diff options
author | Stefan Fritsch <sf@sfritsch.de> | 2015-12-19 09:17:42 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Stefan Fritsch <sf@sfritsch.de> | 2015-12-19 09:17:42 +0100 |
commit | d5325781b38052fbdf4cc28a6c6d3052b9424b51 (patch) | |
tree | 0dd970f541f3d816f3b2217a9cd7a77f1733cbc9 /modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c | |
parent | f775596dea7222b55efc18005acf1919609c3602 (diff) | |
download | apache2-d5325781b38052fbdf4cc28a6c6d3052b9424b51.tar.gz |
Imported Upstream version 2.4.18
Diffstat (limited to 'modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c')
-rw-r--r-- | modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c | 216 |
1 files changed, 198 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c b/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c index cd07b1bc..f3699773 100644 --- a/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c +++ b/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c @@ -113,6 +113,108 @@ static int has_buffered_data(request_rec *r) return result; } +static int ap_array_same_str_set(apr_array_header_t *s1, apr_array_header_t *s2) +{ + int i; + const char *c; + + if (s1 == s2) { + return 1; + } + else if (!s1 || !s2 || (s1->nelts != s2->nelts)) { + return 0; + } + + for (i = 0; i < s1->nelts; i++) { + c = APR_ARRAY_IDX(s1, i, const char *); + if (!c || !ap_array_str_contains(s2, c)) { + return 0; + } + } + return 1; +} + +static int ssl_pk_server_compatible(modssl_pk_server_t *pks1, + modssl_pk_server_t *pks2) +{ + if (!pks1 || !pks2) { + return 0; + } + /* both have the same certificates? */ + if ((pks1->ca_name_path != pks2->ca_name_path) + && (!pks1->ca_name_path || !pks2->ca_name_path + || strcmp(pks1->ca_name_path, pks2->ca_name_path))) { + return 0; + } + if ((pks1->ca_name_file != pks2->ca_name_file) + && (!pks1->ca_name_file || !pks2->ca_name_file + || strcmp(pks1->ca_name_file, pks2->ca_name_file))) { + return 0; + } + if (!ap_array_same_str_set(pks1->cert_files, pks2->cert_files) + || !ap_array_same_str_set(pks1->key_files, pks2->key_files)) { + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +static int ssl_auth_compatible(modssl_auth_ctx_t *a1, + modssl_auth_ctx_t *a2) +{ + if (!a1 || !a2) { + return 0; + } + /* both have the same verification */ + if ((a1->verify_depth != a2->verify_depth) + || (a1->verify_mode != a2->verify_mode)) { + return 0; + } + /* both have the same ca path/file */ + if ((a1->ca_cert_path != a2->ca_cert_path) + && (!a1->ca_cert_path || !a2->ca_cert_path + || strcmp(a1->ca_cert_path, a2->ca_cert_path))) { + return 0; + } + if ((a1->ca_cert_file != a2->ca_cert_file) + && (!a1->ca_cert_file || !a2->ca_cert_file + || strcmp(a1->ca_cert_file, a2->ca_cert_file))) { + return 0; + } + /* both have the same ca cipher suite string */ + if ((a1->cipher_suite != a2->cipher_suite) + && (!a1->cipher_suite || !a2->cipher_suite + || strcmp(a1->cipher_suite, a2->cipher_suite))) { + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +static int ssl_ctx_compatible(modssl_ctx_t *ctx1, + modssl_ctx_t *ctx2) +{ + if (!ctx1 || !ctx2 + || (ctx1->protocol != ctx2->protocol) + || !ssl_auth_compatible(&ctx1->auth, &ctx2->auth) + || !ssl_pk_server_compatible(ctx1->pks, ctx2->pks)) { + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +static int ssl_server_compatible(server_rec *s1, server_rec *s2) +{ + SSLSrvConfigRec *sc1 = s1? mySrvConfig(s1) : NULL; + SSLSrvConfigRec *sc2 = s2? mySrvConfig(s2) : NULL; + + /* both use the same TLS protocol? */ + if (!sc1 || !sc2 + || !ssl_ctx_compatible(sc1->server, sc2->server)) { + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + /* * Post Read Request Handler */ @@ -137,7 +239,13 @@ int ssl_hook_ReadReq(request_rec *r) } } + /* If we are on a slave connection, we do not expect to have an SSLConnRec, + * but our master connection might. */ sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection); + if (!