diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/openssl/patches/patch-ah')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/openssl/patches/patch-ah | 55 |
1 files changed, 55 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/openssl/patches/patch-ah b/security/openssl/patches/patch-ah new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..ede9af6ae95 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/openssl/patches/patch-ah @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +$NetBSD: patch-ah,v 1.4 2003/03/21 18:40:49 seb Exp $ + +--- ssl/s3_srvr.c.orig 2002-08-08 21:17:58.000000000 +0000 ++++ ssl/s3_srvr.c +@@ -1418,7 +1418,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange( + if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) + { + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; +- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); ++ /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */ + } + + if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) +@@ -1434,30 +1434,29 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange( + (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff)))) + { + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; +- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); +- goto f_err; ++ /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */ ++ ++ /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack ++ * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version ++ * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would ++ * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext ++ * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except ++ * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks, ++ * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */ ++ p[0] = (char)(int) "CAN-2003-0131 patch 2003-03-19"; + } + } + + if (al != -1) + { +-#if 0 +- goto f_err; +-#else + /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure + * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding +- * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). +- * But note that due to length and protocol version checking, the +- * attack is impractical anyway (see section 5 in D. Bleichenbacher: +- * "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA +- * Encryption Standard PKCS #1", CRYPTO '98, LNCS 1462, pp. 1-12). +- */ ++ * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */ + ERR_clear_error(); + i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; + p[0] = s->client_version >> 8; + p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; + RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2); /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */ +-#endif + } + + s->session->master_key_length= |