PSARC 2010/032 EC and SHA2 for KMF

6902640 pktool/KMF needs to support ECDSA keys and certificates
6787016 pktool can offer the ability to generate RSA keypairs

18 files changed, 1734 insertions, 1186 deletions

diff --git a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/ber_der/common/clasn1.c b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/ber_der/common/clasn1.c
index d6e31390fd..2e1c3400c1 100644
--- a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/ber_der/common/clasn1.c
+++ b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/ber_der/common/clasn1.c
@@ -1,16 +1,15 @@
 /*
- * Copyright 2007 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright 2010 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
  * Use is subject to license terms.
  */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1995-1999 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
  */
 
-#pragma ident	"%Z%%M%	%I%	%E% SMI"
-
 #include <strings.h>
 #include <kmftypes.h>
 #include <ber_der.h>
+#include <kmfber_int.h>
 #include <kmfapi.h>
 #include <kmfapiP.h>
 
@@ -23,14 +22,18 @@ const KMF_OID extension_request_oid = {OID_PKCS_9_LENGTH + 1,
 	OID_ExtensionRequest};
 
 static KMF_RETURN
-encode_algoid(BerElement *asn1, KMF_X509_ALGORITHM_IDENTIFIER *algoid)
+encode_algoid(BerElement *asn1, KMF_X509_ALGORITHM_IDENTIFIER *algoid,
+    boolean_t encode_params)
 {
 	KMF_RETURN ret = KMF_OK;
 
 	if (kmfber_printf(asn1, "{D", &algoid->algorithm) == -1) {
 		ret = KMF_ERR_BAD_CERT_FORMAT;
 	}
-	if (algoid->parameters.Data == NULL ||
+	if (!encode_params) {
+		if (kmfber_printf(asn1, "}") == -1)
+			return (KMF_ERR_BAD_CERT_FORMAT);
+	} else if (algoid->parameters.Data == NULL ||
 	    algoid->parameters.Length == 0) {
 		if (kmfber_printf(asn1, "n}") == -1)
 			return (KMF_ERR_BAD_CERT_FORMAT);
@@ -196,31 +199,98 @@ free_decoded_cert(KMF_X509_CERTIFICATE *certptr)
 }
 
 static KMF_RETURN
-get_algoid(BerElement *asn1, KMF_X509_ALGORITHM_IDENTIFIER *algoid)
+get_sequence_data(BerElement *asn1, BerValue *seqdata)
 {
-	KMF_RETURN ret = KMF_OK;
-	ber_tag_t tag, newtag;
+	ber_tag_t tag;
 	ber_len_t size;
-	BerValue AlgOID = {NULL, 0};
 
 	tag = kmfber_next_element(asn1, &size, NULL);
-	if (tag != BER_CONSTRUCTED_SEQUENCE)
+	if (tag == BER_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER) {
+		/* The whole block is the OID. */
+		size += kmfber_calc_taglen(tag) + kmfber_calc_lenlen(size);
+		seqdata->bv_val = malloc(size);
+		if (seqdata->bv_val == NULL) {
+			return (KMF_ERR_MEMORY);
+		}
+		/* read the raw data into the Algoritm params area. */
+		if (kmfber_read(asn1, seqdata->bv_val, size) ==
+		    -1) {
+			return (KMF_ERR_BAD_CERT_FORMAT);
+		}
+		seqdata->bv_len = size;
+		return (KMF_OK);
+	} else if (tag != BER_CONSTRUCTED_SEQUENCE)
+		return (KMF_ERR_BAD_CERT_FORMAT);
+
+	if ((kmfber_scanf(asn1, "tl", &tag, &size)) == -1) {
 		return (KMF_ERR_BAD_CERT_FORMAT);
+	}
+	/*
+	 * We need to read the tag and the length bytes too,
+	 * so adjust the size.
+	 */
+	size += kmfber_calc_taglen(tag) + kmfber_calc_lenlen(size);
+	seqdata->bv_val = malloc(size);
+	if (seqdata->bv_val == NULL) {
+		return (KMF_ERR_MEMORY);
+	}
+	/* read the raw data into the Algoritm params area. */
+	if (kmfber_read(asn1, seqdata->bv_val, size) ==
+	    -1) {
+		return (KMF_ERR_BAD_CERT_FORMAT);
+	}
+	seqdata->bv_len = size;
+	return (KMF_OK);
+}
+
+static KMF_RETURN
+get_algoid(BerElement *asn1, KMF_X509_ALGORITHM_IDENTIFIER *algoid)
+{
+	KMF_RETURN rv = KMF_OK;
+	ber_tag_t tag;
+	ber_len_t size;
+	BerValue algoid_data;
+	BerValue AlgOID;
+	BerElement *oidasn1 = NULL;
+
+	/* Read the entire OID seq into it's own data block */
+	rv = get_sequence_data(asn1, &algoid_data);
+	if (rv != KMF_OK)
+		return (rv);
+
+	/* Now parse just this block so we don't overrun */
+	if ((oidasn1 = kmfder_init(&algoid_data)) == NULL)
+		return (KMF_ERR_MEMORY);
+	tag = kmfber_next_element(oidasn1, &size, NULL);
+	if (tag == BER_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER) {
+		algoid->algorithm.Data = (uchar_t *)algoid_data.bv_val;
+		algoid->algorithm.Length = algoid_data.bv_len;
+		algoid->parameters.Data = NULL;
+		algoid->parameters.Length = 0;
+		kmfber_free(oidasn1, 1);
+		return (KMF_OK);
+	}
 
-	if ((tag = kmfber_scanf(asn1, "{Dt", &AlgOID, &newtag)) == -1) {
+	if ((tag = kmfber_scanf(oidasn1, "{D", &AlgOID)) == -1) {
+		kmfber_free(oidasn1, 1);
 		return (KMF_ERR_BAD_CERT_FORMAT);
 	}
 	algoid->algorithm.Data = (uchar_t *)AlgOID.bv_val;
 	algoid->algorithm.Length = AlgOID.bv_len;
 
-	if (newtag == BER_NULL) {
-		(void) kmfber_scanf(asn1, "n}");
+	tag = kmfber_next_element(oidasn1, &size, NULL);
+	if (tag == BER_NULL) {
+		(void) kmfber_scanf(oidasn1, "n}");
+		algoid->parameters.Data = NULL;
+		algoid->parameters.Length = 0;
+	} else if (tag == KMFBER_END_OF_SEQORSET || tag == KMFBER_DEFAULT) {
+		/* close sequence, we are done with Algoid */
 		algoid->parameters.Data = NULL;
 		algoid->parameters.Length = 0;
 	} else {
-		/* Peek at the tag and length bytes */
-		if ((kmfber_scanf(asn1, "tl", &tag, &size)) == -1) {
-			ret = KMF_ERR_BAD_CERT_FORMAT;
+		/* The rest of the data is the algorithm parameters */
+		if ((kmfber_scanf(oidasn1, "tl", &tag, &size)) == -1) {
+			rv = KMF_ERR_BAD_CERT_FORMAT;
 			goto cleanup;
 		}
 
@@ -231,26 +301,24 @@ get_algoid(BerElement *asn1, KMF_X509_ALGORITHM_IDENTIFIER *algoid)
 		size += kmfber_calc_taglen(tag) + kmfber_calc_lenlen(size);
 		algoid->parameters.Data = malloc(size);
 		if (algoid->parameters.Data == NULL) {
-			ret = KMF_ERR_MEMORY;
+			rv = KMF_ERR_MEMORY;
 			goto cleanup;
 		}
 		/* read the raw data into the Algoritm params area. */
-		if (kmfber_read(asn1, (char *)algoid->parameters.Data,
+		if (kmfber_read(oidasn1, (char *)algoid->parameters.Data,
 		    size) == -1) {
-			ret = KMF_ERR_BAD_CERT_FORMAT;
+			rv = KMF_ERR_BAD_CERT_FORMAT;
 			goto cleanup;
 		}
 		algoid->parameters.Length = size;
-		if ((tag = kmfber_scanf(asn1, "}")) == -1) {
-			ret = KMF_ERR_BAD_CERT_FORMAT;
-		}
 	}
 cleanup:
-	if (ret != KMF_OK) {
+	if (rv != KMF_OK) {
 		free_algoid(algoid);
 	}
+	kmfber_free(oidasn1, 1);
 
-	return (ret);
+	return (rv);
 }
 
 static KMF_RETURN
@@ -274,7 +342,11 @@ encode_spki(BerElement *asn1, KMF_X509_SPKI *spki)
 	if (kmfber_printf(asn1, "{") == -1)
 		return (KMF_ERR_BAD_CERT_FORMAT);
 
-	if ((ret = encode_algoid(asn1, &spki->algorithm)) != KMF_OK)
+	/*
+	 * The SPKI is the only place where algorithm parameters
+	 * should be encoded.
+	 */
+	if ((ret = encode_algoid(asn1, &spki->algorithm, TRUE)) != KMF_OK)
 		return (ret);
 
 	if (kmfber_printf(asn1, "B}", spki->subjectPublicKey.Data,
@@ -346,6 +418,7 @@ cleanup:
 	return (ret);
 }
 
+
 KMF_RETURN
 DerEncodeDSASignature(KMF_DATA *rawdata, KMF_DATA *signature)
 {
@@ -356,7 +429,7 @@ DerEncodeDSASignature(KMF_DATA *rawdata, KMF_DATA *signature)
 	if (rawdata == NULL || signature == NULL)
 		return (KMF_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER);
 
-	if (rawdata->Data == NULL || rawdata->Length != DSA_RAW_SIG_LEN)
+	if (rawdata->Data == NULL || rawdata->Length == 0)
 		return (KMF_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER);
 
 	asn1 = kmfder_alloc();
@@ -364,10 +437,10 @@ DerEncodeDSASignature(KMF_DATA *rawdata, KMF_DATA *signature)
 		return (KMF_ERR_MEMORY);
 
 	/*
-	 * The DSA signature is the concatenation of 2 SHA-1 hashed
+	 * The [EC]DSA signature is the concatenation of 2
 	 * bignum values.
 	 */
-	n = DSA_RAW_SIG_LEN/2;
+	n = rawdata->Length/2;
 	if (kmfber_printf(asn1, "{II}",
 	    rawdata->Data, n, &rawdata->Data[n], n) == -1) {
 		kmfber_free(asn1, 1);
@@ -388,12 +461,60 @@ DerEncodeDSASignature(KMF_DATA *rawdata, KMF_DATA *signature)
 	return (KMF_OK);
 }
 
+/*
+ * ECDSA and DSA encode signatures the same way.
+ */
+KMF_RETURN
+DerEncodeECDSASignature(KMF_DATA *rawdata, KMF_DATA *signature)
+{
+	return (DerEncodeDSASignature(rawdata, signature));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert a signed DSA sig to a fixed-length unsigned one.
+ * This is necessary because DER encoding seeks to use the
+ * minimal amount of bytes but we need a full 20 byte DSA
+ * value with leading 0x00 bytes.
+ */
+static KMF_RETURN
+convert_signed_to_fixed(BerValue *src, BerValue *dst)
+{
+	int cnt;
+	char *p;
+	if (dst->bv_len > src->bv_len) {
+		cnt = dst->bv_len - src->bv_len;
+		/* prepend with leading 0s */
+		(void) memset(dst->bv_val, 0x00, cnt);
+		(void) memcpy(dst->bv_val + cnt, src->bv_val,
+		    src->bv_len);
+		return (KMF_OK);
+	}
+	if (dst->bv_len == src->bv_len) {
+		(void) memcpy(dst->bv_val, src->bv_val,
+		    dst->bv_len);
+		return (KMF_OK);
+	}
+	/*
+	 * src is larger than dest, strip leading 0s.
+	 * This should not be necessary, but do it just in case.
+	 */
+	cnt = src->bv_len - dst->bv_len;
+	p = src->bv_val;
+	while (cnt-- > 0) {
+		if (*p++ != 0x00)
+			return (KMF_ERR_ENCODING);
+	}
+	(void) memcpy(dst->bv_val, p, dst->bv_len);
+	return (KMF_OK);
+}
+
 KMF_RETURN
 DerDecodeDSASignature(KMF_DATA *encoded, KMF_DATA *signature)
 {
 	KMF_RETURN ret = KMF_OK;
 	BerElement *asn1 = NULL;
 	BerValue buf, *R = NULL, *S = NULL;
+	BerValue fixedR, fixedS;
 
 	buf.bv_val = (char *)encoded->Data;
 	buf.bv_len = encoded->Length;
@@ -413,14 +534,50 @@ DerDecodeDSASignature(KMF_DATA *encoded, KMF_DATA *signature)
 		goto cleanup;
 	}
 	signature->Length = R->bv_len + S->bv_len;
+	/*
+	 * If either of the values had a leading 0 lopped off
+	 * they will be 1 byte short and need to be adjusted below.
+	 * The stripping is correct as per ASN.1 rules.
+	 *
+	 * We don't know the exact length that the R and S values
+	 * must be, it depends on the signature algorithm and,
+	 * in the case of EC, the curve used. So instead of
+	 * checking for a specific length, we just check to see
+	 * if the value came out to be an odd number.  If so,
+	 * then we know it needs a leading 0x00 byte which
+	 * will be added below when we convert it to a fixed
+	 * length.
+	 */
+	if ((R->bv_len % 2) != 0)
+		signature->Length++;
+	if ((S->bv_len % 2) != 0)
+		signature->Length++;
+
 	signature->Data = malloc(signature->Length);
 	if (signature->Data == NULL)  {
 		ret = KMF_ERR_MEMORY;
 		goto cleanup;
 	}
-	(void) memcpy(signature->Data, R->bv_val, R->bv_len);
-	(void) memcpy(&signature->Data[R->bv_len], S->bv_val, S->bv_len);
+	fixedR.bv_val = (char *)signature->Data;
+	/* adjust length if it needs a leading 0x00 byte */
+	fixedR.bv_len = R->bv_len + (R->bv_len % 2);
+
+	fixedS.bv_val = (char *)(signature->Data + fixedR.bv_len);
+	/* adjust length if it needs a leading 0x00 byte */
+	fixedS.bv_len = S->bv_len + (S->bv_len % 2);
+
+	/*
+	 * This will add back any missing leading 0's
+	 * that were stripped off earlier when the signature
+	 * was parsed.  This ensures that the 2 parts of the
+	 * signature are the right length and have the proper
+	 * leading 0's prepended.
+	 */
+	ret = convert_signed_to_fixed(R, &fixedR);
+	if (ret)
+		goto cleanup;
 
+	ret = convert_signed_to_fixed(S, &fixedS);
 cleanup:
 	if (R && R->bv_val)
 		free(R->bv_val);
@@ -436,6 +593,13 @@ cleanup:
 }
 
 KMF_RETURN
+DerDecodeECDSASignature(KMF_DATA *encoded, KMF_DATA *signature)
+{
+	/* ECDSA can be decoded using same code as standard DSA */
+	return (DerDecodeDSASignature(encoded, signature));
+}
+
+KMF_RETURN
 DerDecodeSPKI(KMF_DATA *EncodedSPKI, KMF_X509_SPKI *spki)
 {
 	KMF_RETURN ret = KMF_OK;
@@ -1472,7 +1636,8 @@ encode_tbs_cert(BerElement *asn1, KMF_X509_TBS_CERT *tbscert)
 		goto cleanup;
 	}
 
-	if ((ret = encode_algoid(asn1, &tbscert->signature)) != KMF_OK)
+	/* Don't encode alg parameters in signature algid area */
+	if ((ret = encode_algoid(asn1, &tbscert->signature, FALSE)) != KMF_OK)
 		goto cleanup;
 
 	/* Encode the Issuer RDN */
@@ -1601,9 +1766,9 @@ DerEncodeSignedCertificate(KMF_X509_CERTIFICATE *signed_cert_ptr,
 		goto cleanup;
 	}
 
-	/* Add the Algorithm & Signature Sequence */
+	/* Add the Algorithm & Signature Sequence (no parameters) */
 	if ((ret = encode_algoid(asn1,
-	    &signature->algorithmIdentifier)) != KMF_OK)
+	    &signature->algorithmIdentifier, FALSE)) != KMF_OK)
 		goto cleanup;
 
 	if (signature->encrypted.Length > 0) {
@@ -1721,90 +1886,6 @@ cleanup:
 	return (ret);
 }
 
-/*
- * Name: GetKeyFromSpki
- *
- * Description:
- * This function parses the KMF_X509_SPKI into its
- * key and parameter components based on the key generation algorithm.
- * NOTE:  Currently, it only checks for the RSA and DSA algorithms.
- *	The RSA algorithm is equivalent to the default behavior.
- *	All other algorithms will default to the parameters = NULL and the
- *	key data equal to whatever is in the CSSM_KEY structure for the key
- *
- * Parameters:
- * AlgId (input) : Algorithm identifier
- * SpkiPtr (input): SPKI structure that contains the key
- * key_ptr(output): The output key
- *
- */
-KMF_RETURN
-GetKeyFromSpki(KMF_ALGORITHM_INDEX AlgId,
-	KMF_X509_SPKI *SpkiPtr,
-	KMF_DATA **key_ptr)
-{
-	KMF_RETURN ret = KMF_OK;
-	BerElement *asn1;
-	BerValue *encodedkey = NULL;
-
-	if (!key_ptr || !SpkiPtr) {
-		return (KMF_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER);
-	}
-	*key_ptr = NULL;
-
-	switch (AlgId) {
-		case KMF_ALGID_DSA:
-			asn1 = kmfder_alloc();
-			if (asn1 == NULL) {
-				return (KMF_ERR_MEMORY);
-			}
-
-			if ((ret = encode_spki(asn1, SpkiPtr)) != KMF_OK) {
-				ret = KMF_ERR_MEMORY;
-				goto cleanup;
-			}
-
-			if (kmfber_flatten(asn1, &encodedkey) == -1) {
-				ret = KMF_ERR_MEMORY;
-				goto cleanup;
-			}
-
-			*key_ptr = malloc(sizeof (KMF_DATA));
-
-			if (!*key_ptr) {
-				ret = KMF_ERR_MEMORY;
-				goto cleanup;
-			}
-
-			(*key_ptr)->Length = encodedkey->bv_len;
-			(*key_ptr)->Data = (uchar_t *)encodedkey->bv_val;
-cleanup:
-			kmfber_free(asn1, 1);
-			if (encodedkey)
-				free(encodedkey);
-		break;
-		default: /* RSA */
-			*key_ptr = malloc(sizeof (KMF_DATA));
-
-			if (!*key_ptr) {
-				return (KMF_ERR_MEMORY);
-			}
-			(*key_ptr)->Length = SpkiPtr->subjectPublicKey.Length;
-			(*key_ptr)->Data = malloc((*key_ptr)->Length);
-
-			if (!(*key_ptr)->Data) {
-				free(*key_ptr);
-				*key_ptr = NULL;
-				return (KMF_ERR_MEMORY);
-			}
-			(void) memcpy((*key_ptr)->Data,
-			    SpkiPtr->subjectPublicKey.Data,
-			    (*key_ptr)->Length);
-			return (ret);
-	}
-	return (ret);
-}
-
 static KMF_RETURN
 decode_csr_extensions(BerElement *asn1, KMF_X509_EXTENSIONS *extns)
 {
@@ -2133,7 +2214,6 @@ encode_tbs_csr(BerElement *asn1, KMF_TBS_CSR *tbscsr)
 	if ((ret = encode_spki(asn1, &tbscsr->subjectPublicKeyInfo)) != KMF_OK)
 		goto cleanup;
 
-
 	if ((ret = encode_csr_extensions(asn1, tbscsr)) != KMF_OK)
 		goto cleanup;
 
@@ -2216,6 +2296,56 @@ cleanup:
 	return (rv);
 }
 
+KMF_RETURN
+DerEncodeECPrivateKey(KMF_DATA *encodedkey, KMF_RAW_EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+	KMF_RETURN rv = KMF_OK;
+	BerElement *asn1 = NULL;
+	uchar_t ver = 1;
+	BerValue  *data = NULL;
+
+	asn1 = kmfder_alloc();
+	if (asn1 == NULL)
+		return (KMF_ERR_MEMORY);
+
+	if (kmfber_printf(asn1, "{io",
+	    ver, eckey->value.val, eckey->value.len) == -1) {
+		rv = KMF_ERR_ENCODING;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Indicate that we are using the named curve option
+	 * for the parameters.
+	 */
+	if (kmfber_printf(asn1, "T", 0xA0) == -1) {
+		rv = KMF_ERR_ENCODING;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+	if (kmfber_printf(asn1, "l", eckey->params.Length) == -1) {
+		rv = KMF_ERR_ENCODING;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+	if (kmfber_write(asn1, (char *)eckey->params.Data,
+	    eckey->params.Length, 0) == -1) {
+		rv = KMF_ERR_ENCODING;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+	if (kmfber_printf(asn1, "}") == -1) {
+		rv = KMF_ERR_ENCODING;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+	if (kmfber_flatten(asn1, &data) == -1) {
+		rv = KMF_ERR_MEMORY;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+	encodedkey->Data = (uchar_t *)data->bv_val;
+	encodedkey->Length = data->bv_len;
+
+cleanup:
+	kmfber_free(asn1, 1);
+	return (rv);
+}
+
 
 KMF_RETURN
 DerEncodeTbsCsr(KMF_TBS_CSR *tbs_csr_ptr,
@@ -2288,7 +2418,7 @@ DerEncodeSignedCsr(KMF_CSR_DATA *signed_csr_ptr,
 
 	/* Add the Algorithm & Signature Sequence */
 	if ((ret = encode_algoid(asn1,
-	    &signature->algorithmIdentifier)) != KMF_OK)
+	    &signature->algorithmIdentifier, FALSE)) != KMF_OK)
 		goto cleanup;
 
 	if (signature->encrypted.Length > 0) {
@@ -2325,6 +2455,24 @@ cleanup:
 	return (ret);
 }
 
+static KMF_RETURN
+ber_copy_data(KMF_DATA *dst, KMF_DATA *src)
+{
+	KMF_RETURN ret = KMF_OK;
+
+	if (dst == NULL || src == NULL)
+		return (KMF_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER);
+
+	dst->Data = malloc(src->Length);
+	if (dst->Data == NULL)
+		return (KMF_ERR_MEMORY);
+
+	dst->Length = src->Length;
+	(void) memcpy(dst->Data, src->Data, src->Length);
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
 KMF_RETURN
 ExtractSPKIData(
 	const KMF_X509_SPKI *pKey,
@@ -2388,6 +2536,16 @@ ExtractSPKIData(
 
 			*uNumKeyParts = KMF_NUMBER_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY_PARTS;
 			break;
+		case KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithECDSA:
+		case KMF_ALGID_ECDSA:
+			(void) ber_copy_data(&pKeyParts[KMF_ECDSA_PARAMS],
+			    (KMF_DATA *)&pKey->algorithm.parameters);
+
+			(void) ber_copy_data(&pKeyParts[KMF_ECDSA_POINT],
+			    (KMF_DATA *)&pKey->subjectPublicKey);
+
+			*uNumKeyParts = 2;
+			break;
 
 		case KMF_ALGID_RSA:
 		case KMF_ALGID_MD2WithRSA:
diff --git a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/ber_der/common/decode.c b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/ber_der/common/decode.c
index 459c49fdbe..cdae8d84a9 100644
--- a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/ber_der/common/decode.c
+++ b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/ber_der/common/decode.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright 2010 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
  * Use is subject to license terms.
  */
 /*
@@ -345,10 +345,10 @@ ber_get_bigint(BerElement *ber, struct berval **bv)
 
 	(*bv)->bv_len = len;
 
-	/* If DER encoding, strip leading 0's */
+	/* If DER encoding, strip leading 0's if high-order bit is set */
 	if (ber->ber_options & KMFBER_OPT_USE_DER) {
 		char *p = (*bv)->bv_val;
-		while ((*p == 0x00) && ((*bv)->bv_len > 0)) {
+		while ((*p == 0x00) && ((*bv)->bv_len > 0) && (p[1] & 0x80)) {
 			p++;
 			(*bv)->bv_len--;
 		}
diff --git a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/ber_der/common/mapfile-vers b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/ber_der/common/mapfile-vers
index 0a97cd2eab..cda7690c8d 100644
--- a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/ber_der/common/mapfile-vers
+++ b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/ber_der/common/mapfile-vers
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
 # CDDL HEADER END
 #
 #
-# Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
+# Copyright 2010 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
 # Use is subject to license terms.
 #
 
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ SUNWprivate_1.1 {
 	CopyRDN;
 	CopySPKI;
 	DerDecodeDSASignature;
+	DerDecodeECDSASignature;
 	DerDecodeExtension;
 	DerDecodeName;
 	DerDecodeSPKI;
@@ -52,6 +53,8 @@ SUNWprivate_1.1 {
 	DerDecodeTbsCsr;
 	DerEncodeDSAPrivateKey;
 	DerEncodeDSASignature;
+	DerEncodeECDSASignature;
+	DerEncodeECPrivateKey;
 	DerEncodeName;
 	DerEncodeRSAPrivateKey;
 	DerEncodeSPKI;
@@ -61,7 +64,6 @@ SUNWprivate_1.1 {
 	DerEncodeTbsCsr;
 	ExtractSPKIData;
 	ExtractX509CertParts;
-	GetKeyFromSpki;
 	kmfber_alloc;
 	kmfber_bvfree;
 	kmfber_first_element;
diff --git a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/ber_der/inc/ber_der.h b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/ber_der/inc/ber_der.h
index abf112351d..4c2da6c91a 100644
--- a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/ber_der/inc/ber_der.h
+++ b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/ber_der/inc/ber_der.h
@@ -1,11 +1,9 @@
 /*
- * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright 2010 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
  * Use is subject to license terms.
  */
 
 /*
- * Mode: C++; tab-width: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4
- *
  * The contents of this file are subject to the Netscape Public License
  * Version 1.0(the "NPL"); you may not use this file except in
  * compliance with the NPL.  You may obtain a copy of the NPL at
@@ -143,8 +141,6 @@ extern KMF_RETURN DerDecodeTbsCsr(const KMF_DATA *, KMF_TBS_CSR **);
 extern KMF_RETURN DerEncodeTbsCsr(KMF_TBS_CSR *, KMF_DATA *);
 
 KMF_RETURN ExtractX509CertParts(KMF_DATA *, KMF_DATA *, KMF_DATA *);
-KMF_RETURN GetKeyFromSpki(KMF_ALGORITHM_INDEX, KMF_X509_SPKI *,
-	KMF_DATA **);
 extern KMF_RETURN DerEncodeName(KMF_X509_NAME *, KMF_DATA *);
 KMF_RETURN DerDecodeName(KMF_DATA *, KMF_X509_NAME *);
 KMF_RETURN DerDecodeExtension(KMF_DATA *, KMF_X509_EXTENSION **);
@@ -154,6 +150,8 @@ KMF_RETURN CopySPKI(KMF_X509_SPKI *,
 extern KMF_RETURN DerDecodeSPKI(KMF_DATA *, KMF_X509_SPKI *);
 extern KMF_RETURN DerDecodeDSASignature(KMF_DATA *, KMF_DATA *);
 extern KMF_RETURN DerEncodeDSASignature(KMF_DATA *, KMF_DATA *);
+extern KMF_RETURN DerEncodeECDSASignature(KMF_DATA *, KMF_DATA *);
+extern KMF_RETURN DerDecodeECDSASignature(KMF_DATA *, KMF_DATA *);
 KMF_RETURN DerEncodeAlgoid(KMF_DATA *, KMF_DATA *);
 KMF_RETURN DerDecodeSPKI(KMF_DATA *, KMF_X509_SPKI *);
 KMF_RETURN DerEncodeSPKI(KMF_X509_SPKI *, KMF_DATA *);
@@ -162,5 +160,6 @@ extern KMF_RETURN ExtractSPKIData(const KMF_X509_SPKI *,
 extern KMF_RETURN AddRDN(KMF_X509_NAME *, KMF_X509_RDN *);
 KMF_RETURN DerEncodeRSAPrivateKey(KMF_DATA *, KMF_RAW_RSA_KEY *);
 KMF_RETURN DerEncodeDSAPrivateKey(KMF_DATA *, KMF_RAW_DSA_KEY *);
+KMF_RETURN DerEncodeECPrivateKey(KMF_DATA *, KMF_RAW_EC_KEY *);
 
 #endif /* BER_DER_H */
diff --git a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/include/algorithm.h b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/include/algorithm.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 00e2eabddf..0000000000
--- a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/include/algorithm.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright 2007 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
- * Use is subject to license terms.
- */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1995-2000 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
- */
-
-#ifndef _ALGORITHM_H
-#define	_ALGORITHM_H
-
-#pragma ident	"%Z%%M%	%I%	%E% SMI"
-
-#include <kmftypes.h>
-#include <security/cryptoki.h>
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-typedef struct pkcs_algorithm_map
-{
-	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE	pkcs_mechanism;
-	uint32_t		algorithm;
-	uint32_t		context_type;
-	uint32_t		enc_mode;
-	CK_BBOOL		bMultiPart;
-	CK_BBOOL		fix_keylength;
-	uint32_t		keylength;
-	CK_BBOOL		fix_blocksize;
-	uint32_t		block_size;
-	CK_BBOOL		requires_iv;
-	uint32_t		iv_length;
-	CK_FLAGS		required_flags;
-	CK_KEY_TYPE		key_type;
-	char			*szDescription;
-} PKCS_ALGORITHM_MAP;
-
-extern KMF_SIGNATURE_MODE PKCS_GetDefaultSignatureMode(KMF_ALGORITHM_INDEX);
-extern PKCS_ALGORITHM_MAP* pkcs_get_alg_map(KMF_ALGCLASS, uint32_t,
-	uint32_t);
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif /* _ALGORITHM_H */
diff --git a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/include/kmfapiP.h b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/include/kmfapiP.h
index 1e0d108f92..27deeb460c 100644
--- a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/include/kmfapiP.h
+++ b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/include/kmfapiP.h
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
  * CDDL HEADER END
  */
 /*
- * Copyright 2008 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright 2010 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
  * Use is subject to license terms.
  */
 #ifndef _KMFAPIP_H
@@ -143,13 +143,6 @@ typedef struct {
 			KMF_HANDLE_T,
 			int, KMF_ATTRIBUTE *);
 
-	KMF_RETURN	(*VerifyDataWithCert) (
-			KMF_HANDLE_T,
-			KMF_ALGORITHM_INDEX,
-			KMF_DATA *,
-			KMF_DATA *,
-			KMF_DATA *);
-
 	KMF_RETURN	(*StoreKey) (
 			KMF_HANDLE_T,
 			int,
@@ -224,6 +217,10 @@ VerifyDataWithKey(KMF_HANDLE_T, KMF_DATA *, KMF_ALGORITHM_INDEX,
 extern KMF_BOOL pkcs_algid_to_keytype(
     KMF_ALGORITHM_INDEX, CK_KEY_TYPE *);
 
+extern KMF_RETURN PKCS_DigestData(KMF_HANDLE_T,
+    CK_SESSION_HANDLE, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE,
+    KMF_DATA *, KMF_DATA *, boolean_t);
+
 extern KMF_RETURN PKCS_VerifyData(
     KMF_HANDLE *,
     KMF_ALGORITHM_INDEX,
@@ -247,10 +244,6 @@ extern KMF_RETURN copy_algoid(KMF_X509_ALGORITHM_IDENTIFIER *destid,
 extern KMF_OID *x509_algid_to_algoid(KMF_ALGORITHM_INDEX);
 extern KMF_ALGORITHM_INDEX x509_algoid_to_algid(KMF_OID *);
 
-extern KMF_RETURN PKCS_AcquirePublicKeyHandle(CK_SESSION_HANDLE ckSession,
-    const KMF_X509_SPKI *, CK_KEY_TYPE, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *,
-    KMF_BOOL *);
-
 extern KMF_RETURN GetIDFromSPKI(KMF_X509_SPKI *, KMF_DATA *);
 extern KMF_RETURN kmf_select_token(KMF_HANDLE_T, char *, int);
 extern KMF_RETURN kmf_set_altname(KMF_X509_EXTENSIONS *,
@@ -295,6 +288,9 @@ extern KMF_RETURN test_attributes(int, KMF_ATTRIBUTE_TESTER *,
 #define	KMF_DSA_BASE		(2)
 #define	KMF_DSA_PUBLIC_VALUE	(3)
 
+#define	KMF_ECDSA_PARAMS	(0)
+#define	KMF_ECDSA_POINT		(1)
+
 #ifndef max
 #define	max(a, b) ((a) < (b) ? (b) : (a))
 #endif
@@ -341,7 +337,10 @@ typedef struct conf_entrylist {
 	struct conf_entrylist 	*next;
 } conf_entrylist_t;
 
-
+extern KMF_RETURN get_pk11_data(KMF_ALGORITHM_INDEX,
+	CK_KEY_TYPE *, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE *, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE *, boolean_t);
+extern KMF_RETURN kmf_create_pk11_session(CK_SESSION_HANDLE *,
+	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE, CK_FLAGS);
 extern KMF_RETURN get_entrylist(conf_entrylist_t **);
 extern void free_entrylist(conf_entrylist_t *);
 extern void free_entry(conf_entry_t *);
diff --git a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/include/kmftypes.h b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/include/kmftypes.h
index dbbf680537..01e38862dc 100644
--- a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/include/kmftypes.h
+++ b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/include/kmftypes.h
@@ -115,6 +115,9 @@ typedef enum {
  * Algorithms
  * This type defines a set of constants used to identify cryptographic
  * algorithms.
+ *
+ * When adding new ALGID, be careful not to rearrange existing
+ * values, doing so can cause problem in the STC test suite.
  */
 typedef enum {
 	KMF_ALGID_NONE	= 0,
@@ -125,7 +128,20 @@ typedef enum {
 	KMF_ALGID_MD5WithRSA,
 	KMF_ALGID_MD2WithRSA,
 	KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithRSA,
-	KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithDSA
+	KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithDSA,
+
+	KMF_ALGID_ECDSA,
+
+	KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithRSA,
+	KMF_ALGID_SHA384WithRSA,
+	KMF_ALGID_SHA512WithRSA,
+
+	KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithDSA,
+
+	KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithECDSA,
+	KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithECDSA,
+	KMF_ALGID_SHA384WithECDSA,
+	KMF_ALGID_SHA512WithECDSA
 } KMF_ALGORITHM_INDEX;
 
 /*
@@ -146,7 +162,8 @@ typedef enum {
 	KMF_RC4 = 4,
 	KMF_DES = 5,
 	KMF_DES3 = 6,
-	KMF_GENERIC_SECRET = 7
+	KMF_GENERIC_SECRET = 7,
+	KMF_ECDSA = 8
 }KMF_KEY_ALG;
 
 typedef enum {
@@ -156,7 +173,6 @@ typedef enum {
 	KMF_SYMMETRIC = 3	/* symmetric key */
 }KMF_KEY_CLASS;
 
-
 typedef enum {
 	KMF_CERT = 0,
 	KMF_CSR = 1,
@@ -187,6 +203,11 @@ typedef struct {
 } KMF_RAW_SYM_KEY;
 
 typedef struct {
+	KMF_BIGINT	value;
+	KMF_OID		params;
+} KMF_RAW_EC_KEY;
+
+typedef struct {
 	KMF_KEY_ALG	keytype;
 	boolean_t	sensitive;
 	boolean_t	not_extractable;
@@ -194,6 +215,7 @@ typedef struct {
 		KMF_RAW_RSA_KEY	rsa;
 		KMF_RAW_DSA_KEY	dsa;
 		KMF_RAW_SYM_KEY	sym;
+		KMF_RAW_EC_KEY  ec;
 	}rawdata;
 	char *label;
 	KMF_DATA id;
@@ -355,20 +377,6 @@ typedef enum {
 } KMF_OCSP_REVOKED_STATUS;
 
 typedef enum {
-	KMF_ALGCLASS_NONE 	= 0,
-	KMF_ALGCLASS_CUSTOM,
-	KMF_ALGCLASS_SIGNATURE,
-	KMF_ALGCLASS_SYMMETRIC,
-	KMF_ALGCLASS_DIGEST,
-	KMF_ALGCLASS_RANDOMGEN,
-	KMF_ALGCLASS_UNIQUEGEN,
-	KMF_ALGCLASS_MAC,
-	KMF_ALGCLASS_ASYMMETRIC,
-	KMF_ALGCLASS_KEYGEN,
-	KMF_ALGCLASS_DERIVEKEY
-} KMF_ALGCLASS;
-
-typedef enum {
 	KMF_CERT_ISSUER		= 1,
 	KMF_CERT_SUBJECT,
 	KMF_CERT_VERSION,
@@ -786,7 +794,8 @@ typedef enum {
 	KMF_CIPHERTEXT_DATA_ATTR,
 	KMF_VALIDATE_RESULT_ATTR,
 	KMF_KEY_DATA_ATTR,
-	KMF_PK11_USER_TYPE_ATTR
+	KMF_PK11_USER_TYPE_ATTR,
+	KMF_ECC_CURVE_OID_ATTR
 } KMF_ATTR_TYPE;
 
 typedef struct {
@@ -1155,11 +1164,14 @@ KMFOID_PKIX_KP_OCSPSigning,
 KMFOID_SHA1,
 KMFOID_RSA,
 KMFOID_DSA,
+KMFOID_MD5,
 KMFOID_MD5WithRSA,
 KMFOID_MD2WithRSA,
 KMFOID_SHA1WithRSA,
+KMFOID_SHA256WithRSA,
+KMFOID_SHA384WithRSA,
+KMFOID_SHA512WithRSA,
 KMFOID_SHA1WithDSA,
-KMFOID_OIW_DSAWithSHA1,
 KMFOID_X9CM_DSA,
 KMFOID_X9CM_DSAWithSHA1;
 
@@ -1171,6 +1183,79 @@ KMFOID_PKINIT_Kdc,
 KMFOID_MS_KP_SCLogon,
 KMFOID_MS_KP_SCLogon_UPN;
 
+/* For ECC support */
+extern const KMF_OID
+KMFOID_EC_PUBLIC_KEY,
+KMFOID_SHA1WithECDSA,
+KMFOID_SHA224WithECDSA,
+KMFOID_SHA256WithECDSA,
+KMFOID_SHA384WithECDSA,
+KMFOID_SHA512WithECDSA,
+KMFOID_SHA224WithDSA,
+KMFOID_SHA256WithDSA,
+KMFOID_SHA224,
+KMFOID_SHA256,
+KMFOID_SHA384,
+KMFOID_SHA512,
+KMFOID_ECC_secp112r1,
+KMFOID_ECC_secp112r2,
+KMFOID_ECC_secp128r1,
+KMFOID_ECC_secp128r2,
+KMFOID_ECC_secp160k1,
+KMFOID_ECC_secp160r1,
+KMFOID_ECC_secp160r2,
+KMFOID_ECC_secp192k1,
+KMFOID_ECC_secp224k1,
+KMFOID_ECC_secp224r1,
+KMFOID_ECC_secp256k1,
+KMFOID_ECC_secp384r1,
+KMFOID_ECC_secp521r1,
+KMFOID_ECC_sect113r1,
+KMFOID_ECC_sect113r2,
+KMFOID_ECC_sect131r1,
+KMFOID_ECC_sect131r2,
+KMFOID_ECC_sect163k1,
+KMFOID_ECC_sect163r1,
+KMFOID_ECC_sect163r2,
+KMFOID_ECC_sect193r1,
+KMFOID_ECC_sect193r2,
+KMFOID_ECC_sect233k1,
+KMFOID_ECC_sect233r1,
+KMFOID_ECC_sect239k1,
+KMFOID_ECC_sect283k1,
+KMFOID_ECC_sect283r1,
+KMFOID_ECC_sect409k1,
+KMFOID_ECC_sect409r1,
+KMFOID_ECC_sect571k1,
+KMFOID_ECC_sect571r1,
+KMFOID_ECC_c2pnb163v1,
+KMFOID_ECC_c2pnb163v2,
+KMFOID_ECC_c2pnb163v3,
+KMFOID_ECC_c2pnb176v1,
+KMFOID_ECC_c2tnb191v1,
+KMFOID_ECC_c2tnb191v2,
+KMFOID_ECC_c2tnb191v3,
+KMFOID_ECC_c2pnb208w1,
+KMFOID_ECC_c2tnb239v1,
+KMFOID_ECC_c2tnb239v2,
+KMFOID_ECC_c2tnb239v3,
+KMFOID_ECC_c2pnb272w1,
+KMFOID_ECC_c2pnb304w1,
+KMFOID_ECC_c2tnb359v1,
+KMFOID_ECC_c2pnb368w1,
+KMFOID_ECC_c2tnb431r1,
+KMFOID_ECC_prime192v2,
+KMFOID_ECC_prime192v3,
+KMFOID_ECC_secp192r1,
+KMFOID_ECC_secp256r1;
+
+/*
+ * ANSI X9-62 prime192v1 is same as secp192r1 and
+ * ANSI X9-62 prime256v1 is same as secp256r1
+ */
+#define	KMFOID_ANSIX962_prime192v1 KMFOID_ECC_secp192r1
+#define	KMFOID_ANSIX962_prime256v1 KMFOID_ECC_secp256r1
+
 /*
  * KMF Certificate validation codes.  These may be masked together.
  */
diff --git a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/libkmf/Makefile.com b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/libkmf/Makefile.com
index af34cf87a3..b11f172a71 100644
--- a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/libkmf/Makefile.com
+++ b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/libkmf/Makefile.com
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 #
 # CDDL HEADER END
 #
-# Copyright 2008 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
+# Copyright 2010 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
 # Use is subject to license terms.
 #
 
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ VERS= .1
 
 OBJECTS= \
 	algoid.o \
-	algorithm.o \
 	certgetsetop.o \
 	certop.o \
 	client.o \
diff --git a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/libkmf/common/algoid.c b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/libkmf/common/algoid.c
index f33634f007..51804af492 100644
--- a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/libkmf/common/algoid.c
+++ b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/libkmf/common/algoid.c
@@ -2,12 +2,10 @@
  * Copyright (c) 1995-2000 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
  */
 /*
- * Copyright 2007 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright 2010 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
  * Use is subject to license terms.
  */
 
-#pragma ident	"%Z%%M%	%I%	%E% SMI"
-
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 
@@ -28,9 +26,17 @@ static KMF_OID_ID ALGOID_ID_Table[] = {
 	{(KMF_OID *)&KMFOID_RSA, KMF_ALGID_RSA},
 	{(KMF_OID *)&KMFOID_DSA, KMF_ALGID_DSA},
 	{(KMF_OID *)&KMFOID_MD5WithRSA, KMF_ALGID_MD5WithRSA},
-	{(KMF_OID *)&KMFOID_MD2WithRSA, KMF_ALGID_MD2WithRSA},
 	{(KMF_OID *)&KMFOID_SHA1WithRSA, KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithRSA},
-	{(KMF_OID *)&KMFOID_SHA1WithDSA, KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithDSA}
+	{(KMF_OID *)&KMFOID_SHA1WithDSA, KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithDSA},
+	{(KMF_OID *)&KMFOID_SHA256WithDSA, KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithDSA},
+	{(KMF_OID *)&KMFOID_SHA1WithECDSA, KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithECDSA},
+	{(KMF_OID *)&KMFOID_SHA256WithECDSA, KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithECDSA},
+	{(KMF_OID *)&KMFOID_SHA256WithRSA, KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithRSA},
+	{(KMF_OID *)&KMFOID_SHA384WithECDSA, KMF_ALGID_SHA384WithECDSA},
+	{(KMF_OID *)&KMFOID_SHA384WithRSA, KMF_ALGID_SHA384WithRSA},
+	{(KMF_OID *)&KMFOID_SHA512WithECDSA, KMF_ALGID_SHA512WithECDSA},
+	{(KMF_OID *)&KMFOID_SHA512WithRSA, KMF_ALGID_SHA512WithRSA},
+	{(KMF_OID *)&KMFOID_EC_PUBLIC_KEY, KMF_ALGID_ECDSA}
 };
 
 #define	NUM_ALGOIDS ((sizeof (ALGOID_ID_Table))/(sizeof (ALGOID_ID_Table[0])))
diff --git a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/libkmf/common/algorithm.c b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/libkmf/common/algorithm.c
deleted file mode 100644
index d0ed3912a3..0000000000
--- a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/libkmf/common/algorithm.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,152 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1995-2000 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
- */
-/*
- * Copyright 2007 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
- * Use is subject to license terms.
- */
-#pragma ident	"%Z%%M%	%I%	%E% SMI"
-
-#include <kmfapiP.h>
-#include <algorithm.h>
-#include <security/cryptoki.h>
-
-typedef struct _pkcs_key_type_map
-{
-	KMF_ALGORITHM_INDEX kmfAlgorithmId;
-	CK_KEY_TYPE ckKeyType;
-}
-PKCS_KEY_TYPE_MAP;
-
-static const PKCS_KEY_TYPE_MAP _PKCS2KMFKeyTypeMap[] = {
-	{ KMF_ALGID_RSA, CKK_RSA },
-	{ KMF_ALGID_DSA, CKK_DSA }
-};
-
-#define	SUP(_ckmech_, _kmfalg_, _kmfcls_, _kmfmode_, _multi_, \
-	_fixkelen_, _keylen_, _fixblksz_, _blksz_, _reqiv_, _ivlen_,\
-	_regalgflg_, _keytype_, _desc_) \
-	{ _ckmech_, _kmfalg_, _kmfcls_, _kmfmode_, _multi_, _fixkelen_,\
-	_keylen_, _fixblksz_, _blksz_, _reqiv_, _ivlen_, _regalgflg_,\
-	_keytype_, _desc_ },
-
-static const PKCS_ALGORITHM_MAP _PKCS2KMFMap[] = {
-/*
- * PKCS #11 Mechanism,
- * Alg. ID
- * Alg. Class
- * Alg. Mode
- * Milti-Part
- * Fix Key Length
- * Key Length
- * Fix Block Size
- * Block Size
- * Needs IV
- * IV Length
- * Alg. Flags
- * Type
- * Description
- */
-SUP(CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, KMF_ALGID_RSA, KMF_ALGCLASS_KEYGEN,\
-	KMF_ALGMODE_NONE, 0, 0, 0,\
-	0, 0, 0, 0, CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR,\
-	CKK_RSA, "RSA PKCS #1 Key Pair Generation")
-SUP(CKM_RSA_X_509, KMF_ALGID_RSA, KMF_ALGCLASS_ASYMMETRIC, KMF_ALGMODE_NONE,
-	0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CKF_ENCRYPT,
-	CKK_RSA, "RSA RAW Encryption")
-SUP(CKM_RSA_X_509, KMF_ALGID_RSA, KMF_ALGCLASS_ASYMMETRIC, KMF_ALGMODE_NONE,
-	0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CKF_SIGN_RECOVER,
-	CKK_RSA, "RSA RAW Private Key Encryption")
-SUP(CKM_RSA_X_509, KMF_ALGID_RSA, KMF_ALGCLASS_SIGNATURE, KMF_ALGMODE_NONE,
-	0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CKF_SIGN,
-	CKK_RSA, "RSA RAW Signature")
-SUP(CKM_RSA_PKCS, KMF_ALGID_RSA, KMF_ALGCLASS_SIGNATURE,
-	KMF_ALGMODE_PKCS1_EMSA_V15,
-	0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CKF_SIGN, CKK_RSA,
-	"RSA PKCS #1 Signature")
-SUP(CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS, KMF_ALGID_MD2WithRSA, KMF_ALGCLASS_SIGNATURE,
-	KMF_ALGMODE_PKCS1_EMSA_V15, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0,
-	0, 0, CKF_SIGN, CKK_RSA, "MD2 w/RSA Signature")
-SUP(CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS, KMF_ALGID_MD5WithRSA, KMF_ALGCLASS_SIGNATURE,
-	KMF_ALGMODE_PKCS1_EMSA_V15, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0,
-	0, 0, CKF_SIGN, CKK_RSA, "MD5 w/RSA Signature")
-SUP(CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS, KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithRSA, KMF_ALGCLASS_SIGNATURE,
-	KMF_ALGMODE_PKCS1_EMSA_V15, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0,
-	0, 0, CKF_SIGN, CKK_RSA, "SHA-1 w/RSA Signature")
-
-SUP(CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN, KMF_ALGID_DSA, KMF_ALGCLASS_KEYGEN, KMF_ALGMODE_NONE,
-	0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
-	CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, CKK_DSA, "DSA Key Pair Generation")
-
-SUP(CKM_DSA, KMF_ALGID_DSA, KMF_ALGCLASS_SIGNATURE, KMF_ALGMODE_NONE,
-	0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CKF_SIGN,
-	CKK_DSA, "DSA Signature")
-
-SUP(CKM_DSA_SHA1, KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithDSA, KMF_ALGCLASS_SIGNATURE,
-	KMF_ALGMODE_NONE, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
-	0, CKF_SIGN, CKK_DSA, "SHA-1 w/DSA Signature")
-
-SUP(CKM_SHA_1, KMF_ALGID_SHA1, KMF_ALGCLASS_DIGEST, KMF_ALGMODE_NONE,
-	1, 1, 20, 0, 0, 0, 0, CKF_DIGEST, (CK_KEY_TYPE)-1, "SHA-1")
-};
-
-/* Undefine the macro definitions */
-#undef SUP
-
-/* Number of items in the algorithm map table */
-#define	_PKCS2KMFMapCount (\
-	sizeof (_PKCS2KMFMap) / sizeof (_PKCS2KMFMap[0]))
-
-/* Indicator that the algorithm was not found */
-#define	PKCS_ALGORITHM_NOT_FOUND    ((uint32_t)(~0))
-
-/*
- * Name: pkcs_get_alg_map
- *
- * Description:
- *  Searches the _PKCS2KMFMap table for a matching set of alg.
- *  description parameters.
- *
- * Parameters:
- *  algType (input) - KMF_ALGCLASS_* identifier to match.
- *  algID (input) - KMF_ALGID_* identifier to match.
- *  mode (input) - KMF_ALGMODE_* identifier to match. Use
- *      KMF_ALGMODE_NONE if a mode does not apply.
- *
- * Returns:
- *  Pointer to the lookup table entry that matches requested parameters.
- *  Ptr->keylength will equal PKCS11CONVERT_NOT_FOUND if no match is found.
- */
-PKCS_ALGORITHM_MAP *
-pkcs_get_alg_map(KMF_ALGCLASS algType, uint32_t algID, uint32_t mode)
-{
-	uint32_t i = 0;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < _PKCS2KMFMapCount; i++) {
-		if ((_PKCS2KMFMap[i].context_type == algType) &&
-		    (_PKCS2KMFMap[i].algorithm == algID) &&
-		    (_PKCS2KMFMap[i].enc_mode == mode)) {
-		return ((PKCS_ALGORITHM_MAP *)&(_PKCS2KMFMap[i]));
-		}
-	}
-
-	return (NULL);
-}
-
-KMF_BOOL
-pkcs_algid_to_keytype(KMF_ALGORITHM_INDEX AlgId,
-	CK_KEY_TYPE *pckKeyType)
-{
-	uint32_t uIndex;
-	uint32_t uMapSize =
-	    sizeof (_PKCS2KMFKeyTypeMap) / sizeof (PKCS_KEY_TYPE_MAP);
-
-	for (uIndex = 0; uIndex < uMapSize; uIndex++) {
-		if (_PKCS2KMFKeyTypeMap[uIndex].kmfAlgorithmId == AlgId) {
-			*pckKeyType = _PKCS2KMFKeyTypeMap[uIndex].ckKeyType;
-			return (1);
-		}
-	}
-
-	return (0);
-}
diff --git a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/libkmf/common/certop.c b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/libkmf/common/certop.c
index da56202051..3302fa8de5 100644
--- a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/libkmf/common/certop.c
+++ b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/libkmf/common/certop.c
@@ -71,13 +71,23 @@ get_keyalg_from_cert(KMF_DATA *cert, KMF_KEY_ALG *keyalg)
 
