Add upstream candidate patch for CVE-2013-4243. PKGREVISION -> 6

1 files changed, 45 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/graphics/tiff/patches/patch-CVE-2013-4243 b/graphics/tiff/patches/patch-CVE-2013-4243
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..e71ac593450
--- /dev/null
+++ b/graphics/tiff/patches/patch-CVE-2013-4243
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-CVE-2013-4243,v 1.1 2013/09/21 18:47:05 dholland Exp $
+
+Upstream candidate patch for CVE 2013-4243.
+taken from http://bugzilla.maptools.org/attachment.cgi?id=518
+(via http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2451)
+
+Despite looking suspect with respect to integer overflows, this
+appears to be ok, as long as you aren't on a 16-bit platform, because
+the largest image size the input can encode is apparently 65535*65535.
+
+--- tools/gif2tiff.c.orig	2013-09-21 18:45:13.000000000 +0000
++++ tools/gif2tiff.c
+@@ -280,6 +280,10 @@ readgifimage(char* mode)
+         fprintf(stderr, "no colormap present for image\n");
+         return (0);
+     }
++    if (width == 0 || height == 0) {
++        fprintf(stderr, "Invalid value of width or height\n");
++        return(0);
++    }
+     if ((raster = (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(width*height+EXTRAFUDGE)) == NULL) {
+         fprintf(stderr, "not enough memory for image\n");
+         return (0);
+@@ -406,6 +410,10 @@ process(register int code, unsigned char
+ 	    fprintf(stderr, "bad input: code=%d is larger than clear=%d\n",code, clear);
+ 	    return 0;
+ 	}
++	if (*fill >= raster + width*height) {
++	    fprintf(stderr, "raster full before eoi code\n");
++	    return 0;
++	}
+ 	*(*fill)++ = suffix[code];
+ 	firstchar = oldcode = code;
+ 	return 1;
+@@ -436,6 +444,10 @@ process(register int code, unsigned char
+     }
+     oldcode = incode;
+     do {
++        if (*fill >= raster + width*height) {
++            fprintf(stderr, "raster full before eoi code\n");
++            return 0;
++        }
+ 	*(*fill)++ = *--stackp;
+     } while (stackp > stack);
+     return 1;