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-rw-r--r--src/crypto/rsa/pss.go297
1 files changed, 297 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/crypto/rsa/pss.go b/src/crypto/rsa/pss.go
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+// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package rsa
+
+// This file implements the PSS signature scheme [1].
+//
+// [1] http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/pkcs/files/h11300-wp-pkcs-1v2-2-rsa-cryptography-standard.pdf
+
+import (
+ "bytes"
+ "crypto"
+ "errors"
+ "hash"
+ "io"
+ "math/big"
+)
+
+func emsaPSSEncode(mHash []byte, emBits int, salt []byte, hash hash.Hash) ([]byte, error) {
+ // See [1], section 9.1.1
+ hLen := hash.Size()
+ sLen := len(salt)
+ emLen := (emBits + 7) / 8
+
+ // 1. If the length of M is greater than the input limitation for the
+ // hash function (2^61 - 1 octets for SHA-1), output "message too
+ // long" and stop.
+ //
+ // 2. Let mHash = Hash(M), an octet string of length hLen.
+
+ if len(mHash) != hLen {
+ return nil, errors.New("crypto/rsa: input must be hashed message")
+ }
+
+ // 3. If emLen < hLen + sLen + 2, output "encoding error" and stop.
+
+ if emLen < hLen+sLen+2 {
+ return nil, errors.New("crypto/rsa: encoding error")
+ }
+
+ em := make([]byte, emLen)
+ db := em[:emLen-sLen-hLen-2+1+sLen]
+ h := em[emLen-sLen-hLen-2+1+sLen : emLen-1]
+
+ // 4. Generate a random octet string salt of length sLen; if sLen = 0,
+ // then salt is the empty string.
+ //
+ // 5. Let
+ // M' = (0x)00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 || mHash || salt;
+ //
+ // M' is an octet string of length 8 + hLen + sLen with eight
+ // initial zero octets.
+ //
+ // 6. Let H = Hash(M'), an octet string of length hLen.
+
+ var prefix [8]byte
+
+ hash.Write(prefix[:])
+ hash.Write(mHash)
+ hash.Write(salt)
+
+ h = hash.Sum(h[:0])
+ hash.Reset()
+
+ // 7. Generate an octet string PS consisting of emLen - sLen - hLen - 2
+ // zero octets. The length of PS may be 0.
+ //
+ // 8. Let DB = PS || 0x01 || salt; DB is an octet string of length
+ // emLen - hLen - 1.
+
+ db[emLen-sLen-hLen-2] = 0x01
+ copy(db[emLen-sLen-hLen-1:], salt)
+
+ // 9. Let dbMask = MGF(H, emLen - hLen - 1).
+ //
+ // 10. Let maskedDB = DB \xor dbMask.
+
+ mgf1XOR(db, hash, h)
+
+ // 11. Set the leftmost 8 * emLen - emBits bits of the leftmost octet in
+ // maskedDB to zero.
+
+ db[0] &= (0xFF >> uint(8*emLen-emBits))
+
+ // 12. Let EM = maskedDB || H || 0xbc.
+ em[emLen-1] = 0xBC
+
+ // 13. Output EM.
+ return em, nil
+}
+
+func emsaPSSVerify(mHash, em []byte, emBits, sLen int, hash hash.Hash) error {
+ // 1. If the length of M is greater than the input limitation for the
+ // hash function (2^61 - 1 octets for SHA-1), output "inconsistent"
+ // and stop.
+ //
+ // 2. Let mHash = Hash(M), an octet string of length hLen.
+ hLen := hash.Size()
+ if hLen != len(mHash) {
+ return ErrVerification
+ }
+
+ // 3. If emLen < hLen + sLen + 2, output "inconsistent" and stop.
+ emLen := (emBits + 7) / 8
+ if emLen < hLen+sLen+2 {
+ return ErrVerification
+ }
+
+ // 4. If the rightmost octet of EM does not have hexadecimal value
+ // 0xbc, output "inconsistent" and stop.
+ if em[len(em)-1] != 0xBC {
+ return ErrVerification
+ }
+
+ // 5. Let maskedDB be the leftmost emLen - hLen - 1 octets of EM, and
+ // let H be the next hLen octets.
+ db := em[:emLen-hLen-1]
+ h := em[emLen-hLen-1 : len(em)-1]
+
+ // 6. If the leftmost 8 * emLen - emBits bits of the leftmost octet in
+ // maskedDB are not all equal to zero, output "inconsistent" and
+ // stop.
+ if em[0]&(0xFF<<uint(8-(8*emLen-emBits))) != 0 {
+ return ErrVerification
+ }
+
+ // 7. Let dbMask = MGF(H, emLen - hLen - 1).
+ //
+ // 8. Let DB = maskedDB \xor dbMask.
+ mgf1XOR(db, hash, h)
+
+ // 9. Set the leftmost 8 * emLen - emBits bits of the leftmost octet in DB
+ // to zero.
+ db[0] &= (0xFF >> uint(8*emLen-emBits))
+
+ if sLen == PSSSaltLengthAuto {
+ FindSaltLength:
+ for sLen = emLen - (hLen + 2); sLen >= 0; sLen-- {
+ switch db[emLen-hLen-sLen-2] {
+ case 1:
+ break FindSaltLength
+ case 0:
+ continue
+ default:
+ return ErrVerification
+ }
+ }
+ if sLen < 0 {
+ return ErrVerification
+ }
+ } else {
+ // 10. If the emLen - hLen - sLen - 2 leftmost octets of DB are not zero
+ // or if the octet at position emLen - hLen - sLen - 1 (the leftmost
+ // position is "position 1") does not have hexadecimal value 0x01,
+ // output "inconsistent" and stop.
+ for _, e := range db[:emLen-hLen-sLen-2] {
+ if e != 0x00 {
+ return ErrVerification
+ }
+ }
+ if db[emLen-hLen-sLen-2] != 0x01 {
+ return ErrVerification
+ }
+ }
+
+ // 11. Let salt be the last sLen octets of DB.
+ salt := db[len(db)-sLen:]
+
+ // 12. Let
+ // M' = (0x)00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 || mHash || salt ;
+ // M' is an octet string of length 8 + hLen + sLen with eight
+ // initial zero octets.
+ //
+ // 13. Let H' = Hash(M'), an octet string of length hLen.
+ var prefix [8]byte
+ hash.Write(prefix[:])
+ hash.Write(mHash)
+ hash.Write(salt)
+
+ h0 := hash.Sum(nil)
+
+ // 14. If H = H', output "consistent." Otherwise, output "inconsistent."
+ if !bytes.Equal(h0, h) {
+ return ErrVerification
+ }
+ return nil
+}
+
+// signPSSWithSalt calculates the signature of hashed using PSS [1] with specified salt.
+// Note that hashed must be the result of hashing the input message using the
+// given hash function. salt is a random sequence of bytes whose length will be
+// later used to verify the signature.
+func signPSSWithSalt(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed, salt []byte) (s []byte, err error) {
+ nBits := priv.N.BitLen()
+ em, err := emsaPSSEncode(hashed, nBits-1, salt, hash.New())
+ if err != nil {
+ return
+ }
+ m := new(big.Int).SetBytes(em)
+ c, err := decrypt(rand, priv, m)
+ if err != nil {
+ return
+ }
+ s = make([]byte, (nBits+7)/8)
+ copyWithLeftPad(s, c.Bytes())
+ return
+}
+
+const (
+ // PSSSaltLengthAuto causes the salt in a PSS signature to be as large
+ // as possible when signing, and to be auto-detected when verifying.
+ PSSSaltLengthAuto = 0
+ // PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash causes the salt length to equal the length
+ // of the hash used in the signature.
+ PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash = -1
+)
+
+// PSSOptions contains options for creating and verifying PSS signatures.
+type PSSOptions struct {
+ // SaltLength controls the length of the salt used in the PSS
+ // signature. It can either be a number of bytes, or one of the special
+ // PSSSaltLength constants.
+ SaltLength int
+
+ // Hash, if not zero, overrides the hash function passed to SignPSS.
+ // This is the only way to specify the hash function when using the
+ // crypto.Signer interface.
+ Hash crypto.Hash
+}
+
+// HashFunc returns pssOpts.Hash so that PSSOptions implements
+// crypto.SignerOpts.
+func (pssOpts *PSSOptions) HashFunc() crypto.Hash {
+ return pssOpts.Hash
+}
+
+func (opts *PSSOptions) saltLength() int {
+ if opts == nil {
+ return PSSSaltLengthAuto
+ }
+ return opts.SaltLength
+}
+
+// SignPSS calculates the signature of hashed using RSASSA-PSS [1].
+// Note that hashed must be the result of hashing the input message using the
+// given hash function. The opts argument may be nil, in which case sensible
+// defaults are used.
+func SignPSS(rand io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte, opts *PSSOptions) (s []byte, err error) {
+ saltLength := opts.saltLength()
+ switch saltLength {
+ case PSSSaltLengthAuto:
+ saltLength = (priv.N.BitLen()+7)/8 - 2 - hash.Size()
+ case PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash:
+ saltLength = hash.Size()
+ }
+
+ if opts.Hash != 0 {
+ hash = opts.Hash
+ }
+
+ salt := make([]byte, saltLength)
+ if _, err = io.ReadFull(rand, salt); err != nil {
+ return
+ }
+ return signPSSWithSalt(rand, priv, hash, hashed, salt)
+}
+
+// VerifyPSS verifies a PSS signature.
+// hashed is the result of hashing the input message using the given hash
+// function and sig is the signature. A valid signature is indicated by
+// returning a nil error. The opts argument may be nil, in which case sensible
+// defaults are used.
+func VerifyPSS(pub *PublicKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte, sig []byte, opts *PSSOptions) error {
+ return verifyPSS(pub, hash, hashed, sig, opts.saltLength())
+}
+
+// verifyPSS verifies a PSS signature with the given salt length.
+func verifyPSS(pub *PublicKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte, sig []byte, saltLen int) error {
+ nBits := pub.N.BitLen()
+ if len(sig) != (nBits+7)/8 {
+ return ErrVerification
+ }
+ s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig)
+ m := encrypt(new(big.Int), pub, s)
+ emBits := nBits - 1
+ emLen := (emBits + 7) / 8
+ if emLen < len(m.Bytes()) {
+ return ErrVerification
+ }
+ em := make([]byte, emLen)
+ copyWithLeftPad(em, m.Bytes())
+ if saltLen == PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash {
+ saltLen = hash.Size()
+ }
+ return emsaPSSVerify(hashed, em, emBits, saltLen, hash.New())
+}