 	switch (AlgorithmId) {
 		case KMF_ALGID_MD5WithRSA:
-		case KMF_ALGID_MD2WithRSA:
 		case KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithRSA:
+		case KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithRSA:
+		case KMF_ALGID_SHA384WithRSA:
+		case KMF_ALGID_SHA512WithRSA:
 			*keyalg = KMF_RSA;
 			break;
 		case KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithDSA:
+		case KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithDSA:
 			*keyalg = KMF_DSA;
 			break;
+		case KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithECDSA:
+		case KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithECDSA:
+		case KMF_ALGID_SHA384WithECDSA:
+		case KMF_ALGID_SHA512WithECDSA:
+		case KMF_ALGID_ECDSA:
+			*keyalg = KMF_ECDSA;
+			break;
 		default:
 			rv = KMF_ERR_BAD_ALGORITHM;
 	}
@@ -410,8 +420,8 @@ kmf_sign_cert(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, int numattr, KMF_ATTRIBUTE *attrlist)
 	int freethekey = 0;
 	KMF_POLICY_RECORD *policy;
 	KMF_OID *oid = NULL;
-	KMF_ALGORITHM_INDEX AlgId;
 	KMF_X509_CERTIFICATE *x509cert;
+	KMF_X509_TBS_CERT *decodedTbsCert = NULL;
 	KMF_ATTRIBUTE_TESTER required_attrs[] = {
 	    {KMF_KEYSTORE_TYPE_ATTR, FALSE, 1, sizeof (KMF_KEYSTORE_TYPE)},
 	    {KMF_CERT_DATA_ATTR, FALSE, sizeof (KMF_DATA), sizeof (KMF_DATA)}
@@ -466,18 +476,6 @@ kmf_sign_cert(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, int numattr, KMF_ATTRIBUTE *attrlist)
 		}
 		sign_key_ptr = &sign_key;
 		freethekey = 1;
-
-		ret = get_sigalg_from_cert(signer_cert, &AlgId);
-		if (ret != KMF_OK)
-			goto out;
-		else
-			oid = x509_algid_to_algoid(AlgId);
-	} else if (sign_key_ptr != NULL) {
-		if (sign_key_ptr->keyalg == KMF_RSA) {
-			oid = (KMF_OID *)&KMFOID_SHA1WithRSA;
-		} else if (sign_key_ptr->keyalg == KMF_DSA) {
-			oid = (KMF_OID *)&KMFOID_SHA1WithDSA;
-		}
 	}
 
 	/* Now we are ready to sign */
@@ -490,11 +488,22 @@ kmf_sign_cert(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, int numattr, KMF_ATTRIBUTE *attrlist)
 			ret = KMF_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER;
 			goto out;
 		}
+
+		/* determine signature OID from cert request */
+		oid = CERT_ALG_OID(x509cert);
+
 		ret = kmf_encode_cert_record(x509cert, &unsignedCert);
-		if (ret == KMF_OK)
-			tbs_cert = &unsignedCert;
-		else
+		if (ret != KMF_OK)
 			goto out;
+
+		tbs_cert = &unsignedCert;
+	}
+	/* If OID still not found, decode the TBS Cert and pull it out */
+	if (oid == NULL) {
+		ret = DerDecodeTbsCertificate(tbs_cert, &decodedTbsCert);
+		if (ret != KMF_OK)
+			goto out;
+		oid = &decodedTbsCert->signature.algorithm;
 	}
 
 	signed_cert = kmf_get_attr_ptr(KMF_CERT_DATA_ATTR, attrlist,
@@ -515,6 +524,10 @@ out:
 		kmf_free_kmf_key(handle, &sign_key);
 
 	kmf_free_data(&unsignedCert);
+	if (decodedTbsCert != NULL) {
+		kmf_free_tbs_cert(decodedTbsCert);
+		free(decodedTbsCert);
+	}
 	return (ret);
 }
 
@@ -564,7 +577,7 @@ kmf_sign_data(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, int numattr,
 	KMF_DATA *tbs_data = NULL;  /* to be signed data */
 	KMF_DATA *output = NULL;
 	KMF_KEY_HANDLE sign_key, *sign_key_ptr;
-	KMF_ALGORITHM_INDEX AlgId;
+	KMF_ALGORITHM_INDEX AlgId = KMF_ALGID_NONE;
 	KMF_DATA	signature = {0, NULL};
 	KMF_OID *oid;
 	KMF_POLICY_RECORD *policy;
@@ -665,9 +678,7 @@ kmf_sign_data(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, int numattr,
 		ret = get_sigalg_from_cert(signer_cert, &AlgId);
 		if (ret != KMF_OK)
 			goto cleanup;
-		else
-			oid = x509_algid_to_algoid(AlgId);
-
+		oid = x509_algid_to_algoid(AlgId);
 	} else if (oid == NULL && ret == KMF_OK) {
 		/* AlgID was given by caller, convert it to OID */
 		oid = x509_algid_to_algoid(AlgId);
@@ -691,13 +702,15 @@ kmf_sign_data(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, int numattr,
 
 	/*
 	 * For DSA, NSS returns an encoded signature. Decode the
-	 * signature as DSA signature should be 40-byte long.
+	 * signature and expect a 40-byte DSA signature.
 	 */
 	if (plugin->type == KMF_KEYSTORE_NSS &&
-	    AlgId == KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithDSA) {
+	    (AlgId == KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithDSA ||
+	    AlgId == KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithDSA)) {
 		ret = DerDecodeDSASignature(output, &signature);
 		if (ret != KMF_OK)
 			goto cleanup;
+
 		output->Length = signature.Length;
 		(void) memcpy(output->Data, signature.Data, signature.Length);
 	}
@@ -712,7 +725,6 @@ cleanup:
 	if (signer_cert != NULL && sign_key_ptr != NULL)
 		kmf_free_kmf_key(handle, sign_key_ptr);
 
-
 	return (ret);
 }
 
@@ -806,6 +818,8 @@ kmf_verify_data(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
 
 	/* If the caller passed a signer cert instead of a key use it. */
 	if (signer_cert != NULL) {
+		KMF_X509_CERTIFICATE *SignerCert = NULL;
+
 		policy = handle->policy;
 		ret = check_key_usage(handle, signer_cert, KMF_KU_SIGN_DATA);
 		if (ret == KMF_ERR_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND && policy->ku_bits == 0)
@@ -813,17 +827,35 @@ kmf_verify_data(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
 		if (ret != KMF_OK)
 			return (ret);
 
-		if (kstype == KMF_KEYSTORE_NSS)
-			kstype = KMF_KEYSTORE_PK11TOKEN;
-		plugin = FindPlugin(handle, kstype);
-		if (plugin == NULL)
-			return (KMF_ERR_PLUGIN_NOTFOUND);
-		if (plugin->funclist->VerifyDataWithCert == NULL)
-			return (KMF_ERR_FUNCTION_NOT_FOUND);
+		/* Decode the signer cert so we can get the SPKI data */
+		ret = DerDecodeSignedCertificate(signer_cert, &SignerCert);
+		if (ret != KMF_OK)
+			return (ret);
 
-		CLEAR_ERROR(handle, ret);
-		ret = plugin->funclist->VerifyDataWithCert(handle,
-		    sigAlg, indata, insig, signer_cert);
+		/* If no algorithm specified, use the certs signature alg */
+		if (sigAlg == KMF_ALGID_NONE)
+			sigAlg = x509_algoid_to_algid(CERT_ALG_OID(SignerCert));
+
+		if (sigAlg == KMF_ALGID_NONE) {
+			kmf_free_signed_cert(SignerCert);
+			free(SignerCert);
+			return (KMF_ERR_BAD_ALGORITHM);
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Verify the data locally (i.e. using PKCS#11).
+		 * The verify operation uses a public key and does not
+		 * require access to a specific keystore. Save time
+		 * (and code) by just using the frameworks implementation
+		 * of the verify operation using crypto framework
+		 * APIs.
+		 */
+		ret = PKCS_VerifyData(handle, sigAlg,
+		    &SignerCert->certificate.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
+		    indata, insig);
+
+		kmf_free_signed_cert(SignerCert);
+		free(SignerCert);
 	} else {
 		/* Retrieve public key data from keystore */
 		plugin = FindPlugin(handle, kstype);
@@ -836,10 +868,9 @@ kmf_verify_data(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
 		}
 
 		ret = DerDecodeSPKI(&derkey, &spki);
-		if (ret == KMF_OK) {
+		if (ret == KMF_OK)
 			ret = PKCS_VerifyData(handle, sigAlg, &spki,
 			    indata, insig);
-		}
 
 		if (derkey.Data != NULL)
 			free(derkey.Data);
@@ -946,54 +977,6 @@ kmf_verify_cert(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, int numattr, KMF_ATTRIBUTE *attrlist)
 }
 
 /*
- * Utility routine for verifying generic data using a
- * certificate to derive the public key.  This is
- * done in a specific plugin because there are situations
- * where we want to force this operation to happen in
- * a specific keystore.
- * For example:
- *    libelfsign.so.1 verifies signatures on crypto libraries.
- *    We must use pkcs11 functions to verify the pkcs11
- *    plugins in order to keep the validation within the
- *    Cryptographic Framework's FIPS-140 boundary. To avoid
- *    a circular dependency, pksc11_softtoken.so.1 is
- *    interposed by libkcfd.so.1 via kcfd, which prevents
- *    libpkcs11.so.1's interfaces from being used when libkmf.so.1
- *    is called from kcfd.
- */
-static KMF_RETURN
-plugin_verify_data_with_cert(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
-	KMF_KEYSTORE_TYPE kstype,
-	KMF_ALGORITHM_INDEX algid,
-	KMF_DATA *indata,
-	KMF_DATA *insig,
-	const KMF_DATA *SignerCert)
-{
-	KMF_PLUGIN *plugin;
-	KMF_RETURN ret = KMF_OK;
-
-	/*
-	 * If NSS, use PKCS#11, we are not accessing the database(s),
-	 * we just prefer the "verify" operation from the crypto framework.
-	 */
-	if (kstype == KMF_KEYSTORE_NSS)
-		kstype = KMF_KEYSTORE_PK11TOKEN;
-
-	plugin = FindPlugin(handle, kstype);
-	if (plugin == NULL)
-		return (KMF_ERR_PLUGIN_NOTFOUND);
-
-	if (plugin->funclist->VerifyDataWithCert == NULL)
-		return (KMF_ERR_FUNCTION_NOT_FOUND);
-
-	CLEAR_ERROR(handle, ret);
-	ret = (plugin->funclist->VerifyDataWithCert(handle,
-	    algid, indata, insig, (KMF_DATA *)SignerCert));
-
-	return (ret);
-}
-
-/*
  * Name: kmf_encrypt
  *
  * Description:
@@ -1078,8 +1061,15 @@ kmf_encrypt(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, int numattr, KMF_ATTRIBUTE *attrlist)
 
 	algid = x509_algoid_to_algid(alg);
 
-	/* DSA does not support encrypt */
-	if (algid == KMF_ALGID_DSA || algid == KMF_ALGID_NONE) {
+	/* [EC]DSA does not support encrypt */
+	if (algid == KMF_ALGID_DSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithECDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithECDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA384WithECDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA512WithECDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_NONE) {
 		kmf_free_signed_cert(x509cert);
 		free(x509cert);
 		return (KMF_ERR_BAD_ALGORITHM);
@@ -1186,8 +1176,9 @@ kmf_decrypt(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, int numattr, KMF_ATTRIBUTE *attrlist)
 	AlgorithmId = x509_algoid_to_algid((KMF_OID *)
 	    &spki_ptr->algorithm.algorithm);
 
-	/* DSA does not support decrypt */
-	if (AlgorithmId == KMF_ALGID_DSA) {
+	/* [EC]DSA does not support decrypt */
+	if (AlgorithmId == KMF_ALGID_DSA ||
+	    AlgorithmId == KMF_ALGID_ECDSA) {
 		ret = KMF_ERR_BAD_ALGORITHM;
 		goto cleanup;
 	}
@@ -2991,12 +2982,26 @@ sign_cert(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
 
 	algid = x509_algoid_to_algid(signature_oid);
 
-	/*
-	 * For DSA, KMF_SignDataWithKey() returns a 40-bytes decoded
-	 * signature. So we must encode the signature correctly.
-	 */
-	if (algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithDSA) {
+	if (algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithECDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithECDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA384WithECDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA512WithECDSA) {
+		/* ASN.1 encode ECDSA signature */
+		KMF_DATA signature;
+
+		ret = DerEncodeECDSASignature(&signed_data, &signature);
+		kmf_free_data(&signed_data);
+
+		if (ret != KMF_OK)
+			goto cleanup;
 
+		subj_cert->signature.encrypted = signature;
+	} else if (algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithDSA) {
+		/*
+		 * For DSA, kmf_sign_data() returns a 40-byte
+		 * signature. We must encode the signature correctly.
+		 */
 		KMF_DATA signature;
 
 		ret = DerEncodeDSASignature(&signed_data, &signature);
@@ -3068,10 +3073,18 @@ verify_cert_with_key(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
 	if (algid == KMF_ALGID_NONE)
 		return (KMF_ERR_BAD_ALGORITHM);
 
-	if (algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithDSA) {
+	if (algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithDSA) {
 		ret = DerDecodeDSASignature(&signed_data, &signature);
 		if (ret != KMF_OK)
 			goto cleanup;
+	} else if (algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithECDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithECDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA384WithECDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA512WithECDSA) {
+		ret = DerDecodeECDSASignature(&signed_data, &signature);
+		if (ret != KMF_OK)
+			goto cleanup;
 	} else {
 		signature.Data = signed_data.Data;
 		signature.Length = signed_data.Length;
@@ -3091,7 +3104,12 @@ cleanup:
 		kmf_free_signed_cert(signed_cert);
 		free(signed_cert);
 	}
-	if (algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithDSA) {
+	if (algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithECDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithECDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA384WithECDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA512WithECDSA) {
 		free(signature.Data);
 	}
 
@@ -3149,27 +3167,39 @@ verify_cert_with_cert(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
 	/* Decode the to-be-verified cert so we know what algorithm to use */
 	ret = DerDecodeSignedCertificate(CertToBeVerifiedData,
 	    &ToBeVerifiedCert);
-
 	if (ret != KMF_OK)
 		goto cleanup;
 
 	algid = x509_algoid_to_algid(CERT_SIG_OID(ToBeVerifiedCert));
 
-	if (algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithDSA) {
+	if (algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithDSA) {
 		ret = DerDecodeDSASignature(&signed_data, &signature);
 		if (ret != KMF_OK)
 			goto cleanup;
+	} else if (algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithECDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithECDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA384WithECDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA512WithECDSA) {
+		ret = DerDecodeECDSASignature(&signed_data, &signature);
+		if (ret != KMF_OK)
+			goto cleanup;
 	} else {
 		signature.Data = signed_data.Data;
 		signature.Length = signed_data.Length;
 	}
 
+	ret = DerDecodeSignedCertificate(SignerCertData, &SignerCert);
+	if (ret != KMF_OK)
+		goto cleanup;
+
 	/*
 	 * Force use of PKCS11 API for kcfd/libelfsign.  This is
 	 * required for the Cryptographic Framework's FIPS-140 boundary.
 	 */
-	ret = plugin_verify_data_with_cert(handle, KMF_KEYSTORE_PK11TOKEN,
-	    algid, &data_to_verify, &signature,	SignerCertData);
+	ret = PKCS_VerifyData(handle, algid,
+	    &SignerCert->certificate.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
+	    &data_to_verify, &signature);
 
 cleanup:
 	kmf_free_data(&data_to_verify);
@@ -3185,7 +3215,12 @@ cleanup:
 		free(ToBeVerifiedCert);
 	}
 
-	if (algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithDSA) {
+	if (algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithECDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithECDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA384WithECDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA512WithECDSA) {
 		free(signature.Data);
 	}
 
diff --git a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/libkmf/common/csrcrlop.c b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/libkmf/common/csrcrlop.c
index 6c0f363157..165fce83d4 100644
--- a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/libkmf/common/csrcrlop.c
+++ b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/libkmf/common/csrcrlop.c
@@ -369,6 +369,7 @@ sign_csr(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
 	KMF_DATA	signed_data = {0, NULL};
 	KMF_RETURN	ret = KMF_OK;
 	KMF_ATTRIBUTE	attlist[5];
+	KMF_ALGORITHM_INDEX algid;
 	int i = 0;
 
 	if (!SignedCsr)
@@ -425,7 +426,29 @@ sign_csr(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
 	if (ret)
 		goto cleanup;
 
-	subj_csr.signature.encrypted = signed_data;
+	algid = x509_algoid_to_algid(&algo->algorithm);
+	if (algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithECDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithECDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA384WithECDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA512WithECDSA) {
+		/*
+		 * For DSA and ECDSA, we must encode the
+		 * signature correctly.
+		 */
+		KMF_DATA signature;
+
+		ret = DerEncodeDSASignature(&signed_data, &signature);
+		kmf_free_data(&signed_data);
+
+		if (ret != KMF_OK)
+			goto cleanup;
+
+		subj_csr.signature.encrypted = signature;
+	} else {
+		subj_csr.signature.encrypted = signed_data;
+	}
 
 	/* Now, re-encode the CSR with the new signature */
 	ret = DerEncodeSignedCsr(&subj_csr, SignedCsr);
@@ -573,12 +596,43 @@ kmf_verify_csr(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, int numattr,
 
 	x509alg = &csrdata->signature.algorithmIdentifier;
 	algid = x509_algoid_to_algid(&x509alg->algorithm);
+	if (algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithDSA) {
+		/* Decode the DSA signature before verifying it */
+		KMF_DATA signature;
+		rv = DerDecodeDSASignature(&csrdata->signature.encrypted,
+		    &signature);
+		if (rv != KMF_OK)
+			goto end;
+
+		rv = PKCS_VerifyData(handle, algid,
+		    &csrdata->csr.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
+		    &rawcsr, &signature);
+
+		kmf_free_data(&signature);
+	} else if (algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithECDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithECDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA384WithECDSA ||
+	    algid == KMF_ALGID_SHA512WithECDSA) {
+		KMF_DATA signature;
+		rv = DerDecodeECDSASignature(&csrdata->signature.encrypted,
+		    &signature);
+		if (rv != KMF_OK)
+			goto end;
 
-	rv = PKCS_VerifyData(handle, algid,
-	    &csrdata->csr.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
-	    &rawcsr,
-	    &csrdata->signature.encrypted);
+		rv = PKCS_VerifyData(handle, algid,
+		    &csrdata->csr.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
+		    &rawcsr, &signature);
 
+		kmf_free_data(&signature);
+	} else {
+		rv = PKCS_VerifyData(handle, algid,
+		    &csrdata->csr.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
+		    &rawcsr,
+		    &csrdata->signature.encrypted);
+	}
+
+end:
 	kmf_free_data(&rawcsr);
 	return (rv);
 }
@@ -842,50 +896,3 @@ kmf_is_crl_file(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, char *filename, KMF_ENCODE_FORMAT *pformat)
 
 	return (IsCRLFileFn(handle, filename, pformat));
 }
-
-/*
- * Phase 1 APIs still needed to maintain compat with elfsign.
- */
-KMF_RETURN
-KMF_CreateCSRFile(KMF_DATA *csrdata, KMF_ENCODE_FORMAT format,
-	char *csrfile)
-{
-	return (kmf_create_csr_file(csrdata, format, csrfile));
-}
-
-KMF_RETURN
-KMF_SetCSRPubKey(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
-	KMF_KEY_HANDLE *KMFKey,
-	KMF_CSR_DATA *Csr)
-{
-	return (kmf_set_csr_pubkey(handle, KMFKey, Csr));
-}
-
-KMF_RETURN
-KMF_SetCSRVersion(KMF_CSR_DATA *CsrData, uint32_t version)
-{
-	return (kmf_set_csr_version(CsrData, version));
-}
-
-KMF_RETURN
-KMF_SetCSRSignatureAlgorithm(KMF_CSR_DATA *CsrData,
-	KMF_ALGORITHM_INDEX sigAlg)
-{
-	return (kmf_set_csr_sig_alg(CsrData, sigAlg));
-}
-
-KMF_RETURN
-KMF_SignCSR(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
-	const KMF_CSR_DATA *tbsCsr,
-	KMF_KEY_HANDLE	*Signkey,
-	KMF_DATA	*SignedCsr)
-{
-	return (kmf_sign_csr(handle, tbsCsr, Signkey, SignedCsr));
-}
-
-KMF_RETURN
-KMF_SetCSRSubjectName(KMF_CSR_DATA *CsrData,
-	KMF_X509_NAME *subject_name_ptr)
-{
-	return (kmf_set_csr_subject(CsrData, subject_name_ptr));
-}
diff --git a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/libkmf/common/kmfoids.c b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/libkmf/common/kmfoids.c
index a29ea9ee31..bc1eb3bf1a 100644
--- a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/libkmf/common/kmfoids.c
+++ b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/libkmf/common/kmfoids.c
@@ -1,13 +1,11 @@
 /*
- * Copyright 2008 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright 2010 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
  * Use is subject to license terms.
  */
 /*
  * Copyright(c) 1995-2000 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
  */
 
-#pragma ident	"%Z%%M%	%I%	%E% SMI"
-
 #include <kmfapi.h>
 
 /* From X.520 */
@@ -363,6 +361,9 @@ OID_RSAEncryption[] = { OID_PKCS_1, 1 },
 OID_MD2WithRSA[]   = { OID_PKCS_1, 2 },
 OID_MD5WithRSA[]   = { OID_PKCS_1, 4 },
 OID_SHA1WithRSA[]  = { OID_PKCS_1, 5 },
+OID_SHA256WithRSA[]  = { OID_PKCS_1, 11 },
+OID_SHA384WithRSA[]  = { OID_PKCS_1, 12 },
+OID_SHA512WithRSA[]  = { OID_PKCS_1, 13 },
 OID_X9CM_DSA[] = { OID_X9CM_X9ALGORITHM, 1 },
 OID_X9CM_DSAWithSHA1[] = { OID_X9CM_X9ALGORITHM, 3};
 
@@ -373,9 +374,10 @@ KMFOID_DSA = {OID_OIW_ALGORITHM_LENGTH+1, OID_OIW_DSA},
 KMFOID_MD5WithRSA = {OID_PKCS_1_LENGTH+1, OID_MD5WithRSA},
 KMFOID_MD2WithRSA = {OID_PKCS_1_LENGTH+1, OID_MD2WithRSA},
 KMFOID_SHA1WithRSA = {OID_PKCS_1_LENGTH+1, OID_SHA1WithRSA},
-KMFOID_SHA1WithDSA = {OID_OIW_ALGORITHM_LENGTH+1, OID_OIW_DSAWithSHA1},
-KMFOID_OIW_DSAWithSHA1  = {OID_OIW_ALGORITHM_LENGTH+1,
-	OID_OIW_DSAWithSHA1},
+KMFOID_SHA256WithRSA = {OID_PKCS_1_LENGTH+1, OID_SHA256WithRSA},
+KMFOID_SHA384WithRSA = {OID_PKCS_1_LENGTH+1, OID_SHA384WithRSA},
+KMFOID_SHA512WithRSA = {OID_PKCS_1_LENGTH+1, OID_SHA512WithRSA},
+KMFOID_SHA1WithDSA  = {OID_OIW_ALGORITHM_LENGTH+1, OID_OIW_DSAWithSHA1},
 KMFOID_X9CM_DSA = {OID_X9CM_X9ALGORITHM_LENGTH+1, OID_X9CM_DSA},
 KMFOID_X9CM_DSAWithSHA1 = {OID_X9CM_X9ALGORITHM_LENGTH+1,
 		OID_X9CM_DSAWithSHA1};
@@ -400,3 +402,179 @@ KMFOID_MS_KP_SCLogon = {OID_MS_KP_SC_LOGON_LENGTH,
     OID_pkinit_kp_sc_logon},
 KMFOID_MS_KP_SCLogon_UPN = {OID_MS_KP_SC_LOGON_UPN_LENGTH,
     OID_pkinit_san_upn};
+
+/*
+ * MD5
+ * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
+ * digestAlgorithm(2) 5
+ */
+#define	RSADSI 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d
+#define	OID_id_md5	RSADSI, 0x02, 0x05
+
+/*
+ * SHA2 OIDs
+ */
+#define	NIST_ALG 96, 134, 72, 1, 101, 3, 4
+#define	NIST_HASH NIST_ALG, 2
+#define	OID_id_sha256 NIST_HASH, 1
+#define	OID_id_sha384 NIST_HASH, 2
+#define	OID_id_sha512 NIST_HASH, 3
+#define	OID_id_sha224 NIST_HASH, 4
+
+#define	OID_id_dsa_with_sha224	NIST_ALG, 3, 1
+#define	OID_id_dsa_with_sha256	NIST_ALG, 3, 2
+
+/*
+ * For ECC support.
+ */
+#define	CERTICOM_OID	0x2b, 0x81, 0x04
+#define	SECG_OID	CERTICOM_OID, 0x00
+
+#define	ANSI_X962_OID		0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d
+#define	ANSI_X962_CURVE_OID	ANSI_X962_OID, 0x03
+#define	ANSI_X962_GF2m_OID	ANSI_X962_CURVE_OID, 0x00
+#define	ANSI_X962_GFp_OID	ANSI_X962_CURVE_OID, 0x01
+
+#define	ANSI_X962_SIG_OID	ANSI_X962_OID, 0x04
+#define	OID_ecdsa_with_sha224	ANSI_X962_SIG_OID, 3, 1
+#define	OID_ecdsa_with_sha256	ANSI_X962_SIG_OID, 3, 2
+#define	OID_ecdsa_with_sha384	ANSI_X962_SIG_OID, 3, 3
+#define	OID_ecdsa_with_sha512	ANSI_X962_SIG_OID, 3, 4
+
+static uint8_t
+OID_secp112r1[] = { 0x6, 0x5, SECG_OID, 0x06 },
+OID_secp112r2[] = { 0x6, 0x5, SECG_OID, 0x07 },
+OID_secp128r1[] = { 0x6, 0x5, SECG_OID, 0x1c },
+OID_secp128r2[] = { 0x6, 0x5, SECG_OID, 0x1d },
+OID_secp160k1[] = { 0x6, 0x5, SECG_OID, 0x09 },
+OID_secp160r1[] = { 0x6, 0x5, SECG_OID, 0x08 },
+OID_secp160r2[] = { 0x6, 0x5, SECG_OID, 0x1e },
+OID_secp192k1[] = { 0x6, 0x5, SECG_OID, 0x1f },
+OID_secp224k1[] = { 0x6, 0x5, SECG_OID, 0x20 },
+OID_secp224r1[] = { 0x6, 0x5, SECG_OID, 0x21 },
+OID_secp256k1[] = { 0x6, 0x5, SECG_OID, 0x0a },
+OID_secp384r1[] = { 0x6, 0x5, SECG_OID, 0x22 },
+OID_secp521r1[] = { 0x6, 0x5, SECG_OID, 0x23 },
+OID_sect113r1[] = { 0x6, 0x5, SECG_OID, 0x04 },
+OID_sect113r2[] = { 0x6, 0x5, SECG_OID, 0x05 },
+OID_sect131r1[] = { 0x6, 0x5, SECG_OID, 0x16 },
+OID_sect131r2[] = { 0x6, 0x5, SECG_OID, 0x17 },
+OID_sect163k1[] = { 0x6, 0x5, SECG_OID, 0x01 },
+OID_sect163r1[] = { 0x6, 0x5, SECG_OID, 0x02 },
+OID_sect163r2[] = { 0x6, 0x5, SECG_OID, 0x0f },
+OID_sect193r1[] = { 0x6, 0x5, SECG_OID, 0x18 },
+OID_sect193r2[] = { 0x6, 0x5, SECG_OID, 0x19 },
+OID_sect233k1[] = { 0x6, 0x5, SECG_OID, 0x1a },
+OID_sect233r1[] = { 0x6, 0x5, SECG_OID, 0x1b },
+OID_sect239k1[] = { 0x6, 0x5, SECG_OID, 0x03 },
+OID_sect283k1[] = { 0x6, 0x5, SECG_OID, 0x10 },
+OID_sect283r1[] = { 0x6, 0x5, SECG_OID, 0x11 },
+OID_sect409k1[] = { 0x6, 0x5, SECG_OID, 0x24 },
+OID_sect409r1[] = { 0x6, 0x5, SECG_OID, 0x25 },
+OID_sect571k1[] = { 0x6, 0x5, SECG_OID, 0x26 },
+OID_sect571r1[] = { 0x6, 0x5, SECG_OID, 0x27 },
+OID_c2pnb163v1[] = { 0x6, 0x8, ANSI_X962_GF2m_OID, 0x01 },
+OID_c2pnb163v2[] = { 0x6, 0x8, ANSI_X962_GF2m_OID, 0x02 },
+OID_c2pnb163v3[] = { 0x6, 0x8, ANSI_X962_GF2m_OID, 0x03 },
+OID_c2pnb176v1[] = { 0x6, 0x8, ANSI_X962_GF2m_OID, 0x04 },
+OID_c2tnb191v1[] = { 0x6, 0x8, ANSI_X962_GF2m_OID, 0x05 },
+OID_c2tnb191v2[] = { 0x6, 0x8, ANSI_X962_GF2m_OID, 0x06 },
+OID_c2tnb191v3[] = { 0x6, 0x8, ANSI_X962_GF2m_OID, 0x07 },
+OID_c2pnb208w1[] = { 0x6, 0x8, ANSI_X962_GF2m_OID, 0x0a },
+OID_c2tnb239v1[] = { 0x6, 0x8, ANSI_X962_GF2m_OID, 0x0b },
+OID_c2tnb239v2[] = { 0x6, 0x8, ANSI_X962_GF2m_OID, 0x0c },
+OID_c2tnb239v3[] = { 0x6, 0x8, ANSI_X962_GF2m_OID, 0x0d },
+OID_c2pnb272w1[] = { 0x6, 0x8, ANSI_X962_GF2m_OID, 0x10 },
+OID_c2pnb304w1[] = { 0x6, 0x8, ANSI_X962_GF2m_OID, 0x11 },
+OID_c2tnb359v1[] = { 0x6, 0x8, ANSI_X962_GF2m_OID, 0x12 },
+OID_c2pnb368w1[] = { 0x6, 0x8, ANSI_X962_GF2m_OID, 0x13 },
+OID_c2tnb431r1[] = { 0x6, 0x8, ANSI_X962_GF2m_OID, 0x14 },
+
+OID_prime192v2[] = { 0x6, 0x8, ANSI_X962_GFp_OID, 0x02 },
+OID_prime192v3[] = { 0x6, 0x8, ANSI_X962_GFp_OID, 0x03 },
+
+OID_secp192r1[] = { 0x6, 0x8, ANSI_X962_GFp_OID, 0x01 },
+OID_secp256r1[] = { 0x6, 0x8, ANSI_X962_GFp_OID, 0x07 };
+
+const KMF_OID
+KMFOID_ECC_secp112r1 = {sizeof (OID_secp112r1), OID_secp112r1},
+KMFOID_ECC_secp112r2 = {sizeof (OID_secp112r2), OID_secp112r2},
+KMFOID_ECC_secp128r1 = {sizeof (OID_secp128r1), OID_secp128r1},
+KMFOID_ECC_secp128r2 = {sizeof (OID_secp128r2), OID_secp128r2},
+KMFOID_ECC_secp160k1 = {sizeof (OID_secp160k1), OID_secp160k1},
+KMFOID_ECC_secp160r1 = {sizeof (OID_secp160r1), OID_secp160r1},
+KMFOID_ECC_secp160r2 = {sizeof (OID_secp160r2), OID_secp160r2},
+KMFOID_ECC_secp192k1 = {sizeof (OID_secp192k1), OID_secp192k1},
+KMFOID_ECC_secp224k1 = {sizeof (OID_secp224k1), OID_secp224k1},
+KMFOID_ECC_secp224r1 = {sizeof (OID_secp224r1), OID_secp224r1},
+KMFOID_ECC_secp256k1 = {sizeof (OID_secp256k1), OID_secp256k1},
+KMFOID_ECC_secp384r1 = {sizeof (OID_secp384r1), OID_secp384r1},
+KMFOID_ECC_secp521r1 = {sizeof (OID_secp521r1), OID_secp521r1},
+KMFOID_ECC_sect113r1 = {sizeof (OID_sect113r1), OID_sect113r1},
+KMFOID_ECC_sect113r2 = {sizeof (OID_sect113r2), OID_sect113r2},
+KMFOID_ECC_sect131r1 = {sizeof (OID_sect131r1), OID_sect131r1},
+KMFOID_ECC_sect131r2 = {sizeof (OID_sect131r2), OID_sect131r2},
+KMFOID_ECC_sect163k1 = {sizeof (OID_sect163k1), OID_sect163k1},
+KMFOID_ECC_sect163r1 = {sizeof (OID_sect163r1), OID_sect163r1},
+KMFOID_ECC_sect163r2 = {sizeof (OID_sect163r2), OID_sect163r2},
+KMFOID_ECC_sect193r1 = {sizeof (OID_sect193r1), OID_sect193r1},
+KMFOID_ECC_sect193r2 = {sizeof (OID_sect193r2), OID_sect193r2},
+KMFOID_ECC_sect233k1 = {sizeof (OID_sect233k1), OID_sect233k1},
+KMFOID_ECC_sect233r1 = {sizeof (OID_sect233r1), OID_sect233r1},
+KMFOID_ECC_sect239k1 = {sizeof (OID_sect239k1), OID_sect239k1},
+KMFOID_ECC_sect283k1 = {sizeof (OID_sect283k1), OID_sect283k1},
+KMFOID_ECC_sect283r1 = {sizeof (OID_sect283r1), OID_sect283r1},
+KMFOID_ECC_sect409k1 = {sizeof (OID_sect409k1), OID_sect409k1},
+KMFOID_ECC_sect409r1 = {sizeof (OID_sect409r1), OID_sect409r1},
+KMFOID_ECC_sect571k1 = {sizeof (OID_sect571k1), OID_sect571k1},
+KMFOID_ECC_sect571r1 = {sizeof (OID_sect571r1), OID_sect571r1},
+KMFOID_ECC_c2pnb163v1 = {sizeof (OID_c2pnb163v1), OID_c2pnb163v1},
+KMFOID_ECC_c2pnb163v2 = {sizeof (OID_c2pnb163v2), OID_c2pnb163v2},
+KMFOID_ECC_c2pnb163v3 = {sizeof (OID_c2pnb163v3), OID_c2pnb163v3},
+KMFOID_ECC_c2pnb176v1 = {sizeof (OID_c2pnb176v1), OID_c2pnb176v1},
+KMFOID_ECC_c2tnb191v1 = {sizeof (OID_c2tnb191v1), OID_c2tnb191v1},
+KMFOID_ECC_c2tnb191v2 = {sizeof (OID_c2tnb191v2), OID_c2tnb191v2},
+KMFOID_ECC_c2tnb191v3 = {sizeof (OID_c2tnb191v3), OID_c2tnb191v3},
+KMFOID_ECC_c2pnb208w1 = {sizeof (OID_c2pnb208w1), OID_c2pnb208w1},
+KMFOID_ECC_c2tnb239v1 = {sizeof (OID_c2tnb239v1), OID_c2tnb239v1},
+KMFOID_ECC_c2tnb239v2 = {sizeof (OID_c2tnb239v2), OID_c2tnb239v2},
+KMFOID_ECC_c2tnb239v3 = {sizeof (OID_c2tnb239v3), OID_c2tnb239v3},
+KMFOID_ECC_c2pnb272w1 = {sizeof (OID_c2pnb272w1), OID_c2pnb272w1},
+KMFOID_ECC_c2pnb304w1 = {sizeof (OID_c2pnb304w1), OID_c2pnb304w1},
+KMFOID_ECC_c2tnb359v1 = {sizeof (OID_c2tnb359v1), OID_c2tnb359v1},
+KMFOID_ECC_c2pnb368w1 = {sizeof (OID_c2pnb368w1), OID_c2pnb368w1},
+KMFOID_ECC_c2tnb431r1 = {sizeof (OID_c2tnb431r1), OID_c2tnb431r1},
+KMFOID_ECC_prime192v2 = {sizeof (OID_prime192v2), OID_prime192v2},
+KMFOID_ECC_prime192v3 = {sizeof (OID_prime192v3), OID_prime192v3},
+KMFOID_ECC_secp192r1 = {sizeof (OID_secp192r1), OID_secp192r1},
+KMFOID_ECC_secp256r1 = {sizeof (OID_secp256r1), OID_secp256r1};
+
+static uint8_t
+OID_EC_PUBLIC_KEY[] = {ANSI_X962_OID, 0x02, 0x01},
+OID_ECDSA_SHA1[] = {ANSI_X962_OID, 0x04, 0x01},
+OID_ECDSA_SHA224[] = {ANSI_X962_OID, 0x04, 0x03, 0x01},
+OID_ECDSA_SHA256[] = {ANSI_X962_OID, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02},
+OID_ECDSA_SHA384[] = {ANSI_X962_OID, 0x04, 0x03, 0x03},
+OID_ECDSA_SHA512[] = {ANSI_X962_OID, 0x04, 0x03, 0x04},
+OID_DSA_SHA224[] = {OID_id_dsa_with_sha224},
+OID_DSA_SHA256[] = {OID_id_dsa_with_sha256},
+OID_SHA224[] = {OID_id_sha224},
+OID_SHA256[] = {OID_id_sha256},
+OID_SHA384[] = {OID_id_sha384},
+OID_SHA512[] = {OID_id_sha512},
+OID_MD5[] = {OID_id_md5};
+
+const KMF_OID
+KMFOID_EC_PUBLIC_KEY = { sizeof (OID_EC_PUBLIC_KEY), OID_EC_PUBLIC_KEY},
+KMFOID_SHA1WithECDSA = { sizeof (OID_ECDSA_SHA1), OID_ECDSA_SHA1},
+KMFOID_SHA224WithECDSA = { sizeof (OID_ECDSA_SHA224), OID_ECDSA_SHA224},
+KMFOID_SHA256WithECDSA = { sizeof (OID_ECDSA_SHA256), OID_ECDSA_SHA256},
+KMFOID_SHA384WithECDSA = { sizeof (OID_ECDSA_SHA384), OID_ECDSA_SHA384},
+KMFOID_SHA512WithECDSA = { sizeof (OID_ECDSA_SHA512), OID_ECDSA_SHA512},
+KMFOID_SHA224WithDSA = { sizeof (OID_DSA_SHA224), OID_DSA_SHA224},
+KMFOID_SHA256WithDSA = { sizeof (OID_DSA_SHA256), OID_DSA_SHA256},
+KMFOID_SHA224 = { sizeof (OID_SHA224), OID_SHA224},
+KMFOID_SHA256 = { sizeof (OID_SHA256), OID_SHA256},
+KMFOID_SHA384 = { sizeof (OID_SHA384), OID_SHA384},
+KMFOID_SHA512 = { sizeof (OID_SHA512), OID_SHA512},
+KMFOID_MD5 = { sizeof (OID_MD5), OID_MD5};
diff --git a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/libkmf/common/mapfile-vers b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/libkmf/common/mapfile-vers
index f1d5b722df..d221e5b79d 100644
--- a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/libkmf/common/mapfile-vers
+++ b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/libkmf/common/mapfile-vers
@@ -75,6 +75,58 @@ SUNW_1.1 {
 	KMFOID_Description;
 	KMFOID_DestinationIndicator;
 	KMFOID_DistinguishedName;
+	KMFOID_EC_PUBLIC_KEY;
+	KMFOID_ECC_c2pnb163v1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_c2pnb163v2;
+	KMFOID_ECC_c2pnb163v3;
+	KMFOID_ECC_c2pnb176v1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_c2pnb208w1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_c2pnb272w1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_c2pnb304w1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_c2pnb368w1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_c2tnb191v1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_c2tnb191v2;
+	KMFOID_ECC_c2tnb191v3;
+	KMFOID_ECC_c2tnb239v1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_c2tnb239v2;
+	KMFOID_ECC_c2tnb239v3;
+	KMFOID_ECC_c2tnb359v1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_c2tnb431r1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_prime192v2;
+	KMFOID_ECC_prime192v3;
+	KMFOID_ECC_secp112r1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_secp112r2;
+	KMFOID_ECC_secp128r1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_secp128r2;
+	KMFOID_ECC_secp160k1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_secp160r1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_secp160r2;
+	KMFOID_ECC_secp192k1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_secp224k1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_secp224r1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_secp256k1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_secp384r1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_secp521r1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_sect113r1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_sect113r2;
+	KMFOID_ECC_sect131r1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_sect131r2;
+	KMFOID_ECC_sect163k1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_sect163r1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_sect163r2;
+	KMFOID_ECC_sect193r1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_sect193r2;
+	KMFOID_ECC_sect233k1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_sect233r1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_sect239k1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_sect283k1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_sect283r1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_sect409k1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_sect409r1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_sect571k1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_sect571r1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_secp192r1;
+	KMFOID_ECC_secp256r1;
 	KMFOID_EmailAddress;
 	KMFOID_EnhancedSearchGuide;
 	KMFOID_ExtendedCertificateAttributes;
@@ -95,6 +147,7 @@ SUNW_1.1 {
 	KMFOID_KnowledgeInformation;
 	KMFOID_LocalityName;
 	KMFOID_MD2WithRSA;
+	KMFOID_MD5;
 	KMFOID_MD5WithRSA;
 	KMFOID_Member;
 	KMFOID_MessageDigest;
@@ -102,7 +155,6 @@ SUNW_1.1 {
 	KMFOID_MS_KP_SCLogon_UPN;
 	KMFOID_Name;
 	KMFOID_NameConstraints;
-	KMFOID_OIW_DSAWithSHA1;
 	KMFOID_ObjectClass;
 	KMFOID_OrganizationName;
 	KMFOID_OrganizationalUnitName;
@@ -139,7 +191,21 @@ SUNW_1.1 {
 	KMFOID_RoleOccupant;
 	KMFOID_SHA1;
 	KMFOID_SHA1WithDSA;
+	KMFOID_SHA1WithECDSA;
 	KMFOID_SHA1WithRSA;
+	KMFOID_SHA224;
+	KMFOID_SHA256;
+	KMFOID_SHA384;
+	KMFOID_SHA512;
+	KMFOID_SHA224WithDSA;
+	KMFOID_SHA256WithDSA;
+	KMFOID_SHA224WithECDSA;
+	KMFOID_SHA256WithECDSA;
+	KMFOID_SHA256WithRSA;
+	KMFOID_SHA384WithECDSA;
+	KMFOID_SHA384WithRSA;
+	KMFOID_SHA512WithECDSA;
+	KMFOID_SHA512WithRSA;
 	KMFOID_SearchGuide;
 	KMFOID_SeeAlso;
 	KMFOID_SerialNumber;
@@ -323,10 +389,12 @@ SUNWprivate_1.1 {
 	free_entrylist;
 	get_entrylist;
 	kmf_select_token;
+	kmf_create_pk11_session;
 	parsePolicyElement;
-	PKCS_AcquirePublicKeyHandle;
-	PKCS_GetDefaultSignatureMode;
-	pkcs_get_alg_map;
+	PKCS_VerifyData;
+	PKCS_DigestData;
+	PKCS_EncryptData;
+	get_pk11_data;
 	x509_algid_to_algoid;
 	x509_algoid_to_algid;
     local:
diff --git a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/libkmf/common/pk11keys.c b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/libkmf/common/pk11keys.c
index 5a6e945009..df2cd0f8df 100644
--- a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/libkmf/common/pk11keys.c
+++ b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/libkmf/common/pk11keys.c
@@ -1,26 +1,91 @@
 /*
- * Copyright 2007 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright 2010 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
  * Use is subject to license terms.
  */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1995-2000 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
  */
 
-#pragma ident	"%Z%%M%	%I%	%E% SMI"
-
 #include <kmfapiP.h>
 #include <sha1.h>
 #include <security/cryptoki.h>
 
-#include <algorithm.h>
 #include <ber_der.h>
 
 #define	MAX_PUBLIC_KEY_TEMPLATES    (20)
 #define	MAX_PRIVATE_KEY_TEMPLATES   (24)
 #define	MAX_SECRET_KEY_TEMPLATES    (24)
 
-static KMF_RETURN
-create_pk11_session(CK_SESSION_HANDLE *sessionp, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wanted_mech,
+typedef struct
+{
+	KMF_ALGORITHM_INDEX kmfAlgorithmId;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE ckKeyType;
+	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE signmech;
+	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE vfymech;
+	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashmech;
+} ALG_INFO;
+
+static const ALG_INFO alg_info_map[] = {
+	{ KMF_ALGID_RSA, CKK_RSA, CKM_RSA_PKCS, CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL},
+	{ KMF_ALGID_DSA, CKK_DSA, CKM_DSA, CKM_DSA, CKM_SHA_1 },
+	{ KMF_ALGID_ECDSA, CKK_EC, CKM_ECDSA, CKM_ECDSA, CKM_SHA_1 },
+	{ KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithDSA, CKK_DSA, CKM_DSA, CKM_DSA, CKM_SHA_1 },
+	{ KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithDSA, CKK_DSA, CKM_DSA, CKM_DSA, CKM_SHA256 },
+
+	/*
+	 * For RSA, the verify can be done using a single mechanism,
+	 * but signing must be done separately because not all hardware
+	 * tokens support the combined hash+key operations.
+	 */
+	{ KMF_ALGID_MD5WithRSA, CKK_RSA, CKM_RSA_PKCS,
+	    CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS, CKM_MD5},
+	{ KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithRSA, CKK_RSA, CKM_RSA_PKCS,
+	    CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS, CKM_SHA_1},
+	{ KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithRSA, CKK_RSA, CKM_RSA_PKCS,
+	    CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS, CKM_SHA256},
+	{ KMF_ALGID_SHA384WithRSA, CKK_RSA, CKM_RSA_PKCS,
+	    CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS, CKM_SHA384},
+	{ KMF_ALGID_SHA512WithRSA, CKK_RSA, CKM_RSA_PKCS,
+	    CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS, CKM_SHA512},
+	{ KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithECDSA, CKK_EC, CKM_ECDSA,
+	    CKM_ECDSA, CKM_SHA_1},
+	{ KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithECDSA, CKK_EC, CKM_ECDSA,
+	    CKM_ECDSA, CKM_SHA256},
+	{ KMF_ALGID_SHA384WithECDSA, CKK_EC, CKM_ECDSA,
+	    CKM_ECDSA, CKM_SHA384},
+	{ KMF_ALGID_SHA512WithECDSA, CKK_EC, CKM_ECDSA,
+	    CKM_ECDSA, CKM_SHA512}
+};
+
+KMF_RETURN
+get_pk11_data(KMF_ALGORITHM_INDEX AlgId,
+	CK_KEY_TYPE *keytype, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE *signmech,
+	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE *hashmech, boolean_t vfy)
+{
+	uint32_t uIndex;
+	uint32_t uMapSize =
+	    sizeof (alg_info_map) / sizeof (ALG_INFO);
+
+	for (uIndex = 0; uIndex < uMapSize; uIndex++) {
+		if (alg_info_map[uIndex].kmfAlgorithmId == AlgId) {
+			if (keytype)
+				*keytype = alg_info_map[uIndex].ckKeyType;
+			if (hashmech)
+				*hashmech = alg_info_map[uIndex].hashmech;
+			if (signmech)
+				*signmech =
+				    (vfy ? alg_info_map[uIndex].vfymech :
+				    alg_info_map[uIndex].signmech);
+			return (KMF_OK);
+		}
+	}
+	/* no match */
+	return (KMF_ERR_BAD_ALGORITHM);
+}
+
+KMF_RETURN
+kmf_create_pk11_session(CK_SESSION_HANDLE *sessionp,
+	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wanted_mech,
 	CK_FLAGS wanted_flags)
 {
 	CK_RV rv;
@@ -56,7 +121,8 @@ create_pk11_session(CK_SESSION_HANDLE *sessionp, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wanted_mech,
 
 	for (i = 0; i < pulCount; i++) {
 		rv = C_GetMechanismInfo(pSlotList[i], wanted_mech, &info);
-		if (rv == CKR_OK && (info.flags & wanted_flags))
+		if (rv == CKR_OK &&
+		    (info.flags & wanted_flags) == wanted_flags)
 			break;
 	}
 	if (i < pulCount) {
@@ -173,7 +239,7 @@ PKCS_CreatePublicKey(
 	}
 
 	/* Fill in the common key attributes */
-	if (!pkcs_algid_to_keytype(AlgorithmId,	&ckKeyType)) {
+	if (get_pk11_data(AlgorithmId, &ckKeyType, NULL, NULL, 0)) {
 		goto cleanup;
 	}
 	if (!PKCS_AddTemplate(ckTemplate, &ckNumTemplates,
@@ -210,6 +276,7 @@ PKCS_CreatePublicKey(
 		    MAX_PUBLIC_KEY_TEMPLATES, CKA_MODULUS,
 		    (CK_BYTE *)KeyParts[KMF_RSA_MODULUS].Data,
 		    (CK_ULONG)KeyParts[KMF_RSA_MODULUS].Length) ||
+
 		    !PKCS_AddTemplate(ckTemplate, &ckNumTemplates,
 		    MAX_PUBLIC_KEY_TEMPLATES, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT,
 		    (CK_BYTE *)KeyParts[KMF_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT].Data,
@@ -239,6 +306,20 @@ PKCS_CreatePublicKey(
 		goto cleanup;
 		}
 		break;
+	case CKK_EC:
+		if (!PKCS_AddTemplate(ckTemplate, &ckNumTemplates,
+		    MAX_PUBLIC_KEY_TEMPLATES, CKA_EC_POINT,
+		    (CK_BYTE *)KeyParts[KMF_ECDSA_POINT].Data,
+		    (CK_ULONG)KeyParts[KMF_ECDSA_POINT].Length) ||
+
+		    !PKCS_AddTemplate(ckTemplate, &ckNumTemplates,
+		    MAX_PUBLIC_KEY_TEMPLATES, CKA_EC_PARAMS,
+		    (CK_BYTE *)KeyParts[KMF_ECDSA_PARAMS].Data,
+		    (CK_ULONG)KeyParts[KMF_ECDSA_PARAMS].Length)) {
+			mrReturn = KMF_ERR_INTERNAL;
+			goto cleanup;
+		}
+		break;
 	default:
 		mrReturn = KMF_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER;
 	}
@@ -274,18 +355,16 @@ cleanup:
  *  - Public Key with label:
  *    Attempts to find a public key with the corresponding label.
  */
-KMF_RETURN
+static KMF_RETURN
 PKCS_AcquirePublicKeyHandle(CK_SESSION_HANDLE ckSession,
 	const KMF_X509_SPKI *pKey,
 	CK_KEY_TYPE ckRequestedKeyType,
-	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *pckKeyHandle,
-	KMF_BOOL *pbTemporary)
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *pckKeyHandle)
 {
 	KMF_RETURN mrReturn = KMF_OK;
 
-
 	/* Key searching variables */
-	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ckKeyHandle;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ckKeyHandle = 0;
 	CK_OBJECT_CLASS ckObjClass;
 	CK_KEY_TYPE ckKeyType;
 	CK_ATTRIBUTE ckTemplate[3];
@@ -299,8 +378,6 @@ PKCS_AcquirePublicKeyHandle(CK_SESSION_HANDLE ckSession,
 	if (mrReturn != KMF_OK)
 		return (mrReturn);
 
-	*pbTemporary = KMF_TRUE;
-
 	/* Fetch the key class and algorithm from the object */
 	ckNumTemplates = 0;
 	if (!PKCS_AddTemplate(ckTemplate, &ckNumTemplates,
@@ -309,21 +386,20 @@ PKCS_AcquirePublicKeyHandle(CK_SESSION_HANDLE ckSession,
 	    !PKCS_AddTemplate(ckTemplate, &ckNumTemplates,
 	    ckMaxTemplates, CKA_KEY_TYPE, (CK_BYTE *)&ckKeyType,
 	    sizeof (ckKeyType))) {
+		(void) C_DestroyObject(ckSession, ckKeyHandle);
 		return (KMF_ERR_INTERNAL);
 	}
 	ckRv = C_GetAttributeValue(ckSession, ckKeyHandle,
 	    ckTemplate,	ckNumTemplates);
 	if (ckRv != CKR_OK) {
+		(void) C_DestroyObject(ckSession, ckKeyHandle);
 		return (ckRv);
 	}
 
 	/* Make sure the results match the expected values */
 	if ((ckKeyType != ckRequestedKeyType) ||
 	    (ckObjClass != CKO_PUBLIC_KEY)) {
-		if (*pbTemporary == KMF_TRUE) {
-			(void) C_DestroyObject(ckSession, ckKeyHandle);
-		}
-
+		(void) C_DestroyObject(ckSession, ckKeyHandle);
 		return (KMF_ERR_BAD_KEY_FORMAT);
 	}
 
@@ -333,95 +409,136 @@ PKCS_AcquirePublicKeyHandle(CK_SESSION_HANDLE ckSession,
 	return (KMF_OK);
 }
 
-KMF_SIGNATURE_MODE
-PKCS_GetDefaultSignatureMode(KMF_ALGORITHM_INDEX AlgId)
-{
-	KMF_SIGNATURE_MODE AlgMode;
-
-	switch (AlgId) {
-		case KMF_ALGID_RSA:
-		case KMF_ALGID_MD5WithRSA:
-		case KMF_ALGID_MD2WithRSA:
-		case KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithRSA:
-			AlgMode = KMF_ALGMODE_PKCS1_EMSA_V15;
-			break;
-		default:
-			AlgMode = KMF_ALGMODE_NONE;
-			break;
-	}
-
-	return (AlgMode);
-}
-
+/*
+ * Utility routine for verifying generic data using
+ * the cryptographic framework (PKCS#11).
+ * There are situations where we want to force this
+ * operation to happen in a specific keystore.
+ * For example:
+ * libelfsign.so.1 verifies signatures on crypto libraries.
+ * We must use pkcs11 functions to verify the pkcs11
+ * plugins in order to keep the validation within the
+ * Cryptographic Framework's FIPS-140 boundary. To avoid
+ * a circular dependency, pksc11_softtoken.so.1 is
+ * interposed by libkcfd.so.1 via kcfd, which prevents
+ * libpkcs11.so.1's interfaces from being used when libkmf.so.1
+ * is called from kcfd.
+ *
+ * This also saves code and time because verify operations
+ * only use public keys and do not need acccess to any
+ * keystore specific functions.
+ */
 KMF_RETURN
-PKCS_VerifyData(KMF_HANDLE_T kmfh,
+PKCS_VerifyData(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
 		KMF_ALGORITHM_INDEX AlgorithmId,
 		KMF_X509_SPKI *keyp,
 		KMF_DATA *data,
-		KMF_DATA *signed_data)
+		KMF_DATA *signature)
 {
-	KMF_RETURN rv = KMF_OK;
-	PKCS_ALGORITHM_MAP *pAlgMap = NULL;
-	CK_RV ckRv;
-	CK_MECHANISM ckMechanism;
-	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ckKeyHandle;
-	KMF_BOOL	bTempKey;
+	KMF_RETURN	rv = KMF_OK;
+	CK_RV		ckRv;
+	KMF_HANDLE	*kmfh = (KMF_HANDLE *)handle;
+	CK_MECHANISM	ckMechanism;
+	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechtype, hashmech;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ckKeyHandle = 0;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE	pk11keytype;
 	CK_SESSION_HANDLE ckSession = 0;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE	subprime = { CKA_SUBPRIME, NULL, 0 };
+	CK_BYTE		*dataptr;
+	CK_ULONG	datalen;
+	KMF_DATA	hashData = {NULL, 0};
+	uchar_t		digest[1024];
 
 	if (AlgorithmId == KMF_ALGID_NONE)
 		return (KMF_ERR_BAD_ALGORITHM);
 
-	pAlgMap = pkcs_get_alg_map(KMF_ALGCLASS_SIGNATURE,
-	    AlgorithmId, PKCS_GetDefaultSignatureMode(AlgorithmId));
-
-	if (!pAlgMap)
+	if (get_pk11_data(AlgorithmId, &pk11keytype, &mechtype, &hashmech, 1))
 		return (KMF_ERR_BAD_ALGORITHM);
 
-	rv = create_pk11_session(&ckSession, pAlgMap->pkcs_mechanism,
-	    CKF_VERIFY);
-
+	/*
+	 * Verify in metaslot/softtoken since only the public key is needed
+	 * and not all hardware tokens support the combined [hash]-RSA/DSA/EC
+	 * mechanisms.
+	 */
+	rv = kmf_create_pk11_session(&ckSession, mechtype, 0);
 	if (rv != KMF_OK)
 		return (rv);
 
 	/* Fetch the verifying key */
 	rv = PKCS_AcquirePublicKeyHandle(ckSession, keyp,
-	    pAlgMap->key_type, &ckKeyHandle, &bTempKey);
+	    pk11keytype, &ckKeyHandle);
 
 	if (rv != KMF_OK) {
 		(void) C_CloseSession(ckSession);
 		return (rv);
 	}
+	dataptr = data->Data;
+	datalen = data->Length;
+	/*
+	 * For some mechanisms, we must compute the hash separately
+	 * and then do the verify.
+	 */
+	if (hashmech != 0 &&
+	    (mechtype == CKM_ECDSA ||
+	    mechtype == CKM_DSA ||
+	    mechtype == CKM_RSA_PKCS)) {
+		hashData.Data = digest;
+		hashData.Length = sizeof (digest);
+
+		rv = PKCS_DigestData(handle, ckSession,
+		    hashmech, data, &hashData,
+		    (mechtype == CKM_RSA_PKCS));
+		if (rv)
+			goto cleanup;
 
-	ckMechanism.mechanism = pAlgMap->pkcs_mechanism;
+		dataptr = hashData.Data;
+		datalen = hashData.Length;
+	}
+	if (mechtype == CKM_DSA &&
+	    hashmech == CKM_SHA256) {
+		/*
+		 * FIPS 186-3 says that when using DSA
+		 * the hash must be truncated to the size of the
+		 * subprime.
+		 */
+		ckRv = C_GetAttributeValue(ckSession,
+		    ckKeyHandle, &subprime, 1);
+		if (ckRv != CKR_OK)  {
+			kmfh->lasterr.kstype = KMF_KEYSTORE_PK11TOKEN;
+			kmfh->lasterr.errcode = ckRv;
+			rv = KMF_ERR_INTERNAL;
+			goto cleanup;
+		}
+		datalen = subprime.ulValueLen;
+	}
+
+	ckMechanism.mechanism = mechtype;
 	ckMechanism.pParameter = NULL;
 	ckMechanism.ulParameterLen = 0;
 
 	ckRv = C_VerifyInit(ckSession, &ckMechanism, ckKeyHandle);
 	if (ckRv != CKR_OK) {
-		if (bTempKey)
-			(void) C_DestroyObject(ckSession, ckKeyHandle);
 		kmfh->lasterr.kstype = KMF_KEYSTORE_PK11TOKEN;
 		kmfh->lasterr.errcode = ckRv;
-		(void) C_CloseSession(ckSession);
-		return (KMF_ERR_INTERNAL);
+		rv = KMF_ERR_INTERNAL;
+		goto cleanup;
 	}
-
-	ckRv = C_Verify(ckSession, (CK_BYTE *)data->Data,
-	    (CK_ULONG)data->Length,
-	    (CK_BYTE *)signed_data->Data,
-	    (CK_ULONG)signed_data->Length);
+	ckRv = C_Verify(ckSession,
+	    dataptr, datalen,
+	    (CK_BYTE *)signature->Data,
+	    (CK_ULONG)signature->Length);
 
 	if (ckRv != CKR_OK) {
 		kmfh->lasterr.kstype = KMF_KEYSTORE_PK11TOKEN;
 		kmfh->lasterr.errcode = ckRv;
 		rv = KMF_ERR_INTERNAL;
 	}
-	if (bTempKey)
-		(void) C_DestroyObject(ckSession, ckKeyHandle);
 
+cleanup:
+	if (ckKeyHandle != 0)
+		(void) C_DestroyObject(ckSession, ckKeyHandle);
 	(void) C_CloseSession(ckSession);
 	return (rv);
-
 }
 
 KMF_RETURN
@@ -432,11 +549,11 @@ PKCS_EncryptData(KMF_HANDLE_T kmfh,
 		KMF_DATA *ciphertext)
 {
 	KMF_RETURN rv = KMF_OK;
-	PKCS_ALGORITHM_MAP *pAlgMap = NULL;
 	CK_RV ckRv;
 	CK_MECHANISM ckMechanism;
-	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ckKeyHandle;
-	KMF_BOOL bTempKey;
+	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechtype;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE keytype;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ckKeyHandle = 0;
 	CK_SESSION_HANDLE ckSession = NULL;
 	CK_ULONG out_len = 0, in_len = 0, total_encrypted = 0;
 	uint8_t *in_data, *out_data;
@@ -446,21 +563,16 @@ PKCS_EncryptData(KMF_HANDLE_T kmfh,
 	CK_ULONG ckMaxTemplates = (sizeof (ckTemplate) /
 	    sizeof (CK_ATTRIBUTE));
 
-	pAlgMap = pkcs_get_alg_map(KMF_ALGCLASS_SIGNATURE,
-	    AlgorithmId, PKCS_GetDefaultSignatureMode(AlgorithmId));
-
-	if (!pAlgMap)
+	if (get_pk11_data(AlgorithmId, &keytype, &mechtype, NULL, 0))
 		return (KMF_ERR_BAD_ALGORITHM);
 
-	rv = create_pk11_session(&ckSession, pAlgMap->pkcs_mechanism,
-	    CKF_ENCRYPT);
-
+	rv = kmf_create_pk11_session(&ckSession, mechtype, CKF_ENCRYPT);
 	if (rv != KMF_OK)
 		return (rv);
 
 	/* Get the public key used in encryption */
 	rv = PKCS_AcquirePublicKeyHandle(ckSession, keyp,
-	    pAlgMap->key_type, &ckKeyHandle, &bTempKey);
+	    keytype, &ckKeyHandle);
 
 	if (rv != KMF_OK) {
 		(void) C_CloseSession(ckSession);
@@ -471,7 +583,7 @@ PKCS_EncryptData(KMF_HANDLE_T kmfh,
 	ckNumTemplates = 0;
 	if (!PKCS_AddTemplate(ckTemplate, &ckNumTemplates, ckMaxTemplates,
 	    CKA_MODULUS, (CK_BYTE *)NULL, sizeof (CK_ULONG))) {
-		if (bTempKey)
+		if (ckKeyHandle != 0)
 			(void) C_DestroyObject(ckSession, ckKeyHandle);
 		(void) C_CloseSession(ckSession);
 		return (KMF_ERR_INTERNAL);
@@ -481,7 +593,7 @@ PKCS_EncryptData(KMF_HANDLE_T kmfh,
 	    ckTemplate, ckNumTemplates);
 
 	if (ckRv != CKR_OK) {
-		if (bTempKey)
+		if (ckKeyHandle != 0)
 			(void) C_DestroyObject(ckSession, ckKeyHandle);
 		kmfh->lasterr.kstype = KMF_KEYSTORE_PK11TOKEN;
 		kmfh->lasterr.errcode = ckRv;
@@ -491,13 +603,13 @@ PKCS_EncryptData(KMF_HANDLE_T kmfh,
 	out_len = ckTemplate[0].ulValueLen;
 
 	if (out_len > ciphertext->Length) {
-		if (bTempKey)
+		if (ckKeyHandle != 0)
 			(void) C_DestroyObject(ckSession, ckKeyHandle);
 		(void) C_CloseSession(ckSession);
 		return (KMF_ERR_BUFFER_SIZE);
 	}
 
-	ckMechanism.mechanism = pAlgMap->pkcs_mechanism;
+	ckMechanism.mechanism = mechtype;
 	ckMechanism.pParameter = NULL_PTR;
 	ckMechanism.ulParameterLen = 0;
 
@@ -512,7 +624,7 @@ PKCS_EncryptData(KMF_HANDLE_T kmfh,
 	for (i = 0; i < blocks; i++) {
 		ckRv = C_EncryptInit(ckSession, &ckMechanism, ckKeyHandle);
 		if (ckRv != CKR_OK) {
-			if (bTempKey)
+			if (ckKeyHandle != 0)
 				(void) C_DestroyObject(ckSession, ckKeyHandle);
 			kmfh->lasterr.kstype = KMF_KEYSTORE_PK11TOKEN;
 			kmfh->lasterr.errcode = ckRv;
@@ -523,7 +635,7 @@ PKCS_EncryptData(KMF_HANDLE_T kmfh,
 		    (CK_BYTE_PTR)out_data, &out_len);
 
 		if (ckRv != CKR_OK) {
-			if (bTempKey)
+			if (ckKeyHandle != 0)
 				(void) C_DestroyObject(ckSession, ckKeyHandle);
 			kmfh->lasterr.kstype = KMF_KEYSTORE_PK11TOKEN;
 			kmfh->lasterr.errcode = ckRv;
@@ -540,7 +652,7 @@ PKCS_EncryptData(KMF_HANDLE_T kmfh,
 		/* Encrypt the remaining data */
 		ckRv = C_EncryptInit(ckSession, &ckMechanism, ckKeyHandle);
 		if (ckRv != CKR_OK) {
-			if (bTempKey)
+			if (ckKeyHandle != 0)
 				(void) C_DestroyObject(ckSession, ckKeyHandle);
 			kmfh->lasterr.kstype = KMF_KEYSTORE_PK11TOKEN;
 			kmfh->lasterr.errcode = ckRv;
@@ -553,7 +665,7 @@ PKCS_EncryptData(KMF_HANDLE_T kmfh,
 		    (CK_BYTE_PTR)out_data, &out_len);
 
 		if (ckRv != CKR_OK) {
-			if (bTempKey)
+			if (ckKeyHandle != 0)
 				(void) C_DestroyObject(ckSession, ckKeyHandle);
 			kmfh->lasterr.kstype = KMF_KEYSTORE_PK11TOKEN;
 			kmfh->lasterr.errcode = ckRv;
@@ -568,7 +680,7 @@ PKCS_EncryptData(KMF_HANDLE_T kmfh,
 
 	ciphertext->Length = total_encrypted;
 
-	if (bTempKey)
+	if (ckKeyHandle != 0)
 		(void) C_DestroyObject(ckSession, ckKeyHandle);
 
 	(void) C_CloseSession(ckSession);
@@ -577,7 +689,7 @@ PKCS_EncryptData(KMF_HANDLE_T kmfh,
 }
 
 static void
-DigestData(KMF_DATA *IDInput, KMF_DATA *IDOutput)
+create_id_hash(KMF_DATA *IDInput, KMF_DATA *IDOutput)
 {
 	SHA1_CTX ctx;
 
@@ -616,9 +728,12 @@ GetIDFromSPKI(KMF_X509_SPKI *spki, KMF_DATA *ID)
 
 	/* Check the KEY algorithm */
 	if (algId == KMF_ALGID_RSA) {
-		DigestData(&KeyParts[KMF_RSA_MODULUS], ID);
+		create_id_hash(&KeyParts[KMF_RSA_MODULUS], ID);
 	} else if (algId == KMF_ALGID_DSA) {
-		DigestData(&KeyParts[KMF_DSA_PUBLIC_VALUE], ID);
+		create_id_hash(&KeyParts[KMF_DSA_PUBLIC_VALUE], ID);
+	} else if (algId == KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithECDSA ||
+	    algId == KMF_ALGID_ECDSA) {
+		create_id_hash(&KeyParts[KMF_ECDSA_POINT], ID);
 	} else {
 		/* We only support RSA and DSA keys for now */
 		rv = KMF_ERR_BAD_ALGORITHM;
@@ -637,3 +752,112 @@ GetIDFromSPKI(KMF_X509_SPKI *spki, KMF_DATA *ID)
 
 	return (rv);
 }
+
+/*
+ * For PKCS1 encoding (necessary for RSA signatures), we
+ * must prepend the following prefixes before computing
+ * the digest.
+ */
+static uchar_t SHA1_DER_PREFIX[] = {
+	0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x0e,
+	0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14
+};
+static uchar_t MD5_DER_PREFIX[] = {
+	0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86,
+	0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x02, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00,
+	0x04, 0x10
+};
+static uchar_t SHA256_DER_PREFIX[] = {0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d,
+    0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x05,
+    0x00, 0x04, 0x20};
+
+static uchar_t SHA384_DER_PREFIX[] = {0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d,
+    0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, 0x05,
+    0x00, 0x04, 0x30};
+
+static uchar_t SHA512_DER_PREFIX[] = {0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d,
+    0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x05,
+    0x00, 0x04, 0x40};
+
+#define	MAX_SHA2_DIGEST_LENGTH 64
+/*
+ * Compute hashes using metaslot (or softtoken).
+ * Not all hardware tokens support the combined HASH + RSA/EC
+ * Signing operations so it is safer to separate the hashing
+ * from the signing.  This function generates a hash using a
+ * separate session.  The resulting digest can be signed later.
+ */
+KMF_RETURN
+PKCS_DigestData(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
+    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechtype,
+    KMF_DATA *tobesigned, KMF_DATA *output,
+    boolean_t pkcs1_encoding)
+{
+	KMF_RETURN	rv = KMF_OK;
+	CK_RV		ckrv;
+	CK_MECHANISM	mechanism;
+	KMF_HANDLE	*kmfh = (KMF_HANDLE *)handle;
+	CK_BYTE		outbuf[MAX_SHA2_DIGEST_LENGTH +
+	    sizeof (SHA512_DER_PREFIX)];
+	CK_ULONG	outlen = sizeof (outbuf);
+
+	mechanism.mechanism = mechtype;
+	mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
+	mechanism.ulParameterLen = 0;
+
+	ckrv = C_DigestInit(hSession, &mechanism);
+	if (ckrv != CKR_OK) {
+		kmfh->lasterr.kstype = KMF_KEYSTORE_PK11TOKEN;
+		kmfh->lasterr.errcode = ckrv;
+		rv = KMF_ERR_INTERNAL;
+		goto end;
+	}
+
+	ckrv = C_Digest(hSession, tobesigned->Data,
+	    tobesigned->Length, outbuf, &outlen);
+	if (ckrv != CKR_OK) {
+		kmfh->lasterr.kstype = KMF_KEYSTORE_PK11TOKEN;
+		kmfh->lasterr.errcode = ckrv;
+		rv = KMF_ERR_INTERNAL;
+	}
+
+	if (pkcs1_encoding) {
+		uchar_t *pfx;
+		int pfxlen;
+		switch (mechtype) {
+			case CKM_MD5:
+				pfx = MD5_DER_PREFIX;
+				pfxlen = sizeof (MD5_DER_PREFIX);
+				break;
+			case CKM_SHA_1:
+				pfx = SHA1_DER_PREFIX;
+				pfxlen = sizeof (SHA1_DER_PREFIX);
+				break;
+			case CKM_SHA256:
+				pfx = SHA256_DER_PREFIX;
+				pfxlen = sizeof (SHA256_DER_PREFIX);
+				break;
+			case CKM_SHA384:
+				pfx = SHA384_DER_PREFIX;
+				pfxlen = sizeof (SHA384_DER_PREFIX);
+				break;
+			case CKM_SHA512:
+				pfx = SHA512_DER_PREFIX;
+				pfxlen = sizeof (SHA512_DER_PREFIX);
+				break;
+			default:
+				rv = KMF_ERR_BAD_ALGORITHM;
+				goto end;
+		}
+		(void) memcpy(output->Data, pfx, pfxlen);
+		(void) memcpy(output->Data + pfxlen, outbuf, outlen);
+		output->Length = outlen + pfxlen;
+	} else {
+		(void) memcpy(output->Data, outbuf, outlen);
+		output->Length = outlen;
+	}
+
+end:
+	return (rv);
+}
diff --git a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/plugins/kmf_nss/common/nss_spi.c b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/plugins/kmf_nss/common/nss_spi.c
index 5fe4f0a766..8a0e6ba862 100644
--- a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/plugins/kmf_nss/common/nss_spi.c
+++ b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/plugins/kmf_nss/common/nss_spi.c
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 /*
  * NSS keystore wrapper
  *
- * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright 2010 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
  * Use is subject to license terms.
  */
 
