Update "apache" package to version 2.2.22. Changes since 2.2.21:

- SECURITY: CVE-2011-3368 (cve.mitre.org)
  Reject requests where the request-URI does not match the HTTP
  specification, preventing unexpected expansion of target URLs in
  some reverse proxy configurations.  [Joe Orton]
- SECURITY: CVE-2011-3607 (cve.mitre.org)
  Fix integer overflow in ap_pregsub() which, when the mod_setenvif module
  is enabled, could allow local users to gain privileges via a .htaccess
  file. [Stefan Fritsch, Greg Ames]
- SECURITY: CVE-2011-4317 (cve.mitre.org)
  Resolve additional cases of URL rewriting with ProxyPassMatch or
  RewriteRule, where particular request-URIs could result in undesired
  backend network exposure in some configurations.
  [Joe Orton]
- SECURITY: CVE-2012-0021 (cve.mitre.org)
  mod_log_config: Fix segfault (crash) when the '%{cookiename}C' log format
  string is in use and a client sends a nameless, valueless cookie, causing
  a denial of service. The issue existed since version 2.2.17. Bug#52256.
  [Rainer Canavan <rainer-apache 7val com>]
- SECURITY: CVE-2012-0031 (cve.mitre.org)
  Fix scoreboard issue which could allow an unprivileged child process
  could cause the parent to crash at shutdown rather than terminate
  cleanly.  [Joe Orton]
- SECURITY: CVE-2012-0053 (cve.mitre.org)
  Fix an issue in error responses that could expose "httpOnly" cookies
  when no custom ErrorDocument is specified for status code 400.
  [Eric Covener]
- mod_proxy_ajp: Try to prevent a single long request from marking a worker
  in error. [Jean-Frederic Clere]
- config: Update the default mod_ssl configuration: Disable SSLv2, only
  allow >= 128bit ciphers, add commented example for speed optimized cipher
  list, limit MSIE workaround to MSIE <= 5. [Kaspar Brand]
- core: Fix segfault in ap_send_interim_response(). Bug#52315.
  [Stefan Fritsch]
- mod_log_config: Prevent segfault. Bug#50861. [Torsten Foertsch
  <torsten.foertsch gmx.net>]
- mod_win32: Invert logic for env var UTF-8 fixing.
  Now we exclude a list of vars which we know for sure they dont hold UTF-8
  chars; all other vars will be fixed. This has the benefit that now also
  all vars from 3rd-party modules will be fixed. Bug#13029 / 34985.
  [Guenter Knauf]
- core: Fix hook sorting for Perl modules, a regression introduced in
  2.2.21. Bug#45076. [Torsten Foertsch <torsten foertsch gmx net>]
- Fix a regression introduced by the CVE-2011-3192 byterange fix in 2.2.20:
  A range of '0-' will now return 206 instead of 200. Bug#51878.
  [Jim Jagielski]
- Example configuration: Fix entry for MaxRanges (use "unlimited" instead
  of "0").  [Rainer Jung]
- mod_substitute: Fix buffer overrun.  [Ruediger Pluem, Rainer Jung]

Please note that all the security fixes had been integrated into
"pkgsrc" as patches previously.

10 files changed, 25 insertions, 324 deletions

diff --git a/www/apache22/Makefile b/www/apache22/Makefile
index c0cb8d2bbb9..acf7cfb17e6 100644
--- a/www/apache22/Makefile
+++ b/www/apache22/Makefile
@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
-# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.78 2012/01/29 12:29:07 tron Exp $
+# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.79 2012/02/01 19:53:21 tron Exp $
 
-DISTNAME=	httpd-2.2.21
+DISTNAME=	httpd-2.2.22
 
 PKGNAME=	${DISTNAME:S/httpd/apache/}
-PKGREVISION=	7
 CATEGORIES=	www
 MASTER_SITES=	${MASTER_SITE_APACHE:=httpd/} \
 		http://archive.apache.org/dist/httpd/ \
@@ -122,8 +121,8 @@ OWN_DIRS_PERMS+=	${VARBASE}/db/httpd/proxy ${APACHE_USER} ${APACHE_GROUP} 0755
 FIX_PERMS=		apachectl apxs dbmmanage envvars-std mkcert
 FIX_MAN_PERMS=		man1/htdbm.1 man1/htpasswd.1 man1/htdigest.1
 FIX_MAN_PERMS+=		man1/dbmmanage.1 man8/httpd.8 man8/suexec.8
-FIX_MAN_PERMS+=		man8/rotatelogs.8 man8/logresolve.8 man8/apxs.8
-FIX_MAN_PERMS+=		man8/apachectl.8 man8/ab.8
+FIX_MAN_PERMS+=		man8/rotatelogs.8 man1/logresolve.1 man1/apxs.1
+FIX_MAN_PERMS+=		man8/apachectl.8 man1/ab.1 man1/httxt2dbm.1
 
 # Fix paths in the apache manpages.
 SUBST_CLASSES+=		man
diff --git a/www/apache22/PLIST b/www/apache22/PLIST
index aebfb147a12..75d4f406a2a 100644
--- a/www/apache22/PLIST
+++ b/www/apache22/PLIST
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-@comment $NetBSD: PLIST,v 1.19 2011/05/12 06:50:44 tron Exp $
+@comment $NetBSD: PLIST,v 1.20 2012/02/01 19:53:21 tron Exp $
 ${PLIST.suexec}sbin/suexec
 include/httpd/ap_compat.h
 include/httpd/ap_config.h
@@ -127,16 +127,17 @@ ${PLIST.all-shared}lib/httpd/mod_version.so
 ${PLIST.all-shared}lib/httpd/mod_vhost_alias.so
 libexec/cgi-bin/printenv
 libexec/cgi-bin/test-cgi
+man/man1/ab.1
+man/man1/apxs.1
 man/man1/dbmmanage.1
 man/man1/htdbm.1
 man/man1/htdigest.1
 man/man1/htpasswd.1
-man/man8/ab.8
+man/man1/httxt2dbm.1
+man/man1/logresolve.1
 man/man8/apachectl.8
-man/man8/apxs.8
 man/man8/htcacheclean.8
 man/man8/httpd.8
-man/man8/logresolve.8
 man/man8/rotatelogs.8
 man/man8/suexec.8
 sbin/ab
@@ -618,6 +619,7 @@ share/httpd/manual/license.html
 share/httpd/manual/license.html.en
 share/httpd/manual/logs.html
 share/httpd/manual/logs.html.en
+share/httpd/manual/logs.html.fr
 share/httpd/manual/logs.html.ja.utf8
 share/httpd/manual/logs.html.ko.euc-kr
 share/httpd/manual/logs.html.tr.utf8
@@ -892,11 +894,14 @@ share/httpd/manual/mod/mod_proxy_connect.html.en
 share/httpd/manual/mod/mod_proxy_connect.html.ja.utf8
 share/httpd/manual/mod/mod_proxy_ftp.html
 share/httpd/manual/mod/mod_proxy_ftp.html.en
+share/httpd/manual/mod/mod_proxy_ftp.html.ja.utf8
 share/httpd/manual/mod/mod_proxy_http.html
 share/httpd/manual/mod/mod_proxy_http.html.en
 share/httpd/manual/mod/mod_proxy_http.html.fr
+share/httpd/manual/mod/mod_proxy_http.html.ja.utf8
 share/httpd/manual/mod/mod_proxy_scgi.html
 share/httpd/manual/mod/mod_proxy_scgi.html.en
+share/httpd/manual/mod/mod_proxy_scgi.html.ja.utf8
 share/httpd/manual/mod/mod_reqtimeout.html
 share/httpd/manual/mod/mod_reqtimeout.html.en
 share/httpd/manual/mod/mod_rewrite.html
@@ -1007,6 +1012,7 @@ share/httpd/manual/new_features_2_0.html.tr.utf8
