diff options
| author | tez <tez@pkgsrc.org> | 2011-05-31 17:18:42 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | tez <tez@pkgsrc.org> | 2011-05-31 17:18:42 +0000 |
| commit | df6f95f533bb3a4ece56da4eceea8a440ac4ffc4 (patch) | |
| tree | f4509a653460ac847e9095988ebb15abda862f69 /security | |
| parent | 6924ae8dffc621ecb4eac04464e040ff6b6136cd (diff) | |
| download | pkgsrc-df6f95f533bb3a4ece56da4eceea8a440ac4ffc4.tar.gz | |
Add protection against ECDSA timing attacks as mentioned in the paper
by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri, see:
http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232.pdf
[Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri]
(patch confirmed in upstream cvs)
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/openssl/Makefile | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/openssl/distinfo | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/openssl/patches/patch-crypto_ecdsa_ecs__ossl.c | 27 |
3 files changed, 31 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/security/openssl/Makefile b/security/openssl/Makefile index ea0b34b184f..f04b1278560 100644 --- a/security/openssl/Makefile +++ b/security/openssl/Makefile @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.155 2011/04/01 21:02:48 tez Exp $ +# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.156 2011/05/31 17:18:42 tez Exp $ OPENSSL_SNAPSHOT?= # empty OPENSSL_STABLE?= # empty @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ MASTER_SITES= ftp://ftp.openssl.org/snapshot/ .endif SVR4_PKGNAME= ossl -PKGREVISION= 1 +PKGREVISION= 2 CATEGORIES= security MAINTAINER= pkgsrc-users@NetBSD.org HOMEPAGE= http://www.openssl.org/ diff --git a/security/openssl/distinfo b/security/openssl/distinfo index b4eec094ade..05c660f38aa 100644 --- a/security/openssl/distinfo +++ b/security/openssl/distinfo @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.80 2011/02/09 00:15:30 taca Exp $ +$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.81 2011/05/31 17:18:42 tez Exp $ SHA1 (openssl-0.9.8q.tar.gz) = 12b6859698ca299fa0cba594686c25d5c01e410d RMD160 (openssl-0.9.8q.tar.gz) = 2a6583fc059f83232b16d0dad8855fc8086f2450 @@ -11,4 +11,5 @@ SHA1 (patch-af) = 2610930b6b06397fa2e3955b3244c02193f5b7a6 SHA1 (patch-ag) = 5f12c72b85e4b6c6a79dfcf87055e9e029fbd8c8 SHA1 (patch-ak) = 049250b9bd42e6f155145703135dab39a7ec17e0 SHA1 (patch-al) = 076a606352bdeaeea1cc64f16be2ac1325882302 +SHA1 (patch-crypto_ecdsa_ecs__ossl.c) = 07e038d0fa4df429336e9f879f3323fae5c6b9d9 SHA1 (patch-ssl_t1__lib.c) = 0ec0cfd2c70c7d35c2bb1c6261d5817ea56941aa diff --git a/security/openssl/patches/patch-crypto_ecdsa_ecs__ossl.c b/security/openssl/patches/patch-crypto_ecdsa_ecs__ossl.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..2dfa4683f4a --- /dev/null +++ b/security/openssl/patches/patch-crypto_ecdsa_ecs__ossl.c @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +$NetBSD: patch-crypto_ecdsa_ecs__ossl.c,v 1.1 2011/05/31 17:18:42 tez Exp $ + +Add protection against ECDSA timing attacks as mentioned in the paper +by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri, see: + http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232.pdf +[Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri] + +--- crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c.orig 2009-12-01 11:32:16.000000000 -0600 ++++ crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c 2011-05-31 11:17:14.168169900 -0500 +@@ -144,6 +144,16 @@ + } + while (BN_is_zero(k)); + ++#ifdef ECDSA_POINT_MUL_NO_CONSTTIME ++ /* We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, ++ * so we compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed ++ * bit-length. */ ++ ++ if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) goto err; ++ if (BN_num_bits(k) <= BN_num_bits(order)) ++ if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) goto err; ++#endif /* def(ECDSA_POINT_MUL_NO_CONSTTIME) */ ++ + /* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */ + if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) + { + |