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authornia <nia@pkgsrc.org>2019-08-29 11:09:10 +0000
committernia <nia@pkgsrc.org>2019-08-29 11:09:10 +0000
commit7e424f9d764c56c6d8aafa7fa4ffc49e392d7679 (patch)
tree12c5297bd551883cfaa2f3090d7a851d5235c84a
parent22bc293a601005fbc31c5f514514cbb322f08206 (diff)
downloadpkgsrc-7e424f9d764c56c6d8aafa7fa4ffc49e392d7679.tar.gz
dmg2img: Update to 1.6.7.
pkgsrc changes: - OpenSSL 1.1 support. Upstream changes: dmg2img-1.6.7: 09 February 2017 Peter Wu Fixed buffer underrun Avoid truncating .img file when run to list partition dmg2img-1.6.6: 06 February 2017 Peter Wu Fixed a crash on invalid block signature
-rw-r--r--sysutils/dmg2img/Makefile5
-rw-r--r--sysutils/dmg2img/distinfo11
-rw-r--r--sysutils/dmg2img/patches/patch-vfdecrypt.c215
3 files changed, 223 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/sysutils/dmg2img/Makefile b/sysutils/dmg2img/Makefile
index e4ca3073de8..9492194cc18 100644
--- a/sysutils/dmg2img/Makefile
+++ b/sysutils/dmg2img/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.8 2016/03/07 20:17:33 nros Exp $
+# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.9 2019/08/29 11:09:10 nia Exp $
-DISTNAME= dmg2img-1.6.5
+DISTNAME= dmg2img-1.6.7
CATEGORIES= sysutils
MASTER_SITES+= http://vu1tur.eu.org/tools/
@@ -12,5 +12,4 @@ LICENSE= gnu-gpl-v2
.include "../../archivers/bzip2/buildlink3.mk"
.include "../../devel/zlib/buildlink3.mk"
.include "../../security/openssl/buildlink3.mk"
-
.include "../../mk/bsd.pkg.mk"
diff --git a/sysutils/dmg2img/distinfo b/sysutils/dmg2img/distinfo
index 9cab71a0ca6..934eeaaab50 100644
--- a/sysutils/dmg2img/distinfo
+++ b/sysutils/dmg2img/distinfo
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
-$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.4 2016/03/07 20:17:33 nros Exp $
+$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.5 2019/08/29 11:09:10 nia Exp $
-SHA1 (dmg2img-1.6.5.tar.gz) = 87db4a19badfde40d007a76092454b0942df2bf4
-RMD160 (dmg2img-1.6.5.tar.gz) = 437048d16e5887c79008f2023256dccd176b3192
-SHA512 (dmg2img-1.6.5.tar.gz) = 31528a23986848a8ab319768a8254db6b0035324cbac8328ef865b98ab2cddfd606da19a27202c4ef53cdc5dda75aca489859f82115a5dde6fe9b1f20cd6bd46
-Size (dmg2img-1.6.5.tar.gz) = 23442 bytes
+SHA1 (dmg2img-1.6.7.tar.gz) = 15dc1bc352c524fb54259c0787551927bb03088f
+RMD160 (dmg2img-1.6.7.tar.gz) = 4b3dfa6b02f39cbe1020605e3c32c06936df6852
+SHA512 (dmg2img-1.6.7.tar.gz) = 4c42841c5cdbf868b6038648a6c83e78d4b7f2010f7065d7b3f4c2c04d13af9489716c1dfa867aff5f3c3b3eef96dc3fc0610eff13fec139265f37f468e339e6
+Size (dmg2img-1.6.7.tar.gz) = 23238 bytes
SHA1 (patch-aa) = 25f3a28092435b15f0086050bac6e5f9c485bd2f
+SHA1 (patch-vfdecrypt.c) = 109180aadf93c6bc3963b1699f59b0cbaaa4e315
diff --git a/sysutils/dmg2img/patches/patch-vfdecrypt.c b/sysutils/dmg2img/patches/patch-vfdecrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..477a6d80a58
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sysutils/dmg2img/patches/patch-vfdecrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-vfdecrypt.c,v 1.1 2019/08/29 11:09:10 nia Exp $
+
+OpenSSL 1.1 compatibility.