(sslconn && sslconn->ssl) && r->connection->master) { + sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection->master); + } + if (!sslconn) { return DECLINED; } @@ -195,15 +303,16 @@ int ssl_hook_ReadReq(request_rec *r) " provided in HTTP request", servername); return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST; } - if (r->server != handshakeserver) { + if (r->server != handshakeserver + && !ssl_server_compatible(sslconn->server, r->server)) { /* - * We are really not in Kansas anymore... * The request does not select the virtual host that was - * selected by the SNI. + * selected by the SNI and its SSL parameters are different */ + ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server, APLOGNO(02032) "Hostname %s provided via SNI and hostname %s provided" - " via HTTP select a different server", + " via HTTP have no compatible SSL setup", servername, r->hostname); return HTTP_MISDIRECTED_REQUEST; } @@ -302,6 +411,7 @@ int ssl_hook_Access(request_rec *r) SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection); SSL *ssl = sslconn ? sslconn->ssl : NULL; server_rec *handshakeserver = sslconn ? sslconn->server : NULL; + SSLSrvConfigRec *hssc = handshakeserver? mySrvConfig(handshakeserver) : NULL; SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL; apr_array_header_t *requires; ssl_require_t *ssl_requires; @@ -313,8 +423,19 @@ int ssl_hook_Access(request_rec *r) X509_STORE_CTX cert_store_ctx; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list_old = NULL, *cipher_list = NULL; const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; - int depth, verify_old, verify, n; - + int depth, verify_old, verify, n, is_slave = 0; + const char *ncipher_suite; + + /* On a slave connection, we do not expect to have an SSLConnRec, but + * our master connection might have one. */ + if (!(sslconn && ssl) && r->connection->master) { + sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection->master); + ssl = sslconn ? sslconn->ssl : NULL; + handshakeserver = sslconn ? sslconn->server : NULL; + hssc = handshakeserver? mySrvConfig(handshakeserver) : NULL; + is_slave = 1; + } + if (ssl) { /* * We should have handshaken here (on handshakeserver), @@ -333,7 +454,7 @@ int ssl_hook_Access(request_rec *r) * Support for SSLRequireSSL directive */ if (dc->bSSLRequired && !ssl) { - if (sc->enabled == SSL_ENABLED_OPTIONAL) { + if ((sc->enabled == SSL_ENABLED_OPTIONAL) && !is_slave) { /* This vhost was configured for optional SSL, just tell the * client that we need to upgrade. */ @@ -416,8 +537,13 @@ int ssl_hook_Access(request_rec *r) * new cipher suite. This approach is fine because the user explicitly * has to enable this via ``SSLOptions +OptRenegotiate''. So we do no * implicit optimizations. - */ - if (dc->szCipherSuite || (r->server != handshakeserver)) { + */ + ncipher_suite = (dc->szCipherSuite? + dc->szCipherSuite : (r->server != handshakeserver)? + sc->server->auth.cipher_suite : NULL); + + if (ncipher_suite && (!sslconn->cipher_suite + || strcmp(ncipher_suite, sslconn->cipher_suite))) { /* remember old state */ if (dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_OPTRENEGOTIATE) { @@ -432,10 +558,18 @@ int ssl_hook_Access(request_rec *r) } /* configure new state */ - if ((dc->szCipherSuite || sc->server->auth.cipher_suite) && - !SSL_set_cipher_list(ssl, dc->szCipherSuite ? - dc->szCipherSuite : - sc->server->auth.cipher_suite)) { + if (is_slave) { + /* TODO: this categorically fails changed cipher suite settings + * on slave connections. We could do better by + * - create a new SSL* from our SSL_CTX and set cipher suite there, + * and retrieve ciphers, free afterwards + * Modifying the SSL on a slave connection is no good. + */ + apr_table_setn(r->notes, "ssl-renegotiate-forbidden", "cipher-suite"); + return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; + } + + if (!SSL_set_cipher_list(ssl, ncipher_suite)) { ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r, APLOGNO(02253) "Unable to reconfigure (per-directory) " "permitted SSL ciphers"); @@ -502,6 +636,15 @@ int ssl_hook_Access(request_rec *r) } if (renegotiate) { + if (is_slave) { + /* The request causes renegotiation on a slave connection. + * This is not allowed since we might have concurrent requests + * on this connection. + */ + apr_table_setn(r->notes, "ssl-renegotiate-forbidden", "cipher-suite"); + return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; + } + #ifdef SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE if (sc->cipher_server_pref == TRUE) { SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE); @@ -554,6 +697,7 @@ int ssl_hook_Access(request_rec *r) */ if ((dc->nVerifyClient != SSL_CVERIFY_UNSET) || (sc->server->auth.verify_mode != SSL_CVERIFY_UNSET)) { + /* remember old state */ verify_old = SSL_get_verify_mode(ssl); /* configure new state */ @@ -572,6 +716,9 @@ int ssl_hook_Access(request_rec *r) verify |= SSL_VERIFY_PEER; } + /* TODO: this seems premature since we do not know if there + * are any changes required. + */ SSL_set_verify(ssl, verify, ssl_callback_SSLVerify); SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, X509_V_OK); @@ -587,6 +734,14 @@ int ssl_hook_Access(request_rec *r) (verify & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))) { renegotiate = TRUE; + if (is_slave) { + /* The request causes renegotiation on a slave connection. + * This is not allowed since we might have concurrent requests + * on this connection. + */ + apr_table_setn(r->notes, "ssl-renegotiate-forbidden", "verify-client"); + return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; + } /* optimization */ if ((dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_OPTRENEGOTIATE) && @@ -907,6 +1062,10 @@ int ssl_hook_Access(request_rec *r) return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; } } + /* remember any new cipher suite used in renegotiation */ + if (ncipher_suite) { + sslconn->cipher_suite = ncipher_suite; + } } /* If we're trying to have the user name set from a client @@ -1170,6 +1329,10 @@ int ssl_hook_Fixup(request_rec *r) apr_table_mergen(r->headers_out, "Connection", "upgrade"); } + if (!(sslconn && sslconn->ssl) && r->connection->master) { + sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection->master); + } + /* * Check to see if SSL is on */ @@ -1192,8 +1355,8 @@ int ssl_hook_Fixup(request_rec *r) /* standard SSL environment variables */ if (dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_STDENVVARS) { - modssl_var_extract_dns(env, sslconn->ssl, r->pool); - modssl_var_extract_san_entries(env, sslconn->ssl, r->pool); + modssl_var_extract_dns(env, ssl, r->pool); + modssl_var_extract_san_entries(env, ssl, r->pool); for (i = 0; ssl_hook_Fixup_vars[i]; i++) { var = (char *)ssl_hook_Fixup_vars[i]; @@ -2037,7 +2200,8 @@ static int ssl_find_vhost(void *servername, conn_rec *c, server_rec *s) * retrieval */ sslcon->server = s; - + sslcon->cipher_suite = sc->server->auth.cipher_suite; + /* * There is one special filter callback, which is set * very early depending on the base_server's log level. @@ -2194,14 +2358,30 @@ int ssl_callback_alpn_select(SSL *ssl, init_vhost(c, ssl); proposed = ap_select_protocol(c, NULL, sslconn->server, client_protos); - *out = (const unsigned char *)(proposed? proposed : ap_get_protocol(c)); - len = strlen((const char*)*out); + if (!proposed) { + proposed = ap_get_protocol(c); + } + + len = strlen(proposed); if (len > 255) { ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, c, APLOGNO(02840) "ALPN negotiated protocol name too long"); return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; } + *out = (const unsigned char *)proposed; *outlen = (unsigned char)len; + + if (strcmp(proposed, ap_get_protocol(c))) { + apr_status_t status; + + status = ap_switch_protocol(c, NULL, sslconn->server, proposed); + if (status != APR_SUCCESS) { + ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, status, c, + APLOGNO(02908) "protocol switch to '%s' failed", + proposed); + return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; + } + } return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } |