6739234 move SVR4 packaging to ONNV gate

1 files changed, 2474 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/usr/src/lib/libpkg/common/keystore.c b/usr/src/lib/libpkg/common/keystore.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ad94b96c2d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/usr/src/lib/libpkg/common/keystore.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2474 @@
+/*
+ * CDDL HEADER START
+ *
+ * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
+ * Common Development and Distribution License (the "License").
+ * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ *
+ * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
+ * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions
+ * and limitations under the License.
+ *
+ * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
+ * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
+ * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
+ * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
+ * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
+ *
+ * CDDL HEADER END
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
+ * Use is subject to license terms.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Module:	keystore.c
+ * Description:	This module contains the structure definitions for processing
+ *		package keystore files.
+ */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <strings.h>
+#include <libintl.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/safestack.h>
+#include <openssl/stack.h>
+#include "p12lib.h"
+#include "pkgerr.h"
+#include "keystore.h"
+#include "pkglib.h"
+#include "pkglibmsgs.h"
+
+typedef struct keystore_t {
+	boolean_t		dirty;
+	boolean_t		new;
+	char			*path;
+	char			*passphrase;
+	/* truststore handles */
+	int			cafd;
+	STACK_OF(X509)		*cacerts;
+	char			*capath;
+
+	/* user certificate handles */
+	STACK_OF(X509)		*clcerts;
+	char			*clpath;
+
+	/* private key handles */
+	STACK_OF(EVP_PKEY)	*pkeys;
+	char			*keypath;
+} keystore_t;
+
+/* local routines */
+static keystore_t	*new_keystore(void);
+static void		free_keystore(keystore_t *);
+static boolean_t	verify_keystore_integrity(PKG_ERR *, keystore_t *);
+static boolean_t	check_password(PKCS12 *, char *);
+static boolean_t	resolve_paths(PKG_ERR *, char *, char *,
+    long, keystore_t *);
+static boolean_t	lock_keystore(PKG_ERR *, long, keystore_t *);
+
+static boolean_t	unlock_keystore(PKG_ERR *, keystore_t *);
+static boolean_t	read_keystore(PKG_ERR *, keystore_t *,
+    keystore_passphrase_cb);
+static boolean_t	write_keystore(PKG_ERR *, keystore_t *,
+    keystore_passphrase_cb);
+static boolean_t	write_keystore_file(PKG_ERR *, char *, PKCS12 *);
+static boolean_t	clear_keystore_file(PKG_ERR *, char *);
+static PKCS12		*read_keystore_file(PKG_ERR *, char *);
+static char		*get_time_string(ASN1_TIME *);
+
+/* locking routines */
+static boolean_t	restore_keystore_file(PKG_ERR *, char *);
+static int		file_lock(int, int, int);
+static int		file_unlock(int);
+static boolean_t	file_lock_test(int, int);
+static boolean_t	file_empty(char *);
+static boolean_t	get_keystore_passwd(PKG_ERR *err, PKCS12 *p12,
+    keystore_passphrase_cb cb, keystore_t *keystore);
+static boolean_t	wait_restore(int, char *, char *, char *);
+
+#define	KEYSTORE_PERMS	(S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH)
+
+/* wait on other keystore access for 1 minute before giving up */
+#define	LOCK_TIMEOUT	60
+
+/*
+ * print_certs  - prints certificates out of a keystore, to a file.
+ *
+ * Arguments:
+ * err - Error object to append errors to
+ * keystore - Keystore on which to operate
+ * alias - Name of certificate to print, NULL means print all
+ * format - Format in which to print certificates
+ * outfile - Where to print certificates
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0 - Success
+ *   non-zero - Failure, errors added to err
+ */
+int
+print_certs(PKG_ERR *err, keystore_handle_t keystore_h, char *alias,
+    keystore_encoding_format_t format, FILE *outfile)
+{
+	int		i;
+	X509		*cert;
+	char		*fname = NULL;
+	boolean_t	found = B_FALSE;
+	keystore_t	*keystore = keystore_h;
+
+	if (keystore->clcerts != NULL) {
+		/* print out each client cert */
+		for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(keystore->clcerts); i++) {
+			cert = sk_X509_value(keystore->clcerts, i);
+			(void) sunw_get_cert_fname(GETDO_COPY, cert,
+			    &fname);
+
+			if (fname == NULL) {
+				/* no name recorded, keystore is corrupt */
+				pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_CORRUPT,
+				    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_NO_ALIAS),
+				    get_subject_display_name(cert));
+				return (1);
+			}
+
+			if ((alias != NULL) && (!streq(alias, fname))) {
+				/* name does not match, skip it */
+				(void) OPENSSL_free(fname);
+				fname = NULL;
+				continue;
+			} else {
+				found = B_TRUE;
+				(void) print_cert(err, cert, format,
+				    fname, B_FALSE, outfile);
+				(void) OPENSSL_free(fname);
+				fname = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (fname != NULL) {
+	    (void) OPENSSL_free(fname);
+	    fname = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (keystore->cacerts != NULL) {
+		/* print out each trusted cert */
+		for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(keystore->cacerts); i++) {
+			cert = sk_X509_value(keystore->cacerts, i);
+			(void) sunw_get_cert_fname(GETDO_COPY,
+			    cert, &fname);
+
+			if (fname == NULL) {
+				/* no name recorded, keystore is corrupt */
+				pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_CORRUPT,
+				    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_NO_ALIAS),
+				    get_subject_display_name(cert));
+				return (1);
+			}
+
+			if ((alias != NULL) && (!streq(alias, fname))) {
+				/* name does not match, skip it */
+				(void) OPENSSL_free(fname);
+				fname = NULL;
+				continue;
+			} else {
+				found = B_TRUE;
+				(void) print_cert(err, cert, format,
+				    fname, B_TRUE, outfile);
+				(void) OPENSSL_free(fname);
+				fname = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (fname != NULL) {
+	    (void) OPENSSL_free(fname);
+	    fname = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (found) {
+		return (0);
+	} else {
+		/* no certs printed */
+		if (alias != NULL) {
+			pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_NOALIASMATCH,
+			    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_NOCERT),
+			    alias, keystore->path);
+		} else {
+			pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_NOPUBKEY,
+			    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_NOPUBCERTS),
+			    keystore->path);
+			pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_NOCACERT,
+			    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_NOCACERTS),
+			    keystore->path);
+		}
+		return (1);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * print_cert  - prints a single certificate, to a file
+ *
+ * Arguments:
+ * err - Error object to append errors to
+ * x - The certificate to print
+ * alias - Name of certificate to print
+ * format - Format in which to print certificate
+ * outfile - Where to print certificate
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0 - Success
+ *   non-zero - Failure, errors added to err
+ */
+int print_cert(PKG_ERR *err, X509 *x,
+    keystore_encoding_format_t format, char *alias, boolean_t is_trusted,
+    FILE *outfile)
+{
+
+	char *vdb_str;
+	char *vda_str;
+	char vd_str[ATTR_MAX];
+	int ret = 0;
+	char *cn_str, *icn_str, *typ_str;
+	char *tmp;
+	char *md5_fp;
+	char *sha1_fp;
+	int len;
+
+	/* need to localize the word "Fingerprint", hence these pointers */
+	char md5_label[ATTR_MAX];
+	char sha1_label[ATTR_MAX];
+
+	if (is_trusted) {
+		typ_str = gettext(MSG_KEYSTORE_TRUSTED);
+	} else {
+		typ_str = gettext(MSG_KEYSTORE_UNTRUSTED);
+	}
+
+	if ((cn_str = get_subject_display_name(x)) == NULL) {
+		cn_str = gettext(MSG_KEYSTORE_UNKNOWN);
+	}
+
+	if ((icn_str = get_issuer_display_name(x)) == NULL) {
+		icn_str = gettext(MSG_KEYSTORE_UNKNOWN);
+	}
+
+	vdb_str = xstrdup(get_time_string(X509_get_notBefore(x)));
+	vda_str = xstrdup(get_time_string(X509_get_notAfter(x)));
+	if (((len = snprintf(vd_str, ATTR_MAX, "<%s> - <%s>",
+	    vdb_str, vda_str)) < 0) || (len >= ATTR_MAX)) {
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_WEB, gettext(ERR_LEN), vdb_str);
+		ret = 1;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	if ((tmp = get_fingerprint(x, EVP_md5())) == NULL) {
+		md5_fp = gettext(MSG_KEYSTORE_UNKNOWN);
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * make a copy, otherwise the next call to get_fingerprint
+		 * will overwrite this one
+		 */
+		md5_fp = xstrdup(tmp);
+	}
+
+	if ((tmp = get_fingerprint(x, EVP_sha1())) == NULL) {
+		sha1_fp = gettext(MSG_KEYSTORE_UNKNOWN);
+	} else {
+		sha1_fp = xstrdup(tmp);
+	}
+
+	(void) snprintf(md5_label, ATTR_MAX, "%s %s",
+	    OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_MD_type(EVP_md5())),
+	    /* i18n: 14 characters max */
+	    gettext(MSG_KEYSTORE_FP));
+
+	(void) snprintf(sha1_label, ATTR_MAX, "%s %s",
+	    OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_MD_type(EVP_sha1())),
+	    /* i18n: 14 characters max */
+	    gettext(MSG_KEYSTORE_FP));
+
+	switch (format) {
+	case KEYSTORE_FORMAT_PEM:
+		(void) PEM_write_X509(outfile, x);
+		break;
+	case KEYSTORE_FORMAT_DER:
+		(void) i2d_X509_fp(outfile, x);
+		break;
+	case KEYSTORE_FORMAT_TEXT:
+		(void) fprintf(outfile, "%18s: %s\n",
+		    /* i18n: 18 characters max */
+		    gettext(MSG_KEYSTORE_AL), alias);
+		(void) fprintf(outfile, "%18s: %s\n",
+		    /* i18n: 18 characters max */
+		    gettext(MSG_KEYSTORE_CN), cn_str);
+		(void) fprintf(outfile, "%18s: %s\n",
+		    /* i18n: 18 characters max */
+		    gettext(MSG_KEYSTORE_TY), typ_str);
+		(void) fprintf(outfile, "%18s: %s\n",
+		    /* i18n: 18 characters max */
+		    gettext(MSG_KEYSTORE_IN), icn_str);
+		(void) fprintf(outfile, "%18s: %s\n",
+		    /* i18n: 18 characters max */
+		    gettext(MSG_KEYSTORE_VD), vd_str);
+		(void) fprintf(outfile, "%18s: %s\n", md5_label, md5_fp);
+		(void) fprintf(outfile, "%18s: %s\n", sha1_label, sha1_fp);
+		(void) fprintf(outfile, "\n");
+		break;
+	default:
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_INTERNAL,
+		    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_INTERNAL),
+		    __FILE__, __LINE__);
+		ret = 1;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+cleanup:
+	if (md5_fp != NULL)
+		free(md5_fp);
+	if (sha1_fp != NULL)
+		free(sha1_fp);
+	if (vda_str != NULL)
+		free(vda_str);
+	if (vdb_str != NULL)
+		free(vdb_str);
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * open_keystore - Initialize new keystore object for
+ * impending access.
+ *
+ * Arguments:
+ * err - Error object to append errors to
+ * keystore_file - Base filename or directory of keystore
+ * app - Application making request
+ * passwd - Password used to decrypt keystore
+ * flags - Control flags used to control access mode and behavior
+ * result - Resulting keystore object stored here on success
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0 - Success - result contains a pointer to the opened keystore
+ *   non-zero - Failure, errors added to err
+ */
+int
+open_keystore(PKG_ERR *err, char *keystore_file, char *app,
+    keystore_passphrase_cb cb, long flags, keystore_handle_t *result)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	keystore_t	*tmpstore;
+
+	tmpstore = new_keystore();
+
+	tmpstore->dirty = B_FALSE;
+	tmpstore->new = B_FALSE;
+	tmpstore->path = xstrdup(keystore_file);
+
+	if (!resolve_paths(err, keystore_file, app, flags, tmpstore)) {
+		/* unable to determine keystore paths */
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_CORRUPT, gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_REPAIR),
+		    keystore_file);
+		ret = 1;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	if (!verify_keystore_integrity(err, tmpstore)) {
+		/* unable to repair keystore */
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_CORRUPT, gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_REPAIR),
+		    keystore_file);
+		ret = 1;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	if (!lock_keystore(err, flags, tmpstore)) {
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_LOCKED, gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_LOCKED),
+		    keystore_file);
+		ret = 1;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	/* now that we have locked the keystore, go ahead and read it */
+	if (!read_keystore(err, tmpstore, cb)) {
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_READ, gettext(ERR_PARSE),
+		    keystore_file);
+		ret = 1;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	*result = tmpstore;
+	tmpstore = NULL;
+
+cleanup:
+	if (tmpstore != NULL)
+		free_keystore(tmpstore);
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * new_keystore - Allocates and initializes a Keystore object
+ *
+ * Arguments:
+ * NONE
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   NULL - out of memory
+ *   otherwise, returns a pointer to the newly allocated object,
+ *   which should be freed with free_keystore() when no longer
+ *   needed.
+ */
+static keystore_t
+*new_keystore(void)
+{
+	keystore_t *tmpstore;
+
+	if ((tmpstore = (keystore_t *)malloc(sizeof (keystore_t))) == NULL) {
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	tmpstore->dirty = B_FALSE;
+	tmpstore->new = B_FALSE;
+	tmpstore->path = NULL;
+	tmpstore->passphrase = NULL;
+	tmpstore->cafd = -1;
+	tmpstore->cacerts = NULL;
+	tmpstore->capath = NULL;
+	tmpstore->clcerts = NULL;
+	tmpstore->clpath = NULL;
+	tmpstore->pkeys = NULL;
+	tmpstore->keypath = NULL;
+
+	return (tmpstore);
+}
+
+/*
+ * free_keystore - Deallocates a Keystore object
+ *
+ * Arguments:
+ * keystore - The keystore to deallocate
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   NONE
+ */
+static void
+free_keystore(keystore_t *keystore)
+{
+	if (keystore->path != NULL)
+		free(keystore->path);
+	if (keystore->capath != NULL)
+		free(keystore->capath);
+	if (keystore->passphrase != NULL)
+		free(keystore->passphrase);
+	if (keystore->clpath != NULL)
+		free(keystore->clpath);
+	if (keystore->keypath != NULL)
+		free(keystore->keypath);
+
+	if (keystore->pkeys != NULL) {
+		sk_EVP_PKEY_pop_free(keystore->pkeys,
+		    sunw_evp_pkey_free);
+	}
+	if (keystore->clcerts != NULL)
+		sk_X509_free(keystore->clcerts);
+	if (keystore->cacerts != NULL)
+		sk_X509_free(keystore->cacerts);
+	free(keystore);
+}
+
+/*
+ * close_keystore - Writes keystore to disk if needed, then
+ * unlocks and closes keystore.
+ *
+ * Arguments:
+ * err - Error object to append errors to
+ * keystore - Keystore which should be closed
+ * passwd - Password used to encrypt keystore
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0 - Success - keystore is committed to disk, and unlocked
+ *   non-zero - Failure, errors added to err
+ */
+int
+close_keystore(PKG_ERR *err, keystore_handle_t keystore_h,
+    keystore_passphrase_cb cb)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	keystore_t *keystore = keystore_h;
+
+	if (keystore->dirty) {
+		/* write out the keystore first */
+		if (!write_keystore(err, keystore, cb)) {
+			pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_WRITE,
+			    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_WRITE),
+			    keystore->path);
+			ret = 1;
+			goto cleanup;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!unlock_keystore(err, keystore)) {
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_UNLOCK, gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_UNLOCK),
+		    keystore->path);
+		ret = 1;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	free_keystore(keystore);
+cleanup:
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * merge_ca_cert - Adds a trusted certificate (trust anchor) to a keystore.
+ * certificate checked for validity dates and non-duplicity.
+ *
+ * Arguments:
+ * err - Error object to add errors to
+ * cacert - Certificate which to merge into keystore
+ * keystore - The keystore into which the certificate is merged
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0 - Success - Certificate passes validity, and
+ *		is merged into keystore
+ * non-zero - Failure, errors recorded in err
+ */
+int
+merge_ca_cert(PKG_ERR *err, X509 *cacert, keystore_handle_t keystore_h)
+{
+
+	int		ret = 0;
+	X509		*existing = NULL;
+	char		*fname;
+	keystore_t	*keystore = keystore_h;
+
+	/* check validity dates */
+	if (check_cert(err, cacert) != 0) {
+		ret = 1;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	/* create the certificate's friendlyName */
+	fname = get_subject_display_name(cacert);
+
+	if (sunw_set_fname(fname, NULL, cacert) != 0) {
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_NOMEM, gettext(ERR_MEM));
+		ret = 1;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	/* merge certificate into the keystore */
+	if (keystore->cacerts == NULL) {
+		/* no existing truststore, so make a new one */
+		if ((keystore->cacerts = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
+			pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_NOMEM, gettext(ERR_MEM));
+			ret = 1;
+			goto cleanup;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* existing truststore, make sure there's no duplicate */
+		if (sunw_find_fname(fname, NULL, keystore->cacerts,
+		    NULL, &existing) < 0) {
+			pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_INTERNAL,
+			    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_INTERNAL),
+			    __FILE__, __LINE__);
+			ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+			ret = 1;
+			goto cleanup;
+			/* could not search properly! */
+		}
+		if (existing != NULL) {
+			/* whoops, found one already */
+			pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_DUPLICATE,
+			    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_DUPLICATECERT), fname);
+			ret = 1;
+			goto cleanup;
+		}
+	}
+
+	(void) sk_X509_push(keystore->cacerts, cacert);
+	keystore->dirty = B_TRUE;
+cleanup:
+	if (existing != NULL)
+		X509_free(existing);
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * find_key_cert_pair - Searches a keystore for a matching
+ * public key certificate and private key, given an alias.
+ *
+ * Arguments:
+ * err - Error object to add errors to
+ * ks - Keystore to search
+ * alias - Name to used to match certificate's alias
+ * key - Resulting key is placed here
+ * cert - Resulting cert is placed here
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0 - Success - Matching cert/key pair placed in key and cert.
+ * non-zero - Failure, errors recorded in err
+ */
+int
+find_key_cert_pair(PKG_ERR *err, keystore_handle_t ks_h, char *alias,
+    EVP_PKEY **key, X509 **cert)
+{
+	X509		*tmpcert = NULL;
+	EVP_PKEY	*tmpkey = NULL;
+	int		ret = 0;
+	int		items_found;
+	keystore_t	*ks = ks_h;
+
+	if (key == NULL || cert == NULL) {
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_NOPUBKEY,
+		    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_NOPUBCERTS), ks->path);
+		ret = 1;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	if (ks->clcerts == NULL) {
+		/* no public certs */
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_NOPUBKEY,
+		    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_NOCERTS), ks->path);
+		ret = 1;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+	if (ks->pkeys == NULL) {
+		/* no private keys */
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_NOPRIVKEY,
+		    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_NOKEYS), ks->path);
+		ret = 1;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	/* try the easy case first */
+	if ((sk_EVP_PKEY_num(ks->pkeys) == 1) &&
+	    (sk_X509_num(ks->clcerts) == 1)) {
+		tmpkey = sk_EVP_PKEY_value(ks->pkeys, 0);
+		tmpcert = sk_X509_value(ks->clcerts, 0);
+		if (sunw_check_keys(tmpcert, tmpkey)) {
+			/*
+			 * only one private key and public key cert, and they
+			 * match, so use them
+			 */
+			*key = tmpkey;
+			tmpkey = NULL;
+			*cert = tmpcert;
+			tmpcert = NULL;
+			goto cleanup;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Attempt to find the right pair given the alias */
+	items_found = sunw_find_fname(alias, ks->pkeys, ks->clcerts,
+	    &tmpkey, &tmpcert);
+
+	if ((items_found < 0) ||
+	    (items_found & (FOUND_PKEY | FOUND_CERT)) == 0) {
+		/* no key/cert pair found. bail. */
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_BADALIAS,
+		    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_NOMATCH), alias);
+		ret = 1;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	/* success */
+	*key = tmpkey;
+	tmpkey = NULL;
+	*cert = tmpcert;
+	tmpcert = NULL;
+
+cleanup:
+
+	if (tmpcert != NULL)
+		(void) X509_free(tmpcert);
+
+	if (tmpkey != NULL)
+		sunw_evp_pkey_free(tmpkey);
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * find_ca_certs - Searches a keystore for trusted certificates
+ *
+ * Arguments:
+ * err - Error object to add errors to
+ * ks - Keystore to search
+ * cacerts - resulting set of trusted certs are placed here
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0 - Success - trusted cert list returned in cacerts
+ * non-zero - Failure, errors recorded in err
+ */
+int
+find_ca_certs(PKG_ERR *err, keystore_handle_t ks_h, STACK_OF(X509) **cacerts)
+{
+
+	keystore_t	*ks = ks_h;
+
+	/* easy */
+	if (cacerts == NULL) {
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_INTERNAL,
+		    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_INTERNAL), __FILE__, __LINE__);
+		return (1);
+	}
+
+	*cacerts = ks->cacerts;
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * find_cl_certs - Searches a keystore for user certificates
+ *
+ * Arguments:
+ * err - Error object to add errors to
+ * ks - Keystore to search
+ * cacerts - resulting set of user certs are placed here
+ *
+ * No matching of any kind is performed.
+ * Returns:
+ *   0 - Success - trusted cert list returned in cacerts
+ * non-zero - Failure, errors recorded in err
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+find_cl_certs(PKG_ERR *err, keystore_handle_t ks_h, STACK_OF(X509) **clcerts)
+{
+	keystore_t	*ks = ks_h;
+
+	/* easy */
+	*clcerts = ks->clcerts;
+	return (0);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * merge_cert_and_key - Adds a user certificate and matching
+ * private key to a keystore.
+ * certificate checked for validity dates and non-duplicity.
+ *
+ * Arguments:
+ * err - Error object to add errors to
+ * cert - Certificate which to merge into keystore
+ * key - matching private key to 'cert'
+ * alias - Name which to store the cert and key under
+ * keystore - The keystore into which the certificate is merged
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0 - Success - Certificate passes validity, and
+ *		is merged into keystore, along with key
+ * non-zero - Failure, errors recorded in err
+ */
+int
+merge_cert_and_key(PKG_ERR *err, X509 *cert, EVP_PKEY *key, char *alias,
+    keystore_handle_t keystore_h)
+{
+	X509		*existingcert = NULL;
+	EVP_PKEY	*existingkey = NULL;
+	int		ret = 0;
+	keystore_t	*keystore = keystore_h;
+
+	/* check validity dates */
+	if (check_cert(err, cert) != 0) {
+		ret = 1;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	/* set the friendlyName of the key and cert to the supplied alias */
+	if (sunw_set_fname(alias, key, cert) != 0) {
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_NOMEM, gettext(ERR_MEM));
+		ret = 1;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	/* merge certificate and key into the keystore */
+	if (keystore->clcerts == NULL) {
+		/* no existing truststore, so make a new one */
+		if ((keystore->clcerts = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
+			pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_NOMEM, gettext(ERR_MEM));
+			ret = 1;
+			goto cleanup;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* existing certstore, make sure there's no duplicate */
+		if (sunw_find_fname(alias, NULL, keystore->clcerts,
+		    NULL, &existingcert) < 0) {
+			pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_INTERNAL,
+			    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_INTERNAL),
+			    __FILE__, __LINE__);
+			ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+			ret = 1;
+			goto cleanup;
+			/* could not search properly! */
+		}
+		if (existingcert != NULL) {
+			/* whoops, found one already */
+			pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_DUPLICATE,
+			    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_DUPLICATECERT), alias);
+			ret = 1;
+			goto cleanup;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (keystore->pkeys == NULL) {
+		/* no existing keystore, so make a new one */
+		if ((keystore->pkeys = sk_EVP_PKEY_new_null()) == NULL) {
+			pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_NOMEM, gettext(ERR_MEM));
+			ret = 1;
+			goto cleanup;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* existing keystore, so make sure there's no duplicate entry */
+		if (sunw_find_fname(alias, keystore->pkeys, NULL,
+		    &existingkey, NULL) < 0) {
+			pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_INTERNAL,
+			    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_INTERNAL),
+			    __FILE__, __LINE__);
+			ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+			ret = 1;
+			goto cleanup;
+			/* could not search properly! */
+		}
+		if (existingkey != NULL) {
+			/* whoops, found one already */
+			pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_DUPLICATE,
+			    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_DUPLICATEKEY), alias);
+			ret = 1;
+			goto cleanup;
+		}
+	}
+
+	(void) sk_X509_push(keystore->clcerts, cert);
+	(void) sk_EVP_PKEY_push(keystore->pkeys, key);
+	keystore->dirty = B_TRUE;
+cleanup:
+	if (existingcert != NULL)
+		(void) X509_free(existingcert);
+	if (existingkey != NULL)
+		(void) sunw_evp_pkey_free(existingkey);
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * delete_cert_and_keys - Deletes one or more certificates
+ *  and matching private keys from a keystore.
+ *
+ * Arguments:
+ * err - Error object to add errors to
+ * ks - The keystore from which certs and keys are deleted
+ * alias - Name which to search for certificates and keys
+ *	to delete
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0 - Success - All trusted certs which match 'alias'
+ *		are deleted.  All user certificates
+ *		which match 'alias' are deleted, along
+ *		with the matching private key.