 share/httpd/manual/new_features_2_2.html
 share/httpd/manual/new_features_2_2.html.en
 share/httpd/manual/new_features_2_2.html.fr
+share/httpd/manual/new_features_2_2.html.ja.utf8
 share/httpd/manual/new_features_2_2.html.ko.euc-kr
 share/httpd/manual/new_features_2_2.html.pt-br
 share/httpd/manual/new_features_2_2.html.tr.utf8
@@ -1074,6 +1080,7 @@ share/httpd/manual/programs/httxt2dbm.html.tr.utf8
 share/httpd/manual/programs/index.html
 share/httpd/manual/programs/index.html.en
 share/httpd/manual/programs/index.html.es
+share/httpd/manual/programs/index.html.ja.utf8
 share/httpd/manual/programs/index.html.ko.euc-kr
 share/httpd/manual/programs/index.html.ru.koi8-r
 share/httpd/manual/programs/index.html.tr.utf8
@@ -1190,6 +1197,7 @@ share/httpd/manual/upgrading.html
 share/httpd/manual/upgrading.html.de
 share/httpd/manual/upgrading.html.en
 share/httpd/manual/upgrading.html.fr
+share/httpd/manual/upgrading.html.ja.utf8
 share/httpd/manual/urlmapping.html
 share/httpd/manual/urlmapping.html.en
 share/httpd/manual/urlmapping.html.ja.utf8
diff --git a/www/apache22/distinfo b/www/apache22/distinfo
index 0eb940dfe5e..840f7b85625 100644
--- a/www/apache22/distinfo
+++ b/www/apache22/distinfo
@@ -1,24 +1,18 @@
-$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.49 2012/01/29 12:29:07 tron Exp $
+$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.50 2012/02/01 19:53:21 tron Exp $
 
-SHA1 (httpd-2.2.21.tar.bz2) = c02f9b05da9a7e316ff37d9053dc76a57ba51cb4
-RMD160 (httpd-2.2.21.tar.bz2) = 6464a03d78ab858b1288ea9eef4cd5f73b60a9f1
-Size (httpd-2.2.21.tar.bz2) = 5324905 bytes
-SHA1 (patch-CVE-2012-0021) = 8c44c591ffa3a4ca32de47c71d1aa8470de81f1e
+SHA1 (httpd-2.2.22.tar.bz2) = 766cd0843050a8dfb781e48b976f3ba6ebcf8696
+RMD160 (httpd-2.2.22.tar.bz2) = 237a26a7759e7e1af175900d598e25fb082a4eb9
+Size (httpd-2.2.22.tar.bz2) = 5378934 bytes
 SHA1 (patch-aa) = e0bfdf6bc9cb034bea46a390a12a5508e363c9a7
 SHA1 (patch-ab) = 365cc3b0ac2d9d68ccb94f5699fe168a1c9b0150
 SHA1 (patch-ac) = 515043b5c215d49fe8f6d3191b502c978e2a2dad
 SHA1 (patch-ad) = 088d6ff0e7a8acfe70b4f85a6ce58d42c935fd13
 SHA1 (patch-ae) = 86b307d6eefef232b6223afc3f69e64be40bd913
-SHA1 (patch-af) = 312d3bce5e1bf6e747b5f0f313d89bf5b4636392
+SHA1 (patch-af) = 580950dbf0154ba1c93f5c58eae766c7d6c0c00c
 SHA1 (patch-ag) = 78dcb023f524ef65928b529320932c9664ec0d01
 SHA1 (patch-ai) = 4ebc3bd580a298973928eb6d13d2ce745eac0312
 SHA1 (patch-al) = 56b9f5c2f6fd01fe5067f9210e328cbf674c68f1
 SHA1 (patch-am) = ab4a2f7e5a1a3064e908b61157e7fd349c0b0c08
 SHA1 (patch-aw) = ca53d67beeb2c2c4d9adb04d3d79e24a8c427fd4
 SHA1 (patch-lock.c) = 770ca03f1cb4421879bd5baa5a7c30cc91acb6e1
-SHA1 (patch-modules_mappers_mod_rewrite.c) = de7bbdf02dda38e2542e4967ee6f22745ec0f118
-SHA1 (patch-modules_proxy_mod_proxy.c) = bab58b70eee22d7c08be9a4a9ada3fad886fa796
 SHA1 (patch-repos.c) = 0e0361b91d4b0fe6c7c55a12fdfd2e6aacc710e1
-SHA1 (patch-server_protocol.c) = dc99717704f53837dfd7b9c1018487a787dcbfd9
-SHA1 (patch-server_scoreboard.c) = 8d1e007f8d1d6a6db827a41d82369749e603a2b3
-SHA1 (patch-server_util.c) = 37e9c357618a9645222cd981f0ccb04c7987fe15
diff --git a/www/apache22/patches/patch-CVE-2012-0021 b/www/apache22/patches/patch-CVE-2012-0021
deleted file mode 100644