+
+Allocate contexts from the heap on all OpenSSL versions, this is needed
+since OpenSSL 1.1.0. No attempt is done at addressing issues like global
+variables and fixing potential memleaks on error paths.
+
+Compile-tested only with OpenSSL 1.1.0e (Arch Linux) and OpenSSL 1.0.2g
+(Ubuntu 16.04), I have no test file.
+
+Fixes https://github.com/Lekensteyn/dmg2img/issues/4
+
+--- vfdecrypt.c.orig 2010-03-24 17:52:45.000000000 +0000
++++ vfdecrypt.c
+@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ void adjust_v2_header_byteorder(cencrypt
+ pwhdr->encrypted_keyblob_size = htonl(pwhdr->encrypted_keyblob_size);
+ }
+
+-HMAC_CTX hmacsha1_ctx;
++HMAC_CTX *hmacsha1_ctx;
+ AES_KEY aes_decrypt_key;
+ int CHUNK_SIZE=4096; // default
+
+@@ -196,9 +196,9 @@ void compute_iv(uint32_t chunk_no, uint8
+ unsigned int mdLen;
+
+ chunk_no = OSSwapHostToBigInt32(chunk_no);
+- HMAC_Init_ex(&hmacsha1_ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+- HMAC_Update(&hmacsha1_ctx, (void *) &chunk_no, sizeof(uint32_t));
+- HMAC_Final(&hmacsha1_ctx, mdResult, &mdLen);
++ HMAC_Init_ex(hmacsha1_ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
++ HMAC_Update(hmacsha1_ctx, (void *) &chunk_no, sizeof(uint32_t));
++ HMAC_Final(hmacsha1_ctx, mdResult, &mdLen);
+ memcpy(iv, mdResult, CIPHER_BLOCKSIZE);
+ }
+
+@@ -212,52 +212,75 @@ void decrypt_chunk(uint8_t *ctext, uint8
+ /* DES3-EDE unwrap operation loosely based on to RFC 2630, section 12.6
+ * wrapped_key has to be 40 bytes in length. */
+ int apple_des3_ede_unwrap_key(uint8_t *wrapped_key, int wrapped_key_len, uint8_t *decryptKey, uint8_t *unwrapped_key) {
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+ uint8_t *TEMP1, *TEMP2, *CEKICV;
+ uint8_t IV[8] = { 0x4a, 0xdd, 0xa2, 0x2c, 0x79, 0xe8, 0x21, 0x05 };
+ int outlen, tmplen, i;
+
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
++#else
++ ctx = malloc(sizeof(*ctx));
++#endif
++ if (!ctx) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "Out of memory: EVP_CIPHER_CTX!\n");
++ return(-1);
++ }
++
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
+ /* result of the decryption operation shouldn't be bigger than ciphertext */
+ TEMP1 = malloc(wrapped_key_len);
+ TEMP2 = malloc(wrapped_key_len);
+ CEKICV = malloc(wrapped_key_len);
+ /* uses PKCS#7 padding for symmetric key operations by default */
+- EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, decryptKey, IV);
++ EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, decryptKey, IV);
+
+- if(!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, TEMP1, &outlen, wrapped_key, wrapped_key_len)) {
++ if(!EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, TEMP1, &outlen, wrapped_key, wrapped_key_len)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "internal error (1) during key unwrap operation!\n");
+ return(-1);
+ }
+- if(!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, TEMP1 + outlen, &tmplen)) {
++ if(!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, TEMP1 + outlen, &tmplen)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "internal error (2) during key unwrap operation!\n");
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ outlen += tmplen;
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx);
++#else
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
++#endif
+
+ /* reverse order of TEMP3 */
+ for(i = 0; i < outlen; i++) TEMP2[i] = TEMP1[outlen - i - 1];
+
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
+ /* uses PKCS#7 padding for symmetric key operations by default */
+- EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, decryptKey, TEMP2);
+- if(!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, CEKICV, &outlen, TEMP2+8, outlen-8)) {
++ EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, decryptKey, TEMP2);
++ if(!EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, CEKICV, &outlen, TEMP2+8, outlen-8)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "internal error (3) during key unwrap operation!\n");
+ return(-1);
+ }
+- if(!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, CEKICV + outlen, &tmplen)) {
