Update ntp4 package to 4.2.8p2.

NTP 4.2.8p2 (Harlan Stenn <stenn@ntp.org>, 2015/04/xx)

Focus: Security and Bug fixes, enhancements.

Severity: MEDIUM

In addition to bug fixes and enhancements, this release fixes the
following medium-severity vulnerabilities involving private key
authentication:

* [Sec 2779] ntpd accepts unauthenticated packets with symmetric key crypto.

    References: Sec 2779 / CVE-2015-1798 / VU#374268
    Affects: All NTP4 releases starting with ntp-4.2.5p99 up to but not
	including ntp-4.2.8p2 where the installation uses symmetric keys
	to authenticate remote associations.
    CVSS: (AV:A/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P) Base Score: 5.4
    Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p2) 07 Apr 2015
    Summary: When ntpd is configured to use a symmetric key to authenticate
	a remote NTP server/peer, it checks if the NTP message
	authentication code (MAC) in received packets is valid, but not if
	there actually is any MAC included. Packets without a MAC are
	accepted as if they had a valid MAC. This allows a MITM attacker to
	send false packets that are accepted by the client/peer without
	having to know the symmetric key. The attacker needs to know the
	transmit timestamp of the client to match it in the forged reply
	and the false reply needs to reach the client before the genuine
	reply from the server. The attacker doesn't necessarily need to be
	relaying the packets between the client and the server.

	Authentication using autokey doesn't have this problem as there is
	a check that requires the key ID to be larger than NTP_MAXKEY,
	which fails for packets without a MAC.
    Mitigation:
        Upgrade to 4.2.8p2, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
	or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
        Configure ntpd with enough time sources and monitor it properly.
    Credit: This issue was discovered by Miroslav Lichvar, of Red Hat.

* [Sec 2781] Authentication doesn't protect symmetric associations against
  DoS attacks.

    References: Sec 2781 / CVE-2015-1799 / VU#374268
    Affects: All NTP releases starting with at least xntp3.3wy up to but
	not including ntp-4.2.8p2 where the installation uses symmetric
	key authentication.
    CVSS: (AV:A/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P) Base Score: 5.4
    Note: the CVSS base Score for this issue could be 4.3 or lower, and
	it could be higher than 5.4.
    Date Resolved: Stable (4.2.8p2) 07 Apr 2015
    Summary: An attacker knowing that NTP hosts A and B are peering with
	each other (symmetric association) can send a packet to host A
	with source address of B which will set the NTP state variables
	on A to the values sent by the attacker. Host A will then send
	on its next poll to B a packet with originate timestamp that
	doesn't match the transmit timestamp of B and the packet will
	be dropped. If the attacker does this periodically for both
	hosts, they won't be able to synchronize to each other. This is
	a known denial-of-service attack, described at
	https://www.eecis.udel.edu/~mills/onwire.html .

	According to the document the NTP authentication is supposed to
	protect symmetric associations against this attack, but that
	doesn't seem to be the case. The state variables are updated even
	when authentication fails and the peers are sending packets with
	originate timestamps that don't match the transmit timestamps on
	the receiving side.

	This seems to be a very old problem, dating back to at least
	xntp3.3wy. It's also in the NTPv3 (RFC 1305) and NTPv4 (RFC 5905)
	specifications, so other NTP implementations with support for
	symmetric associations and authentication may be vulnerable too.
	An update to the NTP RFC to correct this error is in-process.
    Mitigation:
        Upgrade to 4.2.8p2, or later, from the NTP Project Download Page
	or the NTP Public Services Project Download Page
        Note that for users of autokey, this specific style of MITM attack
	is simply a long-known potential problem.
        Configure ntpd with appropriate time sources and monitor ntpd.
	Alert your staff if problems are detected.
    Credit: This issue was discovered by Miroslav Lichvar, of Red Hat.

* New script: update-leap
The update-leap script will verify and if necessary, update the
leap-second definition file.
It requires the following commands in order to work:

	wget logger tr sed shasum

Some may choose to run this from cron.  It needs more portability testing.

3 files changed, 8 insertions, 7 deletions

diff --git a/net/ntp4/Makefile b/net/ntp4/Makefile
index 31cf37426d1..05dfaf7b018 100644
--- a/net/ntp4/Makefile
+++ b/net/ntp4/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.84 2015/03/21 20:49:28 bsiegert Exp $
+# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.85 2015/04/08 03:31:33 taca Exp $
 #
 
-DISTNAME=	ntp-4.2.8p1
+DISTNAME=	ntp-4.2.8p2
 PKGNAME=	${DISTNAME:S/-dev-/-/}
 CATEGORIES=	net time
 MASTER_SITES=	http://www.eecis.udel.edu/~ntp/ntp_spool/ntp4/ntp-4.2/
diff --git a/net/ntp4/PLIST b/net/ntp4/PLIST
index 5dc289f1b23..e0bc05c9dad 100644
--- a/net/ntp4/PLIST
+++ b/net/ntp4/PLIST
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-@comment $NetBSD: PLIST,v 1.17 2015/03/21 20:49:28 bsiegert Exp $
+@comment $NetBSD: PLIST,v 1.18 2015/04/08 03:31:33 taca Exp $
 bin/sntp
 man/man1/sntp.1
 man/man5/ntp.conf.5
@@ -486,6 +486,7 @@ share/doc/ntp/sitemap.html
 share/doc/ntp/sntp.html
 share/doc/ntp/stats.html
 share/doc/ntp/tickadj.html
+share/doc/ntp/update-leap.html
 share/doc/ntp/warp.html
 share/doc/ntp/xleave.html
 share/doc/sntp/sntp.html
diff --git a/net/ntp4/distinfo b/net/ntp4/distinfo
index 0ea8397dccf..c844a960f6c 100644
--- a/net/ntp4/distinfo
+++ b/net/ntp4/distinfo
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.20 2015/03/21 20:49:28 bsiegert Exp $
+$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.21 2015/04/08 03:31:33 taca Exp $
 
-SHA1 (ntp-4.2.8p1.tar.gz) = 1e6d8894bbd3456bd71aa890b02f802f2e611e86
-RMD160 (ntp-4.2.8p1.tar.gz) = f61569230e876faf9271607aff9dcbd242ea4f69
-Size (ntp-4.2.8p1.tar.gz) = 6791852 bytes
+SHA1 (ntp-4.2.8p2.tar.gz) = 51d014c4a38383692d0895f5b8247004942e3b38
+RMD160 (ntp-4.2.8p2.tar.gz) = 5e2bec1f296f6d1528694167da2229cae13ebf47
+Size (ntp-4.2.8p2.tar.gz) = 6820869 bytes
 SHA1 (patch-aa) = b247569339d09a88f2e143e355033ce7635ffe92
 SHA1 (patch-configure) = 21466ffa5d0334957a1a93b2a99087e7edaaa4d5
 SHA1 (patch-sntp_configure) = 38357046af0f0c1aeb8b57bb9c653e330d3feadd