static void complete_domain_destroy(stru
+ 
+     xsm_free_security_domain(d);
+     free_cpumask_var(d->domain_dirty_cpumask);
++    xfree(d->vcpu);
+     free_domain_struct(d);
+ 
+     send_global_virq(VIRQ_DOM_EXC);
+
+--- xen/common/xenoprof.c.orig
++++ xen/common/xenoprof.c
+@@ -239,6 +239,7 @@ static int alloc_xenoprof_struct(
+     d->xenoprof->rawbuf = alloc_xenheap_pages(get_order_from_pages(npages), 0);
+     if ( d->xenoprof->rawbuf == NULL )
+     {
++        xfree(d->xenoprof->vcpu);
+         xfree(d->xenoprof);
+         d->xenoprof = NULL;
+         return -ENOMEM;
+@@ -286,6 +287,7 @@ void free_xenoprof_pages(struct domain *
+         free_xenheap_pages(x->rawbuf, order);
+     }
+ 
++    xfree(x->vcpu);
+     xfree(x);
+     d->xenoprof = NULL;
+ }
diff --git a/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-CVE-2015-7970 b/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-CVE-2015-7970
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..79a37b0d58c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-CVE-2015-7970
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-CVE-2015-7970,v 1.1 2015/10/29 20:40:53 bouyer Exp $
+ 
+Patch for CVE-2015-7970 aka XSA-150, from
+http://xenbits.xenproject.org/xsa/xsa150.patch
+
+--- xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c
+@@ -920,28 +920,6 @@ p2m_pod_zero_check(struct p2m_domain *p2
+ }
+ 
+ #define POD_SWEEP_LIMIT 1024
+-
+-/* When populating a new superpage, look at recently populated superpages
+- * hoping that they've been zeroed.  This will snap up zeroed pages as soon as 
+- * the guest OS is done with them. */
+-static void
+-p2m_pod_check_last_super(struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long gfn_aligned)
+-{
+-    unsigned long check_gfn;
+-
+-    ASSERT(p2m->pod.last_populated_index < POD_HISTORY_MAX);
+-
+-    check_gfn = p2m->pod.last_populated[p2m->pod.last_populated_index];
+-
+-    p2m->pod.last_populated[p2m->pod.last_populated_index] = gfn_aligned;
+-
+-    p2m->pod.last_populated_index =
+-        ( p2m->pod.last_populated_index + 1 ) % POD_HISTORY_MAX;
+-
+-    p2m_pod_zero_check_superpage(p2m, check_gfn);
+-}
+-
+-
+ #define POD_SWEEP_STRIDE  16
+ static void
+ p2m_pod_emergency_sweep(struct p2m_domain *p2m)
+@@ -982,7 +960,7 @@ p2m_pod_emergency_sweep(struct p2m_domai
+          * NB that this is a zero-sum game; we're increasing our cache size
+          * by re-increasing our 'debt'.  Since we hold the pod lock,
+          * (entry_count - count) must remain the same. */
+-        if ( p2m->pod.count > 0 && i < limit )
++        if ( i < limit && (p2m->pod.count > 0 || hypercall_preempt_check()) )
+             break;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -994,6 +972,58 @@ p2m_pod_emergency_sweep(struct p2m_domai
+ 
+ }
+ 
++static void pod_eager_reclaim(struct p2m_domain *p2m)
++{
++    struct pod_mrp_list *mrp = &p2m->pod.mrp;
++    unsigned int i = 0;
++
++    /*
++     * Always check one page for reclaimation.
++     *
++     * If the PoD pool is empty, keep checking some space is found, or all
++     * entries have been exhaused.