+ * non-zero - Failure, errors recorded in err
+ */
+int
+delete_cert_and_keys(PKG_ERR *err, keystore_handle_t ks_h, char *alias)
+{
+	X509		*existingcert;
+	EVP_PKEY	*existingkey;
+	int		i;
+	char		*fname = NULL;
+	boolean_t	found = B_FALSE;
+	keystore_t	*ks = ks_h;
+
+	/* delete any and all client certs with the supplied name */
+	if (ks->clcerts != NULL) {
+		for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ks->clcerts); i++) {
+			existingcert = sk_X509_value(ks->clcerts, i);
+			if (sunw_get_cert_fname(GETDO_COPY,
+			    existingcert, &fname) >= 0) {
+				if (streq(fname, alias)) {
+					/* match, so nuke it */
+					existingcert =
+					    sk_X509_delete(ks->clcerts, i);
+					X509_free(existingcert);
+					existingcert = NULL;
+					found = B_TRUE;
+				}
+				(void) OPENSSL_free(fname);
+				fname = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+		if (sk_X509_num(ks->clcerts) <= 0) {
+			/* we deleted all the client certs */
+			sk_X509_free(ks->clcerts);
+			ks->clcerts = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* and now the private keys */
+	if (ks->pkeys != NULL) {
+		for (i = 0; i < sk_EVP_PKEY_num(ks->pkeys); i++) {
+			existingkey = sk_EVP_PKEY_value(ks->pkeys, i);
+			if (sunw_get_pkey_fname(GETDO_COPY,
+			    existingkey, &fname) >= 0) {
+				if (streq(fname, alias)) {
+					/* match, so nuke it */
+					existingkey =
+					    sk_EVP_PKEY_delete(ks->pkeys, i);
+					sunw_evp_pkey_free(existingkey);
+					existingkey = NULL;
+					found = B_TRUE;
+				}
+				(void) OPENSSL_free(fname);
+				fname = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+		if (sk_EVP_PKEY_num(ks->pkeys) <= 0) {
+			/* we deleted all the private keys */
+			sk_EVP_PKEY_free(ks->pkeys);
+			ks->pkeys = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* finally, remove any trust anchors that match */
+
+	if (ks->cacerts != NULL) {
+		for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ks->cacerts); i++) {
+			existingcert = sk_X509_value(ks->cacerts, i);
+			if (sunw_get_cert_fname(GETDO_COPY,
+			    existingcert, &fname) >= 0) {
+				if (streq(fname, alias)) {
+					/* match, so nuke it */
+					existingcert =
+					    sk_X509_delete(ks->cacerts, i);
+					X509_free(existingcert);
+					existingcert = NULL;
+					found = B_TRUE;
+				}
+				(void) OPENSSL_free(fname);
+				fname = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+		if (sk_X509_num(ks->cacerts) <= 0) {
+			/* we deleted all the CA certs */
+			sk_X509_free(ks->cacerts);
+			ks->cacerts = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (found) {
+		ks->dirty = B_TRUE;
+		return (0);
+	} else {
+		/* no certs or keys deleted */
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_NOALIASMATCH,
+		    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_NOCERTKEY),
+		    alias, ks->path);
+		return (1);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * check_cert - Checks certificate validity.  This routine
+ * checks that the current time falls within the period
+ * of validity for the cert.
+ *
+ * Arguments:
+ * err - Error object to add errors to
+ * cert - The certificate to check
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0 - Success - Certificate checks out
+ * non-zero - Failure, errors and reasons recorded in err
+ */
+int
+check_cert(PKG_ERR *err, X509 *cert)
+{
+	char			currtimestr[ATTR_MAX];
+	time_t			currtime;
+	char			*r, *before_str, *after_str;
+	/* get current time */
+	if ((currtime = time(NULL)) == (time_t)-1) {
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_TIME, gettext(ERR_CURR_TIME));
+		return (1);
+	}
+
+	(void) strlcpy(currtimestr, ctime(&currtime), ATTR_MAX);
+
+	/* trim whitespace from end of time string */
+	for (r = (currtimestr + strlen(currtimestr) - 1); isspace(*r); r--) {
+		*r = '\0';
+	}
+	/* check  validity of cert */
+	switch (sunw_check_cert_times(CHK_BOTH, cert)) {
+	case CHKERR_TIME_OK:
+		/* Current time meets requested checks */
+		break;
+	case CHKERR_TIME_BEFORE_BAD:
+		/* 'not before' field is invalid */
+	case CHKERR_TIME_AFTER_BAD:
+		/* 'not after' field is invalid */
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_TIME, gettext(ERR_CERT_TIME_BAD));
+		return (1);
+	case CHKERR_TIME_IS_BEFORE:
+		/* Current time is before 'not before' */
+	case CHKERR_TIME_HAS_EXPIRED:
+		/*
+		 * Ignore expiration time since the trust cert used to
+		 * verify the certs used to sign Sun patches is already
+		 * expired. Once the patches get resigned with the new
+		 * cert we will check expiration against the time the
+		 * patch was signed and not the time it is installed.
+		 */
+		return (0);
+	default:
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_INTERNAL,
+		    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_INTERNAL),
+		    __FILE__, __LINE__);
+		return (1);
+	}
+
+	/* all checks ok */
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * check_cert - Checks certificate validity.  This routine
+ * checks everything that check_cert checks, and additionally
+ * verifies that the private key and corresponding public
+ * key are indeed a pair.
+ *
+ * Arguments:
+ * err - Error object to add errors to
+ * cert - The certificate to check
+ * key - the key to check
+ * Returns:
+ *   0 - Success - Certificate checks out
+ * non-zero - Failure, errors and reasons recorded in err
+ */
+int
+check_cert_and_key(PKG_ERR *err, X509 *cert, EVP_PKEY *key)
+{
+
+	/* check validity dates */
+	if (check_cert(err, cert) != 0) {
+		return (1);
+	}
+
+	/* check key pair match */
+	if (sunw_check_keys(cert, key) == 0) {
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_VERIFY, gettext(ERR_MISMATCHED_KEYS),
+		    get_subject_display_name(cert));
+		return (1);
+	}
+
+	/* all checks OK */
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/* ------------------ private functions ---------------------- */
+
+/*
+ * verify_keystore_integrity - Searches for the remnants
+ * of a failed or aborted keystore modification, and
+ * cleans up the files, retstores the keystore to a known
+ * state.
+ *
+ * Arguments:
+ * err - Error object to add errors to
+ * keystore_file - Base directory or filename of keystore
+ * app - Application making request
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0 - Success - Keystore is restored, or untouched in the
+ *		case that cleanup was unnecessary
+ * non-zero - Failure, errors and reasons recorded in err
+ */
+static boolean_t
+verify_keystore_integrity(PKG_ERR *err, keystore_t *keystore)
+{
+	if (keystore->capath != NULL) {
+		if (!restore_keystore_file(err, keystore->capath)) {
+			return (B_FALSE);
+		}
+	}
+	if (keystore->clpath != NULL) {
+		if (!restore_keystore_file(err, keystore->clpath)) {
+			return (B_FALSE);
+		}
+	}
+	if (keystore->keypath != NULL) {
+		if (!restore_keystore_file(err, keystore->keypath)) {
+			return (B_FALSE);
+		}
+	}
+	return (B_TRUE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * restore_keystore_file - restores a keystore file to
+ * a known state.
+ *
+ * Keystore files can possibly be corrupted by a variety
+ * of error conditions during reading/writing.  This
+ * routine, along with write_keystore_file, tries to
+ * maintain keystore integrity by writing the files
+ * out in a particular order, minimizing the time period
+ * that the keystore is in an indeterminate state.
+ *
+ * With the current implementation, there are some failures
+ * that are wholly unrecoverable, such as disk corruption.
+ * These routines attempt to minimize the risk, but not
+ * eliminate it.  When better, atomic operations are available
+ * (such as a trued atabase with commit, rollback, and
+ * guaranteed atomicity), this implementation should use that.
+ *
+ * Arguments:
+ * err - Error object to add errors to
+ * keystore_file - keystore file path to restore.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0 - Success - Keystore file is restored, or untouched in the
+ *		case that cleanup was unnecessary
+ * non-zero - Failure, errors and reasons recorded in err
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static boolean_t
+restore_keystore_file(PKG_ERR *err, char *keystore_file)
+{
+	char	newpath[MAXPATHLEN];
+	char	backuppath[MAXPATHLEN];
+	int	newfd;
+	struct stat buf;
+	int len;
+
+	if (((len = snprintf(newpath, MAXPATHLEN, "%s.new",
+	    keystore_file)) < 0) ||
+	    (len >= ATTR_MAX)) {
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_WEB, gettext(ERR_LEN), keystore_file);
+		return (B_FALSE);
+	}
+
+	if (((len = snprintf(backuppath, MAXPATHLEN, "%s.bak",
+	    keystore_file)) < 0) ||
+	    (len >= ATTR_MAX)) {
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_WEB, gettext(ERR_LEN), keystore_file);
+		return (B_FALSE);
+	}
+
+	if ((newfd = open(newpath, O_RDWR|O_NONBLOCK, 0)) != -1) {
+		if (fstat(newfd, &buf) != -1) {
+			if (S_ISREG(buf.st_mode)) {
+				/*
+				 * restore the file, waiting on it
+				 * to be free for locking, or for
+				 * it to disappear
+				 */
+				if (!wait_restore(newfd, keystore_file,
+				    newpath, backuppath)) {
+					pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_WRITE,
+					    gettext(ERR_WRITE),
+					    newpath, strerror(errno));
+					(void) close(newfd);
+					return (B_FALSE);
+				} else {
+					return (B_TRUE);
+				}
+			} else {
+				/* "new" file is not a regular file */
+				pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_WRITE,
+				    gettext(ERR_NOT_REG), newpath);
+				(void) close(newfd);
+				return (B_FALSE);
+			}
+		} else {
+			/* couldn't stat "new" file */
+			pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_WRITE,
+			    gettext(ERR_WRITE), newpath,
+			    strerror(errno));
+			(void) close(newfd);
+			return (B_FALSE);
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* "new" file doesn't exist */
+		return (B_TRUE);
+	}
+}
+
+static boolean_t
+wait_restore(int newfd, char *keystore_file,
+    char *origpath, char *backuppath)
+{
+	struct stat buf;
+	FILE *newstream;
+	PKCS12 *p12;
+
+	(void) alarm(LOCK_TIMEOUT);
+	if (file_lock(newfd, F_WRLCK, 1) == -1) {
+		/* could not lock file */
+		(void) alarm(0);
+		return (B_FALSE);
+	}
+	(void) alarm(0);
+
+	if (fstat(newfd, &buf) != -1) {
+		if (S_ISREG(buf.st_mode)) {
+			/*
+			 * The new file still
+			 * exists, with no
+			 * owner.  It must be
+			 * the result of an
+			 * aborted update.
