diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/crypto/tls/key_agreement.go')
-rw-r--r-- | src/crypto/tls/key_agreement.go | 413 |
1 files changed, 413 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/crypto/tls/key_agreement.go b/src/crypto/tls/key_agreement.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0974fc6e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/crypto/tls/key_agreement.go @@ -0,0 +1,413 @@ +// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package tls + +import ( + "crypto" + "crypto/ecdsa" + "crypto/elliptic" + "crypto/md5" + "crypto/rsa" + "crypto/sha1" + "crypto/sha256" + "crypto/x509" + "encoding/asn1" + "errors" + "io" + "math/big" +) + +var errClientKeyExchange = errors.New("tls: invalid ClientKeyExchange message") +var errServerKeyExchange = errors.New("tls: invalid ServerKeyExchange message") + +// rsaKeyAgreement implements the standard TLS key agreement where the client +// encrypts the pre-master secret to the server's public key. +type rsaKeyAgreement struct{} + +func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) generateServerKeyExchange(config *Config, cert *Certificate, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, hello *serverHelloMsg) (*serverKeyExchangeMsg, error) { + return nil, nil +} + +func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) processClientKeyExchange(config *Config, cert *Certificate, ckx *clientKeyExchangeMsg, version uint16) ([]byte, error) { + preMasterSecret := make([]byte, 48) + _, err := io.ReadFull(config.rand(), preMasterSecret[2:]) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if len(ckx.ciphertext) < 2 { + return nil, errClientKeyExchange + } + + ciphertext := ckx.ciphertext + if version != VersionSSL30 { + ciphertextLen := int(ckx.ciphertext[0])<<8 | int(ckx.ciphertext[1]) + if ciphertextLen != len(ckx.ciphertext)-2 { + return nil, errClientKeyExchange + } + ciphertext = ckx.ciphertext[2:] + } + + err = rsa.DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey(config.rand(), cert.PrivateKey.(*rsa.PrivateKey), ciphertext, preMasterSecret) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + // We don't check the version number in the premaster secret. For one, + // by checking it, we would leak information about the validity of the + // encrypted pre-master secret. Secondly, it provides only a small + // benefit against a downgrade attack and some implementations send the + // wrong version anyway. See the discussion at the end of section + // 7.4.7.1 of RFC 4346. + return preMasterSecret, nil +} + +func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) processServerKeyExchange(config *Config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, serverHello *serverHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate, skx *serverKeyExchangeMsg) error { + return errors.New("tls: unexpected ServerKeyExchange") +} + +func (ka rsaKeyAgreement) generateClientKeyExchange(config *Config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, error) { + preMasterSecret := make([]byte, 48) + preMasterSecret[0] = byte(clientHello.vers >> 8) + preMasterSecret[1] = byte(clientHello.vers) + _, err := io.ReadFull(config.rand(), preMasterSecret[2:]) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + encrypted, err := rsa.EncryptPKCS1v15(config.rand(), cert.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey), preMasterSecret) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + ckx := new(clientKeyExchangeMsg) + ckx.ciphertext = make([]byte, len(encrypted)+2) + ckx.ciphertext[0] = byte(len(encrypted) >> 8) + ckx.ciphertext[1] = byte(len(encrypted)) + copy(ckx.ciphertext[2:], encrypted) + return preMasterSecret, ckx, nil +} + +// sha1Hash calculates a SHA1 hash over the given byte slices. +func sha1Hash(slices [][]byte) []byte { + hsha1 := sha1.New() + for _, slice := range slices { + hsha1.Write(slice) + } + return hsha1.Sum(nil) +} + +// md5SHA1Hash implements TLS 1.0's hybrid hash function which consists of the +// concatenation of an MD5 and SHA1 hash. +func md5SHA1Hash(slices [][]byte) []byte { + md5sha1 := make([]byte, md5.Size+sha1.Size) + hmd5 := md5.New() + for _, slice := range slices { + hmd5.Write(slice) + } + copy(md5sha1, hmd5.Sum(nil)) + copy(md5sha1[md5.Size:], sha1Hash(slices)) + return md5sha1 +} + +// sha256Hash implements TLS 1.2's hash function. +func sha256Hash(slices [][]byte) []byte { + h := sha256.New() + for _, slice := range slices { + h.Write(slice) + } + return h.Sum(nil) +} + +// hashForServerKeyExchange hashes the given slices and returns their digest +// and the identifier of the hash function used. The hashFunc argument is only +// used for >= TLS 1.2 and precisely identifies the hash function to use. +func hashForServerKeyExchange(sigType, hashFunc uint8, version uint16, slices ...