@@ -154,7 +154,6 @@ KMF_PLUGIN_FUNCLIST nss_plugin_table =
 	NSS_CreateSymKey,
 	NSS_GetSymKeyValue,
 	NSS_SetTokenPin,
-	NULL, /* VerifyData */
 	NSS_StoreKey,
 	NULL /* Finalize */
 };
@@ -683,7 +682,6 @@ NSS_FreeKMFCert(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
 	}
 }
 
-
 KMF_RETURN
 NSS_DeleteCert(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, int numattr, KMF_ATTRIBUTE *attrlist)
 {
@@ -817,6 +815,7 @@ NSS_CreateKeypair(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
 	PK11SlotInfo *nss_slot = NULL;
 	SECKEYPrivateKey *NSSprivkey = NULL;
 	SECKEYPublicKey *NSSpubkey = NULL;
+	SECKEYECParams *ecparams = NULL;
 	PQGParams *pqgParams = NULL;
 	KMF_CREDENTIAL cred;
 	boolean_t storekey = TRUE;
@@ -936,6 +935,20 @@ NSS_CreateKeypair(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
 		}
 
 		nssparams = pqgParams;
+	} else if (keytype == KMF_ECDSA) {
+		KMF_OID *eccoid = kmf_get_attr_ptr(KMF_ECC_CURVE_OID_ATTR,
+		    attrlist, numattr);
+		if (eccoid == NULL)
+			return (KMF_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER);
+
+		ecparams = SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, NULL, (eccoid->Length));
+		if (!ecparams)
+			return (KMF_ERR_MEMORY);
+
+		(void) memcpy(ecparams->data, eccoid->Data, eccoid->Length);
+
+		mechanism = CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN;
+		nssparams = ecparams;
 	} else {
 		rv = KMF_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER;
 		goto cleanup;
@@ -988,6 +1001,9 @@ cleanup:
 	if (pqgParams != NULL)
 		PK11_PQG_DestroyParams(pqgParams);
 
+	if (ecparams != NULL)
+		SECITEM_FreeItem(ecparams, PR_TRUE);
+
 	if (nss_slot != NULL)
 		PK11_FreeSlot(nss_slot);
 
@@ -1027,9 +1043,23 @@ NSS_SignData(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, KMF_KEY_HANDLE *key,
 		signAlgTag = SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD2_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION;
 	else if (AlgId == KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithRSA)
 		signAlgTag = SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA1_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION;
+	else if (AlgId == KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithRSA)
+		signAlgTag = SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION;
+	else if (AlgId == KMF_ALGID_SHA384WithRSA)
+		signAlgTag = SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA384_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION;
+	else if (AlgId == KMF_ALGID_SHA512WithRSA)
+		signAlgTag = SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA512_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION;
 	else if (AlgId == KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithDSA)
 		signAlgTag = SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA1_DIGEST;
-	else
+	else if (AlgId == KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithECDSA || AlgId == KMF_ALGID_ECDSA)
+		signAlgTag = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA1_DIGEST;
+	else if (AlgId == KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithECDSA)
+		signAlgTag = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA256_SIGNATURE;
+	else if (AlgId == KMF_ALGID_SHA384WithECDSA)
+		signAlgTag = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA384_SIGNATURE;
+	else if (AlgId == KMF_ALGID_SHA512WithECDSA)
+		signAlgTag = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA512_SIGNATURE;
+	else	/* NSS does not support DSA with SHA2 hashes (FIPS 186-3) */
 		return (KMF_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER);
 
 	rv = SEC_SignData(&signed_data, tobesigned->Data,
@@ -1321,6 +1351,8 @@ pk11keytype2kmf(CK_KEY_TYPE type)
 		return (KMF_DES);
 	case CKK_DES3:
 		return (KMF_DES3);
+	case CKK_EC:
+		return (KMF_ECDSA);
 	default:
 		/* not supported */
 		return (KMF_KEYALG_NONE);
@@ -1437,6 +1469,8 @@ NSS_FindKey(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
 					keys[count].keyalg = KMF_RSA;
 				else if (pubnode->key->keyType == dsaKey)
 					keys[count].keyalg = KMF_DSA;
+				else if (pubnode->key->keyType == ecKey)
+					keys[count].keyalg = KMF_ECDSA;
 			}
 			if (match)
 				count++;
@@ -1469,6 +1503,8 @@ NSS_FindKey(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
 					keys[count].keyalg = KMF_RSA;
 				else if (prinode->key->keyType == dsaKey)
 					keys[count].keyalg = KMF_DSA;
+				else if (prinode->key->keyType == ecKey)
+					keys[count].keyalg = KMF_ECDSA;
 			}
 			if (match)
 				count++;
@@ -2188,12 +2224,16 @@ NSS_StoreKey(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
 			    &rawkey->rawdata.rsa);
 			if (rv != KMF_OK)
 				goto cleanup;
-
 		} else if (rawkey->keytype == KMF_DSA) {
 			rv = DerEncodeDSAPrivateKey(&derkey,
 			    &rawkey->rawdata.dsa);
 			if (rv != KMF_OK)
 				goto cleanup;
+		} else if (rawkey->keytype == KMF_ECDSA) {
+			rv = DerEncodeECPrivateKey(&derkey,
+			    &rawkey->rawdata.ec);
+			if (rv != KMF_OK)
+				goto cleanup;
 		}
 		rpk.algorithm = nss_cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm;
 		rpk.privateKey.data = derkey.Data;
diff --git a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/plugins/kmf_openssl/common/openssl_spi.c b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/plugins/kmf_openssl/common/openssl_spi.c
index 59def17c80..f7ffa36662 100644
--- a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/plugins/kmf_openssl/common/openssl_spi.c
+++ b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/plugins/kmf_openssl/common/openssl_spi.c
@@ -259,10 +259,6 @@ OpenSSL_VerifyCRLFile(KMF_HANDLE_T, char *, KMF_DATA *);
 KMF_RETURN
 OpenSSL_CheckCRLDate(KMF_HANDLE_T, char *);
 
-KMF_RETURN
-OpenSSL_VerifyDataWithCert(KMF_HANDLE_T, KMF_ALGORITHM_INDEX,
-	KMF_DATA *, KMF_DATA *, KMF_DATA *);
-
 static
 KMF_PLUGIN_FUNCLIST openssl_plugin_table =
 {
@@ -290,7 +286,6 @@ KMF_PLUGIN_FUNCLIST openssl_plugin_table =
 	OpenSSL_CreateSymKey,
 	OpenSSL_GetSymKeyValue,
 	NULL,	/* SetTokenPin */
-	OpenSSL_VerifyDataWithCert,
 	OpenSSL_StoreKey,
 	NULL	/* Finalize */
 };
@@ -678,7 +673,6 @@ load_certs(KMF_HANDLE *kmfh, char *issuer, char *subject, KMF_BIGINT *serial,
 			rv = KMF_ERR_CERT_NOT_FOUND;
 		return (rv);
 	}
-
 	if (format == KMF_FORMAT_ASN1) {
 		/* load a single certificate */
 		certs = (KMF_DATA *)malloc(sizeof (KMF_DATA));
@@ -697,13 +691,12 @@ load_certs(KMF_HANDLE *kmfh, char *issuer, char *subject, KMF_BIGINT *serial,
 			certs = NULL;
 		}
 		return (rv);
-
 	} else if (format == KMF_FORMAT_PKCS12) {
 		/* We need a credential to access a PKCS#12 file */
 		rv = KMF_ERR_BAD_CERT_FORMAT;
-
 	} else if (format == KMF_FORMAT_PEM ||
 	    format != KMF_FORMAT_PEM_KEYPAIR) {
+
 		/* This function only works on PEM files */
 		rv = extract_pem(kmfh, issuer, subject, serial, pathname,
 		    (uchar_t *)NULL, 0, NULL, &certs, &nc);
@@ -724,7 +717,6 @@ load_certs(KMF_HANDLE *kmfh, char *issuer, char *subject, KMF_BIGINT *serial,
 			if (rv == KMF_ERR_VALIDITY_PERIOD)
 				rv = KMF_OK;
 		}
-
 		if (rv != KMF_OK) {
 			/* Remove this cert from the list by clearing it. */
 			kmf_free_data(&certs[i]);
@@ -733,7 +725,6 @@ load_certs(KMF_HANDLE *kmfh, char *issuer, char *subject, KMF_BIGINT *serial,
 		}
 		rv = KMF_OK;
 	}
-
 	if (rv == KMF_OK && hits > 0) {
 		/*
 		 * Sort the list of certs by length to put the cleared ones
@@ -744,23 +735,17 @@ load_certs(KMF_HANDLE *kmfh, char *issuer, char *subject, KMF_BIGINT *serial,
 
 		/* since we sorted the list, just return the number of hits */
 		*numcerts = hits;
-
 	} else {
-		if (rv == KMF_OK && hits == 0) {
+		if (rv == KMF_OK && hits == 0)
 			rv = KMF_ERR_CERT_NOT_FOUND;
-		}
-
 		if (certs != NULL) {
-			kmf_free_data(certs);
 			free(certs);
 			certs = NULL;
 		}
 	}
-
 	return (rv);
 }
 
-
 static KMF_RETURN
 kmf_load_cert(KMF_HANDLE *kmfh,
     char *issuer, char *subject, KMF_BIGINT *serial,
@@ -1211,9 +1196,7 @@ OpenSSL_FreeKMFCert(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
 {
 	if (kmf_cert != NULL) {
 		if (kmf_cert->certificate.Data != NULL) {
-			free(kmf_cert->certificate.Data);
-			kmf_cert->certificate.Data = NULL;
-			kmf_cert->certificate.Length = 0;
+			kmf_free_data(&kmf_cert->certificate);
 		}
 		if (kmf_cert->kmf_private.label)
 			free(kmf_cert->kmf_private.label);
@@ -1333,8 +1316,7 @@ OpenSSL_DeleteCert(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, int numattr, KMF_ATTRIBUTE *attrlist)
 
 				if (rv == KMF_ERR_CERT_NOT_FOUND) {
 					free(fname);
-					if (certdata.Data)
-						free(certdata.Data);
+					kmf_free_data(&certdata);
 					rv = KMF_OK;
 					continue;
 				} else if (rv != KMF_OK) {
@@ -1349,8 +1331,7 @@ OpenSSL_DeleteCert(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, int numattr, KMF_ATTRIBUTE *attrlist)
 					break;
 				}
 				free(fname);
-				if (certdata.Data)
-					free(certdata.Data);
+				kmf_free_data(&certdata);
 			}
 		}
 		(void) closedir(dirp);
@@ -1370,8 +1351,7 @@ out:
 	if (fullpath != NULL)
 		free(fullpath);
 
-	if (certdata.Data)
-		free(certdata.Data);
+	kmf_free_data(&certdata);
 
 	return (rv);
 }
@@ -1767,6 +1747,21 @@ cleanup:
 	return (rv);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Make sure the BN conversion is properly padded with 0x00
+ * bytes.  If not, signature verification for DSA signatures
+ * may fail in the case where the bignum value does not use
+ * all of the bits.
+ */
+static int
+fixbnlen(BIGNUM *bn, unsigned char *buf, int len) {
+	int bytes = len - BN_num_bytes(bn);
+	while (bytes-- > 0)
+		*buf++ = 0;
+
+	return (BN_bn2bin(bn, buf));
+}
+
 KMF_RETURN
 OpenSSL_SignData(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, KMF_KEY_HANDLE *key,
 	KMF_OID *AlgOID, KMF_DATA *tobesigned, KMF_DATA *output)
@@ -1786,7 +1781,7 @@ OpenSSL_SignData(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, KMF_KEY_HANDLE *key,
 	/* Map the OID to an OpenSSL algorithm */
 	AlgId = x509_algoid_to_algid(AlgOID);
 	if (AlgId == KMF_ALGID_NONE)
-		return (KMF_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER);
+		return (KMF_ERR_BAD_ALGORITHM);
 
 	if (key->keyalg == KMF_RSA) {
 		EVP_PKEY *pkey = (EVP_PKEY *)key->keyp;
@@ -1798,10 +1793,16 @@ OpenSSL_SignData(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, KMF_KEY_HANDLE *key,
 			md = EVP_md2();
 		else if (AlgId == KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithRSA)
 			md = EVP_sha1();
+		else if (AlgId == KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithRSA)
+			md = EVP_sha256();
+		else if (AlgId == KMF_ALGID_SHA384WithRSA)
+			md = EVP_sha384();
+		else if (AlgId == KMF_ALGID_SHA512WithRSA)
+			md = EVP_sha512();
 		else if (AlgId == KMF_ALGID_RSA)
 			md = NULL;
 		else
-			return (KMF_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER);
+			return (KMF_ERR_BAD_ALGORITHM);
 
 		if ((md == NULL) && (AlgId == KMF_ALGID_RSA)) {
 			RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA((EVP_PKEY *)pkey);
@@ -1836,6 +1837,14 @@ OpenSSL_SignData(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, KMF_KEY_HANDLE *key,
 		uint32_t hashlen;
 		DSA_SIG *dsasig;
 
+		if (AlgId == KMF_ALGID_DSA ||
+		    AlgId == KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithDSA)
+			md = EVP_sha1();
+		else if (AlgId == KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithDSA)
+			md = EVP_sha256();
+		else /* Bad algorithm */
+			return (KMF_ERR_BAD_ALGORITHM);
+
 		/*
 		 * OpenSSL EVP_Sign operation automatically converts to
 		 * ASN.1 output so we do the operations separately so we
@@ -1844,24 +1853,27 @@ OpenSSL_SignData(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, KMF_KEY_HANDLE *key,
 		 * not all mechanisms return ASN.1 encodings (PKCS#11
 		 * and NSS return raw signature data).
 		 */
-		md = EVP_sha1();
 		EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
 		(void) EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, md, NULL);
 		(void) EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, tobesigned->Data,
 		    tobesigned->Length);
 		(void) EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, hash, &hashlen);
-		(void) EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
 
+		/* Only sign first 20 bytes for SHA2 */
+		if (AlgId == KMF_ALGID_SHA256WithDSA)
+			hashlen = 20;
 		dsasig = DSA_do_sign(hash, hashlen, dsa);
 		if (dsasig != NULL) {
 			int i;
-			output->Length = i = BN_bn2bin(dsasig->r, output->Data);
-			output->Length += BN_bn2bin(dsasig->s,
-			    &output->Data[i]);
+			output->Length = i = fixbnlen(dsasig->r, output->Data,
+			    hashlen);
+			output->Length += fixbnlen(dsasig->s, &output->Data[i],
+			    hashlen);
 			DSA_SIG_free(dsasig);
 		} else {
 			SET_ERROR(kmfh, ERR_get_error());
 		}
+		(void) EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
 	} else {
 		return (KMF_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER);
 	}
@@ -2429,7 +2441,7 @@ OpenSSL_CreateOCSPRequest(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
 
 end:
 	/*
-	 * We don't need to free "id" explicitly, because OCSP_REQUEST_free()
+	 * We don't need to free "id" explicitely, because OCSP_REQUEST_free()
 	 * will also deallocate certid's space.
 	 */
 	if (req != NULL) {
@@ -3203,6 +3215,12 @@ raw_key_to_pkey(KMF_KEY_HANDLE *key)
 		pkey = ImportRawRSAKey(&rawkey->rawdata.rsa);
 	} else if (rawkey->keytype == KMF_DSA) {
 		pkey = ImportRawDSAKey(&rawkey->rawdata.dsa);
+	} else if (rawkey->keytype == KMF_ECDSA) {
+		/*
+		 * OpenSSL in Solaris does not support EC for
+		 * legal reasons
+		 */
+		return (NULL);
 	} else {
 		/* wrong kind of key */
 		return (NULL);
@@ -3649,7 +3667,9 @@ extract_pem(KMF_HANDLE *kmfh,
 			&certlist[matchcerts++]);
 
 		if (rv != KMF_OK) {
-			kmf_free_data(certlist);
+			int j;
+			for (j = 0; j < matchcerts; j++)
+				kmf_free_data(&certlist[j]);
 			free(certlist);
 			certlist = NULL;
 			ncerts = matchcerts = 0;
@@ -3659,10 +3679,11 @@ extract_pem(KMF_HANDLE *kmfh,
 	if (numcerts != NULL)
 		*numcerts = matchcerts;
 
-	if (certs != NULL) {
+	if (certs != NULL)
 		*certs = certlist;
-	} else if (certlist != NULL) {
-		kmf_free_data(certlist);
+	else if (certlist != NULL) {
+		for (i = 0; i < ncerts; i++)
+			kmf_free_data(&certlist[i]);
 		free(certlist);
 		certlist = NULL;
 	}
@@ -3688,7 +3709,6 @@ err:
 	return (rv);
 }
 
-
 static KMF_RETURN
 openssl_parse_bags(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, char *pin,
 	STACK_OF(EVP_PKEY) *keys, STACK_OF(X509) *certs)
@@ -3728,7 +3748,7 @@ set_pkey_attrib(EVP_PKEY *pkey, ASN1_TYPE *attrib, int nid)
 		X509_ATTRIBUTE *a;
 		for (i = 0;
 		    i < sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(pkey->attributes); i++) {
-			/* LINTED E_BAD_PTR_CAST_ALIGN */
+			/* LINTED E_BAD_PTR_CASE_ALIGN */
 			a = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_value(pkey->attributes, i);
 			if (OBJ_obj2nid(a->object) == nid) {
 				X509_ATTRIBUTE_free(a);
@@ -4385,14 +4405,12 @@ openssl_import_objects(KMF_HANDLE *kmfh,
 			(void) sk_EVP_PKEY_push(privkeys, pkey);
 			/* convert the certificate list here */
 			if (*ncerts > 0 && certlist != NULL) {
-				kmfcerts = (KMF_X509_DER_CERT *)malloc(*ncerts *
+				kmfcerts = (KMF_X509_DER_CERT *)calloc(*ncerts,
 				    sizeof (KMF_X509_DER_CERT));
 				if (kmfcerts == NULL) {
 					rv = KMF_ERR_MEMORY;
 					goto end;
 				}
-				(void) memset(kmfcerts, 0, *ncerts *
-				    sizeof (KMF_X509_DER_CERT));
 				for (i = 0; i < *ncerts; i++) {
 					kmfcerts[i].certificate = certdata[i];
 					kmfcerts[i].kmf_private.keystore_type =
@@ -4781,208 +4799,6 @@ OpenSSL_GetSymKeyValue(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, KMF_KEY_HANDLE *symkey,
 }
 