+			 */
+			newstream = fdopen(newfd, "r");
+			if ((p12 =
+			    d2i_PKCS12_fp(newstream,
+				NULL)) != NULL) {
+				/*
+				 * The file
+				 * appears
+				 * complete.
+				 * Replace the
+				 * exsisting
+				 * keystore
+				 * file with
+				 * this one
+				 */
+				(void) rename(keystore_file, backuppath);
+				(void) rename(origpath, keystore_file);
+				PKCS12_free(p12);
+			} else {
+				/* The file is not complete.  Remove it */
+				(void) remove(origpath);
+			}
+			/* remove backup file */
+			(void) remove(backuppath);
+			(void) fclose(newstream);
+			(void) close(newfd);
+			return (B_TRUE);
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * new file exists, but is not a
+			 * regular file
+			 */
+			(void) close(newfd);
+			return (B_FALSE);
+		}
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * could not stat file.  Unless
+		 * the reason was that the file
+		 * is now gone, this is an error
+		 */
+		if (errno != ENOENT) {
+			(void) close(newfd);
+			return (B_FALSE);
+		}
+		/*
+		 * otherwise, file is gone.  The process
+		 * that held the lock must have
+		 * successfully cleaned up and
+		 * exited with a valid keystore
+		 * state
+		 */
+		(void) close(newfd);
+		return (B_TRUE);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * resolve_paths - figure out if we are dealing with a single-file
+ * or multi-file keystore
+ *
+ * The flags tell resolve_paths how to behave:
+ *
+ * KEYSTORE_PATH_SOFT
+ * If the keystore file does not exist at <base>/<app> then
+ * use <base> as the path to the keystore.  This can be used,
+ * for example, to access an app-specific keystore iff it
+ * exists, otherwise revert back to an app-generic keystore.
+ *
+ * KEYSTORE_PATH_HARD
+ * Always use the keystore located at <keystore_path>/<app>.
+ * In read/write mode, if the files do not exist, then
+ * they will be created.  This is used to avoid falling
+ * back to an app-generic keystore path when the app-specific
+ * one does not exist.
+ *
+ * Arguments:
+ * err - Error object to add errors to
+ * keystore_file - base keystore file path to lock
+ * app - Application making requests
+ * flags - Control flags (see above description)
+ * keystore - object which is being locked
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   B_TRUE - Success - Keystore file is locked, paths to
+ *		appropriate files placed in keystore.
+ *   B_FALSE - Failure, errors and reasons recorded in err
+ */
+static boolean_t
+resolve_paths(PKG_ERR *err, char *keystore_file, char *app,
+    long flags, keystore_t *keystore)
+{
+	char			storepath[PATH_MAX];
+	struct stat		buf;
+	boolean_t		multi = B_FALSE;
+	int			fd1, fd2, len;
+
+	/*
+	 * figure out whether we are dealing with a single-file keystore
+	 * or a multi-file keystore
+	 */
+	if (app != NULL) {
+		if (((len = snprintf(storepath, PATH_MAX, "%s/%s",
+		    keystore_file, app)) < 0) ||
+		    (len >= ATTR_MAX)) {
+			pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_WEB, gettext(ERR_LEN),
+			    keystore_file);
+			return (B_FALSE);
+		}
+
+		if (((fd1 = open(storepath, O_NONBLOCK|O_RDONLY)) == -1) ||
+		    (fstat(fd1, &buf) == -1) ||
+		    !S_ISDIR(buf.st_mode)) {
+			/*
+			 * app-specific does not exist
+			 * fallback to app-generic, if flags say we can
+			 */
+			if ((flags & KEYSTORE_PATH_MASK) ==
+			    KEYSTORE_PATH_SOFT) {
+
+				if (((fd2 = open(keystore_file,
+				    O_NONBLOCK|O_RDONLY)) != -1) &&
+				    (fstat(fd2, &buf) != -1)) {
+					if (S_ISDIR(buf.st_mode)) {
+						/*
+						 * app-generic dir
+						 * exists, so use it
+						 * as a multi-file
+						 * keystore
+						 */
+						multi = B_TRUE;
+						app = NULL;
+					} else if (S_ISREG(buf.st_mode)) {
+						/*
+						 * app-generic file exists, so
+						 * use it as a single file ks
+						 */
+						multi = B_FALSE;
+						app = NULL;
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		if (fd1 != -1)
+			(void) close(fd1);
+		if (fd2 != -1)
+			(void) close(fd2);
+	} else {
+		if (((fd1 = open(keystore_file,
+		    O_NONBLOCK|O_RDONLY)) != -1) &&
+		    (fstat(fd1, &buf) != -1) &&
+		    S_ISDIR(buf.st_mode)) {
+			/*
+			 * app-generic dir exists, so use
+			 * it as a multi-file keystore
+			 */
+			multi = B_TRUE;
+		}
+		if (fd1 != -1)
+			(void) close(fd1);
+	}
+
+	if (app != NULL) {
+		/* app-specific keystore */
+		(void) snprintf(storepath, PATH_MAX, "%s/%s/%s",
+		    keystore_file, app, TRUSTSTORE);
+		keystore->capath = xstrdup(storepath);
+		(void) snprintf(storepath, PATH_MAX, "%s/%s/%s",
+		    keystore_file, app, CERTSTORE);
+		keystore->clpath = xstrdup(storepath);
+		(void) snprintf(storepath, PATH_MAX, "%s/%s/%s",
+		    keystore_file, app, KEYSTORE);
+		keystore->keypath = xstrdup(storepath);
+	} else {
+		/* app-generic keystore */
+		if (!multi) {
+			/* single-file app-generic keystore */
+			keystore->capath = xstrdup(keystore_file);
+			keystore->keypath = NULL;
+			keystore->clpath = NULL;
+		} else {
+			/* multi-file app-generic keystore */
+			(void) snprintf(storepath, PATH_MAX, "%s/%s",
+			    keystore_file, TRUSTSTORE);
+			keystore->capath = xstrdup(storepath);
+			(void) snprintf(storepath, PATH_MAX, "%s/%s",
+			    keystore_file, CERTSTORE);
+			keystore->clpath = xstrdup(storepath);
+			(void) snprintf(storepath, PATH_MAX, "%s/%s",
+			    keystore_file, KEYSTORE);
+			keystore->keypath = xstrdup(storepath);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return (B_TRUE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * lock_keystore - Locks a keystore for shared (read-only)
+ * or exclusive (read-write) access.
+ *
+ * The flags tell lock_keystore how to behave:
+ *
+ * KEYSTORE_ACCESS_READONLY
+ * opens keystore read-only.  Attempts to modify results in an error
+ *
+ * KEYSTORE_ACCESS_READWRITE
+ * opens keystore read-write
+ *
+ * KEYSTORE_PATH_SOFT
+ * If the keystore file does not exist at <base>/<app> then
+ * use <base> as the path to the keystore.  This can be used,
+ * for example, to access an app-specific keystore iff it
+ * exists, otherwise revert back to an app-generic keystore.
+ *
+ * KEYSTORE_PATH_HARD
+ * Always use the keystore located at <keystore_path>/<app>.
+ * In read/write mode, if the files do not exist, then
+ * they will be created.  This is used to avoid falling
+ * back to an app-generic keystore path when the app-specific
+ * one does not exist.
+ *
+ * Arguments:
+ * err - Error object to add errors to
+ * flags - Control flags (see above description)
+ * keystore - object which is being locked
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0 - Success - Keystore file is locked, paths to
+ *		appropriate files placed in keystore.
+ * non-zero - Failure, errors and reasons recorded in err
+ */
+static boolean_t
+lock_keystore(PKG_ERR *err, long flags, keystore_t *keystore)
+{
+	boolean_t		ret = B_TRUE;
+	struct stat		buf;
+
+	switch (flags & KEYSTORE_ACCESS_MASK) {
+	case KEYSTORE_ACCESS_READONLY:
+		if ((keystore->cafd =
+		    open(keystore->capath, O_NONBLOCK|O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
+			if (errno == ENOENT) {
+				/*
+				 * no keystore.  try to create an
+				 * empty one so we can lock on it and
+				 * prevent others from gaining
+				 * exclusive access.  It will be
+				 * deleted when the keystore is closed.