index 80d11463546..00000000000
--- a/www/apache22/patches/patch-CVE-2012-0021
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-$NetBSD: patch-CVE-2012-0021,v 1.1 2012/01/29 12:29:08 tron Exp $
-
-Fix security vulnerability reported in CVE-2012-0021. Patch taken from
-Apache SVN repository:
-
-http://svn.apache.org/viewvc?view=revision&revision=1227292
-
---- modules/loggers/mod_log_config.c.orig	2010-08-24 07:41:38.000000000 +0100
-+++ modules/loggers/mod_log_config.c	2012-01-29 12:08:13.000000000 +0000
-@@ -524,19 +524,21 @@
- 
-         while ((cookie = apr_strtok(cookies, ";", &last1))) {
-             char *name = apr_strtok(cookie, "=", &last2);
--            char *value;
--            apr_collapse_spaces(name, name);
-+            if (name) {
-+                char *value;
-+                apr_collapse_spaces(name, name);
-+
-+                if (!strcasecmp(name, a) && (value = apr_strtok(NULL, "=", &last2))) {
-+                    char *last;
-+                    value += strspn(value, " \t");  /* Move past leading WS */
-+                    last = value + strlen(value) - 1;
-+                    while (last >= value && apr_isspace(*last)) {
-+                       *last = '\0';
-+                       --last;
-+                    }
- 
--            if (!strcasecmp(name, a) && (value = apr_strtok(NULL, "=", &last2))) {
--                char *last;
--                value += strspn(value, " \t");  /* Move past leading WS */
--                last = value + strlen(value) - 1;
--                while (last >= value && apr_isspace(*last)) {
--                   *last = '\0';
--                   --last;
-+                    return ap_escape_logitem(r->pool, value);
-                 }
--
--                return ap_escape_logitem(r->pool, value);
-             }
-             cookies = NULL;
-         }
diff --git a/www/apache22/patches/patch-af b/www/apache22/patches/patch-af
index 809b76d5702..278ba6db864 100644
--- a/www/apache22/patches/patch-af
+++ b/www/apache22/patches/patch-af
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-$NetBSD: patch-af,v 1.5 2011/03/20 03:18:21 dholland Exp $
+$NetBSD: patch-af,v 1.6 2012/02/01 19:53:21 tron Exp $
 
 Fix markup glitch.
 
---- docs/man/apxs.8~	2011-03-20 02:48:50.000000000 +0000
-+++ docs/man/apxs.8
-@@ -96,7 +96,11 @@ This explicitly sets the module name for
+--- docs/man/apxs.1.orig	2012-01-10 23:32:02.000000000 +0000
++++ docs/man/apxs.1	2012-02-01 19:18:34.000000000 +0000
+@@ -96,7 +96,11 @@
   
  .TP
  -q
diff --git a/www/apache22/patches/patch-modules_mappers_mod_rewrite.c b/www/apache22/patches/patch-modules_mappers_mod_rewrite.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 47396c88531..00000000000
--- a/www/apache22/patches/patch-modules_mappers_mod_rewrite.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-$NetBSD: patch-modules_mappers_mod_rewrite.c,v 1.1 2011/12/13 15:37:56 spz Exp $
-
-revision 1209432 from http://svn.apache.org/:
-	Fix for additional cases of URL rewriting with ProxyPassMatch or
-	RewriteRule, where particular request-URIs could result in undesired
-	backend network exposure in some configurations. (CVE-2011-4317)
-
-	Thanks to Prutha Parikh from Qualys for reporting this issue.