 /*
- * id-sha1    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
- *     iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3)
- *     algorithms(2) 26
- * }
- */
-#define	ASN1_SHA1_OID_PREFIX_LEN 15
-static uchar_t SHA1_DER_PREFIX[ASN1_SHA1_OID_PREFIX_LEN] = {
-	0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09,
-	0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x0e,
-	0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, 0x05,
-	0x00, 0x04, 0x14
-};
-
-/*
- * id-md2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
- *     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 2
- * }
- */
-#define	ASN1_MD2_OID_PREFIX_LEN 18
-static uchar_t MD2_DER_PREFIX[ASN1_MD2_OID_PREFIX_LEN] = {
-	0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0c,
-	0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86,
-	0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d,
-	0x02, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00,
-	0x04, 0x10
-};
-
-/*
- * id-md5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
- *     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 5
- * }
- */
-#define	ASN1_MD5_OID_PREFIX_LEN 18
-static uchar_t MD5_DER_PREFIX[ASN1_MD5_OID_PREFIX_LEN] = {
-	0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0c,
-	0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86,
-	0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d,
-	0x02, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00,
-	0x04, 0x10
-};
-
-KMF_RETURN
-OpenSSL_VerifyDataWithCert(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
-	KMF_ALGORITHM_INDEX algid, KMF_DATA *indata,
-	KMF_DATA *insig, KMF_DATA *cert)
-{
-	KMF_RETURN ret = KMF_OK;
-	KMF_HANDLE	*kmfh = (KMF_HANDLE *)handle;
-	X509	*xcert = NULL;
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-	uchar_t *p;
-	uchar_t *rsaout = NULL;
-	uchar_t *pfx = NULL;
-	const EVP_MD *md;
-	int pfxlen = 0, len;
-
-	if (handle == NULL || indata == NULL ||
-	    indata->Data == NULL || indata->Length == 0 ||
-	    insig == NULL|| insig->Data == NULL || insig->Length == 0 ||
-	    cert == NULL || cert->Data == NULL || cert->Length == 0)
-		return (KMF_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER);
-
-	p = cert->Data;
-	xcert = d2i_X509(NULL, (const uchar_t **)&p, cert->Length);
-	if (xcert == NULL) {
-		SET_ERROR(kmfh, ERR_get_error());
-		ret = KMF_ERR_BAD_CERT_FORMAT;
-		goto cleanup;
-	}
-
-	pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xcert);
-	if (pkey == NULL) {
-		SET_ERROR(kmfh, ERR_get_error());
-		ret = KMF_ERR_BAD_CERT_FORMAT;
-		goto cleanup;
-	}
-
-	if (algid != KMF_ALGID_NONE) {
-		switch (algid) {
-			case KMF_ALGID_MD5WithRSA:
-				md = EVP_md5();
-				break;
-			case KMF_ALGID_MD2WithRSA:
-				md = EVP_md2();
-				break;
-			case KMF_ALGID_SHA1WithRSA:
-				md = EVP_sha1();
-				break;
-			case KMF_ALGID_RSA:
-				md = NULL;
-				break;
-			default:
-				ret = KMF_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER;
-				goto cleanup;
-		}
-	} else {
-		/* Get the hash type from the cert signature */
-		md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(xcert->sig_alg->algorithm);
-		if (md == NULL) {
-			SET_ERROR(kmfh, ERR_get_error());
-			ret = KMF_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER;
-			goto cleanup;
-		}
-	}
-	if (md != NULL) {
-		switch (EVP_MD_type(md)) {
-		case NID_md2:
-		case NID_md2WithRSAEncryption:
-			pfxlen = ASN1_MD2_OID_PREFIX_LEN;
-			pfx = MD2_DER_PREFIX;
-			break;
-		case NID_md5:
-		case NID_md5WithRSAEncryption:
-			pfxlen = ASN1_MD5_OID_PREFIX_LEN;
-			pfx = MD5_DER_PREFIX;
-			break;
-		case NID_sha1:
-		case NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption:
-			pfxlen = ASN1_SHA1_OID_PREFIX_LEN;
-			pfx = SHA1_DER_PREFIX;
-			break;
-		default: /* Unsupported */
-			pfxlen = 0;
-			pfx = NULL;
-			break;
-		}
-	}
-
-	/* RSA with no hash is a special case */
-	rsaout = malloc(RSA_size(pkey->pkey.rsa));
-	if (rsaout == NULL)
-		return (KMF_ERR_MEMORY);
-
-	/* Decrypt the input signature */
-	len = RSA_public_decrypt(insig->Length,
-	    insig->Data, rsaout, pkey->pkey.rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
-	if (len < 1) {
-		SET_ERROR(kmfh, ERR_get_error());
-		ret = KMF_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER;
-	} else {
-		size_t hashlen = 0;
-		uint32_t dlen;
-		char *digest = NULL;
-
-		/*
-		 * If the AlgId requires it, hash the input data before
-		 * comparing it to the decrypted signature.
-		 */
-		if (md) {
-			EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
-
-			hashlen = md->md_size;
-
-			digest = malloc(hashlen + pfxlen);
-			if (digest == NULL)
-				return (KMF_ERR_MEMORY);
-			/* Add the prefix to the comparison buffer. */
-			if (pfx && pfxlen > 0) {
-				(void) memcpy(digest, pfx, pfxlen);
-			}
-			(void) EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, md);
-			(void) EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, indata->Data,
-			    indata->Length);
-
-			/* Add the digest AFTER the ASN1 prefix */
-			(void) EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx,
-			    (uchar_t *)digest + pfxlen, &dlen);
-
-			dlen += pfxlen;
-		} else {
-			digest = (char *)indata->Data;
-			dlen = indata->Length;
-		}
-
-		/*
-		 * The result of the RSA decryption should be ASN1(OID | Hash).
-		 * Compare the output hash to the input data for the final
-		 * result.
-		 */
-		if (memcmp(rsaout, digest, dlen))
-			ret = KMF_ERR_INTERNAL;
-		else
-			ret = KMF_OK;
-
-		/* If we had to allocate space for the digest, free it now */
-		if (hashlen)
-			free(digest);
-	}
-cleanup:
-	if (pkey)
-		EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-
-	if (xcert)
-		X509_free(xcert);
-
-	if (rsaout)
-		free(rsaout);
-
-	return (ret);
-}
-
-/*
  * substitute for the unsafe access(2) function.
  * If the file in question already exists, return 1.
  * else 0.  If an error occurs during testing (other
diff --git a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/plugins/kmf_pkcs11/common/pkcs11_spi.c b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/plugins/kmf_pkcs11/common/pkcs11_spi.c
index 8d65701ebd..104612f1e9 100644
--- a/usr/src/lib/libkmf/plugins/kmf_pkcs11/common/pkcs11_spi.c
+++ b/usr/src/lib/libkmf/plugins/kmf_pkcs11/common/pkcs11_spi.c
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
 /*
  * PKCS11 token KMF Plugin
  *
- * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright 2010 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
  * Use is subject to license terms.
  */
 
@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@
 
 #include <kmfapiP.h>
 #include <ber_der.h>
-#include <algorithm.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <sha1.h>
 #include <bignum.h>
@@ -127,10 +126,6 @@ KMF_RETURN
 KMFPK11_SetTokenPin(KMF_HANDLE_T, int, KMF_ATTRIBUTE *);
 
 KMF_RETURN
-KMFPK11_VerifyDataWithCert(KMF_HANDLE_T, KMF_ALGORITHM_INDEX, KMF_DATA *,
-	KMF_DATA *, KMF_DATA *);
-
-KMF_RETURN
 KMFPK11_ExportPK12(KMF_HANDLE_T, int, KMF_ATTRIBUTE *);
 
 
@@ -161,7 +156,6 @@ KMF_PLUGIN_FUNCLIST pk11token_plugin_table =
 	KMFPK11_CreateSymKey,
 	KMFPK11_GetSymKeyValue,
 	KMFPK11_SetTokenPin,
-	KMFPK11_VerifyDataWithCert,
 	KMFPK11_StoreKey,
 	NULL			/* Finalize */
 };
@@ -777,7 +771,7 @@ KMFPK11_FreeKMFCert(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, KMF_X509_DER_CERT *kmf_cert)
 
 KMF_RETURN
 KMFPK11_EncodePubKeyData(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, KMF_KEY_HANDLE *pKey,
-		KMF_DATA *eData)
+	KMF_DATA *eData)
 {
 	KMF_RETURN ret = KMF_OK;
 	CK_RV rv;
@@ -789,9 +783,11 @@ KMFPK11_EncodePubKeyData(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, KMF_KEY_HANDLE *pKey,
 	BerElement *asn1 = NULL;
 	BerValue *PubKeyParams = NULL, *EncodedKey = NULL;
 	KMF_X509_SPKI spki;
+	CK_BYTE ec_params[256], ec_point[256];
 
 	CK_ATTRIBUTE rsaTemplate[4];
 	CK_ATTRIBUTE dsaTemplate[6];
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE ecdsaTemplate[6];
 
 	if (kmfh == NULL)
 		return (KMF_ERR_UNINITIALIZED); /* Plugin Not Initialized */
@@ -809,21 +805,16 @@ KMFPK11_EncodePubKeyData(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, KMF_KEY_HANDLE *pKey,
 	(void) memset(&Base, 0, sizeof (Base));
 	(void) memset(&Value, 0, sizeof (Value));
 
-	SETATTR(rsaTemplate, 0, CKA_CLASS, &ckObjClass, sizeof (ckObjClass));
-	SETATTR(rsaTemplate, 1, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &ckKeyType, sizeof (ckKeyType));
-	SETATTR(rsaTemplate, 2, CKA_MODULUS, Modulus.Data, Modulus.Length);
-	SETATTR(rsaTemplate, 3, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, Exponent.Data,
-	    Exponent.Length);
-
-	SETATTR(dsaTemplate, 0, CKA_CLASS, &ckObjClass, sizeof (ckObjClass));
-	SETATTR(dsaTemplate, 1, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &ckKeyType, sizeof (ckKeyType));
-	SETATTR(dsaTemplate, 2, CKA_PRIME, Prime.Data, Prime.Length);
-	SETATTR(dsaTemplate, 3, CKA_SUBPRIME, Subprime.Data, Subprime.Length);
-	SETATTR(dsaTemplate, 4, CKA_BASE, Base.Data, Base.Length);
-	SETATTR(dsaTemplate, 5, CKA_VALUE, Value.Data, Value.Length);
-
 	switch (pKey->keyalg) {
 		case KMF_RSA:
+			SETATTR(rsaTemplate, 0, CKA_CLASS, &ckObjClass,
+			    sizeof (ckObjClass));
+			SETATTR(rsaTemplate, 1, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &ckKeyType,
+			    sizeof (ckKeyType));
+			SETATTR(rsaTemplate, 2, CKA_MODULUS, Modulus.Data,
+			    Modulus.Length);
+			SETATTR(rsaTemplate, 3, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT,
+			    Exponent.Data, Exponent.Length);
 			/* Get the length of the fields */
 			rv = C_GetAttributeValue(kmfh->pk11handle,
 			    (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)pKey->keyp, rsaTemplate, 4);
@@ -893,6 +884,19 @@ KMFPK11_EncodePubKeyData(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, KMF_KEY_HANDLE *pKey,
 
 			break;
 		case KMF_DSA:
+			SETATTR(dsaTemplate, 0, CKA_CLASS, &ckObjClass,
+			    sizeof (ckObjClass));
+			SETATTR(dsaTemplate, 1, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &ckKeyType,
+			    sizeof (ckKeyType));
+			SETATTR(dsaTemplate, 2, CKA_PRIME, Prime.Data,
+			    Prime.Length);
+			SETATTR(dsaTemplate, 3, CKA_SUBPRIME, Subprime.Data,
+			    Subprime.Length);
+			SETATTR(dsaTemplate, 4, CKA_BASE, Base.Data,
+			    Base.Length);
+			SETATTR(dsaTemplate, 5, CKA_VALUE, Value.Data,
+			    Value.Length);
+
 			/* Get the length of the fields */
 			rv = C_GetAttributeValue(kmfh->pk11handle,
 			    (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)pKey->keyp, dsaTemplate, 6);
@@ -1008,6 +1012,41 @@ KMFPK11_EncodePubKeyData(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, KMF_KEY_HANDLE *pKey,
 			kmfber_free(asn1, 1);
 			free(Value.Data);
 			break;
+		case KMF_ECDSA:
+			/* The EC_PARAMS are the PubKey algorithm parameters */
+			PubKeyParams = calloc(1, sizeof (BerValue));
+			if (PubKeyParams == NULL)
+				return (KMF_ERR_MEMORY);
+			EncodedKey = calloc(1, sizeof (BerValue));
+			if (EncodedKey == NULL) {
+				free(PubKeyParams);
+				return (KMF_ERR_MEMORY);
+			}
+			SETATTR(ecdsaTemplate, 0, CKA_EC_PARAMS,
+			    &ec_params, sizeof (ec_params));
+			SETATTR(ecdsaTemplate, 1, CKA_EC_POINT,
+			    &ec_point, sizeof (ec_point));
+
+			/* Get the length of the fields */
+			rv = C_GetAttributeValue(kmfh->pk11handle,
+			    (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)pKey->keyp,
+			    ecdsaTemplate, 2);
+			if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+				SET_ERROR(kmfh, rv);
+				return (KMF_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER);
+			}
+			/* The params are to be used as algorithm parameters */
+			PubKeyParams->bv_val = (char *)ec_params;
+			PubKeyParams->bv_len = ecdsaTemplate[0].ulValueLen;
+			/*
+			 * The EC_POINT is to be used as the subject pub key.
+			 */
+			EncodedKey->bv_val = (char *)ec_point;
+			EncodedKey->bv_len = ecdsaTemplate[1].ulValueLen;
+
+			/* Use the EC_PUBLIC_KEY OID */
+			Algorithm = (KMF_OID *)&KMFOID_EC_PUBLIC_KEY;
+			break;
 		default:
 			return (KMF_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER);
 	}
@@ -1036,12 +1075,14 @@ KMFPK11_EncodePubKeyData(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, KMF_KEY_HANDLE *pKey,
 
 cleanup:
 	if (EncodedKey) {
-		free(EncodedKey->bv_val);
+		if (pKey->keyalg != KMF_ECDSA)
+			free(EncodedKey->bv_val);
 		free(EncodedKey);
 	}
 
 	if (PubKeyParams) {
-		free(PubKeyParams->bv_val);
+		if (pKey->keyalg != KMF_ECDSA)
+			free(PubKeyParams->bv_val);
 		free(PubKeyParams);
 	}
 
@@ -1363,32 +1404,18 @@ out:
 	return (rv);
 }
 
-KMF_RETURN
-KMFPK11_CreateKeypair(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
-	int numattr,
-	KMF_ATTRIBUTE *attlist)
+static CK_RV
+gendsa_keypair(KMF_HANDLE *kmfh, boolean_t storekey,
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *pubKey,
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *priKey)
 {
-	KMF_RETURN rv = KMF_OK;
-	KMF_HANDLE *kmfh = (KMF_HANDLE *)handle;
-
-	CK_RV			ckrv = 0;
-	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	pubKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	priKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	hSession = kmfh->pk11handle;
-
-	static CK_OBJECT_CLASS	priClass = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
-	static CK_OBJECT_CLASS	pubClass = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
-
-	static CK_ULONG	modulusBits = 1024;
-	uint32_t	modulusBits_size = sizeof (CK_ULONG);
-	static CK_BYTE	PubExpo[3] = {0x01, 0x00, 0x01};
+	CK_RV ckrv = CKR_OK;
+	CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession = kmfh->pk11handle;
+	static CK_ULONG	dsaKeyType = CKK_DSA;
 	static CK_BBOOL	true = TRUE;
-	static CK_BBOOL	ontoken = TRUE;
 	static CK_BBOOL	false = FALSE;
-	static CK_ULONG	dsaKeyType = CKK_DSA;
-
-	CK_ATTRIBUTE rsaPubKeyTemplate[16];
-	CK_ATTRIBUTE rsaPriKeyTemplate[16];
+	static CK_OBJECT_CLASS	priClass = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+	static CK_OBJECT_CLASS	pubClass = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
 
 	static CK_BYTE ckDsaPrime[128] = {
 	0xb2, 0x6b, 0xc3, 0xfb, 0xe3, 0x26, 0xf4, 0xc2,
@@ -1434,7 +1461,7 @@ KMFPK11_CreateKeypair(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
 	static CK_ATTRIBUTE ckDsaPubKeyTemplate[] = {
 	{ CKA_CLASS, &pubClass, sizeof (pubClass) },
 	{ CKA_KEY_TYPE, &dsaKeyType, sizeof (dsaKeyType) },
-	{ CKA_TOKEN, &ontoken, sizeof (ontoken)},
+	{ CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof (true)},
 	{ CKA_PRIVATE, &false, sizeof (false)},
 	{ CKA_PRIME, &ckDsaPrime, sizeof (ckDsaPrime) },
 	{ CKA_SUBPRIME, &ckDsaSubPrime, sizeof (ckDsaSubPrime)},
@@ -1450,26 +1477,201 @@ KMFPK11_CreateKeypair(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
 	static CK_ATTRIBUTE ckDsaPriKeyTemplate[] = {
 	{CKA_CLASS, &priClass, sizeof (priClass)},
 	{CKA_KEY_TYPE, &dsaKeyType, sizeof (dsaKeyType)},
-	{CKA_TOKEN, &ontoken, sizeof (ontoken)},
+	{CKA_TOKEN, &true, sizeof (true)},
 	{CKA_PRIVATE, &true, sizeof (true)},
 	{CKA_SIGN, &true, sizeof (true)},
 	};
 
+#define	NUMBER_DSA_PRI_TEMPLATES (sizeof (ckDsaPriKeyTemplate) / \
+					sizeof (CK_ATTRIBUTE))
+#define	MAX_DSA_PRI_TEMPLATES (sizeof (ckDsaPriKeyTemplate) / \
+				sizeof (CK_ATTRIBUTE))
+	CK_MECHANISM keyGenMech = {CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL, 0};
+
+	SETATTR(ckDsaPriKeyTemplate, 2, CKA_TOKEN,
+	    (storekey ? &true : &false), sizeof (CK_BBOOL));
+
+	ckrv = C_GenerateKeyPair(hSession, &keyGenMech,
+	    ckDsaPubKeyTemplate,
+	    (sizeof (ckDsaPubKeyTemplate)/sizeof (CK_ATTRIBUTE)),
+	    ckDsaPriKeyTemplate,
+	    (sizeof (ckDsaPriKeyTemplate)/sizeof (CK_ATTRIBUTE)),
+	    pubKey, priKey);
+	if (ckrv != CKR_OK) {
+		SET_ERROR(kmfh, ckrv);
+		return (KMF_ERR_KEYGEN_FAILED);
+	}
+
+	return (ckrv);
+}
+
+static CK_RV
+genrsa_keypair(KMF_HANDLE *kmfh, CK_ULONG modulusBits,
+	boolean_t storekey, KMF_BIGINT *rsaexp,
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *pubKey,
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *priKey)
+{
+	CK_RV ckrv = CKR_OK;
+	CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession = kmfh->pk11handle;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE rsaPubKeyTemplate[16];
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE rsaPriKeyTemplate[16];
+	CK_MECHANISM keyGenMech = {CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL, 0};
+	int numpubattr = 0, numpriattr = 0;
+	static CK_BYTE	PubExpo[3] = {0x01, 0x00, 0x01};
+	static CK_BBOOL	true = TRUE;
+	static CK_BBOOL	false = FALSE;
+
+	SETATTR(rsaPubKeyTemplate, numpubattr, CKA_TOKEN,
+	    (storekey ? &true : &false), sizeof (CK_BBOOL));
+	numpubattr++;
+
+	SETATTR(rsaPubKeyTemplate, numpubattr, CKA_MODULUS_BITS,
+	    &modulusBits, sizeof (modulusBits));
+	numpubattr++;
+
+	if (rsaexp != NULL && (rsaexp->len > 0 && rsaexp->val != NULL)) {
+		SETATTR(rsaPubKeyTemplate, numpubattr,
+		    CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT,
+		    rsaexp->val, rsaexp->len);
+		numpubattr++;
+	} else {
+		SETATTR(rsaPubKeyTemplate, numpubattr,
+		    CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, &PubExpo, sizeof (PubExpo));
+		numpubattr++;
+	}
+	SETATTR(rsaPubKeyTemplate, numpubattr, CKA_ENCRYPT,
+	    &true, sizeof (true));
+	numpubattr++;
+	SETATTR(rsaPubKeyTemplate, numpubattr, CKA_VERIFY,
+	    &true, sizeof (true));
+	numpubattr++;
+	SETATTR(rsaPubKeyTemplate, numpubattr, CKA_WRAP,
+	    &true, sizeof (true));
+	numpubattr++;
+
+	SETATTR(rsaPriKeyTemplate, numpriattr, CKA_TOKEN,
+	    (storekey ? &true : &false), sizeof (CK_BBOOL));
+	numpriattr++;
+	SETATTR(rsaPriKeyTemplate, numpriattr, CKA_PRIVATE, &true,
+	    sizeof (true));
+	numpriattr++;
+	SETATTR(rsaPriKeyTemplate, numpriattr, CKA_DECRYPT, &true,
+	    sizeof (true));
+	numpriattr++;
+	SETATTR(rsaPriKeyTemplate, numpriattr, CKA_SIGN, &true,
+	    sizeof (true));
+	numpriattr++;
+	SETATTR(rsaPriKeyTemplate, numpriattr, CKA_UNWRAP, &true,
+	    sizeof (true));
+	numpriattr++;
+
+	ckrv = C_GenerateKeyPair(hSession, &keyGenMech,
+	    rsaPubKeyTemplate, numpubattr,
+	    rsaPriKeyTemplate, numpriattr,
+	    pubKey, priKey);
+	if (ckrv != CKR_OK) {
+		SET_ERROR(kmfh, ckrv);
+		return (ckrv);
+	}
+
+	return (ckrv);
+}
+
+static CK_RV
+genecc_keypair(KMF_HANDLE *kmfh,
+	boolean_t ontoken,
+	KMF_OID *curveoid,
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *pubKey,
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *priKey)
+{
+	CK_RV ckrv;
+	CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession = kmfh->pk11handle;
+	CK_MECHANISM keyGenMech = {CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL, 0};
+	const ulong_t publicKey = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
+	const ulong_t privateKey = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+	const ulong_t keytype = CKK_EC;
+	static CK_BBOOL	true = TRUE;
+	static CK_BBOOL	false = FALSE;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE public_template[6];
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE private_template[6];
+	int numpubattr, numpriattr;
+
+	numpubattr = 0;
+	SETATTR(public_template, numpubattr, CKA_CLASS,
+	    &publicKey, sizeof (publicKey));
+	numpubattr++;
+	SETATTR(public_template, numpubattr, CKA_KEY_TYPE,
+	    &keytype, sizeof (keytype));
+	numpubattr++;
+	SETATTR(public_template, numpubattr, CKA_EC_PARAMS,
+	    curveoid->Data, curveoid->Length);
+	numpubattr++;
+	SETATTR(public_template, numpubattr, CKA_TOKEN,
+	    ontoken ? &true : &false, sizeof (true));
+	numpubattr++;
+	SETATTR(public_template, numpubattr, CKA_VERIFY,
+	    &true, sizeof (true));
+	numpubattr++;
+	SETATTR(public_template, numpubattr, CKA_PRIVATE,
+	    &false, sizeof (false));
+	numpubattr++;
+
+	numpriattr = 0;
+	SETATTR(private_template, numpriattr, CKA_CLASS,
+	    &privateKey, sizeof (privateKey));
+	numpriattr++;
+	SETATTR(private_template, numpriattr, CKA_KEY_TYPE,
+	    &keytype, sizeof (keytype));
+	numpriattr++;
+	SETATTR(private_template, numpriattr, CKA_TOKEN,
+	    ontoken ? &true : &false, sizeof (true));
+	numpriattr++;
+	SETATTR(private_template, numpriattr, CKA_PRIVATE,
+	    &true, sizeof (true));
+	numpriattr++;
+	SETATTR(private_template, numpriattr, CKA_SIGN,
+	    &true, sizeof (true));
+	numpriattr++;
+	SETATTR(private_template, numpriattr, CKA_DERIVE,
+	    &true, sizeof (true));
+	numpriattr++;
+
+	ckrv = C_GenerateKeyPair(hSession, &keyGenMech,
+	    public_template, numpubattr,
+	    private_template, numpriattr,
+	    pubKey, priKey);
+	if (ckrv != CKR_OK) {
+		SET_ERROR(kmfh, ckrv);
+		return (ckrv);
+	}
+
+	return (ckrv);
+}
+
+KMF_RETURN
+KMFPK11_CreateKeypair(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
+	int numattr,
+	KMF_ATTRIBUTE *attlist)
+{
+	KMF_RETURN rv = KMF_OK;
+	KMF_HANDLE *kmfh = (KMF_HANDLE *)handle;
+	KMF_DATA IDInput, IDOutput;
+	KMF_CREDENTIAL *cred;
+	KMF_KEY_ALG keytype = KMF_RSA;
+	KMF_KEY_HANDLE *pubkey, *privkey;
+
+	CK_RV			ckrv = 0;
+	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	hSession = kmfh->pk11handle;
 	CK_ATTRIBUTE labelattr[1];
 	CK_ATTRIBUTE idattr[1];
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pubKey, priKey;
+
 	char IDHashData[SHA1_HASH_LENGTH];
-	KMF_DATA IDInput, IDOutput;
+	static CK_ULONG	modulusBits = 1024;
+	uint32_t	modulusBits_size = sizeof (CK_ULONG);
 	SHA1_CTX ctx;
-	KMF_CREDENTIAL *cred;
-	KMF_KEY_ALG keytype = KMF_RSA;
 	boolean_t storekey = TRUE;
 	char *keylabel = NULL;
-	KMF_KEY_HANDLE *pubkey, *privkey;
-
-#define	NUMBER_DSA_PRI_TEMPLATES (sizeof (ckDsaPriKeyTemplate) / \
-					sizeof (CK_ATTRIBUTE))
-#define	MAX_DSA_PRI_TEMPLATES (sizeof (ckDsaPriKeyTemplate) / \
-				sizeof (CK_ATTRIBUTE))
 
 	if (kmfh == NULL)
 		return (KMF_ERR_UNINITIALIZED); /* Plugin Not Initialized */
@@ -1504,12 +1706,10 @@ KMFPK11_CreateKeypair(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
 	(void) memset(pubkey, 0, sizeof (KMF_KEY_HANDLE));
 	(void) memset(privkey, 0, sizeof (KMF_KEY_HANDLE));
 	if (keytype == KMF_RSA) {
-		CK_MECHANISM keyGenMech = {CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL, 0};
-		CK_BYTE *modulus;
+		CK_BYTE *modulus = NULL;
 		CK_ULONG modulusLength = 0;
-		CK_ATTRIBUTE modattr[1];
 		KMF_BIGINT *rsaexp = NULL;
-		int numpubattr = 0, numpriattr = 0;
+		CK_ATTRIBUTE modattr[1];
 
 		rv = kmf_get_attr(KMF_KEYLENGTH_ATTR, attlist, numattr,
 		    &modulusBits, &modulusBits_size);
@@ -1519,64 +1719,14 @@ KMFPK11_CreateKeypair(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
 		if (rv != KMF_OK)
 			return (KMF_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER);
 
-		SETATTR(rsaPubKeyTemplate, numpubattr, CKA_TOKEN,
-		    (storekey ? &true : &false), sizeof (CK_BBOOL));
-		numpubattr++;
+		rsaexp = kmf_get_attr_ptr(KMF_RSAEXP_ATTR, attlist, numattr);
 
