Add patch for security vulnerabilities reported in CVE-2012-0021

and CVE-2012-0053 taken from Apache SVN repository.

4 files changed, 136 insertions, 6 deletions

diff --git a/www/apache22/Makefile b/www/apache22/Makefile
index 5d95de2c05b..c0cb8d2bbb9 100644
--- a/www/apache22/Makefile
+++ b/www/apache22/Makefile
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.77 2012/01/17 20:48:28 spz Exp $
+# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.78 2012/01/29 12:29:07 tron Exp $
 
 DISTNAME=	httpd-2.2.21
 
 PKGNAME=	${DISTNAME:S/httpd/apache/}
-PKGREVISION=	6
+PKGREVISION=	7
 CATEGORIES=	www
 MASTER_SITES=	${MASTER_SITE_APACHE:=httpd/} \
 		http://archive.apache.org/dist/httpd/ \
diff --git a/www/apache22/distinfo b/www/apache22/distinfo
index 6654b10c356..0eb940dfe5e 100644
--- a/www/apache22/distinfo
+++ b/www/apache22/distinfo
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
-$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.48 2012/01/17 20:48:28 spz Exp $
+$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.49 2012/01/29 12:29:07 tron Exp $
 
 SHA1 (httpd-2.2.21.tar.bz2) = c02f9b05da9a7e316ff37d9053dc76a57ba51cb4
 RMD160 (httpd-2.2.21.tar.bz2) = 6464a03d78ab858b1288ea9eef4cd5f73b60a9f1
 Size (httpd-2.2.21.tar.bz2) = 5324905 bytes
+SHA1 (patch-CVE-2012-0021) = 8c44c591ffa3a4ca32de47c71d1aa8470de81f1e
 SHA1 (patch-aa) = e0bfdf6bc9cb034bea46a390a12a5508e363c9a7
 SHA1 (patch-ab) = 365cc3b0ac2d9d68ccb94f5699fe168a1c9b0150
 SHA1 (patch-ac) = 515043b5c215d49fe8f6d3191b502c978e2a2dad
@@ -18,6 +19,6 @@ SHA1 (patch-lock.c) = 770ca03f1cb4421879bd5baa5a7c30cc91acb6e1
 SHA1 (patch-modules_mappers_mod_rewrite.c) = de7bbdf02dda38e2542e4967ee6f22745ec0f118
 SHA1 (patch-modules_proxy_mod_proxy.c) = bab58b70eee22d7c08be9a4a9ada3fad886fa796
 SHA1 (patch-repos.c) = 0e0361b91d4b0fe6c7c55a12fdfd2e6aacc710e1
-SHA1 (patch-server_protocol.c) = 2be3e4fc08da717fa55b058eb32e398f6546d457
+SHA1 (patch-server_protocol.c) = dc99717704f53837dfd7b9c1018487a787dcbfd9
 SHA1 (patch-server_scoreboard.c) = 8d1e007f8d1d6a6db827a41d82369749e603a2b3
 SHA1 (patch-server_util.c) = 37e9c357618a9645222cd981f0ccb04c7987fe15
diff --git a/www/apache22/patches/patch-CVE-2012-0021 b/www/apache22/patches/patch-CVE-2012-0021
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..80d11463546
--- /dev/null
+++ b/www/apache22/patches/patch-CVE-2012-0021
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-CVE-2012-0021,v 1.1 2012/01/29 12:29:08 tron Exp $
+
+Fix security vulnerability reported in CVE-2012-0021. Patch taken from
+Apache SVN repository:
+
+http://svn.apache.org/viewvc?view=revision&revision=1227292
+
+--- modules/loggers/mod_log_config.c.orig	2010-08-24 07:41:38.000000000 +0100
++++ modules/loggers/mod_log_config.c	2012-01-29 12:08:13.000000000 +0000
+@@ -524,19 +524,21 @@
+ 
+         while ((cookie = apr_strtok(cookies, ";", &last1))) {
+             char *name = apr_strtok(cookie, "=", &last2);
+-            char *value;
+-            apr_collapse_spaces(name, name);
++            if (name) {
++                char *value;
++                apr_collapse_spaces(name, name);
++
++                if (!strcasecmp(name, a) && (value = apr_strtok(NULL, "=", &last2))) {
++                    char *last;
++                    value += strspn(value, " \t");  /* Move past leading WS */
++                    last = value + strlen(value) - 1;
++                    while (last >= value && apr_isspace(*last)) {
++                       *last = '\0';
++                       --last;
++                    }
+ 
+-            if (!strcasecmp(name, a) && (value = apr_strtok(NULL, "=", &last2))) {
+-                char *last;
+-                value += strspn(value, " \t");  /* Move past leading WS */
+-                last = value + strlen(value) - 1;
+-                while (last >= value && apr_isspace(*last)) {
+-                   *last = '\0';
+-                   --last;
++                    return ap_escape_logitem(r->pool, value);
+                 }
+-
+-                return ap_escape_logitem(r->pool, value);
+             }
+             cookies = NULL;
+         }
diff --git a/www/apache22/patches/patch-server_protocol.c b/www/apache22/patches/patch-server_protocol.c
index 336edb08fc1..2aa8c2ad9ae 100644
--- a/www/apache22/patches/patch-server_protocol.c
+++ b/www/apache22/patches/patch-server_protocol.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-$NetBSD: patch-server_protocol.c,v 1.3 2011/12/12 18:43:14 tron Exp $
+$NetBSD: patch-server_protocol.c,v 1.4 2012/01/29 12:29:08 tron Exp $
 