++     */
++    do
++    {
++        unsigned int idx = (mrp->idx + i++) % ARRAY_SIZE(mrp->list);
++        unsigned long gfn = mrp->list[idx];
++
++        if ( gfn != INVALID_GFN )
++        {
++            if ( gfn & POD_LAST_SUPERPAGE )
++            {
++                gfn &= ~POD_LAST_SUPERPAGE;
++
++                if ( p2m_pod_zero_check_superpage(p2m, gfn) == 0 )
++                {
++                    unsigned int x;
++
++                    for ( x = 0; x < SUPERPAGE_PAGES; ++x, ++gfn )
++                        p2m_pod_zero_check(p2m, &gfn, 1);
++                }
++            }
++            else
++                p2m_pod_zero_check(p2m, &gfn, 1);
++
++            mrp->list[idx] = INVALID_GFN;
++        }
++
++    } while ( (p2m->pod.count == 0) && (i < ARRAY_SIZE(mrp->list)) );
++}
++
++static void pod_eager_record(struct p2m_domain *p2m,
++                             unsigned long gfn, unsigned int order)
++{
++    struct pod_mrp_list *mrp = &p2m->pod.mrp;
++
++    ASSERT(mrp->list[mrp->idx] == INVALID_GFN);
++    ASSERT(gfn != INVALID_GFN);
++
++    mrp->list[mrp->idx++] =
++        gfn | (order == PAGE_ORDER_2M ? POD_LAST_SUPERPAGE : 0);
++    mrp->idx %= ARRAY_SIZE(mrp->list);
++}
++
+ int
+ p2m_pod_demand_populate(struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long gfn,
+                         unsigned int order,
+@@ -1034,6 +1064,8 @@ p2m_pod_demand_populate(struct p2m_domai
+         return 0;
+     }
+ 
++    pod_eager_reclaim(p2m);
++
+     /* Only sweep if we're actually out of memory.  Doing anything else
+      * causes unnecessary time and fragmentation of superpages in the p2m. */
+     if ( p2m->pod.count == 0 )
+@@ -1070,6 +1102,8 @@ p2m_pod_demand_populate(struct p2m_domai
+     p2m->pod.entry_count -= (1 << order);
+     BUG_ON(p2m->pod.entry_count < 0);
+ 
++    pod_eager_record(p2m, gfn_aligned, order);
++
+     if ( tb_init_done )
+     {
+         struct {
+@@ -1085,12 +1119,6 @@ p2m_pod_demand_populate(struct p2m_domai
+         __trace_var(TRC_MEM_POD_POPULATE, 0, sizeof(t), &t);
+     }
+ 
+-    /* Check the last guest demand-populate */
+-    if ( p2m->pod.entry_count > p2m->pod.count 
+-         && (order == PAGE_ORDER_2M)
+-         && (q & P2M_ALLOC) )
+-        p2m_pod_check_last_super(p2m, gfn_aligned);
+-
+     pod_unlock(p2m);
+     return 0;
+ out_of_memory:
+--- xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
+@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ boolean_param("hap_2mb", opt_hap_2mb);
+ /* Init the datastructures for later use by the p2m code */
+ static int p2m_initialise(struct domain *d, struct p2m_domain *p2m)
+ {
++    unsigned int i;
+     int ret = 0;
+ 
+     mm_rwlock_init(&p2m->lock);
+@@ -73,6 +74,9 @@ static int p2m_initialise(struct domain 
+ 
+     p2m->np2m_base = P2M_BASE_EADDR;
+ 
++    for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(p2m->pod.mrp.list); ++i )
++        p2m->pod.mrp.list[i] = INVALID_GFN;
++
+     if ( hap_enabled(d) && cpu_has_vmx )
+         ret = ept_p2m_init(p2m);
+     else
+--- xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h.orig
++++ xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
+@@ -292,10 +292,20 @@ struct p2m_domain {
+                          entry_count;  /* # of pages in p2m marked pod      */
+         unsigned long    reclaim_single; /* Last gpfn of a scan */
+         unsigned long    max_guest;    /* gpfn of max guest demand-populate */
+-#define POD_HISTORY_MAX 128
+-        /* gpfn of last guest superpage demand-populated */
+-        unsigned long    last_populated[POD_HISTORY_MAX]; 
+-        unsigned int     last_populated_index;
++
++        /*
++         * Tracking of the most recently populated PoD pages, for eager
++         * reclamation.
++         */
++        struct pod_mrp_list {
++#define NR_POD_MRP_ENTRIES 32
++
++/* Encode ORDER_2M superpage in top bit of GFN */
++#define POD_LAST_SUPERPAGE (INVALID_GFN & ~(INVALID_GFN >> 1))
++
++            unsigned long list[NR_POD_MRP_ENTRIES];
++            unsigned int idx;
++        } mrp;
+         mm_lock_t        lock;         /* Locking of private pod structs,   *
+                                         * not relying on the p2m lock.      */
+     } pod;
diff --git a/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-CVE-2015-7971 b/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-CVE-2015-7971
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..7724c92a3b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-CVE-2015-7971
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-CVE-2015-7971,v 1.1 2015/10/29 20:40:53 bouyer Exp $
+ 
+Patch for CVE-2015-7971 aka XSA-152, based on 
+http://xenbits.xenproject.org/xsa/xsa152.patch
+
+--- xen/common/xenoprof.c.orig
++++ xen/common/xenoprof.c
+@@ -676,15 +676,13 @@ ret_t do_xenoprof_op(int op, XEN_GUEST_H
+     
+     if ( (op < 0) || (op > XENOPROF_last_op) )
+     {
+-        printk("xenoprof: invalid operation %d for domain %d\n",
+-               op, current->domain->domain_id);
++        gdprintk(XENLOG_DEBUG, "invalid operation %d\n", op);
+         return -EINVAL;
+     }
+ 
+     if ( !NONPRIV_OP(op) && (current->domain != xenoprof_primary_profiler) )
+     {
+-        printk("xenoprof: dom %d denied privileged operation %d\n",
+-               current->domain->domain_id, op);
++        gdprintk(XENLOG_DEBUG, "denied privileged operation %d\n", op);
+         return -EPERM;
+     }
+ 
+@@ -907,8 +905,7 @@ ret_t do_xenoprof_op(int op, XEN_GUEST_H
+     spin_unlock(&xenoprof_lock);
+ 
+     if ( ret < 0 )
+-        printk("xenoprof: operation %d failed for dom %d (status : %d)\n",
+-               op, current->domain->domain_id, ret);
++        gdprintk(XENLOG_DEBUG, "operation %d failed: %d\n", op, ret);
+ 
+     return ret;
+ }