Oops, forgot to "cvs rm" an obsolete patch file.

Thanks to wiz@ noted via mail.

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 67 deletions

diff --git a/security/openssl/patches/patch-ssl_s3__cbc.c b/security/openssl/patches/patch-ssl_s3__cbc.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 41acb9a6b97..00000000000
--- a/security/openssl/patches/patch-ssl_s3__cbc.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
-$NetBSD: patch-ssl_s3__cbc.c,v 1.1 2013/02/08 14:11:08 jperkin Exp $
-
-Apply data-corruption patch from:
-
-  http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=32cc247
-
-Fix IV check and padding removal.
-
-Fix the calculation that checks there is enough room in a record
-after removing padding and optional explicit IV. (by Steve)
-
-For AEAD remove the correct number of padding bytes (by Andy)
-
---- ssl/s3_cbc.c
-+++ ssl/s3_cbc.c
-@@ -139,31 +139,22 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
- 			    unsigned mac_size)
- 	{
- 	unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i;
--	const char has_explicit_iv =
--		s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_VERSION;
--	const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ +
--				  mac_size +
--				  (has_explicit_iv ? block_size : 0);
--
--	/* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant
--	 * time. */
--	if (overhead > rec->length)
--		return 0;
--
--	/* We can always safely skip the explicit IV. We check at the beginning
--	 * of this function that the record has at least enough space for the
--	 * IV, MAC and padding length byte. (These can be checked in
--	 * non-constant time because it's all public information.) So, if the
--	 * padding was invalid, then we didn't change |rec->length| and this is
--	 * safe. If the padding was valid then we know that we have at least
--	 * overhead+padding_length bytes of space and so this is still safe
--	 * because overhead accounts for the explicit IV. */
--	if (has_explicit_iv)
-+	const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
-+	/* Check if version requires explicit IV */
-+	if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
- 		{
-+		/* These lengths are all public so we can test them in
-+		 * non-constant time.
-+		 */
-+		if (overhead + block_size > rec->length)
-+			return 0;
-+		/* We can now safely skip explicit IV */
- 		rec->data += block_size;
- 		rec->input += block_size;
- 		rec->length -= block_size;
- 		}
-+	else if (overhead > rec->length)
-+		return 0;
- 
- 	padding_length = rec->data[rec->length-1];
- 
-@@ -190,7 +181,7 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s,
- 	if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_read_ctx->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
- 		{
- 		/* padding is already verified */
--		rec->length -= padding_length;
-+		rec->length -= padding_length + 1;
- 		return 1;
- 		}
-