diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | security/openssl/Makefile | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/openssl/distinfo | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/openssl/patches/patch-ag | 101 |
3 files changed, 105 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/security/openssl/Makefile b/security/openssl/Makefile index 9e53d5c7b3c..9a3eb706ccd 100644 --- a/security/openssl/Makefile +++ b/security/openssl/Makefile @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ -# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.65 2003/01/28 22:04:07 jlam Exp $ +# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.66 2003/02/20 07:59:24 wiz Exp $ DISTNAME= openssl-0.9.6g +PKGREVISION= 1 SVR4_PKGNAME= ossl CATEGORIES= security MASTER_SITES= ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/ diff --git a/security/openssl/distinfo b/security/openssl/distinfo index 363dd38cd53..a4e2a93950c 100644 --- a/security/openssl/distinfo +++ b/security/openssl/distinfo @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.15 2002/12/03 14:02:24 grant Exp $ +$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.16 2003/02/20 07:59:25 wiz Exp $ SHA1 (openssl-0.9.6g.tar.gz) = 5b3cdad1d33134c97f659a8ad5dbf4ca4cf3d9c8 Size (openssl-0.9.6g.tar.gz) = 2170570 bytes @@ -10,3 +10,4 @@ SHA1 (patch-ac) = 9d53250cf7267461d57edc26573bcd822cd945db SHA1 (patch-ad) = ee8283d5537edce1bb60470c616ebabfda0aa084 SHA1 (patch-ae) = f4bf6ae5aa41b55d9978376e4e50ee10c10dd288 SHA1 (patch-af) = fd470396c5f54ea2d333df44504c03e7c6c8dc96 +SHA1 (patch-ag) = d470c7da2cff7ba37ac38d6ceb79751a7d21d432 diff --git a/security/openssl/patches/patch-ag b/security/openssl/patches/patch-ag new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..3b5fda10917 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/openssl/patches/patch-ag @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +$NetBSD: patch-ag,v 1.8 2003/02/20 07:59:26 wiz Exp $ + +--- ssl/s3_pkt.c.orig Fri May 10 01:07:45 2002 ++++ ssl/s3_pkt.c +@@ -238,6 +238,8 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) + unsigned int mac_size; + int clear=0; + size_t extra; ++ int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0; ++ unsigned char *mac = NULL; + + rr= &(s->s3->rrec); + sess=s->session; +@@ -353,8 +355,11 @@ again: + /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */ + goto err; + +- /* otherwise enc_err == -1 */ +- goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac; ++ /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding ++ * (rec->length has not been changed in this case). ++ * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform ++ * the MAC computation anyway. */ ++ decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; + } + + #ifdef TLS_DEBUG +@@ -380,28 +385,46 @@ printf("\n"); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto f_err; + #else +- goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac; ++ decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; + #endif + } + /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */ +- if (rr->length < mac_size) ++ if (rr->length >= mac_size) + { ++ rr->length -= mac_size; ++ mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */ + #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */ + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + #else +- goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac; ++ decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; ++ rr->length = 0; + #endif + } +- rr->length-=mac_size; + i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0); +- if (memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0) ++ if (mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) + { +- goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac; ++ decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; + } + } + ++ if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac) ++ { ++ /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, ++ * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption ++ * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, ++ * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this ++ * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */ ++ al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; ++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); ++ goto f_err; ++ } ++ + /* r->length is now just compressed */ + if (s->expand != NULL) + { +@@ -443,19 +466,12 @@ printf("\n"); + + return(1); + +-decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac: +- /* Separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, +- * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption +- * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, +- * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this +- * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via logfile) */ +- al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; +- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); + err: + return(ret); + } ++const char *CAN_2003_0078_patch_ID="CAN-2003-0078 patch 2003-02-19"; + + static int do_uncompress(SSL *ssl) + { |