-		SETATTR(rsaPubKeyTemplate, numpubattr, CKA_MODULUS_BITS,
-		    &modulusBits, sizeof (modulusBits));
-		numpubattr++;
+		/* Generate the RSA keypair */
+		ckrv = genrsa_keypair(kmfh, modulusBits, storekey,
+		    rsaexp, &pubKey, &priKey);
 
-		if ((rsaexp = kmf_get_attr_ptr(KMF_RSAEXP_ATTR, attlist,
-		    numattr)) != NULL &&
-		    (rsaexp->len > 0 && rsaexp->val != NULL)) {
-				SETATTR(rsaPubKeyTemplate, numpubattr,
-				    CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT,
-				    rsaexp->val, rsaexp->len);
-				numpubattr++;
-		} else {
-			rv = KMF_OK;
-			SETATTR(rsaPubKeyTemplate, numpubattr,
-			    CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, &PubExpo, sizeof (PubExpo));
-			numpubattr++;
-		}
-		SETATTR(rsaPubKeyTemplate, numpubattr, CKA_ENCRYPT,
-		    &true, sizeof (true));
-		numpubattr++;
-		SETATTR(rsaPubKeyTemplate, numpubattr, CKA_VERIFY,
-		    &true, sizeof (true));
-		numpubattr++;
-		SETATTR(rsaPubKeyTemplate, numpubattr, CKA_WRAP,
-		    &true, sizeof (true));
-		numpubattr++;
-
-		SETATTR(rsaPriKeyTemplate, numpriattr, CKA_TOKEN,
-		    (storekey ? &true : &false), sizeof (CK_BBOOL));
-		numpriattr++;
-		SETATTR(rsaPriKeyTemplate, numpriattr, CKA_PRIVATE, &true,
-		    sizeof (true));
-		numpriattr++;
-		SETATTR(rsaPriKeyTemplate, numpriattr, CKA_DECRYPT, &true,
-		    sizeof (true));
-		numpriattr++;
-		SETATTR(rsaPriKeyTemplate, numpriattr, CKA_SIGN, &true,
-		    sizeof (true));
-		numpriattr++;
-		SETATTR(rsaPriKeyTemplate, numpriattr, CKA_UNWRAP, &true,
-		    sizeof (true));
-		numpriattr++;
-
-
-		pubKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-		priKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
-		ckrv = C_GenerateKeyPair(hSession, &keyGenMech,
-		    rsaPubKeyTemplate, numpubattr,
-		    rsaPriKeyTemplate, numpriattr,
-		    &pubKey, &priKey);
-		if (ckrv != CKR_OK) {
-			SET_ERROR(kmfh, ckrv);
-			return (KMF_ERR_KEYGEN_FAILED);
-		}
+		if (ckrv != CKR_OK)
+			return (KMF_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER);
 
 		privkey->kstype = KMF_KEYSTORE_PK11TOKEN;
 		privkey->keyalg = KMF_RSA;
@@ -1615,37 +1765,79 @@ KMFPK11_CreateKeypair(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
 		IDInput.Length = modulusLength;
 
 	} else if (keytype == KMF_DSA) {
-		CK_MECHANISM keyGenMech = {CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL, 0};
 		CK_BYTE *keyvalue;
 		CK_ULONG valueLen;
 		CK_ATTRIBUTE valattr[1];
 
-		SETATTR(ckDsaPriKeyTemplate, 2, CKA_TOKEN,
-		    (storekey ? &true : &false), sizeof (CK_BBOOL));
+		/* Generate the DSA keypair */
+		ckrv = gendsa_keypair(kmfh, storekey, &pubKey, &priKey);
+		if (ckrv != CKR_OK)
+			return (KMF_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER);
+
+		privkey->kstype = KMF_KEYSTORE_PK11TOKEN;
+		privkey->keyalg = KMF_DSA;
+		privkey->keyclass = KMF_ASYM_PRI;
+		privkey->keyp = (void *)priKey;
+
+		pubkey->kstype = KMF_KEYSTORE_PK11TOKEN;
+		pubkey->keyalg = KMF_DSA;
+		pubkey->keyclass = KMF_ASYM_PUB;
+		pubkey->keyp = (void *)pubKey;
+
+		/* Get the Public Value to use as input for creating the ID */
 		SETATTR(valattr, 0, CKA_VALUE, NULL, &valueLen);
 
-		ckrv = C_GenerateKeyPair(hSession, &keyGenMech,
-		    ckDsaPubKeyTemplate,
-		    (sizeof (ckDsaPubKeyTemplate)/sizeof (CK_ATTRIBUTE)),
-		    ckDsaPriKeyTemplate,
-		    (sizeof (ckDsaPriKeyTemplate)/sizeof (CK_ATTRIBUTE)),
-		    &pubKey, &priKey);
+		ckrv = C_GetAttributeValue(hSession,
+		    (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)pubKey, valattr, 1);
+		if (ckrv != CKR_OK) {
+			SET_ERROR(kmfh, ckrv);
+			return (KMF_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER);
+		}
+
+		valueLen = valattr[0].ulValueLen;
+		keyvalue = malloc(valueLen);
+		if (keyvalue == NULL)
+			return (KMF_ERR_MEMORY);
+
+		valattr[0].pValue = keyvalue;
+		ckrv = C_GetAttributeValue(hSession,
+		    (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)pubKey, valattr, 1);
 		if (ckrv != CKR_OK) {
 			SET_ERROR(kmfh, ckrv);
-			return (KMF_ERR_KEYGEN_FAILED);
+			free(keyvalue);
+			return (KMF_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER);
 		}
 
+		IDInput.Data = keyvalue;
+		IDInput.Length = valueLen;
+	} else if (keytype == KMF_ECDSA) {
+		CK_BYTE *keyvalue;
+		CK_ULONG valueLen;
+		CK_ATTRIBUTE valattr[1];
+		KMF_OID *eccoid = kmf_get_attr_ptr(KMF_ECC_CURVE_OID_ATTR,
+		    attlist, numattr);
+
+		if (eccoid == NULL)
+			return (KMF_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER);
+
+		ckrv = genecc_keypair(kmfh, storekey, eccoid,
+		    &pubKey, &priKey);
+		if (ckrv != CKR_OK)
+			return (KMF_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER);
+
 		privkey->kstype = KMF_KEYSTORE_PK11TOKEN;
-		privkey->keyalg = KMF_DSA;
+		privkey->keyalg = KMF_ECDSA;
 		privkey->keyclass = KMF_ASYM_PRI;
 		privkey->keyp = (void *)priKey;
 
 		pubkey->kstype = KMF_KEYSTORE_PK11TOKEN;
-		pubkey->keyalg = KMF_DSA;
+		pubkey->keyalg = KMF_ECDSA;
 		pubkey->keyclass = KMF_ASYM_PUB;
 		pubkey->keyp = (void *)pubKey;
 
-		/* Get the Public Value to use as input for creating the ID */
+		/* Get the EC_POINT to use as input for creating the ID */
+		SETATTR(valattr, 0, CKA_EC_POINT, NULL, &valueLen);
+
 		ckrv = C_GetAttributeValue(hSession,
 		    (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)pubKey, valattr, 1);
 		if (ckrv != CKR_OK) {
@@ -1812,12 +2004,17 @@ KMFPK11_SignData(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, KMF_KEY_HANDLE *keyp,
 	KMF_DATA *tobesigned,
 	KMF_DATA *output)
 {
+	KMF_RETURN		rv = KMF_OK;
 	CK_RV			ckrv;
 	KMF_HANDLE		*kmfh = (KMF_HANDLE *)handle;
 	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	hSession = kmfh->pk11handle;
 	CK_MECHANISM		mechanism;
-	PKCS_ALGORITHM_MAP 	*pAlgMap;
+	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE	mechtype, hashmech;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE		keytype;
 	KMF_ALGORITHM_INDEX	AlgId;
+	KMF_DATA		hashData = {NULL, 0};
+	uchar_t			digest[1024];
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE		subprime = { CKA_SUBPRIME, NULL, 0 };
 
 	if (kmfh == NULL)
 		return (KMF_ERR_UNINITIALIZED); /* Plugin Not Initialized */
@@ -1834,14 +2031,36 @@ KMFPK11_SignData(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, KMF_KEY_HANDLE *keyp,
 	if (AlgId == KMF_ALGID_NONE)
 		return (KMF_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER);
 
-	/* Map the Algorithm OID to a PKCS#11 mechanism */
-	pAlgMap = pkcs_get_alg_map(KMF_ALGCLASS_SIGNATURE,
-	    AlgId, PKCS_GetDefaultSignatureMode(AlgId));
-
-	if (pAlgMap == NULL)
+	/* Get the PKCS11 signing key type and mechtype */
+	if (get_pk11_data(AlgId, &keytype, &mechtype, &hashmech, 0))
 		return (KMF_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER);
 
-	mechanism.mechanism = pAlgMap->pkcs_mechanism;
+	(void) memset(digest, 0, sizeof (digest));
+	hashData.Data = digest;
+	hashData.Length = sizeof (digest);
+	rv = PKCS_DigestData(handle, hSession, hashmech, tobesigned, &hashData,
+	    (mechtype == CKM_RSA_PKCS));
+	if (rv)
+		return (rv);
+
+	if (mechtype == CKM_DSA && hashmech == CKM_SHA256) {
+		/*
+		 * FIPS 186-3 says that when signing with DSA
+		 * the hash must be truncated to the size of the
+		 * subprime.
+		 */
+		ckrv = C_GetAttributeValue(hSession,
+		    (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)keyp->keyp,
+		    &subprime, 1);
+		if (ckrv != CKR_OK)  {
+			SET_ERROR(kmfh, ckrv);
+			return (KMF_ERR_INTERNAL);
+		}
+		hashData.Length = subprime.ulValueLen;
+	}
+
+	/* the mechtype from the 'get_pk11_info' refers to the signing */
+	mechanism.mechanism = mechtype;
 	mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
 	mechanism.ulParameterLen = 0;
 
@@ -1851,7 +2070,7 @@ KMFPK11_SignData(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, KMF_KEY_HANDLE *keyp,
 		return (KMF_ERR_INTERNAL);
 	}
 
-	ckrv = C_Sign(hSession,	tobesigned->Data, tobesigned->Length,
+	ckrv = C_Sign(hSession,	hashData.Data, hashData.Length,
 	    output->Data, (CK_ULONG *)&output->Length);
 
 	if (ckrv != CKR_OK) {
@@ -2069,6 +2288,8 @@ KMFPK11_FindPrikeyByCert(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, int numattr,
 		key->keyalg = KMF_RSA;
 	else if (keytype == CKK_DSA)
 		key->keyalg = KMF_DSA;
+	else if (keytype == CKK_EC)
+		key->keyalg = KMF_ECDSA;
 	else {
 		/* For asymmetric keys, we only support RSA and DSA */
 		rv = KMF_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
@@ -2104,7 +2325,8 @@ KMFPK11_DecryptData(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, KMF_KEY_HANDLE *key,
 	KMF_HANDLE		*kmfh = (KMF_HANDLE *)handle;
 	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	hSession = kmfh->pk11handle;
 	CK_MECHANISM		mechanism;
-	PKCS_ALGORITHM_MAP 	*pAlgMap;
+	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE	mechtype;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE		keytype;
 	KMF_ALGORITHM_INDEX	AlgId;
 	CK_ULONG out_len = 0, block_len = 0, total_decrypted = 0;
 	uint8_t *in_data, *out_data;
@@ -2126,13 +2348,10 @@ KMFPK11_DecryptData(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, KMF_KEY_HANDLE *key,
 		return (KMF_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER);
 
 	/* Map the Algorithm ID to a PKCS#11 mechanism */
-	pAlgMap = pkcs_get_alg_map(KMF_ALGCLASS_SIGNATURE,
-	    AlgId, PKCS_GetDefaultSignatureMode(AlgId));
-
-	if (pAlgMap == NULL)
+	if (get_pk11_data(AlgId, &keytype, &mechtype, NULL, 0))
 		return (KMF_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER);
 
-	mechanism.mechanism = pAlgMap->pkcs_mechanism;
+	mechanism.mechanism = mechtype;
 	mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
 	mechanism.ulParameterLen = 0;
 
@@ -2390,6 +2609,64 @@ ret1:
 	return (rv);
 }
 
+static KMF_RETURN
+get_raw_ec(KMF_HANDLE *kmfh, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj, KMF_RAW_EC_KEY *rawec)
+{
+	KMF_RETURN rv = KMF_OK;
+	CK_RV ckrv;
+	CK_SESSION_HANDLE sess = kmfh->pk11handle;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE	ec_attrs[2] = {
+		{ CKA_EC_PARAMS, NULL, 0},
+		{ CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0}
+	};
+	CK_ULONG	count = sizeof (ec_attrs) / sizeof (CK_ATTRIBUTE);
+	int		i;
+
+	if ((ckrv = C_GetAttributeValue(sess, obj,
+	    ec_attrs, 2)) != CKR_OK) {
+		SET_ERROR(kmfh, ckrv);
+
+		/* Tell the caller know why the key data cannot be retrieved. */
+		if (ckrv == CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE)
+			return (KMF_ERR_SENSITIVE_KEY);
+		else if (ckrv == CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE)
+			return (KMF_ERR_UNEXTRACTABLE_KEY);
+		return (KMF_ERR_INTERNAL);
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		if (ec_attrs[i].ulValueLen == (CK_ULONG)-1 ||
+		    ec_attrs[i].ulValueLen == 0) {
+			ec_attrs[i].ulValueLen = 0;
+			continue;
+		}
+		if ((ec_attrs[i].pValue =
+		    malloc(ec_attrs[i].ulValueLen)) == NULL) {
+			rv = KMF_ERR_MEMORY;
+			goto end;
+		}
+	}
+	if ((ckrv = C_GetAttributeValue(sess, obj,
+	    ec_attrs, count)) != CKR_OK) {
+		SET_ERROR(kmfh, ckrv);
+		rv = KMF_ERR_INTERNAL;
+		goto end;
+	}
+
+	rawec->params.Data = ec_attrs[0].pValue;
+	rawec->params.Length = ec_attrs[0].ulValueLen;
+	rawec->value.val = ec_attrs[1].pValue;
+	rawec->value.len = ec_attrs[1].ulValueLen;
+
+end:
+	if (rv != KMF_OK) {
+		for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+			if (ec_attrs[i].pValue != NULL)
+				free(ec_attrs[i].pValue);
+		}
+		(void) memset(rawec, 0, sizeof (KMF_RAW_EC_KEY));
+	}
+	return (rv);
+}
 
 static KMF_RETURN
 get_raw_dsa(KMF_HANDLE *kmfh, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj, KMF_RAW_DSA_KEY *rawdsa)
@@ -2544,6 +2821,9 @@ keyObj2RawKey(KMF_HANDLE_T handle, KMF_KEY_HANDLE *inkey,
 			rkey->not_extractable = B_TRUE;
 			rv = KMF_OK;
 		}
+	} else if (inkey->keyalg == KMF_ECDSA) {
+		rv = get_raw_ec(kmfh, (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)inkey->keyp,
+		    &rkey->rawdata.ec);
 	} else {
 		rv = KMF_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER;
 	}
@@ -2569,6 +2849,9 @@ kmf2pk11keytype(KMF_KEY_ALG keyalg, CK_KEY_TYPE *type)
 	case KMF_DSA:
 		*type = CKK_DSA;
 		break;
+	case KMF_ECDSA:
+		*type = CKK_EC;
+		break;
 	case KMF_AES:
 		*type = CKK_AES;
 		break;
@@ -2802,6 +3085,8 @@ KMFPK11_FindKey(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
 						keys[n].keyalg = KMF_RSA;
 					} else if (keytype == CKK_DSA) {
 						keys[n].keyalg = KMF_DSA;
+					} else if (keytype == CKK_EC) {
+						keys[n].keyalg = KMF_ECDSA;
 					} else if (keytype == CKK_AES) {
 						keys[n].keyalg = KMF_AES;
 						keys[n].keyclass =
@@ -2936,6 +3221,8 @@ store_raw_key(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
 		keytype = CKK_RSA;
 	else if (rawkey->keytype == KMF_DSA)
 		keytype = CKK_DSA;
+	else if (rawkey->keytype == KMF_ECDSA)
+		keytype = CKK_EC;
 	else
 		return (KMF_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER);
 
@@ -2960,7 +3247,8 @@ store_raw_key(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
 	SETATTR(templ, i, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keytype, sizeof (keytype)); i++;
 	SETATTR(templ, i, CKA_TOKEN, &cktrue, sizeof (cktrue)); i++;
 	SETATTR(templ, i, CKA_PRIVATE, &cktrue, sizeof (cktrue)); i++;
-	SETATTR(templ, i, CKA_DECRYPT, &cktrue, sizeof (cktrue)); i++;
+	if (keytype != CKK_EC)
+		SETATTR(templ, i, CKA_DECRYPT, &cktrue, sizeof (cktrue)); i++;
 
 	cert = kmf_get_attr_ptr(KMF_CERT_DATA_ATTR, attrlist, numattr);
 	if (cert != NULL) {
@@ -3107,7 +3395,7 @@ store_raw_key(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
 			    rawkey->rawdata.rsa.coef.len);
 			i++;
 		}
-	} else {
+	} else if (keytype == CKK_DSA) {
 		SETATTR(templ, i, CKA_PRIME,
 		    rawkey->rawdata.dsa.prime.val,
 		    rawkey->rawdata.dsa.prime.len);
@@ -3124,6 +3412,19 @@ store_raw_key(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
 		    rawkey->rawdata.dsa.value.val,
 		    rawkey->rawdata.dsa.value.len);
 		i++;
+	} else if (keytype == CKK_EC) {
+		SETATTR(templ, i, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue, sizeof (cktrue));
+		i++;
+		SETATTR(templ, i, CKA_DERIVE, &cktrue, sizeof (cktrue));
+		i++;
+		SETATTR(templ, i, CKA_VALUE,
+		    rawkey->rawdata.ec.value.val,
+		    rawkey->rawdata.ec.value.len);
+		i++;
+		SETATTR(templ, i, CKA_EC_PARAMS,
+		    rawkey->rawdata.ec.params.Data,
+		    rawkey->rawdata.ec.params.Length);
+		i++;
 	}
 
 	ckrv = C_CreateObject(kmfh->pk11handle, templ, i, &keyobj);
@@ -3525,176 +3826,6 @@ end:
 }
 
 static KMF_RETURN
-create_pk11_session(CK_SESSION_HANDLE *sessionp, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wanted_mech,
-	CK_FLAGS wanted_flags)
-{
-	CK_RV rv;
-	KMF_RETURN kmf_rv = KMF_OK;
-	CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList;
-	CK_ULONG pulCount;
-	CK_MECHANISM_INFO info;
-	int i;
-
-	rv = C_Initialize(NULL);
-	if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) {
-		kmf_rv = KMF_ERR_UNINITIALIZED;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	rv = C_GetSlotList(0, NULL, &pulCount);
-	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
-		kmf_rv = KMF_ERR_UNINITIALIZED;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	pSlotList = (CK_SLOT_ID_PTR) malloc(pulCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
-	if (pSlotList == NULL) {
-		kmf_rv = KMF_ERR_MEMORY;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	rv = C_GetSlotList(0, pSlotList, &pulCount);
-	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
-		kmf_rv = KMF_ERR_UNINITIALIZED;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	for (i = 0; i < pulCount; i++) {
-		rv = C_GetMechanismInfo(pSlotList[i], wanted_mech, &info);
-		if (rv == CKR_OK && (info.flags & wanted_flags))
-			break;
-	}
-	if (i < pulCount) {
-		rv = C_OpenSession(pSlotList[i], CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
-		    NULL, NULL, sessionp);
-
-		if (rv != CKR_OK) {
-			kmf_rv = KMF_ERR_UNINITIALIZED;
-		}
-	} else {
-		kmf_rv = KMF_ERR_UNINITIALIZED;
-	}
-
-out:
-	if (pSlotList != NULL)
-		free(pSlotList);
-	return (kmf_rv);
-
-}
-static KMF_RETURN
-verify_data(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
-	KMF_ALGORITHM_INDEX AlgorithmId,
-	KMF_X509_SPKI *keyp,
-	KMF_DATA *data,
-	KMF_DATA *signed_data)
-{
-	KMF_RETURN ret;
-	PKCS_ALGORITHM_MAP *pAlgMap = NULL;
-	CK_RV ckRv;
-	CK_MECHANISM ckMechanism;
-	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ckKeyHandle;
-	KMF_BOOL	bTempKey;
-	KMF_HANDLE	*kmfh = (KMF_HANDLE *)handle;
-	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	ckSession = NULL;
-
-	if (AlgorithmId == KMF_ALGID_NONE)
-		return (KMF_ERR_BAD_ALGORITHM);
-
-	pAlgMap = pkcs_get_alg_map(KMF_ALGCLASS_SIGNATURE,
-	    AlgorithmId, PKCS_GetDefaultSignatureMode(AlgorithmId));
-
-	if (!pAlgMap)
-		return (KMF_ERR_BAD_ALGORITHM);
-
-	ret = create_pk11_session(&ckSession, pAlgMap->pkcs_mechanism,
-	    CKF_VERIFY);
-	if (ret != KMF_OK)
-		return (ret);
-
-	/* Fetch the verifying key */
-	ret = PKCS_AcquirePublicKeyHandle(ckSession, keyp,
-	    pAlgMap->key_type, &ckKeyHandle, &bTempKey);
-
-	if (ret != KMF_OK) {
-		return (ret);
-	}
-
-	ckMechanism.mechanism = pAlgMap->pkcs_mechanism;
-	ckMechanism.pParameter = NULL;
-	ckMechanism.ulParameterLen = 0;
-
-	ckRv = C_VerifyInit(ckSession, &ckMechanism, ckKeyHandle);
-	if (ckRv != CKR_OK) {
-		if (bTempKey)
-			(void) C_DestroyObject(ckSession, ckKeyHandle);
-		SET_ERROR(kmfh, ckRv);
-		ret = KMF_ERR_INTERNAL;
-		goto cleanup;
-	}
-
-	ckRv = C_Verify(ckSession, (CK_BYTE *)data->Data,
-	    (CK_ULONG)data->Length, (CK_BYTE *)signed_data->Data,
-	    (CK_ULONG)signed_data->Length);
-
-	if (ckRv != CKR_OK) {
-		SET_ERROR(kmfh, ckRv);
-		ret = KMF_ERR_INTERNAL;
-	}
-
-cleanup:
-	if (bTempKey)
-		(void) C_DestroyObject(ckSession, ckKeyHandle);
-
-	(void) C_CloseSession(ckSession);
-
-	return (ret);
-}
-
-KMF_RETURN
-KMFPK11_VerifyDataWithCert(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
-	KMF_ALGORITHM_INDEX algid, KMF_DATA *indata,
-	KMF_DATA *insig, KMF_DATA *SignerCertData)
-{
-	KMF_RETURN ret = KMF_OK;
-	KMF_X509_CERTIFICATE *SignerCert = NULL;
-	KMF_X509_SPKI *pubkey;
-
-	if (handle == NULL || indata == NULL ||
-	    indata->Data == NULL || indata->Length == 0 ||
-	    insig == NULL|| insig->Data == NULL || insig->Length == 0 ||
-	    SignerCertData == NULL || SignerCertData->Data == NULL ||
-	    SignerCertData->Length == 0)
-		return (KMF_ERR_BAD_PARAMETER);
-
-	/* Decode the signer cert so we can get the SPKI data */
-	ret = DerDecodeSignedCertificate(SignerCertData, &SignerCert);
-	if (ret != KMF_OK)
-		goto cleanup;
-
-	/* Get the public key info from the signer certificate */
-	pubkey = &SignerCert->certificate.subjectPublicKeyInfo;
-
-	/* If no algorithm specified, use the certs signature algorithm */
-	if (algid == KMF_ALGID_NONE) {
-		algid = x509_algoid_to_algid(CERT_ALG_OID(SignerCert));
-	}
-
-	if (algid == KMF_ALGID_NONE) {
-		ret = KMF_ERR_BAD_ALGORITHM;
-	} else {
-		ret = verify_data(handle, algid, pubkey, indata, insig);
-	}
-
-cleanup:
-	if (SignerCert) {
-		kmf_free_signed_cert(SignerCert);
-		free(SignerCert);
-	}
-
-	return (ret);
-}
-
-static KMF_RETURN
 create_generic_secret_key(KMF_HANDLE_T handle,
 	int numattr, KMF_ATTRIBUTE *attrlist, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *key)
 {