++ if(!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, CEKICV + outlen, &tmplen)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "internal error (4) during key unwrap operation!\n");
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ outlen += tmplen;
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx);
++#else
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
++#endif
+
+ memcpy(unwrapped_key, CEKICV+4, outlen-4);
+ free(TEMP1);
+ free(TEMP2);
+ free(CEKICV);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
++#else
++ free(ctx);
++#endif
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+@@ -279,31 +302,46 @@ int unwrap_v1_header(char *passphrase, c
+ int unwrap_v2_header(char *passphrase, cencrypted_v2_pwheader *header, uint8_t *aes_key, uint8_t *hmacsha1_key) {
+ /* derived key is a 3DES-EDE key */
+ uint8_t derived_key[192/8];
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+ uint8_t *TEMP1;
+ int outlen, tmplen;
+
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
++#else
++ ctx = malloc(sizeof(*ctx));
++#endif
++ if (!ctx) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "Out of memory: EVP_CIPHER_CTX!\n");
++ return(-1);
++ }
++
+ PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(passphrase, strlen(passphrase), (unsigned char*)header->kdf_salt, 20,
+ PBKDF2_ITERATION_COUNT, sizeof(derived_key), derived_key);
+
+ print_hex(derived_key, 192/8);
+
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
+ /* result of the decryption operation shouldn't be bigger than ciphertext */
+ TEMP1 = malloc(header->encrypted_keyblob_size);
+ /* uses PKCS#7 padding for symmetric key operations by default */
+- EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, derived_key, header->blob_enc_iv);
++ EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, derived_key, header->blob_enc_iv);
+
+- if(!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, TEMP1, &outlen, header->encrypted_keyblob, header->encrypted_keyblob_size)) {
++ if(!EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, TEMP1, &outlen, header->encrypted_keyblob, header->encrypted_keyblob_size)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "internal error (1) during key unwrap operation!\n");
+ return(-1);
+ }
+- if(!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, TEMP1 + outlen, &tmplen)) {
++ if(!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, TEMP1 + outlen, &tmplen)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "internal error (2) during key unwrap operation!\n");
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ outlen += tmplen;
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
++#else
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
++ free(ctx);
++#endif
+ memcpy(aes_key, TEMP1, 16);
+ memcpy(hmacsha1_key, TEMP1, 20);
+
+@@ -445,9 +483,22 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
+ if(!kflag) unwrap_v2_header(passphrase, &v2header, aes_key, hmacsha1_key);
+ CHUNK_SIZE = v2header.blocksize;
+ }
+-
+- HMAC_CTX_init(&hmacsha1_ctx);
+- HMAC_Init_ex(&hmacsha1_ctx, hmacsha1_key, sizeof(hmacsha1_key), EVP_sha1(), NULL);
++
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ hmacsha1_ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
++#else
++ hmacsha1_ctx = malloc(sizeof(*hmacsha1_ctx));
++#endif
++ if (!hmacsha1_ctx) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "Out of memory: HMAC CTX!\n");
++ exit(1);
++ }
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ HMAC_CTX_reset(hmacsha1_ctx);
++#else
++ HMAC_CTX_init(hmacsha1_ctx);
++#endif
++ HMAC_Init_ex(hmacsha1_ctx, hmacsha1_key, sizeof(hmacsha1_key), EVP_sha1(), NULL);
+ AES_set_decrypt_key(aes_key, CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH * 8, &aes_decrypt_key);
+
+ if (verbose >= 1) {
+@@ -472,5 +523,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
+ }
+
+ if (verbose) fprintf(stderr, "%"PRIX32" chunks written\n", chunk_no);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ HMAC_CTX_free(hmacsha1_ctx);
++#else
++ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(hmacsha1_ctx);
++ free(hmacsha1_ctx);
++#endif
+ return(0);
+ }