Imported Upstream version 1.4upstream/1.4

1 files changed, 343 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/crypto/cipher/gcm.go b/src/crypto/cipher/gcm.go
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bdafd85fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/crypto/cipher/gcm.go
@@ -0,0 +1,343 @@
+// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package cipher
+
+import (
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"errors"
+)
+
+// AEAD is a cipher mode providing authenticated encryption with associated
+// data.
+type AEAD interface {
+	// NonceSize returns the size of the nonce that must be passed to Seal
+	// and Open.
+	NonceSize() int
+
+	// Overhead returns the maximum difference between the lengths of a
+	// plaintext and ciphertext.
+	Overhead() int
+
+	// Seal encrypts and authenticates plaintext, authenticates the
+	// additional data and appends the result to dst, returning the updated
+	// slice. The nonce must be NonceSize() bytes long and unique for all
+	// time, for a given key.
+	//
+	// The plaintext and dst may alias exactly or not at all.
+	Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, data []byte) []byte
+
+	// Open decrypts and authenticates ciphertext, authenticates the
+	// additional data and, if successful, appends the resulting plaintext
+	// to dst, returning the updated slice. The nonce must be NonceSize()
+	// bytes long and both it and the additional data must match the
+	// value passed to Seal.
+	//
+	// The ciphertext and dst may alias exactly or not at all.
+	Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, data []byte) ([]byte, error)
+}
+
+// gcmFieldElement represents a value in GF(2¹²⁸). In order to reflect the GCM
+// standard and make getUint64 suitable for marshaling these values, the bits
+// are stored backwards. For example:
+//   the coefficient of x⁰ can be obtained by v.low >> 63.
+//   the coefficient of x⁶³ can be obtained by v.low & 1.
+//   the coefficient of x⁶⁴ can be obtained by v.high >> 63.
+//   the coefficient of x¹²⁷ can be obtained by v.high & 1.
+type gcmFieldElement struct {
+	low, high uint64
+}
+
+// gcm represents a Galois Counter Mode with a specific key. See
+// http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/proposedmodes/gcm/gcm-revised-spec.pdf
+type gcm struct {
+	cipher Block
+	// productTable contains the first sixteen powers of the key, H.
+	// However, they are in bit reversed order. See NewGCM.
+	productTable [16]gcmFieldElement
+}
+
+// NewGCM returns the given 128-bit, block cipher wrapped in Galois Counter Mode.
+func NewGCM(cipher Block) (AEAD, error) {
+	if cipher.BlockSize() != gcmBlockSize {
+		return nil, errors.New("cipher: NewGCM requires 128-bit block cipher")
+	}
+
+	var key [gcmBlockSize]byte
+	cipher.Encrypt(key[:], key[:])
+
+	g := &gcm{cipher: cipher}
+
+	// We precompute 16 multiples of |key|. However, when we do lookups
+	// into this table we'll be using bits from a field element and
+	// therefore the bits will be in the reverse order. So normally one
+	// would expect, say, 4*key to be in index 4 of the table but due to
+	// this bit ordering it will actually be in index 0010 (base 2) = 2.
+	x := gcmFieldElement{
+		getUint64(key[:8]),
+		getUint64(key[8:]),
+	}
+	g.productTable[reverseBits(1)] = x
+
+	for i := 2; i < 16; i += 2 {
+		g.productTable[reverseBits(i)] = gcmDouble(&g.productTable[reverseBits(i/2)])
+		g.productTable[reverseBits(i+1)] = gcmAdd(&g.productTable[reverseBits(i)], &x)
+	}
+
+	return g, nil
+}
+
+const (
+	gcmBlockSize = 16
+	gcmTagSize   = 16
+	gcmNonceSize = 12
+)
+
+func (*gcm) NonceSize() int {
+	return gcmNonceSize
+}
+
+func (*gcm) Overhead() int {
+	return gcmTagSize
+}
+
+func (g *gcm) Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, data []byte) []byte {
+	if len(nonce) != gcmNonceSize {
+		panic("cipher: incorrect nonce length given to GCM")
+	}
+
+	ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(plaintext)+gcmTagSize)
+
+	// See GCM spec, section 7.1.
