diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/openssl/patches/patch-ag')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/openssl/patches/patch-ag | 101 |
1 files changed, 101 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/openssl/patches/patch-ag b/security/openssl/patches/patch-ag new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..3b5fda10917 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/openssl/patches/patch-ag @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +$NetBSD: patch-ag,v 1.8 2003/02/20 07:59:26 wiz Exp $ + +--- ssl/s3_pkt.c.orig Fri May 10 01:07:45 2002 ++++ ssl/s3_pkt.c +@@ -238,6 +238,8 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) + unsigned int mac_size; + int clear=0; + size_t extra; ++ int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0; ++ unsigned char *mac = NULL; + + rr= &(s->s3->rrec); + sess=s->session; +@@ -353,8 +355,11 @@ again: + /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */ + goto err; + +- /* otherwise enc_err == -1 */ +- goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac; ++ /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding ++ * (rec->length has not been changed in this case). ++ * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform ++ * the MAC computation anyway. */ ++ decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; + } + + #ifdef TLS_DEBUG +@@ -380,28 +385,46 @@ printf("\n"); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto f_err; + #else +- goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac; ++ decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; + #endif + } + /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */ +- if (rr->length < mac_size) ++ if (rr->length >= mac_size) + { ++ rr->length -= mac_size; ++ mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */ + #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */ + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + #else +- goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac; ++ decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; ++ rr->length = 0; + #endif + } +- rr->length-=mac_size; + i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0); +- if (memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0) ++ if (mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) + { +- goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac; ++ decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1; + } + } + ++ if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac) ++ { ++ /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, ++ * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption ++ * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, ++ * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this ++ * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */ ++ al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; ++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); ++ goto f_err; ++ } ++ + /* r->length is now just compressed */ + if (s->expand != NULL) + { +@@ -443,19 +466,12 @@ printf("\n"); + + return(1); + +-decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac: +- /* Separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, +- * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption +- * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, +- * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this +- * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via logfile) */ +- al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; +- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); + err: + return(ret); + } ++const char *CAN_2003_0078_patch_ID="CAN-2003-0078 patch 2003-02-19"; + + static int do_uncompress(SSL *ssl) + { |