[]byte) ([]byte, crypto.Hash, error) { + if version >= VersionTLS12 { + switch hashFunc { + case hashSHA256: + return sha256Hash(slices), crypto.SHA256, nil + case hashSHA1: + return sha1Hash(slices), crypto.SHA1, nil + default: + return nil, crypto.Hash(0), errors.New("tls: unknown hash function used by peer") + } + } + if sigType == signatureECDSA { + return sha1Hash(slices), crypto.SHA1, nil + } + return md5SHA1Hash(slices), crypto.MD5SHA1, nil +} + +// pickTLS12HashForSignature returns a TLS 1.2 hash identifier for signing a +// ServerKeyExchange given the signature type being used and the client's +// advertised list of supported signature and hash combinations. +func pickTLS12HashForSignature(sigType uint8, clientSignatureAndHashes []signatureAndHash) (uint8, error) { + if len(clientSignatureAndHashes) == 0 { + // If the client didn't specify any signature_algorithms + // extension then we can assume that it supports SHA1. See + // http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 + return hashSHA1, nil + } + + for _, sigAndHash := range clientSignatureAndHashes { + if sigAndHash.signature != sigType { + continue + } + switch sigAndHash.hash { + case hashSHA1, hashSHA256: + return sigAndHash.hash, nil + } + } + + return 0, errors.New("tls: client doesn't support any common hash functions") +} + +func curveForCurveID(id CurveID) (elliptic.Curve, bool) { + switch id { + case CurveP256: + return elliptic.P256(), true + case CurveP384: + return elliptic.P384(), true + case CurveP521: + return elliptic.P521(), true + default: + return nil, false + } + +} + +// ecdheRSAKeyAgreement implements a TLS key agreement where the server +// generates a ephemeral EC public/private key pair and signs it. The +// pre-master secret is then calculated using ECDH. The signature may +// either be ECDSA or RSA. +type ecdheKeyAgreement struct { + version uint16 + sigType uint8 + privateKey []byte + curve elliptic.Curve + x, y *big.Int +} + +func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) generateServerKeyExchange(config *Config, cert *Certificate, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, hello *serverHelloMsg) (*serverKeyExchangeMsg, error) { + var curveid CurveID + preferredCurves := config.curvePreferences() + +NextCandidate: + for _, candidate := range preferredCurves { + for _, c := range clientHello.supportedCurves { + if candidate == c { + curveid = c + break NextCandidate + } + } + } + + if curveid == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("tls: no supported elliptic curves offered") + } + + var ok bool + if ka.curve, ok = curveForCurveID(curveid); !ok { + return nil, errors.New("tls: preferredCurves includes unsupported curve") + } + + var x, y *big.Int + var err error + ka.privateKey, x, y, err = elliptic.GenerateKey(ka.curve, config.rand()) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + ecdhePublic := elliptic.Marshal(ka.curve, x, y) + + // http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.4 + serverECDHParams := make([]byte, 1+2+1+len(ecdhePublic)) + serverECDHParams[0] = 3 // named curve + serverECDHParams[1] = byte(curveid >> 8) + serverECDHParams[2] = byte(curveid) + serverECDHParams[3] = byte(len(ecdhePublic)) + copy(serverECDHParams[4:], ecdhePublic) + + var tls12HashId uint8 + if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 { + if tls12HashId, err = pickTLS12HashForSignature(ka.sigType, clientHello.signatureAndHashes); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + + digest, hashFunc, err := hashForServerKeyExchange(ka.sigType, tls12HashId, ka.version, clientHello.random, hello.random, serverECDHParams) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + var sig []byte + switch ka.sigType { + case signatureECDSA: + privKey, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(*ecdsa.PrivateKey) + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("ECDHE ECDSA requires an ECDSA server private key") + } + r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(config.rand(), privKey, digest) + if err != nil { + return nil, errors.New("failed to sign ECDHE parameters: " + err.Error()) + } + sig, err = asn1.Marshal(ecdsaSignature{r, s}) + case signatureRSA: + privKey, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(*rsa.PrivateKey) + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("ECDHE RSA requires a RSA server private key") + } + sig, err = rsa.SignPKCS1v15(config.rand(), privKey, hashFunc, digest) + if err != nil { + return nil, errors.New("failed to sign ECDHE parameters: " + err.Error()) + } + default: + return nil, errors.New("unknown ECDHE signature algorithm") + } + + skx := new(serverKeyExchangeMsg) + sigAndHashLen := 0 + if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 { + sigAndHashLen = 2 + } + skx.key = make([]byte, len(serverECDHParams)+sigAndHashLen+2+len(sig)) + copy(skx.key, serverECDHParams) + k := skx.key[len(serverECDHParams):] + if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 { + k[0] = tls12HashId + k[1] = ka.sigType + k = k[2:] + } + k[0] = byte(len(sig) >> 8) + k[1] = byte(len(sig)) + copy(k[2:], sig) + + return skx, nil +} + +func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) processClientKeyExchange(config *Config, cert *Certificate, ckx *clientKeyExchangeMsg, version uint16) ([]byte, error) { + if len(ckx.ciphertext) == 0 || int(ckx.ciphertext[0]) != len(ckx.ciphertext)-1 { + return nil, errClientKeyExchange + } + x, y := elliptic.Unmarshal(ka.curve, ckx.ciphertext[1:]) + if x == nil { + return nil, errClientKeyExchange + } + if !ka.curve.IsOnCurve(x, y) { + return nil, errClientKeyExchange + } + x, _ = ka.curve.ScalarMult(x, y, ka.privateKey) + preMasterSecret := make([]byte, (ka.curve.Params().BitSize+7)>>3) + xBytes := x.Bytes() + copy(preMasterSecret[len(preMasterSecret)-len(xBytes):], xBytes) + + return preMasterSecret, nil +} + +func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) processServerKeyExchange(config *Config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, serverHello *serverHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate, skx *serverKeyExchangeMsg) error { + if len(skx.key) < 4 { + return errServerKeyExchange + } + if skx.key[0] != 3 { // named curve + return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported curve") + } + curveid := CurveID(skx.key[1])<<8 | CurveID(skx.key[2]) + + var ok bool + if ka.curve, ok = curveForCurveID(curveid); !ok { + return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported curve") + } + + publicLen := int(skx.key[3]) + if publicLen+4 > len(skx.key) { + return errServerKeyExchange + } + ka.x, ka.y = elliptic.Unmarshal(ka.curve, skx.key[4:4+publicLen]) + if ka.x == nil { + return errServerKeyExchange + } + if !ka.curve.IsOnCurve(ka.x, ka.y) { + return errServerKeyExchange + } + serverECDHParams := skx.key[:4+publicLen] + + sig := skx.key[4+publicLen:] + if len(sig) < 2 { + return errServerKeyExchange + } + + var tls12HashId uint8 + if ka.version >= VersionTLS12 { + // handle SignatureAndHashAlgorithm + var sigAndHash []uint8 + sigAndHash, sig = sig[:2], sig[2:] + if sigAndHash[1] != ka.sigType { + return errServerKeyExchange + } + tls12HashId = sigAndHash[0] + if len(sig) < 2 { + return errServerKeyExchange + } + } + sigLen := int(sig[0])<<8 | int(sig[1]) + if sigLen+2 != len(sig) { + return errServerKeyExchange + } + sig = sig[2:] + + digest, hashFunc, err := hashForServerKeyExchange(ka.sigType, tls12HashId, ka.version, clientHello.random, serverHello.random, serverECDHParams) + if err != nil { + return err + } + switch ka.sigType { + case signatureECDSA: + pubKey, ok := cert.PublicKey.(*ecdsa.PublicKey) + if !ok { + return errors.New("ECDHE ECDSA requires a ECDSA server public key") + } + ecdsaSig := new(ecdsaSignature) + if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(sig, ecdsaSig); err != nil { + return err + } + if ecdsaSig.R.Sign() <= 0 || ecdsaSig.S.Sign() <= 0 { + return errors.New("ECDSA signature contained zero or negative values") + } + if !ecdsa.Verify(pubKey, digest, ecdsaSig.R, ecdsaSig.S) { + return errors.New("ECDSA verification failure") + } + case signatureRSA: + pubKey, ok := cert.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey) + if !ok { + return errors.New("ECDHE RSA requires a RSA server public key") + } + if err := rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(pubKey, hashFunc, digest, sig); err != nil { + return err + } + default: + return errors.New("unknown ECDHE signature algorithm") + } + + return nil +} + +func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) generateClientKeyExchange(config *Config, clientHello *clientHelloMsg, cert *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, error) { + if ka.curve == nil { + return nil, nil, errors.New("missing ServerKeyExchange message") + } + priv, mx, my, err := elliptic.GenerateKey(ka.curve, config.rand()) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + x, _ := ka.curve.ScalarMult(ka.x, ka.y, priv) + preMasterSecret := make([]byte, (ka.curve.Params().BitSize+7)>>3) + xBytes := x.Bytes() + copy(preMasterSecret[len(preMasterSecret)-len(xBytes):], xBytes) + + serialized := elliptic.Marshal(ka.curve, mx, my) + + ckx := new(clientKeyExchangeMsg) + ckx.ciphertext = make([]byte, 1+len(serialized)) + ckx.ciphertext[0] = byte(len(serialized)) + copy(ckx.ciphertext[1:], serialized) + + return preMasterSecret, ckx, nil +} |