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authortron <tron>2012-01-29 12:29:07 +0000
committertron <tron>2012-01-29 12:29:07 +0000
commit6f69c164a920605874f88c3e0b1caaf0fb681b5a (patch)
treeaf7e2dd6061fbc82857fdae9dbfc255fb011c903 /www/apache22/patches
parent03ba660bbe08463d6d39c65e90e832de4ac3430b (diff)
downloadpkgsrc-6f69c164a920605874f88c3e0b1caaf0fb681b5a.tar.gz
Add patch for security vulnerabilities reported in CVE-2012-0021
and CVE-2012-0053 taken from Apache SVN repository.
Diffstat (limited to 'www/apache22/patches')
-rw-r--r--www/apache22/patches/patch-CVE-2012-002142
-rw-r--r--www/apache22/patches/patch-server_protocol.c91
2 files changed, 131 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/www/apache22/patches/patch-CVE-2012-0021 b/www/apache22/patches/patch-CVE-2012-0021
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..80d11463546
--- /dev/null
+++ b/www/apache22/patches/patch-CVE-2012-0021
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-CVE-2012-0021,v 1.1 2012/01/29 12:29:08 tron Exp $
+
+Fix security vulnerability reported in CVE-2012-0021. Patch taken from
+Apache SVN repository:
+
+http://svn.apache.org/viewvc?view=revision&revision=1227292
+
+--- modules/loggers/mod_log_config.c.orig 2010-08-24 07:41:38.000000000 +0100
++++ modules/loggers/mod_log_config.c 2012-01-29 12:08:13.000000000 +0000
+@@ -524,19 +524,21 @@
+
+ while ((cookie = apr_strtok(cookies, ";", &last1))) {
+ char *name = apr_strtok(cookie, "=", &last2);
+- char *value;
+- apr_collapse_spaces(name, name);
++ if (name) {
++ char *value;
++ apr_collapse_spaces(name, name);
++
++ if (!strcasecmp(name, a) && (value = apr_strtok(NULL, "=", &last2))) {
++ char *last;
++ value += strspn(value, " \t"); /* Move past leading WS */
++ last = value + strlen(value) - 1;
++ while (last >= value && apr_isspace(*last)) {
++ *last = '\0';
++ --last;
++ }
+
+- if (!strcasecmp(name, a) && (value = apr_strtok(NULL, "=", &last2))) {
+- char *last;
+- value += strspn(value, " \t"); /* Move past leading WS */
+- last = value + strlen(value) - 1;
+- while (last >= value && apr_isspace(*last)) {
+- *last = '\0';
+- --last;
++ return ap_escape_logitem(r->pool, value);
+ }
+-
+- return ap_escape_logitem(r->pool, value);
+ }
+ cookies = NULL;
+ }
diff --git a/www/apache22/patches/patch-server_protocol.c b/www/apache22/patches/patch-server_protocol.c
index 336edb08fc1..2aa8c2ad9ae 100644
--- a/www/apache22/patches/patch-server_protocol.c
+++ b/www/apache22/patches/patch-server_protocol.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-$NetBSD: patch-server_protocol.c,v 1.3 2011/12/12 18:43:14 tron Exp $
+$NetBSD: patch-server_protocol.c,v 1.4 2012/01/29 12:29:08 tron Exp $
revision 1179239 from http://svn.apache.org/:
SECURITY (CVE-2011-3368): Prevent unintended pattern expansion
@@ -12,8 +12,13 @@ revision 1179525 from http://svn.apache.org/:
request-URI does not match the grammar from RFC 2616. This ensures
the input string for RewriteRule et al really is an absolute path.
+revision 1235454 from http://svn.apache.org/:
+ CVE-2012-0053: Fix an issue in error responses that could expose
+ "httpOnly" cookies when no custom ErrorDocument is specified for
+ status code 400.
+
--- server/protocol.c.orig 2011-05-07 12:39:29.000000000 +0100
-+++ server/protocol.c 2011-12-12 18:37:04.000000000 +0000
++++ server/protocol.c 2012-01-29 12:22:25.000000000 +0000
@@ -640,6 +640,25 @@
ap_parse_uri(r, uri);
@@ -40,3 +45,85 @@ revision 1179525 from http://svn.apache.org/:
if (ll[0]) {
r->assbackwards = 0;
pro = ll;
+@@ -670,6 +689,16 @@
+ return 1;
+ }
+
++/* get the length of the field name for logging, but no more than 80 bytes */
++#define LOG_NAME_MAX_LEN 80
++static int field_name_len(const char *field)
++{
++ const char *end = ap_strchr_c(field, ':');
++ if (end == NULL || end - field > LOG_NAME_MAX_LEN)
++ return LOG_NAME_MAX_LEN;
++ return end - field;
++}
++
+ AP_DECLARE(void) ap_get_mime_headers_core(request_rec *r, apr_bucket_brigade *bb)
+ {
+ char *last_field = NULL;
+@@ -709,12 +738,15 @@
+ /* insure ap_escape_html will terminate correctly */
+ field[len - 1] = '\0';
+ apr_table_setn(r->notes, "error-notes",
+- apr_pstrcat(r->pool,
++ apr_psprintf(r->pool,
+ "Size of a request header field "
+ "exceeds server limit.<br />\n"
+- "<pre>\n",
+- ap_escape_html(r->pool, field),
+- "</pre>\n", NULL));
++ "<pre>\n%.*s\n</pre>/n",
++ field_name_len(field),
++ ap_escape_html(r->pool, field)));
++ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r,
++ "Request header exceeds LimitRequestFieldSize: "
++ "%.*s", field_name_len(field), field);
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+@@ -735,13 +767,17 @@
+ * overflow (last_field) as the field with the problem
+ */
+ apr_table_setn(r->notes, "error-notes",
+- apr_pstrcat(r->pool,
++ apr_psprintf(r->pool,
+ "Size of a request header field "
+ "after folding "
+ "exceeds server limit.<br />\n"
+- "<pre>\n",
+- ap_escape_html(r->pool, last_field),
+- "</pre>\n", NULL));
++ "<pre>\n%.*s\n</pre>\n",
++ field_name_len(last_field),
++ ap_escape_html(r->pool, last_field)));
++ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r,
++ "Request header exceeds LimitRequestFieldSize "
++ "after folding: %.*s",
++ field_name_len(last_field), last_field);
+ return;
+ }
+
+@@ -773,13 +809,18 @@
+ if (!(value = strchr(last_field, ':'))) { /* Find ':' or */
+ r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST; /* abort bad request */
+ apr_table_setn(r->notes, "error-notes",
+- apr_pstrcat(r->pool,
++ apr_psprintf(r->pool,
+ "Request header field is "
+ "missing ':' separator.<br />\n"
+- "<pre>\n",
++ "<pre>\n%.*s</pre>\n",
++ (int)LOG_NAME_MAX_LEN,
+ ap_escape_html(r->pool,
+- last_field),
+- "</pre>\n", NULL));
++ last_field)));
++ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r,
++ "Request header field is missing ':' "
++ "separator: %.*s", (int)LOG_NAME_MAX_LEN,
++ last_field);
++
+ return;
+ }
+