+				 */
+				if ((keystore->cafd =
+				    open(keystore->capath,
+					O_NONBLOCK|O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL,
+					S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR)) == -1) {
+					pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_READ,
+					    gettext(ERR_NO_KEYSTORE),
+					    keystore->capath);
+					ret = B_FALSE;
+					goto cleanup;
+				}
+			} else {
+				pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_READ,
+				    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_OPEN),
+				    keystore->capath, strerror(errno));
+				ret = B_FALSE;
+				goto cleanup;
+			}
+		}
+		if (fstat(keystore->cafd, &buf) != -1) {
+			if (S_ISREG(buf.st_mode)) {
+				if (file_lock(keystore->cafd, F_RDLCK,
+				    0) == -1) {
+					pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_LOCKED,
+					    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_LOCKED_READ),
+					    keystore->capath);
+					ret = B_FALSE;
+					goto cleanup;
+				}
+			} else {
+				/* ca file not a regular file! */
+				pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_READ,
+				    gettext(ERR_NOT_REG),
+				    keystore->capath);
+				ret = B_FALSE;
+				goto cleanup;
+			}
+		} else {
+			pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_READ,
+			    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_OPEN),
+			    keystore->capath, strerror(errno));
+			ret = B_FALSE;
+			goto cleanup;
+		}
+		break;
+	case KEYSTORE_ACCESS_READWRITE:
+
+		if ((keystore->cafd = open(keystore->capath,
+		    O_RDWR|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) {
+			/* does not exist.  try to create an empty one */
+			if (errno == ENOENT) {
+				if ((keystore->cafd =
+				    open(keystore->capath,
+					O_NONBLOCK|O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL,
+					S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR)) == -1) {
+					pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_READ,
+					    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_WRITE),
+					    keystore->capath);
+					ret = B_FALSE;
+					goto cleanup;
+				}
+			} else {
+				pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_READ,
+				    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_OPEN),
+				    keystore->capath, strerror(errno));
+				ret = B_FALSE;
+				goto cleanup;
+			}
+		}
+		if (fstat(keystore->cafd, &buf) != -1) {
+			if (S_ISREG(buf.st_mode)) {
+				if (file_lock(keystore->cafd, F_WRLCK,
+				    0) == -1) {
+					pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_LOCKED,
+					    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_LOCKED),
+					    keystore->capath);
+					ret = B_FALSE;
+					goto cleanup;
+				}
+			} else {
+				/* ca file not a regular file! */
+				pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_READ,
+				    gettext(ERR_NOT_REG),
+				    keystore->capath);
+				ret = B_FALSE;
+				goto cleanup;
+			}
+		} else {
+			pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_READ,
+			    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_OPEN),
+			    keystore->capath, strerror(errno));
+			ret = B_FALSE;
+			goto cleanup;
+		}
+
+		break;
+	default:
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_INTERNAL,
+		    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_INTERNAL),
+		    __FILE__, __LINE__);
+		ret = B_FALSE;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+cleanup:
+	if (!ret) {
+		if (keystore->cafd > 0) {
+			(void) file_unlock(keystore->cafd);
+			(void) close(keystore->cafd);
+			keystore->cafd = -1;
+		}
+
+		if (keystore->capath != NULL)
+			free(keystore->capath);
+		if (keystore->clpath != NULL)
+			free(keystore->clpath);
+		if (keystore->keypath != NULL)
+			free(keystore->keypath);
+		keystore->capath = NULL;
+		keystore->clpath = NULL;
+		keystore->keypath = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * unlock_keystore - Unocks a keystore
+ *
+ * Arguments:
+ * err - Error object to add errors to
+ * keystore - keystore object to unlock
+ * Returns:
+ *   0 - Success - Keystore files are unlocked, files are closed,
+ * non-zero - Failure, errors and reasons recorded in err
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static boolean_t
+unlock_keystore(PKG_ERR *err, keystore_t *keystore)
+{
+
+	/*
+	 * Release lock on the CA file.
+	 * Delete file if it is empty
+	 */
+	if (file_empty(keystore->capath)) {
+		(void) remove(keystore->capath);
+	}
+
+	(void) file_unlock(keystore->cafd);
+	(void) close(keystore->cafd);
+	return (B_TRUE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * read_keystore - Reads keystore files of disk, parses
+ * into internal structures.
+ *
+ * Arguments:
+ * err - Error object to add errors to
+ * keystore - keystore object to read into
+ * cb - callback to get password, if required
+ * Returns:
+ *   0 - Success - Keystore files are read, and placed
+ * into keystore structure.
+ * non-zero - Failure, errors and reasons recorded in err
+ */
+static boolean_t
+read_keystore(PKG_ERR *err, keystore_t *keystore, keystore_passphrase_cb cb)
+{
+	boolean_t	ret = B_TRUE;
+	PKCS12		*p12 = NULL;
+	boolean_t	ca_empty;
+	boolean_t	have_passwd = B_FALSE;
+	boolean_t	cl_empty = B_TRUE;
+	boolean_t	key_empty = B_TRUE;
+
+	ca_empty = file_empty(keystore->capath);
+
+	if (keystore->clpath != NULL)
+		cl_empty = file_empty(keystore->clpath);
+	if (keystore->keypath != NULL)
+		key_empty = file_empty(keystore->keypath);
+
+	if (ca_empty && cl_empty && key_empty) {
+	    keystore->new = B_TRUE;
+	}
+
+	if (!ca_empty) {
+		/* first read the ca file */
+		if ((p12 = read_keystore_file(err,
+		    keystore->capath)) == NULL) {
+			pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_CORRUPT,
+			    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_CORRUPT), keystore->capath);
+			ret = B_FALSE;
+			goto cleanup;
+		}
+
+		/* Get password, using callback if necessary */
+		if (!have_passwd) {
+			if (!get_keystore_passwd(err, p12, cb, keystore)) {
+				ret = B_FALSE;
+				goto cleanup;
+			}
+			have_passwd = B_TRUE;
+		}
+
+		/* decrypt and parse keystore file */
+		if (sunw_PKCS12_contents(p12, keystore->passphrase,
+		    &keystore->pkeys, &keystore->cacerts) < 0) {
+			/* could not parse the contents */
+			pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_CORRUPT,
+			    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_CORRUPT), keystore->capath);
+			ret = B_FALSE;
+			goto cleanup;
+		}
+
+		PKCS12_free(p12);
+		p12 = NULL;
+	} else {
+
+		/*
+		 * truststore is empty, so we don't have any trusted
+		 * certs
+		 */
+		keystore->cacerts = NULL;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * if there is no cl file or key file, use the cl's and key's found
+	 * in the ca file
+	 */
+	if (keystore->clpath == NULL && !ca_empty) {
+		if (sunw_split_certs(keystore->pkeys, keystore->cacerts,
+		    &keystore->clcerts, NULL) < 0) {
+			pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_CORRUPT,
+			    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_CORRUPT), keystore->capath);
+			ret = B_FALSE;
+			goto cleanup;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * files are in separate files.  read keys out of the keystore
+		 * certs out of the certstore, if they are not empty
+		 */
+		if (!cl_empty) {
+			if ((p12 = read_keystore_file(err,
+			    keystore->clpath)) == NULL) {
+				pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_CORRUPT,
+				    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_CORRUPT),
+				    keystore->clpath);
+				ret = B_FALSE;
+				goto cleanup;
+			}
+
+			/* Get password, using callback if necessary */
+			if (!have_passwd) {
+				if (!get_keystore_passwd(err, p12, cb,
+				    keystore)) {
+					ret = B_FALSE;
+					goto cleanup;
+				}
+				have_passwd = B_TRUE;
+			}
+
+			if (check_password(p12,
+			    keystore->passphrase) == B_FALSE) {
+				/*
+				 * password in client cert file
+				 * is different than
+				 * the one in the other files!
+				 */
+				pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_BADPASS,
+				    gettext(ERR_MISMATCHPASS),
+				    keystore->clpath,
+				    keystore->capath, keystore->path);
+				ret = B_FALSE;
+				goto cleanup;
+			}
+
+			if (sunw_PKCS12_contents(p12, keystore->passphrase,
+			    NULL, &keystore->clcerts) < 0) {
+				/* could not parse the contents */
+				pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_CORRUPT,
+				    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_CORRUPT),
+				    keystore->clpath);
+				ret = B_FALSE;
+				goto cleanup;
+			}
+
+			PKCS12_free(p12);
+			p12 = NULL;
+		} else {
+			keystore->clcerts = NULL;
+		}
+
+		if (!key_empty) {
+			if ((p12 = read_keystore_file(err,
+			    keystore->keypath)) == NULL) {
+				pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_CORRUPT,
+				    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_CORRUPT),
+				    keystore->keypath);
+				ret = B_FALSE;
+				goto cleanup;
+			}
+
+			/* Get password, using callback if necessary */
+			if (!have_passwd) {
+				if (!get_keystore_passwd(err, p12, cb,
+				    keystore)) {
+					ret = B_FALSE;
+					goto cleanup;
+				}
+				have_passwd = B_TRUE;
+			}
+
+			if (check_password(p12,
+			    keystore->passphrase) == B_FALSE) {
+				pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_BADPASS,
+				    gettext(ERR_MISMATCHPASS),
+				    keystore->keypath,
+				    keystore->capath, keystore->path);
+				ret = B_FALSE;
+				goto cleanup;
+			}
+
+			if (sunw_PKCS12_contents(p12, keystore->passphrase,
+			    &keystore->pkeys, NULL) < 0) {
+				/* could not parse the contents */
+				pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_CORRUPT,
+				    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_CORRUPT),
+				    keystore->keypath);
+				ret = B_FALSE;
+				goto cleanup;
+			}
+
+			PKCS12_free(p12);
+			p12 = NULL;
+		} else {
+			keystore->pkeys = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
+cleanup:
+	if (p12 != NULL)
+		PKCS12_free(p12);
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * get_keystore_password - retrieves pasword used to
+ * decrypt PKCS12 structure.