 revision 1179239 from http://svn.apache.org/:
 	SECURITY (CVE-2011-3368): Prevent unintended pattern expansion
@@ -12,8 +12,13 @@ revision 1179525 from http://svn.apache.org/:
 	  request-URI does not match the grammar from RFC 2616.  This ensures
 	  the input string for RewriteRule et al really is an absolute path.
 
+revision 1235454 from http://svn.apache.org/:
+	CVE-2012-0053: Fix an issue in error responses that could expose 
+	"httpOnly" cookies when no custom ErrorDocument is specified for 
+	status code 400.
+
 --- server/protocol.c.orig	2011-05-07 12:39:29.000000000 +0100
-+++ server/protocol.c	2011-12-12 18:37:04.000000000 +0000
++++ server/protocol.c	2012-01-29 12:22:25.000000000 +0000
 @@ -640,6 +640,25 @@
  
      ap_parse_uri(r, uri);
@@ -40,3 +45,85 @@ revision 1179525 from http://svn.apache.org/:
      if (ll[0]) {
          r->assbackwards = 0;
          pro = ll;
+@@ -670,6 +689,16 @@
+     return 1;
+ }
+ 
++/* get the length of the field name for logging, but no more than 80 bytes */
++#define LOG_NAME_MAX_LEN 80
++static int field_name_len(const char *field)
++{
++    const char *end = ap_strchr_c(field, ':');
++    if (end == NULL || end - field > LOG_NAME_MAX_LEN)
++        return LOG_NAME_MAX_LEN;
++    return end - field;
++}
++
+ AP_DECLARE(void) ap_get_mime_headers_core(request_rec *r, apr_bucket_brigade *bb)
+ {
+     char *last_field = NULL;
+@@ -709,12 +738,15 @@
+                 /* insure ap_escape_html will terminate correctly */
+                 field[len - 1] = '\0';
+                 apr_table_setn(r->notes, "error-notes",
+-                               apr_pstrcat(r->pool,
++                               apr_psprintf(r->pool,
+                                            "Size of a request header field "
+                                            "exceeds server limit.<br />\n"
+-                                           "<pre>\n",
+-                                           ap_escape_html(r->pool, field),
+-                                           "</pre>\n", NULL));
++                                           "<pre>\n%.*s\n</pre>/n",
++                                           field_name_len(field), 
++                                           ap_escape_html(r->pool, field)));
++                ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, 
++                              "Request header exceeds LimitRequestFieldSize: "
++                              "%.*s", field_name_len(field), field);
+             }
+             return;
+         }
+@@ -735,13 +767,17 @@
+                      * overflow (last_field) as the field with the problem
+                      */
+                     apr_table_setn(r->notes, "error-notes",
+-                                   apr_pstrcat(r->pool,
++                                   apr_psprintf(r->pool,
+                                                "Size of a request header field "
+                                                "after folding "
+                                                "exceeds server limit.<br />\n"
+-                                               "<pre>\n",
+-                                               ap_escape_html(r->pool, last_field),
+-                                               "</pre>\n", NULL));
++                                               "<pre>\n%.*s\n</pre>\n",
++                                               field_name_len(last_field),
++                                               ap_escape_html(r->pool, last_field)));
++                    ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r,
++                                  "Request header exceeds LimitRequestFieldSize "
++                                  "after folding: %.*s",
++                                  field_name_len(last_field), last_field);
+                     return;
+                 }
+ 
+@@ -773,13 +809,18 @@
+                 if (!(value = strchr(last_field, ':'))) { /* Find ':' or    */
+                     r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;      /* abort bad request */
+                     apr_table_setn(r->notes, "error-notes",
+-                                   apr_pstrcat(r->pool,
++                                   apr_psprintf(r->pool,
+                                                "Request header field is "
+                                                "missing ':' separator.<br />\n"
+-                                               "<pre>\n",
++                                               "<pre>\n%.*s</pre>\n",
++                                               (int)LOG_NAME_MAX_LEN,
+                                                ap_escape_html(r->pool,
+-                                                              last_field),
+-                                               "</pre>\n", NULL));
++                                                              last_field)));
++                    ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r,
++                                  "Request header field is missing ':' "
++                                  "separator: %.*s", (int)LOG_NAME_MAX_LEN,
++                                  last_field);
++
+                     return;
+                 }
+