-
-	* modules/proxy/mod_proxy.c (proxy_trans): Decline to handle the "*"
-	  request-URI.  Fail for cases where r->uri does not begin with a "/".
-
-	* modules/mappers/mod_rewrite.c (hook_uri2file): Likewise.
-
---- modules/mappers/mod_rewrite.c.orig	2011-09-03 22:54:25.000000000 +0000
-+++ modules/mappers/mod_rewrite.c
-@@ -4266,6 +4266,18 @@ static int hook_uri2file(request_rec *r)
-         return DECLINED;
-     }
- 
-+    if (strcmp(r->unparsed_uri, "*") == 0) {
-+        /* Don't apply rewrite rules to "*". */
-+        return DECLINED;
-+    }
-+
-+    /* Check that the URI is valid. */
-+    if (!r->uri || r->uri[0] != '/') {
-+        ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
-+                     "Invalid URI in request %s", r->the_request);
-+        return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
-+    }
-+
-     /*
-      *  add the SCRIPT_URL variable to the env. this is a bit complicated
-      *  due to the fact that apache uses subrequests and internal redirects
diff --git a/www/apache22/patches/patch-modules_proxy_mod_proxy.c b/www/apache22/patches/patch-modules_proxy_mod_proxy.c
deleted file mode 100644
index e75f25b9e29..00000000000
--- a/www/apache22/patches/patch-modules_proxy_mod_proxy.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-$NetBSD: patch-modules_proxy_mod_proxy.c,v 1.1 2011/12/13 15:37:57 spz Exp $
-
-revision 1209432 from http://svn.apache.org/:
-        Fix for additional cases of URL rewriting with ProxyPassMatch or
-        RewriteRule, where particular request-URIs could result in undesired
-        backend network exposure in some configurations. (CVE-2011-4317)
-
-        Thanks to Prutha Parikh from Qualys for reporting this issue.
-
-        * modules/proxy/mod_proxy.c (proxy_trans): Decline to handle the "*"
-          request-URI.  Fail for cases where r->uri does not begin with a "/".
-
-        * modules/mappers/mod_rewrite.c (hook_uri2file): Likewise.
-
---- modules/proxy/mod_proxy.c.orig	2010-10-07 18:51:18.000000000 +0000
-+++ modules/proxy/mod_proxy.c
-@@ -566,6 +566,18 @@ static int proxy_trans(request_rec *r)
-         return OK;
-     }
- 
-+    if (strcmp(r->unparsed_uri, "*") == 0) {
-+        /* "*" cannot be proxied. */
-+        return DECLINED;
-+    }
-+
-+    /* Check that the URI is valid. */
-+    if (!r->uri || r->uri[0] != '/') {
-+        ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
-+                     "Invalid URI in request %s", r->the_request);
-+        return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
-+    }
-+
-     /* XXX: since r->uri has been manipulated already we're not really
-      * compliant with RFC1945 at this point.  But this probably isn't
-      * an issue because this is a hybrid proxy/origin server.
diff --git a/www/apache22/patches/patch-server_protocol.c b/www/apache22/patches/patch-server_protocol.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 2aa8c2ad9ae..00000000000
--- a/www/apache22/patches/patch-server_protocol.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
-$NetBSD: patch-server_protocol.c,v 1.4 2012/01/29 12:29:08 tron Exp $
-
-revision 1179239 from http://svn.apache.org/:
-	SECURITY (CVE-2011-3368): Prevent unintended pattern expansion
-	in some reverse proxy configurations by strictly validating
-	the request-URI.
-
-revision 1179525 from http://svn.apache.org/:
-	SECURITY (CVE-2011-3368): Prevent unintended pattern expansion in some
-	reverse proxy configurations by strictly validating the request-URI:
-	* server/protocol.c (read_request_line): Send a 400 response if the
-	  request-URI does not match the grammar from RFC 2616.  This ensures
-	  the input string for RewriteRule et al really is an absolute path.