+ *
+ * Arguments:
+ * err - Error object to add errors to
+ * p12 - PKCS12 structure which returned password should
+ * decrypt
+ * cb - callback to collect password.
+ * keystore - The keystore in which the PKCS12 structure
+ * will eventually populate.
+ * Returns:
+ *   B_TRUE - success.
+ *     keystore password is set in keystore->passphrase.
+ *   B_FALSE - failure, errors logged
+ */
+static boolean_t
+get_keystore_passwd(PKG_ERR *err, PKCS12 *p12, keystore_passphrase_cb cb,
+    keystore_t *keystore)
+{
+	char				*passwd;
+	char				passbuf[KEYSTORE_PASS_MAX + 1];
+	keystore_passphrase_data	data;
+
+	/* see if no password is the right password */
+	if (check_password(p12, "") == B_TRUE) {
+		passwd = "";
+	} else if (check_password(p12, NULL) == B_TRUE) {
+		passwd = NULL;
+	} else {
+		/* oops, it's encrypted.  get password */
+		data.err = err;
+		if (cb(passbuf, KEYSTORE_PASS_MAX, 0,
+		    &data) == -1) {
+			/* could not get password */
+			return (B_FALSE);
+		}
+
+		if (check_password(p12, passbuf) == B_FALSE) {
+				/* wrong password */
+			pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_BADPASS,
+			    gettext(ERR_BADPASS));
+			return (B_FALSE);
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * make copy of password buffer, since it
+		 * goes away upon return
+		 */
+		passwd = xstrdup(passbuf);
+	}
+	keystore->passphrase = passwd;
+	return (B_TRUE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * write_keystore - Writes keystore files to disk
+ *
+ * Arguments:
+ * err - Error object to add errors to
+ * keystore - keystore object to write from
+ * passwd - password used to encrypt keystore
+ * Returns:
+ *   0 - Success - Keystore contents are written out to
+ *   the same locations as read from
+ * non-zero - Failure, errors and reasons recorded in err
+ */
+static boolean_t
+write_keystore(PKG_ERR *err, keystore_t *keystore,
+    keystore_passphrase_cb cb)
+{
+	PKCS12	*p12 = NULL;
+	boolean_t ret = B_TRUE;
+	keystore_passphrase_data data;
+	char		passbuf[KEYSTORE_PASS_MAX + 1];
+
+	if (keystore->capath != NULL && keystore->clpath == NULL &&
+	    keystore->keypath == NULL) {
+
+		/*
+		 * keystore is a file.
+		 * just write out a single file
+		 */
+		if ((keystore->pkeys == NULL) &&
+		    (keystore->clcerts == NULL) &&
+		    (keystore->cacerts == NULL)) {
+			if (!clear_keystore_file(err, keystore->capath)) {
+				/*
+				 * no keys or certs to write out, so
+				 * blank the ca file.  we do not
+				 * delete it since it is used as a
+				 * lock by lock_keystore() in
+				 * subsequent invocations
+				 */
+				pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_WRITE,
+				    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_WRITE),
+				    keystore->capath);
+				ret = B_FALSE;
+				goto cleanup;
+			}
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * if the keystore is being created for the first time,
+			 * prompt for a passphrase for encryption
+			 */
+			if (keystore->new) {
+				data.err = err;
+				if (cb(passbuf, KEYSTORE_PASS_MAX,
+				    1, &data) == -1) {
+					ret = B_FALSE;
+					goto cleanup;
+				}
+			} else {
+				/*
+				 * use the one used when the keystore
+				 * was read
+				 */
+				strlcpy(passbuf, keystore->passphrase,
+				    KEYSTORE_PASS_MAX);
+			}
+
+			p12 = sunw_PKCS12_create(passbuf, keystore->pkeys,
+			    keystore->clcerts, keystore->cacerts);
+
+			if (p12 == NULL) {
+				pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_WRITE,
+				    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_FORM),
+				    keystore->capath);
+				ret = B_FALSE;
+				goto cleanup;
+			}
+
+			if (!write_keystore_file(err, keystore->capath, p12)) {
+				pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_WRITE,
+				    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_WRITE),
+				    keystore->capath);
+				ret = B_FALSE;
+				goto cleanup;
+			}
+		}
+
+	} else {
+		/* files are seprate. Do one at a time */
+
+		/*
+		 * if the keystore is being created for the first time,
+		 * prompt for a passphrase for encryption
+		 */
+		if (keystore->new && ((keystore->pkeys != NULL) ||
+		    (keystore->clcerts != NULL) ||
+		    (keystore->cacerts != NULL))) {
+			data.err = err;
+			if (cb(passbuf, KEYSTORE_PASS_MAX,
+			    1, &data) == -1) {
+				ret = B_FALSE;
+				goto cleanup;
+			}
+		} else {
+			/* use the one used when the keystore was read */
+			strlcpy(passbuf, keystore->passphrase,
+			    KEYSTORE_PASS_MAX);
+		}
+
+		/* do private keys first */
+		if (keystore->pkeys != NULL) {
+			p12 = sunw_PKCS12_create(passbuf, keystore->pkeys,
+			    NULL, NULL);
+
+			if (p12 == NULL) {
+				pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_WRITE,
+				    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_FORM),
+				    keystore->keypath);
+				ret = B_FALSE;
+				goto cleanup;
+			}
+
+			if (!write_keystore_file(err, keystore->keypath,
+			    p12)) {
+				pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_WRITE,
+				    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_WRITE),
+				    keystore->keypath);
+				ret = B_FALSE;
+				goto cleanup;
+			}
+
+			PKCS12_free(p12);
+		} else {
+			if ((remove(keystore->keypath) != 0) &&
+			    (errno != ENOENT)) {
+				pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_WRITE,
+				    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_REMOVE),
+				    keystore->keypath);
+				ret = B_FALSE;
+				goto cleanup;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/* do user certs next */
+		if (keystore->clcerts != NULL) {
+			p12 = sunw_PKCS12_create(passbuf, NULL,
+			    keystore->clcerts, NULL);
+
+			if (p12 == NULL) {
+				pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_WRITE,
+				    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_FORM),
+				    keystore->clpath);
+				ret = B_FALSE;
+				goto cleanup;
+			}
+
+			if (!write_keystore_file(err, keystore->clpath, p12)) {
+				pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_WRITE,
+				    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_WRITE),
+				    keystore->clpath);
+				ret = B_FALSE;
+				goto cleanup;
+			}
+
+			PKCS12_free(p12);
+		} else {
+			if ((remove(keystore->clpath) != 0) &&
+			    (errno != ENOENT)) {
+				pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_WRITE,
+				    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_REMOVE),
+				    keystore->clpath);
+				ret = B_FALSE;
+				goto cleanup;
+			}
+		}
+
+
+		/* finally do CA cert file */
+		if (keystore->cacerts != NULL) {
+			p12 = sunw_PKCS12_create(passbuf, NULL,
+			    NULL, keystore->cacerts);
+
+			if (p12 == NULL) {
+				pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_WRITE,
+				    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_FORM),
+				    keystore->capath);
+				ret = B_FALSE;
+				goto cleanup;
+			}
+
+			if (!write_keystore_file(err, keystore->capath, p12)) {
+				pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_WRITE,
+				    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_WRITE),
+				    keystore->capath);
+				ret = B_FALSE;
+				goto cleanup;
+			}
+
+			PKCS12_free(p12);
+			p12 = NULL;
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * nothing to write out, so truncate the file
+			 * (it will be deleted during close_keystore)
+			 */
+			if (!clear_keystore_file(err, keystore->capath)) {
+				pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_WRITE,
+				    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_WRITE),
+				    keystore->capath);
+				ret = B_FALSE;
+				goto cleanup;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+cleanup:
+	if (p12 != NULL)
+		PKCS12_free(p12);
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * clear_keystore_file - Clears (zeros out) a keystore file.
