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+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1993 Eric P. Allman
+ * Copyright (c) 1993
+ * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * This product includes software developed by the University of
+ * California, Berkeley and its contributors.
+ * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef lint
+static char sccsid[] = "@(#)smrsh.c 8.5 (Berkeley) 10/19/97";
+#endif /* not lint */
+
+/*
+** SMRSH -- sendmail restricted shell
+**
+** This is a patch to get around the prog mailer bugs in most
+** versions of sendmail.
+**
+** Use this in place of /bin/sh in the "prog" mailer definition
+** in your sendmail.cf file. You then create CMDDIR (owned by
+** root, mode 755) and put links to any programs you want
+** available to prog mailers in that directory. This should
+** include things like "vacation" and "procmail", but not "sed"
+** or "sh".
+**
+** Leading pathnames are stripped from program names so that
+** existing .forward files that reference things like
+** "/usr/ucb/vacation" will continue to work.
+**
+** The following characters are completely illegal:
+** < > | ^ ; & $ ` ( ) \n \r
+** This is more restrictive than strictly necessary.
+**
+** To use this, edit /etc/sendmail.cf, search for ^Mprog, and
+** change P=/bin/sh to P=/usr/local/etc/smrsh, where this compiled
+** binary is installed /usr/local/etc/smrsh.
+**
+** This can be used on any version of sendmail.
+**
+** In loving memory of RTM. 11/02/93.
+*/
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/file.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#ifdef EX_OK
+# undef EX_OK
+#endif
+#include <sysexits.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+/* directory in which all commands must reside */
+#ifndef CMDDIR
+# define CMDDIR "/usr/adm/sm.bin"
+#endif
+
+/* characters disallowed in the shell "-c" argument */
+#define SPECIALS "<|>^();&`$\r\n"
+
+/* default search path */
+#ifndef PATH
+# define PATH "/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/ucb"
+#endif
+
+main(argc, argv)
+ int argc;
+ char **argv;
+{
+ register char *p;
+ register char *q;
+ register char *cmd;
+ int i;
+ char *newenv[2];
+ char cmdbuf[1000];
+ char pathbuf[1000];
+
+#ifndef LOG_MAIL
+ openlog("smrsh", 0);
+#else
+ openlog("smrsh", LOG_ODELAY|LOG_CONS, LOG_MAIL);
+#endif
+
+ strcpy(pathbuf, "PATH=");
+ strcat(pathbuf, PATH);
+ newenv[0] = pathbuf;
+ newenv[1] = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ ** Do basic argv usage checking
+ */
+
+ if (argc != 3 || strcmp(argv[1], "-c") != 0)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s -c command\n", argv[0]);
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "usage");
+ exit(EX_USAGE);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ ** Disallow special shell syntax. This is overly restrictive,
+ ** but it should shut down all attacks.
+ ** Be sure to include 8-bit versions, since many shells strip
+ ** the address to 7 bits before checking.
+ */
+
+ strcpy(cmdbuf, SPECIALS);
+ for (p = cmdbuf; *p != '\0'; p++)
+ *p |= '\200';
+ strcat(cmdbuf, SPECIALS);
+ p = strpbrk(argv[2], cmdbuf);
+ if (p != NULL)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: cannot use %c in command\n",
+ argv[0], *p);
+ syslog(LOG_CRIT, "uid %d: attempt to use %c in command: %s",
+ getuid(), *p, argv[2]);
+ exit(EX_UNAVAILABLE);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ ** Do a quick sanity check on command line length.
+ */
+
+ i = strlen(argv[2]);
+ if (i > (sizeof cmdbuf - sizeof CMDDIR - 2))
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: command too long: %s\n", argv[0], argv[2]);
+ syslog(LOG_WARNING, "command too long: %.40s", argv[2]);
+ exit(EX_UNAVAILABLE);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ ** Strip off a leading pathname on the command name. For
+ ** example, change /usr/ucb/vacation to vacation.
+ */
+
+ /* strip leading spaces */
+ for (q = argv[2]; *q != '\0' && isascii(*q) && isspace(*q); )
+ q++;
+
+ /* find the end of the command name */
+ p = strpbrk(q, " \t");
+ if (p == NULL)
+ cmd = &q[strlen(q)];
+ else
+ {
+ *p = '\0';
+ cmd = p;
+ }
+
+ /* search backwards for last / (allow for 0200 bit) */
+ while (cmd > q)
+ {
+ if ((*--cmd & 0177) == '/')
+ {
+ cmd++;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* cmd now points at final component of path name */
+
+ /*
+ ** Check to see if the command name is legal.
+ */
+
+ (void) strcpy(cmdbuf, CMDDIR);
+ (void) strcat(cmdbuf, "/");
+ (void) strcat(cmdbuf, cmd);
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ printf("Trying %s\n", cmdbuf);
+#endif
+ if (access(cmdbuf, X_OK) < 0)
+ {
+ /* oops.... crack attack possiblity */
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s not available for sendmail programs\n",
+ argv[0], cmd);
+ if (p != NULL)
+ *p = ' ';
+ syslog(LOG_CRIT, "uid %d: attempt to use %s", getuid(), cmd);
+ exit(EX_UNAVAILABLE);
+ }
+ if (p != NULL)
+ *p = ' ';
+
+ /*
+ ** Create the actual shell input.
+ */
+
+ strcpy(cmdbuf, CMDDIR);
+ strcat(cmdbuf, "/");
+ strcat(cmdbuf, cmd);
+
+ /*
+ ** Now invoke the shell
+ */
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ printf("%s\n", cmdbuf);
+#endif
+ execle("/bin/sh", "/bin/sh", "-c", cmdbuf, NULL, newenv);
+ syslog(LOG_CRIT, "Cannot exec /bin/sh: %m");
+ perror("/bin/sh");
+ exit(EX_OSFILE);
+}