+	var counter, tagMask [gcmBlockSize]byte
+	copy(counter[:], nonce)
+	counter[gcmBlockSize-1] = 1
+
+	g.cipher.Encrypt(tagMask[:], counter[:])
+	gcmInc32(&counter)
+
+	g.counterCrypt(out, plaintext, &counter)
+	g.auth(out[len(plaintext):], out[:len(plaintext)], data, &tagMask)
+
+	return ret
+}
+
+var errOpen = errors.New("cipher: message authentication failed")
+
+func (g *gcm) Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, data []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	if len(nonce) != gcmNonceSize {
+		panic("cipher: incorrect nonce length given to GCM")
+	}
+
+	if len(ciphertext) < gcmTagSize {
+		return nil, errOpen
+	}
+	tag := ciphertext[len(ciphertext)-gcmTagSize:]
+	ciphertext = ciphertext[:len(ciphertext)-gcmTagSize]
+
+	// See GCM spec, section 7.1.
+	var counter, tagMask [gcmBlockSize]byte
+	copy(counter[:], nonce)
+	counter[gcmBlockSize-1] = 1
+
+	g.cipher.Encrypt(tagMask[:], counter[:])
+	gcmInc32(&counter)
+
+	var expectedTag [gcmTagSize]byte
+	g.auth(expectedTag[:], ciphertext, data, &tagMask)
+
+	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(expectedTag[:], tag) != 1 {
+		return nil, errOpen
+	}
+
+	ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(ciphertext))
+	g.counterCrypt(out, ciphertext, &counter)
+
+	return ret, nil
+}
+
+// reverseBits reverses the order of the bits of 4-bit number in i.
+func reverseBits(i int) int {
+	i = ((i << 2) & 0xc) | ((i >> 2) & 0x3)
+	i = ((i << 1) & 0xa) | ((i >> 1) & 0x5)
+	return i
+}
+
+// gcmAdd adds two elements of GF(2¹²⁸) and returns the sum.
+func gcmAdd(x, y *gcmFieldElement) gcmFieldElement {
+	// Addition in a characteristic 2 field is just XOR.
+	return gcmFieldElement{x.low ^ y.low, x.high ^ y.high}
+}
+
+// gcmDouble returns the result of doubling an element of GF(2¹²⁸).
+func gcmDouble(x *gcmFieldElement) (double gcmFieldElement) {
+	msbSet := x.high&1 == 1
+
+	// Because of the bit-ordering, doubling is actually a right shift.
+	double.high = x.high >> 1
+	double.high |= x.low << 63
+	double.low = x.low >> 1
+
+	// If the most-significant bit was set before shifting then it,
+	// conceptually, becomes a term of x^128. This is greater than the
+	// irreducible polynomial so the result has to be reduced. The
+	// irreducible polynomial is 1+x+x^2+x^7+x^128. We can subtract that to
+	// eliminate the term at x^128 which also means subtracting the other
+	// four terms. In characteristic 2 fields, subtraction == addition ==
+	// XOR.
+	if msbSet {
+		double.low ^= 0xe100000000000000
+	}
+
+	return
+}
+
+var gcmReductionTable = []uint16{
+	0x0000, 0x1c20, 0x3840, 0x2460, 0x7080, 0x6ca0, 0x48c0, 0x54e0,
+	0xe100, 0xfd20, 0xd940, 0xc560, 0x9180, 0x8da0, 0xa9c0, 0xb5e0,
+}
+
+// mul sets y to y*H, where H is the GCM key, fixed during NewGCM.
+func (g *gcm) mul(y *gcmFieldElement) {
+	var z gcmFieldElement
+
+	for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
+		word := y.high
+		if i == 1 {
+			word = y.low
+		}
+
+		// Multiplication works by multiplying z by 16 and adding in
+		// one of the precomputed multiples of H.
+		for j := 0; j < 64; j += 4 {
+			msw := z.high & 0xf
+			z.high >>= 4
+			z.high |= z.low << 60
+			z.low >>= 4
+			z.low ^= uint64(gcmReductionTable[msw]) << 48
+
+			// the values in |table| are ordered for
+			// little-endian bit positions. See the comment
+			// in NewGCM.