-
-revision 1235454 from http://svn.apache.org/:
-	CVE-2012-0053: Fix an issue in error responses that could expose 
-	"httpOnly" cookies when no custom ErrorDocument is specified for 
-	status code 400.
-
---- server/protocol.c.orig	2011-05-07 12:39:29.000000000 +0100
-+++ server/protocol.c	2012-01-29 12:22:25.000000000 +0000
-@@ -640,6 +640,25 @@
- 
-     ap_parse_uri(r, uri);
- 
-+    /* RFC 2616:
-+     *   Request-URI    = "*" | absoluteURI | abs_path | authority
-+     *
-+     * authority is a special case for CONNECT.  If the request is not
-+     * using CONNECT, and the parsed URI does not have scheme, and
-+     * it does not begin with '/', and it is not '*', then, fail
-+     * and give a 400 response. */
-+    if (r->method_number != M_CONNECT
-+	&& !r->parsed_uri.scheme 
-+	&& uri[0] != '/'
-+	&& !(uri[0] == '*' && uri[1] == '\0')) {
-+	    ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
-+			  "invalid request-URI %s", uri);
-+	    r->args = NULL;
-+	    r->hostname = NULL;
-+	    r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
-+	    r->uri = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, uri);
-+    }
-+
-     if (ll[0]) {
-         r->assbackwards = 0;
-         pro = ll;
-@@ -670,6 +689,16 @@
-     return 1;
- }
- 
-+/* get the length of the field name for logging, but no more than 80 bytes */
-+#define LOG_NAME_MAX_LEN 80
-+static int field_name_len(const char *field)
-+{
-+    const char *end = ap_strchr_c(field, ':');
-+    if (end == NULL || end - field > LOG_NAME_MAX_LEN)
-+        return LOG_NAME_MAX_LEN;
-+    return end - field;
-+}
-+
- AP_DECLARE(void) ap_get_mime_headers_core(request_rec *r, apr_bucket_brigade *bb)
- {
-     char *last_field = NULL;
-@@ -709,12 +738,15 @@
-                 /* insure ap_escape_html will terminate correctly */
-                 field[len - 1] = '\0';
-                 apr_table_setn(r->notes, "error-notes",
--                               apr_pstrcat(r->pool,
-+                               apr_psprintf(r->pool,
-                                            "Size of a request header field "
-                                            "exceeds server limit.<br />\n"
--                                           "<pre>\n",
--                                           ap_escape_html(r->pool, field),
--                                           "</pre>\n", NULL));
-+                                           "<pre>\n%.*s\n</pre>/n",
-+                                           field_name_len(field), 
-+                                           ap_escape_html(r->pool, field)));
-+                ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, 
-+                              "Request header exceeds LimitRequestFieldSize: "
-+                              "%.*s", field_name_len(field), field);
-             }
-             return;
-         }
-@@ -735,13 +767,17 @@
-                      * overflow (last_field) as the field with the problem
-                      */
-                     apr_table_setn(r->notes, "error-notes",
--                                   apr_pstrcat(r->pool,
-+                                   apr_psprintf(r->pool,
-                                                "Size of a request header field "
-                                                "after folding "
-                                                "exceeds server limit.<br />\n"
--                                               "<pre>\n",
--                                               ap_escape_html(r->pool, last_field),
--                                               "</pre>\n", NULL));
-+                                               "<pre>\n%.*s\n</pre>\n",
-+                                               field_name_len(last_field),
-+                                               ap_escape_html(r->pool, last_field)));
-+                    ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r,
-+                                  "Request header exceeds LimitRequestFieldSize "
-+                                  "after folding: %.*s",
-+                                  field_name_len(last_field), last_field);