+ *
+ * Arguments:
+ * err - Error object to add errors to
+ * dest - Path of keystore file to zero out.
+ * Returns:
+ *   0 - Success - Keystore file is truncated to zero length
+ * non-zero - Failure, errors and reasons recorded in err
+ */
+static boolean_t
+clear_keystore_file(PKG_ERR *err, char *dest)
+{
+	int fd;
+	struct stat buf;
+
+	fd = open(dest, O_RDWR|O_NONBLOCK);
+	if (fd == -1) {
+		/* can't open for writing */
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_WRITE, gettext(MSG_OPEN),
+		    errno);
+		return (B_FALSE);
+	}
+
+	if ((fstat(fd, &buf) == -1) || !S_ISREG(buf.st_mode)) {
+		/* not a regular file */
+		(void) close(fd);
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_WRITE, gettext(ERR_NOT_REG),
+		    dest);
+		return (B_FALSE);
+	}
+
+	if (ftruncate(fd, 0) == -1) {
+		(void) close(fd);
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_WRITE, gettext(ERR_WRITE),
+		    dest, strerror(errno));
+		return (B_FALSE);
+	}
+
+	(void) close(fd);
+	return (B_TRUE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * write_keystore_file - Writes keystore file to disk.
+ *
+ * Keystore files can possibly be corrupted by a variety
+ * of error conditions during reading/writing.  This
+ * routine, along with restore_keystore_file, tries to
+ * maintain keystore integity by writing the files
+ * out in a particular order, minimizing the time period
+ * that the keystore is in an indeterminate state.
+ *
+ * With the current implementation, there are some failures
+ * that are wholly unrecoverable, such as disk corruption.
+ * These routines attempt to minimize the risk, but not
+ * eliminate it.  When better, atomic operations are available
+ * (such as a true database with commit, rollback, and
+ * guaranteed atomicity), this implementation should use that.
+ *
+ *
+ * Arguments:
+ * err - Error object to add errors to
+ * dest - Destination filename
+ * contents - Contents to write to the file
+ * Returns:
+ *   0 - Success - Keystore contents are written out to
+ *   the destination.
+ * non-zero - Failure, errors and reasons recorded in err
+ */
+static boolean_t
+write_keystore_file(PKG_ERR *err, char *dest, PKCS12 *contents)
+{
+	FILE	*newfile = NULL;
+	boolean_t	ret = B_TRUE;
+	char	newpath[MAXPATHLEN];
+	char	backuppath[MAXPATHLEN];
+	struct stat buf;
+	int fd;
+
+	(void) snprintf(newpath, MAXPATHLEN, "%s.new", dest);
+	(void) snprintf(backuppath, MAXPATHLEN, "%s.bak", dest);
+
+	if ((fd = open(newpath, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY|O_NONBLOCK,
+	    S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR)) == -1) {
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_READ, gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_OPEN),
+		    newpath, strerror(errno));
+		ret = B_FALSE;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	if (fstat(fd, &buf) == -1) {
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_READ, gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_OPEN),
+		    newpath, strerror(errno));
+		ret = B_FALSE;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	if (!S_ISREG(buf.st_mode)) {
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_READ, gettext(ERR_NOT_REG),
+		    newpath);
+		ret = B_FALSE;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	if ((newfile = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) {
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_READ, gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_OPEN),
+		    newpath, strerror(errno));
+		ret = B_FALSE;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	if (i2d_PKCS12_fp(newfile, contents) == 0) {
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_WRITE, gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_WRITE),
+		    newpath);
+		ret = B_FALSE;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	/* flush, then close */
+	(void) fflush(newfile);
+	(void) fclose(newfile);
+	newfile = NULL;
+
+	/* now back up the original file */
+	(void) rename(dest, backuppath);
+
+	/* put new one in its place */
+	(void) rename(newpath, dest);
+
+	/* remove backup */
+	(void) remove(backuppath);
+
+cleanup:
+	if (newfile != NULL)
+		(void) fclose(newfile);
+	if (fd != -1)
+		(void) close(fd);
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * read_keystore_file - Reads single keystore file
+ * off disk in PKCS12 format.
+ *
+ * Arguments:
+ * err - Error object to add errors to
+ * file - File path to read
+ * Returns:
+ *   PKCS12 contents of file, or NULL if an error occurred.
+ *   errors recorded in 'err'.
+ */
+static PKCS12
+*read_keystore_file(PKG_ERR *err, char *file)
+{
+	int fd;
+	struct stat buf;
+	FILE *newfile;
+	PKCS12 *p12 = NULL;
+
+	if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) {
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_READ, gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_OPEN),
+		    file, strerror(errno));
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	if (fstat(fd, &buf) == -1) {
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_READ, gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_OPEN),
+		    file, strerror(errno));
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	if (!S_ISREG(buf.st_mode)) {
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_READ, gettext(ERR_NOT_REG),
+		    file);
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	if ((newfile = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_READ, gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_OPEN),
+		    file, strerror(errno));
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	if ((p12 = d2i_PKCS12_fp(newfile, NULL)) == NULL) {
+		pkgerr_add(err, PKGERR_CORRUPT,
+		    gettext(ERR_KEYSTORE_CORRUPT), file);
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+cleanup:
+	if (newfile != NULL)
+		(void) fclose(newfile);
+	if (fd != -1)
+		(void) close(fd);
+
+	return (p12);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Locks the specified file.
+ */
+static int
+file_lock(int fd, int type, int wait)
+{
+	struct flock lock;
+
+	lock.l_type = type;
+	lock.l_start = 0;
+	lock.l_whence = SEEK_SET;
+	lock.l_len = 0;
+
+	if (!wait) {
+		if (file_lock_test(fd, type)) {
+			/*
+			 * The caller would have to wait to get the
+			 * lock on this file.
+			 */
+			return (-1);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return (fcntl(fd, F_SETLKW, &lock));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns FALSE if the file is not locked; TRUE
+ * otherwise.
+ */
+static boolean_t
+file_lock_test(int fd, int type)
+{
+	struct flock lock;
+
+	lock.l_type = type;
+	lock.l_start = 0;
+	lock.l_whence = SEEK_SET;
+	lock.l_len = 0;
+
+	if (fcntl(fd, F_GETLK, &lock) != -1) {
+		if (lock.l_type != F_UNLCK) {
+			/*
+			 * The caller would have to wait to get the
+			 * lock on this file.
+			 */
+			return (B_TRUE);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The file is not locked.
+	 */
+	return (B_FALSE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Unlocks the specified file.
+ */
+static int
+file_unlock(int fd)
+{
+	struct flock lock;
+
+	lock.l_type = F_UNLCK;
+	lock.l_start = 0;
+	lock.l_whence = SEEK_SET;
+	lock.l_len = 0;
+
+	return (fcntl(fd, F_SETLK, &lock));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Determines if file has a length of 0 or not
+ */
+static boolean_t
+file_empty(char *path)
+{
+	struct stat	buf;
+
+	/* file is empty if size = 0 or it doesn't exist */
+	if (lstat(path, &buf) == 0) {
+		if (buf.st_size == 0) {
+			return (B_TRUE);
+		}
+	} else {
+		if (errno == ENOENT) {
+			return (B_TRUE);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return (B_FALSE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Name:		get_time_string
+ * Description:	Generates a human-readable string from an ASN1_TIME
+ *
+ * Arguments:	intime - The time to convert
+ *
+ * Returns :	A pointer to a static string representing the passed-in time.
+ */
+static char
+*get_time_string(ASN1_TIME *intime)
+{
+
+	static char	time[ATTR_MAX];
+	BIO		*mem;
+	char	*p;
+
+	if (intime == NULL) {
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	if ((mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL) {
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	if (ASN1_TIME_print(mem, intime) == 0) {
+		(void) BIO_free(mem);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	if (BIO_gets(mem, time, ATTR_MAX) <= 0) {
+		(void) BIO_free(mem);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	(void) BIO_free(mem);
+
+	/* trim the end of the string */
+	for (p = time + strlen(time) - 1; isspace(*p); p--) {
+		*p = '\0';
+	}
+
+	return (time);
+}
+
+/*
+ * check_password - do various password checks to see if the current password
+ *                  will work or we need to prompt for a new one.
+ *
+ * Arguments:
+ *   pass   - password to check
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   B_TRUE  - Password is OK.
+ *   B_FALSE - Password not valid.
+ */
+static boolean_t
+check_password(PKCS12 *p12, char *pass)
+{
+	boolean_t ret = B_TRUE;
+
+	/*
+	 * If password is zero length or NULL then try verifying both cases
+	 * to determine which password is correct. The reason for this is that
+	 * under PKCS#12 password based encryption no password and a zero
+	 * length password are two different things...
+	 */
+
+	/* Check the mac */
+	if (pass == NULL || *pass == '\0') {
+		if (PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0) == 0 &&
+		    PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, "", 0) == 0)
+			ret = B_FALSE;
+	} else if (PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, pass, -1) == 0) {
+		ret = B_FALSE;
+	}
+	return (ret);
+}