diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'www/apache22/patches/patch-server_protocol.c')
-rw-r--r-- | www/apache22/patches/patch-server_protocol.c | 91 |
1 files changed, 89 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/www/apache22/patches/patch-server_protocol.c b/www/apache22/patches/patch-server_protocol.c index 336edb08fc1..2aa8c2ad9ae 100644 --- a/www/apache22/patches/patch-server_protocol.c +++ b/www/apache22/patches/patch-server_protocol.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -$NetBSD: patch-server_protocol.c,v 1.3 2011/12/12 18:43:14 tron Exp $ +$NetBSD: patch-server_protocol.c,v 1.4 2012/01/29 12:29:08 tron Exp $ revision 1179239 from http://svn.apache.org/: SECURITY (CVE-2011-3368): Prevent unintended pattern expansion @@ -12,8 +12,13 @@ revision 1179525 from http://svn.apache.org/: request-URI does not match the grammar from RFC 2616. This ensures the input string for RewriteRule et al really is an absolute path. +revision 1235454 from http://svn.apache.org/: + CVE-2012-0053: Fix an issue in error responses that could expose + "httpOnly" cookies when no custom ErrorDocument is specified for + status code 400. + --- server/protocol.c.orig 2011-05-07 12:39:29.000000000 +0100 -+++ server/protocol.c 2011-12-12 18:37:04.000000000 +0000 ++++ server/protocol.c 2012-01-29 12:22:25.000000000 +0000 @@ -640,6 +640,25 @@ ap_parse_uri(r, uri); @@ -40,3 +45,85 @@ revision 1179525 from http://svn.apache.org/: if (ll[0]) { r->assbackwards = 0; pro = ll; +@@ -670,6 +689,16 @@ + return 1; + } + ++/* get the length of the field name for logging, but no more than 80 bytes */ ++#define LOG_NAME_MAX_LEN 80 ++static int field_name_len(const char *field) ++{ ++ const char *end = ap_strchr_c(field, ':'); ++ if (end == NULL || end - field > LOG_NAME_MAX_LEN) ++ return LOG_NAME_MAX_LEN; ++ return end - field; ++} ++ + AP_DECLARE(void) ap_get_mime_headers_core(request_rec *r, apr_bucket_brigade *bb) + { + char *last_field = NULL; +@@ -709,12 +738,15 @@ + /* insure ap_escape_html will terminate correctly */ + field[len - 1] = '\0'; + apr_table_setn(r->notes, "error-notes", +- apr_pstrcat(r->pool, ++ apr_psprintf(r->pool, + "Size of a request header field " + "exceeds server limit.<br />\n" +- "<pre>\n", +- ap_escape_html(r->pool, field), +- "</pre>\n", NULL)); ++ "<pre>\n%.*s\n</pre>/n", ++ field_name_len(field), ++ ap_escape_html(r->pool, field))); ++ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, ++ "Request header exceeds LimitRequestFieldSize: " ++ "%.*s", field_name_len(field), field); + } + return; + } +@@ -735,13 +767,17 @@ + * overflow (last_field) as the field with the problem + */ + apr_table_setn(r->notes, "error-notes", +- apr_pstrcat(r->pool, ++ apr_psprintf(r->pool, + "Size of a request header field " + "after folding " + "exceeds server limit.<br />\n" +- "<pre>\n", +- ap_escape_html(r->pool, last_field), +- "</pre>\n", NULL)); ++ "<pre>\n%.*s\n</pre>\n", ++ field_name_len(last_field), ++ ap_escape_html(r->pool, last_field))); ++ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, ++ "Request header exceeds LimitRequestFieldSize " ++ "after folding: %.*s", ++ field_name_len(last_field), last_field); + return; + } + +@@ -773,13 +809,18 @@ + if (!(value = strchr(last_field, ':'))) { /* Find ':' or */ + r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST; /* abort bad request */ + apr_table_setn(r->notes, "error-notes", +- apr_pstrcat(r->pool, ++ apr_psprintf(r->pool, + "Request header field is " + "missing ':' separator.<br />\n" +- "<pre>\n", ++ "<pre>\n%.*s</pre>\n", ++ (int)LOG_NAME_MAX_LEN, + ap_escape_html(r->pool, +- last_field), +- "</pre>\n", NULL)); ++ last_field))); ++ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, ++ "Request header field is missing ':' " ++ "separator: %.*s", (int)LOG_NAME_MAX_LEN, ++ last_field); ++ + return; + } + |