-                     return;
-                 }
- 
-@@ -773,13 +809,18 @@
-                 if (!(value = strchr(last_field, ':'))) { /* Find ':' or    */
-                     r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;      /* abort bad request */
-                     apr_table_setn(r->notes, "error-notes",
--                                   apr_pstrcat(r->pool,
-+                                   apr_psprintf(r->pool,
-                                                "Request header field is "
-                                                "missing ':' separator.<br />\n"
--                                               "<pre>\n",
-+                                               "<pre>\n%.*s</pre>\n",
-+                                               (int)LOG_NAME_MAX_LEN,
-                                                ap_escape_html(r->pool,
--                                                              last_field),
--                                               "</pre>\n", NULL));
-+                                                              last_field)));
-+                    ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r,
-+                                  "Request header field is missing ':' "
-+                                  "separator: %.*s", (int)LOG_NAME_MAX_LEN,
-+                                  last_field);
-+
-                     return;
-                 }
- 
diff --git a/www/apache22/patches/patch-server_scoreboard.c b/www/apache22/patches/patch-server_scoreboard.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 6426149d756..00000000000
--- a/www/apache22/patches/patch-server_scoreboard.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-$NetBSD: patch-server_scoreboard.c,v 1.1 2012/01/17 20:48:29 spz Exp $
-
-patch for CVE-2012-0031 taken from Revision 1231058 of http://svn.apache.org/
-
---- server/scoreboard.c.orig	2010-10-07 16:56:54.000000000 +0000
-+++ server/scoreboard.c
-@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ AP_DECLARE_DATA const char *ap_scoreboar
- AP_DECLARE_DATA int ap_extended_status = 0;
- AP_DECLARE_DATA int ap_mod_status_reqtail = 0;
- 
-+static ap_scoreboard_e scoreboard_type;
-+
- #if APR_HAS_SHARED_MEMORY
- 
- #include "apr_shm.h"
-@@ -250,7 +252,7 @@ apr_status_t ap_cleanup_scoreboard(void 
-     if (ap_scoreboard_image == NULL) {
-         return APR_SUCCESS;
-     }
--    if (ap_scoreboard_image->global->sb_type == SB_SHARED) {
-+    if (scoreboard_type == SB_SHARED) {
-         ap_cleanup_shared_mem(NULL);
-     }
-     else {
-@@ -312,7 +314,7 @@ int ap_create_scoreboard(apr_pool_t *p, 
-         ap_init_scoreboard(sb_mem);
-     }
- 
--    ap_scoreboard_image->global->sb_type = sb_type;
-+    ap_scoreboard_image->global->sb_type = scoreboard_type = sb_type;
-     ap_scoreboard_image->global->running_generation = 0;
-     ap_scoreboard_image->global->restart_time = apr_time_now();
- 
diff --git a/www/apache22/patches/patch-server_util.c b/www/apache22/patches/patch-server_util.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 65c91175ca3..00000000000
--- a/www/apache22/patches/patch-server_util.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-$NetBSD: patch-server_util.c,v 1.2 2012/01/17 20:48:29 spz Exp $
-
-fix for http://secunia.com/advisories/45793/
-http://svn.apache.org/viewvc/httpd/httpd/branches/2.2.x/server/util.c?r1=1124515&r2=1227280
-modulo we have apr 1.3 and can use APR_SIZE_MAX and APR_ENOMEM
-
---- server/util.c.orig	2011-05-19 02:17:37.000000000 +0000
-+++ server/util.c
-@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ AP_DECLARE(char *) ap_pregsub(apr_pool_t
-     char *dest, *dst;
-     char c;
-     size_t no;
--    int len;
-+    apr_size_t len;
- 
-     if (!source)
-         return NULL;
-@@ -391,6 +391,8 @@ AP_DECLARE(char *) ap_pregsub(apr_pool_t
-             len++;
-         }
-         else if (no < nmatch && pmatch[no].rm_so < pmatch[no].rm_eo) {
-+            if (APR_SIZE_MAX - len <= pmatch[no].rm_eo - pmatch[no].rm_so)
-+                return APR_ENOMEM;
-             len += pmatch[no].rm_eo - pmatch[no].rm_so;
-         }
-