diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'usr/src/common/crypto/modes/gcm.c')
-rw-r--r-- | usr/src/common/crypto/modes/gcm.c | 626 |
1 files changed, 626 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/usr/src/common/crypto/modes/gcm.c b/usr/src/common/crypto/modes/gcm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4802d387d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/usr/src/common/crypto/modes/gcm.c @@ -0,0 +1,626 @@ +/* + * CDDL HEADER START + * + * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the + * Common Development and Distribution License (the "License"). + * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * + * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE + * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions + * and limitations under the License. + * + * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each + * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. + * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the + * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying + * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] + * + * CDDL HEADER END + */ +/* + * Copyright 2008 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. + * Use is subject to license terms. + */ + +#ifndef _KERNEL +#include <strings.h> +#include <limits.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include <security/cryptoki.h> +#endif + +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/kmem.h> +#include <modes/modes.h> +#include <sys/crypto/common.h> +#include <sys/crypto/impl.h> +#include <sys/byteorder.h> + +struct aes_block { + uint64_t a; + uint64_t b; +}; + +static void +gcm_mul(uint64_t *x_in, uint64_t *y, uint64_t *res) +{ + uint64_t R = { 0xe100000000000000ULL }; + struct aes_block z = { 0, 0 }; + struct aes_block v; + uint64_t x; + int i, j; + + v.a = ntohll(y[0]); + v.b = ntohll(y[1]); + + for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) { + x = ntohll(x_in[j]); + for (i = 0; i < 64; i++, x <<= 1) { + if (x & 0x8000000000000000ULL) { + z.a ^= v.a; + z.b ^= v.b; + } + if (v.b & 1ULL) { + v.b = (v.a << 63)|(v.b >> 1); + v.a = (v.a >> 1) ^ R; + } else { + v.b = (v.a << 63)|(v.b >> 1); + v.a = v.a >> 1; + } + } + } + res[0] = htonll(z.a); + res[1] = htonll(z.b); +} + +#define GHASH(c, d, t) \ + xor_block((uint8_t *)(d), (uint8_t *)(c)->gcm_ghash); \ + gcm_mul((uint64_t *)(c)->gcm_ghash, (c)->gcm_H, (uint64_t *)(t)); + +/* + * Encrypt multiple blocks of data in GCM mode. Decrypt for GCM mode + * is done in another function. + */ +int +gcm_mode_encrypt_contiguous_blocks(gcm_ctx_t *ctx, char *data, size_t length, + crypto_data_t *out, size_t block_size, + int (*encrypt_block)(const void *, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *), + void (*copy_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *), + void (*xor_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *)) +{ + size_t remainder = length; + size_t need; + uint8_t *datap = (uint8_t *)data; + uint8_t *blockp; + uint8_t *lastp; + void *iov_or_mp; + offset_t offset; + uint8_t *out_data_1; + uint8_t *out_data_2; + size_t out_data_1_len; + uint64_t counter; + uint64_t counter_mask = ntohll(0x00000000ffffffffULL); + + if (length + ctx->gcm_remainder_len < block_size) { + /* accumulate bytes here and return */ + bcopy(datap, + (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_remainder + ctx->gcm_remainder_len, + length); + ctx->gcm_remainder_len += length; + ctx->gcm_copy_to = datap; + return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS); + } + + lastp = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_cb; + if (out != NULL) + crypto_init_ptrs(out, &iov_or_mp, &offset); + + do { + /* Unprocessed data from last call. */ + if (ctx->gcm_remainder_len > 0) { + need = block_size - ctx->gcm_remainder_len; + + if (need > remainder) + return (CRYPTO_DATA_LEN_RANGE); + + bcopy(datap, &((uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_remainder) + [ctx->gcm_remainder_len], need); + + blockp = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_remainder; + } else { + blockp = datap; + } + + /* + * Increment counter. Counter bits are confined + * to the bottom 32 bits of the counter block. + */ + counter = ntohll(ctx->gcm_cb[1] & counter_mask); + counter = htonll(counter + 1); + counter &= counter_mask; + ctx->gcm_cb[1] = (ctx->gcm_cb[1] & ~counter_mask) | counter; + + encrypt_block(ctx->gcm_keysched, (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_cb, + (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_tmp); + xor_block(blockp, (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_tmp); + + lastp = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_tmp; + + ctx->gcm_processed_data_len += block_size; + + if (out == NULL) { + if (ctx->gcm_remainder_len > 0) { + bcopy(blockp, ctx->gcm_copy_to, + ctx->gcm_remainder_len); + bcopy(blockp + ctx->gcm_remainder_len, datap, + need); + } + } else { + crypto_get_ptrs(out, &iov_or_mp, &offset, &out_data_1, + &out_data_1_len, &out_data_2, block_size); + + /* copy block to where it belongs */ + if (out_data_1_len == block_size) { + copy_block(lastp, out_data_1); + } else { + bcopy(lastp, out_data_1, out_data_1_len); + if (out_data_2 != NULL) { + bcopy(lastp + out_data_1_len, + out_data_2, + block_size - out_data_1_len); + } + } + /* update offset */ + out->cd_offset += block_size; + } + + /* add ciphertext to the hash */ + GHASH(ctx, ctx->gcm_tmp, ctx->gcm_ghash); + + /* Update pointer to next block of data to be processed. */ + if (ctx->gcm_remainder_len != 0) { + datap += need; + ctx->gcm_remainder_len = 0; + } else { + datap += block_size; + } + + remainder = (size_t)&data[length] - (size_t)datap; + + /* Incomplete last block. */ + if (remainder > 0 && remainder < block_size) { + bcopy(datap, ctx->gcm_remainder, remainder); + ctx->gcm_remainder_len = remainder; + ctx->gcm_copy_to = datap; + goto out; + } + ctx->gcm_copy_to = NULL; + + } while (remainder > 0); +out: + return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS); +} + +/* ARGSUSED */ +int +gcm_encrypt_final(gcm_ctx_t *ctx, crypto_data_t *out, size_t block_size, + int (*encrypt_block)(const void *, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *), + void (*copy_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *), + void (*xor_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *)) +{ + uint64_t counter_mask = ntohll(0x00000000ffffffffULL); + uint8_t *ghash, *macp; + int i, rv; + + if (out->cd_length < + (ctx->gcm_remainder_len + ctx->gcm_tag_len)) { + return (CRYPTO_DATA_LEN_RANGE); + } + + ghash = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_ghash; + + if (ctx->gcm_remainder_len > 0) { + uint64_t counter; + uint8_t *tmpp = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_tmp; + + /* + * Here is where we deal with data that is not a + * multiple of the block size. + */ + + /* + * Increment counter. + */ + counter = ntohll(ctx->gcm_cb[1] & counter_mask); + counter = htonll(counter + 1); + counter &= counter_mask; + ctx->gcm_cb[1] = (ctx->gcm_cb[1] & ~counter_mask) | counter; + + encrypt_block(ctx->gcm_keysched, (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_cb, + (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_tmp); + + macp = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_remainder; + bzero(macp + ctx->gcm_remainder_len, + block_size - ctx->gcm_remainder_len); + + /* XOR with counter block */ + for (i = 0; i < ctx->gcm_remainder_len; i++) { + macp[i] ^= tmpp[i]; + } + + /* add ciphertext to the hash */ + GHASH(ctx, macp, ghash); + + ctx->gcm_processed_data_len += ctx->gcm_remainder_len; + } + + ctx->gcm_len_a_len_c[1] = htonll(ctx->gcm_processed_data_len << 3); + GHASH(ctx, ctx->gcm_len_a_len_c, ghash); + encrypt_block(ctx->gcm_keysched, (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_J0, + (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_J0); + xor_block((uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_J0, ghash); + + if (ctx->gcm_remainder_len > 0) { + rv = crypto_put_output_data(macp, out, ctx->gcm_remainder_len); + if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) + return (rv); + } + out->cd_offset += ctx->gcm_remainder_len; + ctx->gcm_remainder_len = 0; + rv = crypto_put_output_data(ghash, out, ctx->gcm_tag_len); + if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) + return (rv); + out->cd_offset += ctx->gcm_tag_len; + + return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS); +} + +/* + * This will only deal with decrypting the last block of the input that + * might not be a multiple of block length. + */ +static void +gcm_decrypt_incomplete_block(gcm_ctx_t *ctx, size_t block_size, size_t index, + int (*encrypt_block)(const void *, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *), + void (*xor_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *)) +{ + uint8_t *datap, *outp, *counterp; + uint64_t counter; + uint64_t counter_mask = ntohll(0x00000000ffffffffULL); + int i; + + /* + * Increment counter. + * Counter bits are confined to the bottom 32 bits + */ + counter = ntohll(ctx->gcm_cb[1] & counter_mask); + counter = htonll(counter + 1); + counter &= counter_mask; + ctx->gcm_cb[1] = (ctx->gcm_cb[1] & ~counter_mask) | counter; + + datap = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_remainder; + outp = &((ctx->gcm_pt_buf)[index]); + counterp = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_tmp; + + /* authentication tag */ + bzero((uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_tmp, block_size); + bcopy(datap, (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_tmp, ctx->gcm_remainder_len); + + /* add ciphertext to the hash */ + GHASH(ctx, ctx->gcm_tmp, ctx->gcm_ghash); + + /* decrypt remaining ciphertext */ + encrypt_block(ctx->gcm_keysched, (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_cb, counterp); + + /* XOR with counter block */ + for (i = 0; i < ctx->gcm_remainder_len; i++) { + outp[i] = datap[i] ^ counterp[i]; + } +} + +/* ARGSUSED */ +int +gcm_mode_decrypt_contiguous_blocks(gcm_ctx_t *ctx, char *data, size_t length, + crypto_data_t *out, size_t block_size, + int (*encrypt_block)(const void *, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *), + void (*copy_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *), + void (*xor_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *)) +{ + size_t new_len; + uint8_t *new; + + /* + * Copy contiguous ciphertext input blocks to plaintext buffer. + * Ciphertext will be decrypted in the final. + */ + if (length > 0) { + new_len = ctx->gcm_pt_buf_len + length; +#ifdef _KERNEL + new = kmem_alloc(new_len, ctx->gcm_kmflag); + bcopy(ctx->gcm_pt_buf, new, ctx->gcm_pt_buf_len); + kmem_free(ctx->gcm_pt_buf, ctx->gcm_pt_buf_len); +#else + new = malloc(new_len); + bcopy(ctx->gcm_pt_buf, new, ctx->gcm_pt_buf_len); + free(ctx->gcm_pt_buf); +#endif + if (new == NULL) + return (CRYPTO_HOST_MEMORY); + + ctx->gcm_pt_buf = new; + ctx->gcm_pt_buf_len = new_len; + bcopy(data, &ctx->gcm_pt_buf[ctx->gcm_processed_data_len], + length); + ctx->gcm_processed_data_len += length; + } + + ctx->gcm_remainder_len = 0; + return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS); +} + +int +gcm_decrypt_final(gcm_ctx_t *ctx, crypto_data_t *out, size_t block_size, + int (*encrypt_block)(const void *, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *), + void (*xor_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *)) +{ + size_t pt_len; + size_t remainder; + uint8_t *ghash; + uint8_t *blockp; + uint8_t *cbp; + uint64_t counter; + uint64_t counter_mask = ntohll(0x00000000ffffffffULL); + int processed = 0, rv; + + ASSERT(ctx->gcm_processed_data_len == ctx->gcm_pt_buf_len); + + pt_len = ctx->gcm_processed_data_len - ctx->gcm_tag_len; + ghash = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_ghash; + blockp = ctx->gcm_pt_buf; + remainder = pt_len; + while (remainder > 0) { + /* add ciphertext to the hash */ + GHASH(ctx, blockp, ghash); + + /* + * Increment counter. + * Counter bits are confined to the bottom 32 bits + */ + counter = ntohll(ctx->gcm_cb[1] & counter_mask); + counter = htonll(counter + 1); + counter &= counter_mask; + ctx->gcm_cb[1] = (ctx->gcm_cb[1] & ~counter_mask) | counter; + + cbp = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_tmp; + encrypt_block(ctx->gcm_keysched, (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_cb, cbp); + + /* XOR with ciphertext */ + xor_block(cbp, blockp); + + processed += block_size; + blockp += block_size; + remainder -= block_size; + + /* Incomplete last block */ + if (remainder > 0 && remainder < block_size) { + bcopy(blockp, ctx->gcm_remainder, remainder); + ctx->gcm_remainder_len = remainder; + /* + * not expecting anymore ciphertext, just + * compute plaintext for the remaining input + */ + gcm_decrypt_incomplete_block(ctx, block_size, + processed, encrypt_block, xor_block); + ctx->gcm_remainder_len = 0; + goto out; + } + } +out: + ctx->gcm_len_a_len_c[1] = htonll(pt_len << 3); + GHASH(ctx, ctx->gcm_len_a_len_c, ghash); + encrypt_block(ctx->gcm_keysched, (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_J0, + (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_J0); + xor_block((uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_J0, ghash); + + /* compare the input authentication tag with what we calculated */ + if (bcmp(&ctx->gcm_pt_buf[pt_len], ghash, ctx->gcm_tag_len)) { + /* They don't match */ + return (CRYPTO_INVALID_MAC); + } else { + rv = crypto_put_output_data(ctx->gcm_pt_buf, out, pt_len); + if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) + return (rv); + out->cd_offset += pt_len; + } + return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS); +} + +static int +gcm_validate_args(CK_AES_GCM_PARAMS *gcm_param) +{ + size_t tag_len; + + /* + * Check the length of the authentication tag (in bits). + */ + tag_len = gcm_param->ulTagBits; + switch (tag_len) { + case 32: + case 64: + case 96: + case 104: + case 112: + case 120: + case 128: + break; + default: + return (CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID); + } + + if (gcm_param->ulIvLen == 0) + return (CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID); + + return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS); +} + +static void +gcm_format_initial_blocks(uchar_t *iv, ulong_t iv_len, + gcm_ctx_t *ctx, size_t block_size, + void (*copy_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *), + void (*xor_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *)) +{ + uint8_t *cb; + ulong_t remainder = iv_len; + ulong_t processed = 0; + uint8_t *datap, *ghash; + uint64_t len_a_len_c[2]; + + ghash = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_ghash; + cb = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_cb; + if (iv_len == 12) { + bcopy(iv, cb, 12); + cb[12] = 0; + cb[13] = 0; + cb[14] = 0; + cb[15] = 1; + /* J0 will be used again in the final */ + copy_block(cb, (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_J0); + } else { + /* GHASH the IV */ + do { + if (remainder < block_size) { + bzero(cb, block_size); + bcopy(&(iv[processed]), cb, remainder); + datap = (uint8_t *)cb; + remainder = 0; + } else { + datap = (uint8_t *)(&(iv[processed])); + processed += block_size; + remainder -= block_size; + } + GHASH(ctx, datap, ghash); + } while (remainder > 0); + + len_a_len_c[0] = 0; + len_a_len_c[1] = htonll(iv_len << 3); + GHASH(ctx, len_a_len_c, ctx->gcm_J0); + + /* J0 will be used again in the final */ + copy_block((uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_J0, (uint8_t *)cb); + } +} + +/* + * The following function is called at encrypt or decrypt init time + * for AES GCM mode. + */ +int +gcm_init(gcm_ctx_t *ctx, unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + unsigned char *auth_data, size_t auth_data_len, size_t block_size, + int (*encrypt_block)(const void *, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *), + void (*copy_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *), + void (*xor_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *)) +{ + uint8_t *ghash, *datap, *authp; + size_t remainder, processed; + + /* encrypt zero block to get subkey H */ + bzero(ctx->gcm_H, sizeof (ctx->gcm_H)); + encrypt_block(ctx->gcm_keysched, (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_H, + (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_H); + + gcm_format_initial_blocks(iv, iv_len, ctx, block_size, + copy_block, xor_block); + + authp = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_tmp; + ghash = (uint8_t *)ctx->gcm_ghash; + bzero(authp, block_size); + bzero(ghash, block_size); + + processed = 0; + remainder = auth_data_len; + do { + if (remainder < block_size) { + /* + * There's not a block full of data, pad rest of + * buffer with zero + */ + bzero(authp, block_size); + bcopy(&(auth_data[processed]), authp, remainder); + datap = (uint8_t *)authp; + remainder = 0; + } else { + datap = (uint8_t *)(&(auth_data[processed])); + processed += block_size; + remainder -= block_size; + } + + /* add auth data to the hash */ + GHASH(ctx, datap, ghash); + + } while (remainder > 0); + + return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS); +} + +int +gcm_init_ctx(gcm_ctx_t *gcm_ctx, char *param, size_t block_size, + int (*encrypt_block)(const void *, const uint8_t *, uint8_t *), + void (*copy_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *), + void (*xor_block)(uint8_t *, uint8_t *)) +{ + int rv; + CK_AES_GCM_PARAMS *gcm_param; + + if (param != NULL) { + gcm_param = (CK_AES_GCM_PARAMS *)param; + + if ((rv = gcm_validate_args(gcm_param)) != 0) { + return (rv); + } + + gcm_ctx->gcm_tag_len = gcm_param->ulTagBits; + gcm_ctx->gcm_tag_len >>= 3; + gcm_ctx->gcm_processed_data_len = 0; + + /* these values are in bits */ + gcm_ctx->gcm_len_a_len_c[0] = htonll(gcm_param->ulAADLen << 3); + + rv = CRYPTO_SUCCESS; + gcm_ctx->gcm_flags |= GCM_MODE; + } else { + rv = CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; + goto out; + } + + if (gcm_init(gcm_ctx, gcm_param->pIv, gcm_param->ulIvLen, + gcm_param->pAAD, gcm_param->ulAADLen, block_size, + encrypt_block, copy_block, xor_block) != 0) { + rv = CRYPTO_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; + } +out: + return (rv); +} + +void * +gcm_alloc_ctx(int kmflag) +{ + gcm_ctx_t *gcm_ctx; + +#ifdef _KERNEL + if ((gcm_ctx = kmem_zalloc(sizeof (gcm_ctx_t), kmflag)) == NULL) +#else + if ((gcm_ctx = calloc(1, sizeof (gcm_ctx_t))) == NULL) +#endif + return (NULL); + + gcm_ctx->gcm_flags = GCM_MODE; + return (gcm_ctx); +} + +void +gcm_set_kmflag(gcm_ctx_t *ctx, int kmflag) +{ + ctx->gcm_kmflag = kmflag; +} |