+			t := &g.productTable[word&0xf]
+
+			z.low ^= t.low
+			z.high ^= t.high
+			word >>= 4
+		}
+	}
+
+	*y = z
+}
+
+// updateBlocks extends y with more polynomial terms from blocks, based on
+// Horner's rule. There must be a multiple of gcmBlockSize bytes in blocks.
+func (g *gcm) updateBlocks(y *gcmFieldElement, blocks []byte) {
+	for len(blocks) > 0 {
+		y.low ^= getUint64(blocks)
+		y.high ^= getUint64(blocks[8:])
+		g.mul(y)
+		blocks = blocks[gcmBlockSize:]
+	}
+}
+
+// update extends y with more polynomial terms from data. If data is not a
+// multiple of gcmBlockSize bytes long then the remainder is zero padded.
+func (g *gcm) update(y *gcmFieldElement, data []byte) {
+	fullBlocks := (len(data) >> 4) << 4
+	g.updateBlocks(y, data[:fullBlocks])
+
+	if len(data) != fullBlocks {
+		var partialBlock [gcmBlockSize]byte
+		copy(partialBlock[:], data[fullBlocks:])
+		g.updateBlocks(y, partialBlock[:])
+	}
+}
+
+// gcmInc32 treats the final four bytes of counterBlock as a big-endian value
+// and increments it.
+func gcmInc32(counterBlock *[16]byte) {
+	for i := gcmBlockSize - 1; i >= gcmBlockSize-4; i-- {
+		counterBlock[i]++
+		if counterBlock[i] != 0 {
+			break
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// sliceForAppend takes a slice and a requested number of bytes. It returns a
+// slice with the contents of the given slice followed by that many bytes and a
+// second slice that aliases into it and contains only the extra bytes. If the
+// original slice has sufficient capacity then no allocation is performed.
+func sliceForAppend(in []byte, n int) (head, tail []byte) {
+	if total := len(in) + n; cap(in) >= total {
+		head = in[:total]
+	} else {
+		head = make([]byte, total)
+		copy(head, in)
+	}
+	tail = head[len(in):]
+	return
+}
+
+// counterCrypt crypts in to out using g.cipher in counter mode.
+func (g *gcm) counterCrypt(out, in []byte, counter *[gcmBlockSize]byte) {
+	var mask [gcmBlockSize]byte
+
+	for len(in) >= gcmBlockSize {
+		g.cipher.Encrypt(mask[:], counter[:])
+		gcmInc32(counter)
+
+		xorWords(out, in, mask[:])
+		out = out[gcmBlockSize:]
+		in = in[gcmBlockSize:]
+	}
+
+	if len(in) > 0 {
+		g.cipher.Encrypt(mask[:], counter[:])
+		gcmInc32(counter)
+		xorBytes(out, in, mask[:])
+	}
+}
+
+// auth calculates GHASH(ciphertext, additionalData), masks the result with
+// tagMask and writes the result to out.
+func (g *gcm) auth(out, ciphertext, additionalData []byte, tagMask *[gcmTagSize]byte) {
+	var y gcmFieldElement
+	g.update(&y, additionalData)
+	g.update(&y, ciphertext)
+
+	y.low ^= uint64(len(additionalData)) * 8
+	y.high ^= uint64(len(ciphertext)) * 8
+
+	g.mul(&y)
+
+	putUint64(out, y.low)
+	putUint64(out[8:], y.high)
+
+	xorWords(out, out, tagMask[:])
+}
+
+func getUint64(data []byte) uint64 {
+	r := uint64(data[0])<<56 |
+		uint64(data[1])<<48 |
+		uint64(data[2])<<40 |
+		uint64(data[3])<<32 |
+		uint64(data[4])<<24 |
+		uint64(data[5])<<16 |
+		uint64(data[6])<<8 |
+		uint64(data[7])
+	return r
+}
+
+func putUint64(out []byte, v uint64) {
+	out[0] = byte(v >> 56)
+	out[1] = byte(v >> 48)
+	out[2] = byte(v >> 40)
+	out[3] = byte(v >> 32)
+	out[4] = byte(v >> 24)
+	out[5] = byte(v >> 16)
+	out[6] = byte(v >> 8)
+	out[7] = byte(v)
+}