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author | Tianon Gravi <admwiggin@gmail.com> | 2015-01-15 11:54:00 -0700 |
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committer | Tianon Gravi <admwiggin@gmail.com> | 2015-01-15 11:54:00 -0700 |
commit | f154da9e12608589e8d5f0508f908a0c3e88a1bb (patch) | |
tree | f8255d51e10c6f1e0ed69702200b966c9556a431 /src/crypto/hmac/hmac.go | |
parent | 8d8329ed5dfb9622c82a9fbec6fd99a580f9c9f6 (diff) | |
download | golang-upstream/1.4.tar.gz |
Imported Upstream version 1.4upstream/1.4
Diffstat (limited to 'src/crypto/hmac/hmac.go')
-rw-r--r-- | src/crypto/hmac/hmac.go | 102 |
1 files changed, 102 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/crypto/hmac/hmac.go b/src/crypto/hmac/hmac.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b6f4919a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/crypto/hmac/hmac.go @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +/* +Package hmac implements the Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) as +defined in U.S. Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 198. +An HMAC is a cryptographic hash that uses a key to sign a message. +The receiver verifies the hash by recomputing it using the same key. + +Receivers should be careful to use Equal to compare MACs in order to avoid +timing side-channels: + + // CheckMAC returns true if messageMAC is a valid HMAC tag for message. + func CheckMAC(message, messageMAC, key []byte) bool { + mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key) + mac.Write(message) + expectedMAC := mac.Sum(nil) + return hmac.Equal(messageMAC, expectedMAC) + } +*/ +package hmac + +import ( + "crypto/subtle" + "hash" +) + +// FIPS 198: +// http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198/fips-198a.pdf + +// key is zero padded to the block size of the hash function +// ipad = 0x36 byte repeated for key length +// opad = 0x5c byte repeated for key length +// hmac = H([key ^ opad] H([key ^ ipad] text)) + +type hmac struct { + size int + blocksize int + key, tmp []byte + outer, inner hash.Hash +} + +func (h *hmac) tmpPad(xor byte) { + for i, k := range h.key { + h.tmp[i] = xor ^ k + } + for i := len(h.key); i < h.blocksize; i++ { + h.tmp[i] = xor + } +} + +func (h *hmac) Sum(in []byte) []byte { + origLen := len(in) + in = h.inner.Sum(in) + h.tmpPad(0x5c) + copy(h.tmp[h.blocksize:], in[origLen:]) + h.outer.Reset() + h.outer.Write(h.tmp) + return h.outer.Sum(in[:origLen]) +} + +func (h *hmac) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) { + return h.inner.Write(p) +} + +func (h *hmac) Size() int { return h.size } + +func (h *hmac) BlockSize() int { return h.blocksize } + +func (h *hmac) Reset() { + h.inner.Reset() + h.tmpPad(0x36) + h.inner.Write(h.tmp[:h.blocksize]) +} + +// New returns a new HMAC hash using the given hash.Hash type and key. +func New(h func() hash.Hash, key []byte) hash.Hash { + hm := new(hmac) + hm.outer = h() + hm.inner = h() + hm.size = hm.inner.Size() + hm.blocksize = hm.inner.BlockSize() + hm.tmp = make([]byte, hm.blocksize+hm.size) + if len(key) > hm.blocksize { + // If key is too big, hash it. + hm.outer.Write(key) + key = hm.outer.Sum(nil) + } + hm.key = make([]byte, len(key)) + copy(hm.key, key) + hm.Reset() + return hm +} + +// Equal compares two MACs for equality without leaking timing information. +func Equal(mac1, mac2 []byte) bool { + // We don't have to be constant time if the lengths of the MACs are + // different as that suggests that a completely different hash function + // was used. + return len(mac1) == len(mac2) && subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(mac1, mac2) == 1 +} |